The Boeing Company

National Labor Relations Board - Administrative Judge Opinions

Jul 14, 2015

19-CA-128941 (N.L.R.B. Jul. 14, 2015)

JD(SF)–26–15
Puget Sound, WA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DIVISION OF JUDGES – SAN FRANCISCO BRANCH OFFICE
THE BOEING COMPANY
And Case 19-CA-128941
SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERING
EMPLOYEES IN AEROSPACE, affiliated with
INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF
PROFESSIONAL & TECHNICAL ENGINEERS,
LOCAL 2001
Patrick E. Berzai, Esq.,
for the General Counsel.
Richard B. Hankins, Esq., Alston D. Correll, and Brennan W. Bolt, Esq. (McGuire Woods
LLP),
for the Respondent.
Thomas B. Buescher, Esq. (Buescher, Kelman, Perera & Turner P.C.),
for the Charging Party.
DECISION
Dickie Montemayor, Administrative Law Judge. This case was tried before me on January
27, 2015, in Seattle, Washington. The case involves an allegation that Boeing (the Respondent)
failed to provide the Society of Professional Engineering Employees in Aerospace, affiliated
with International Federation of Professional & Technical Engineers, Local 2001 (the Union)
certain information requested by the union. The Respondent, for its part, denied that it had any
obligation under the Act to provide the requested information. I find that Respondent violated the
Act essentially as alleged.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The complaint alleged that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by
failing to provide the Union certain relevant requested information. Respondent filed a timely
answer to the complaint denying all violations of the Act. Counsel for the General Counsel, the
Union, and the Respondent filed briefs in support of their positions on March 3, 2015. On the
entire record, I make the following findings, conclusions of law, and recommendations.
JD(SF)–26–15
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FINDINGS OF FACT
I. Jurisdiction
The complaint alleges, Respondent admits, and I find that at all material times, 5
Respondent has been a State of Delaware Corporation with its headquarters in Chicago, Illinois,
that manufactures and produces military and commercial aircraft at various facilities throughout
the United States, including Everett, Washington, and others in the Seattle, Washington
metropolitan area.
10
The complaint further alleges, Respondent admits, and I find that at all material times
Respondent, in conducting these operations, derived gross revenues in excess of $500,000 and
purchased and received at its corporate headquarters products, goods, and materials valued in
excess of $50,000 directly from points located outside the State of Washington.
15
The complaint alleges, Respondent admits, and I find that Respondent is and has been an
employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act, and
further, the Union, is, and has been a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act.
20
Based on the foregoing, I find that this dispute affects commerce and that the Board has
jurisdiction of this case, pursuant to Section 10(a) of the Act.
II. Labor Organization
25
The complaint alleges, Respondent admits, and I find that at all times material
herein, the Union has been a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III.The Alleged Unfair Labor Practices.
30
Background
The Respondent is an aerospace company that employs approximately 150,000
employees 80,000 of which are located in Puget Sound, Washington. (Tr. 95.) Respondent is
divided into four major groups: (1) Boeing Commercial Airplanes (“BCA”); (2) Boeing Defense 35
and Space Group (“BDS”); (3) Engineering Operations and Technology (“EO&T”); and (4)
Shared Services Group (“SSG”). (Tr. 95, 127.).
i. The Professional and Technical Bargaining Units
40
The Respondent has recognized the Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining
representative of the “Professional” and “Technical” bargaining unit employees. The
“Professional” unit consists of fully degreed engineers who perform engineering work and the
“Technical” unit is comprised of employees with a variety of degrees performing hands on work
on the airplanes. (Tr. 95, 96 GC Exh. 2 art. 1, GC Exh. 3 art. 1).45
JD(SF)–26–15
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ii. Joint Stipulation of Facts
Prior to the commencement of the trial, the Charging Party and Respondent
stipulated to the following facts:
5
1. Since at least 1990, Boeing has unilaterally decided and implemented
decisions to relocate, realign, and move work performed by SPEEA-represented employees
in the Puget Sound to be performed by other Boeing employees and/or non-Boeing
employees.
10
2. · Since 2013, Boeing unilaterally decided and did relocate, realign, or move
work performed by SPEEA-represented employees in the Puget Sound to be performed by
other Boeing employees including, but not limited to, the following instances:
a. 2013:15
i. Establishment of Boeing Commercial Airplanes ("BCA")
engineering design center;
ii. 3-D Modeling work affecting approximately 7 SPEEA-represented 20
employees in the Puget Sound;
iii. BCA Commercial Aviation Services ("CAS") Fleet Services
modifications and freighter conversions work affecting approximately
300-400 SPEEA-represented employees in the Puget Sound;25
iv. BCA CAS Out-of-Production Airplane Support affecting
approximately 300 SPEEA represented employees in the Puget Sound;
v. Product Development advanced concepts work affecting 30
approximately 60 SPEEA-represented employees in the Puget Sound;
vi. 787 sustaining aft body structures and systems installation design work
affecting approximately 10 SPEEA-represented employees in the Puget Sound;
35
vii. APU engineering work affecting approximately 13 SPEEA-
represented employees in the Puget Sound;
viii. Propulsion Integration Center work affecting approximately 5-l 0
SPEEA-represented employees in the Puget Sound.40
b. 2014:
i. 787-10 non-recurring aft body structures and systems installation
work affecting approximately 20 SPEEA-represented employees in45
the Puget Sound;
JD(SF)–26–15
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ii. 787 sustaining mid body structures and systems installation work affecting
approximately 5 SPEEA-represented employees in the Puget Sound;
iii. Concept Center Alignment for Engineering Design Centers affecting 5
approximately 30 to 40 SPEEA-represented employees in the Puget Sound;
iv. Boeing Research & Technology work affecting approximately
1,000 SPEEA-represented employees in the Puget Sound;
10
v. CAS Customer Support work affecting approximately 1,000
SPEEA-represented employees in the Puget Sound;
vi. CAS media services support work affecting approximately 25
SPEEA-represented employees in the Puget Sound;15
vii. Global Services and Support work affecting approximately 1,000
SPEEA-represented employees in the Puget Sound; and
viii. 737 MAX Fan Cowl work affecting approximately 20 SPEEA-20
represented employees in the Puget Sound.
3. SPEEA never made any demand or request to bargain over the decisions
concerning these relocations, realignments, and movements of work identified in paragraph
2 of this joint stipulation.25
4. Since at least 1990, SPEEA has never filed an unfair labor practice charge
with the National Labor Relations Board alleging that Boeing decided to relocate, realign,
or move work performed by SPEEA-represented employees without first providing
SPEEA with notice and an opportunity to bargain over the decision.30
5. Since at least 1990, SPEEA has never filed an unfair labor practice charge
with the National Labor Relations Board alleging that Boeing violated Section 8(a)(5) of
the National Labor Relations Act by unilaterally relocating, realigning, or moving work
performed by SPEEA-represented employees.35
6. Since at least 1990, SPEEA has never brought any grievance or demanded
arbitration pursuant to its collective- bargaining agreements with Boeing alleging that Boeing
breached those collective- bargaining agreements by unilaterally relocating, realigning, or
moving work performed by SPEEA-represented employees.40
IV. The Information Requests at Issue in This Case
Boeing and SPEEA are currently signatories to a collective-bargaining agreement (CBA)
which contains as an addendum a letter of understanding (LOU 6) which established a joint 45
JD(SF)–26–15
5
workforce committee (JWC) in which both parties agreed to participate. The purpose of the
committee is to:
discuss and provide relevant, necessary information on a variety of workforce
related subjects, such as skills management, the Performance Management5
process, employment forecast, current and future business and its influence on
staffing strategies, the job posting and transfer process, workforce education, and
new skills development training related to future skills and competencies. (Tr.
122; GC Exh. 2 p. 58; GC Exh. 3, p. 60.).
10
The JWC meetings are held monthly and representatives from both Boeing and SPEEA
attend. Boeing uses these meeting to communicate with SPEEA regarding the relocation of
bargaining work and the potential impact on the bargaining units. (Tr. 25, 26, 122, 124.) During
these meetings, which often take the form of power point slide presentations, SPEAA is afforded
the opportunity to ask questions about work that is being moved. (Tr. 153.)15
The background facts pertinent to this case begin in June of 2013, where at a JWC
meeting Boeing informed SPEAA of its decision to relocate 1000 bargaining unit jobs from the
Puget Sound area to Long Beach, California. (Tr. 26.) Thereafter, at the December 2013, JWC
meeting, Boeing announced its decision to implement a Boeing research and technology (BR&T) 20
study. The results of the study would be the relocation of bargaining unit work to multiple
locations across the United States, creating fewer opportunities for SPEEA represented
employees including the potential for layoffs. (Tr. 27–28). At the January 2014 JWC meeting,
SPEAA was updated and provided an estimate of the expected reductions in BR&T pursuant to
the plan initially laid out in the December meeting. (Tr. 36–37). At the February 2014 JWC 25
meeting, Boeing provided another update of its plans regarding the BR&T relocation and also
announced the potential relocation of work relating to commercial aviation services (CAS). (Tr.
147.) The discussion surrounding CAS involved the movement of work from Puget Sound to
Southern California. (Tr. 147.) At this meeting, SPEEA officials asked if Boeing was planning
on making any other announcements regarding the relocation of work similar to that made in 30
December. (Tr. 39.) Todd Zarfos, the vice president for engineering for the Washington State
Design Center and senior chief engineer for systems for Boeing Commercial Airplanes
responded directly that they would continue to see these types of studies and movement
impacting the Puget Sound work force. On March 27, 2014, Richard Plunkett, SPEEAA’s
director of strategic development sent Yvonne Marx, Boeing’s employee relations specialist, an 35
information request. The request was written by Sean Leonard, SPEEA’s contract administrator
but signed by Plunkett and provided in pertinent part as follows:
SPEEA requires information about the possible movement of unit work and/or
work opportunities, in order to fully and fairly represent its members.40
Please provide the following information relating to "relocation" and/or
"realignment" of work currently being performed by SPEEA-represented
employees in the Puget Sound:
45
1. Provide any and all documents related to the Company's plans to "relocate or
"realign" such work, including but not limited to:
JD(SF)–26–15
6
a. Any studies relating to the "relocation" and/or "realignment" of such work.
b. Any documents relating to specific plans for such "relocation" and/or
"realignment" of such work.5
c. Any documents relating to the timeline for implementation of such "relocation"
and/or "realignment."
d. Any documents relating to the acquisition of property, relocation of equipment, 10
and/or any and all other actions taken by the Company to prepare for such
"relocation" and/or "realignment."
e. Any documents relating to meetings that the Company has held, or plans to
hold, with SPEEA-represented employees to discuss such "relocation" and/or 15
"realignment,"
f. Any documents relating to "Operation Dragonridge" and/or any similar or
related Operation.
20
(GC Exh. 6.).
On April 2, 2014, Yvonne Marx responded to the request for information with the
following:
25
I am writing in response to your request for information dated March 27,
2014 in which you request extensive information regarding the possible
future relocation of SPEEA-represented work. We are struck by the breadth
and scope of the request and struggling to understand the basis upon30
which the Union believes it is entitled to the requested data.
As a preliminary matter, we take issue with your characterization of the
Company's statements. The Company did not make a blanket statement
that work will continue to be moved out of the Puget Sound as your35
request suggests. As you know, the Company maintains the legal and
contractual right to locate engineering work in any location, and is
continually evaluating the most effective ways to utilize its workforce,
including options for the placement of work. Studies undertaken to
evaluate the viability of a work location are highly confidential and often40
speculative business planning exercises, many of which never progress
further than mere exploration.
The Union predicates its data request on nothing more than a
mischaracterization of the Company's position during an unspecified45
Joint Workforce Committee meeting, and the bald assertion that "SPEEA
JD(SF)–26–15
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requires information about the possible movement of unit work and/or
work opportunities, in order to fully and fairly represent its members."
There is nothing within existing law or the parties' contract that requires
the Company to provide the union with information regarding such
studies -certainly not based on such thinly supported alleged relevance.5
We are also at a loss for why you feel the existing process does not
provide you with adequate information regarding work movement
initiatives. The parties have a longstanding practice of utilizing the Joint
Workforce Committee to share information regarding work movement.10
I n those meetings, the union is provided with information relating to
those studies that have advanced beyond mere exploration and that are
likely to have an actual impact on SPEEA members.
These studies are typically shared months in advance, giving SPEEA15
more than ample time and data to sufficiently represent its employees'
interests. There are Joint Workforce Committee meetings scheduled for
both the 1 0 t h and 24 th of this month, and we would be happy to
discuss any specific questions you have regarding the studies that have
been announced at either of those sessions.20
In the meantime, if there are specific provisions of the CBA that you believe the
administration of which requires the requested data, please identify those
provisions and we will evaluate what information could be provided to help
facilitate your request.25
Notwithstanding the above, the Company will provide documents relating to
meetings i t has held with SPEEA-represented employees regarding the
relocation of SPEEA-covered work. If there are specific meetings that you
believe have occurred for which you would like information, please identify them30
specifically to help facilitate a prompt response.
(GC Exh. 7.)
What is evident from reading the response of Ms. Marx is that it contradicts the 35
testimony of Todd Zarfos. Although in her response she asserts, “the company did not make a
blanket statement that work will continue to be moved out,” Zarfos’s testimony as set forth
above suggests otherwise. (Tr. 30, 148.) Marx also asserts that the Union predicated its data
request on “nothing more than a mischaracterization of the company’s position during an
unspecified Joint Workforce Committee meeting.” (GC Exh. 7.) Zarfos’s testimony also 40
undermines the notion that SPEEA “mischaracterized” the company’s position. (Tr. 30, 148.)
On April 11, 2014, SPEEA responded to Marx’s letter as follows:
We don't believe we have mischaracterized the Company's statements at the Joint45
Workforce meeting concerning the movement of work. We don't have a court
JD(SF)–26–15
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reporter attend those meetings, but essentially this is what happened: At the Joint
Workforce Committee meeting on February 27, the Company was asked if more
movement of SPEEA work was coming similar to what is happening in BR&T.
Todd Zarfos responded quite clearly that there was going to be more relocation of
SPEEA work, specifically in CAS.5
In any event, we don't need to get into a debate about what was said at
the Joint Workforce meeting. The information about potential
relocation of SPEEA work or work opportunities is presumptively
relevant information which the Union is entitled to upon request.10
Indeed, the fact that the Company is now disputing what was verbally
said at the February 27 Workforce meeting about this subject
underscores our need for actual documents.
As stated in the request, SPEEA requires information about the potential15
transfer and movement of work currently performed by SPEEA-
represented employees in order to fully and fairly represent its members.
Although this information is presumptively relevant under the National
Labor Relations Act, I can elaborate. Receiving information about
planned work transfers (actual documents, provided sooner than 1520
minutes before the announcement is given to employees) will help
SPEEA evaluate potential decisional and effects bargaining over the
transfers. Additionally, it will help SPEEA assist its members in planning
for potential layoff or other impacts to their careers.
25
Your April 2nd letter stated that you were refusing to provide information about
studies on the grounds that these are '"often speculative business planning
exercises, many of which never progress further than mere exploration." This is
unacceptable, for as you know, six business days after the date of your (April2)
letter, the Company announced at the April 10 Joint Workforce meeting it had30
completed a study and decided to move 1,000 SPEEA-represented C A S jobs to
Southern California. Subsequently, a carefully drafted announcement was
disseminated to employees within 15 minutes of the announcement in the
Workforce meeting, strongly suggesting that the "study" had been completed
well before its disclosure to SPEEA. The company refused to explain when the35
''study'' had been completed.
Although we appreciate that the Joint Workforce committee is available to
discuss certain issues regarding the SPEEA-represented workforce at
Boeing, this forum is no substitute for receiving documents and40
information under the National Labor Relations Act. The existence of the
Joint Workforce committee is not a waiver of the Union's right to
information.
Please provide the information requested by the Union right away. The45
Boeing Company's refusal to provide the information is an unfair labor
JD(SF)–26–15
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practice., and if continued S P E E A A is prepared to file charges with the
National Labor Relations Board.
(GC Exh. 8.)
5
On April 30, 2014, Marx responded to the April 11, 2014 letter as follows:
It is clear we maintain a fundamentally different view of our
obligations. The Union bases its request on an alleged entitlement to
instantaneous notification of any decision the Company makes that10
could potentially impact SPEEA members. The Company is under no
such obligation. While we certainly strive to provide the union with
reasonable notice of such decisions, there is no legal or contractual
basis supporting any particular duration of advance notice. Apart
from dissatisfaction with the length of advance notice of the15
Company's decisions, the only substantive basis alleged for the need
for this information is to facilitate possible decision and effects
bargaining. The parties' contract provides explicitly that "the
location, occurrence and existence·of any condition necessitating a
workforce reduction, and the number of employees involved, will be20
determined exclusively by the Company." We see no decision
bargaining obligations.
As to effects bargaining, there is nothing within the effects bargaining
context that would require the Company to provide the union with any25
specific duration of notice of its decision to exercise its rights. We
note that there is no pending request for effects bargaining, but we
remain more than willing to engage in such discussions and to
provide information reasonably necessary to effectuate them.
30
Notwithstanding the above, the Company will provide documents
relating to meetings it has held with SPEEA-represented employees
regarding the relocation of SPEEA-covered work. If there are
specific meetings that you believe have occurred for which you
would like information, please identify them specifically to help35
facilitate a prompt response.
(GC Exh. 9.)
Boeing refused to acknowledge that it had any obligation to provide the requested 40
information and did not provide information responsive to the Union’s request. The only
information provided was the information conveyed at the Joint Work Force Committee
meetings.
JD(SF)–26–15
10
A. The Duty to Provide Information
I f an employer fails to provide the union with requested information that is 5
relevant to the union's proper performance of its collective-bargaining obligations it violates
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. Leland Stanford Junior University & Service
Employees Local No. 715, SEIU, 262 NLRB 136, 138 (1982) (citing Detroit Edison Co. v.
NLRB, 440 U.S. 301, 303 (1979)). An employer is obligated under the Act to provide
requested information that is relevant to the union’s responsibilities regarding both 10
administration and enforcement of an existing collective-bargaining agreement. NLRB v.
Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 152–153 (1956).
The relevance of any request is ascertained by analyzing the information request against a
liberal "discovery" standard of relevance as distinguished from the standard of relevance in trial
proceedings. NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co., 385 U.S. 432 f n . 6 (1967). The discovery 15
standard for relevance is construed “broadly to encompass any matter that bears on or that
reasonably could lead to other matter[s] that could bear on, any issue…” Oppenheimer Fund,
Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978), Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 51 (1947).
The information doesn’t have to be dispositive of the issues between the parties; it
o n l y h a s t o have some bearing on it. Thus, an employer must furnish information that20
is of even probable or potential relevance to the union's duties. Pfizer Inc., 268 NLRB 916
(1984); Conrock Co., 263 NLRB 1293, 1294 (1982).
B. Relevance
25
a) The Information Request Was Presumptively Relevant
The evidence of record establishes, and I find, that the information requested by the union
was presumptively relevant. More specifically, I find that the information request set forth
herein dated March 27, 2014, was presumptively relevant because each separate item within the
request, on its face, sought information regarding the movement, relocation or realignment of 30
work. Section 1a sought “studies” regarding the movement of work. Section 1b sought
documents relating to the movement of work. Section 1c sought information regarding the time
line for the movement of work. Section 1d sought information regarding the acquisition of
property related to the movement of work. Section 1e sought information regarding information
regarding meetings held that related to the movement of work. Section 1f sought information 35
regarding “Operation Dragonridge,” a code name for a study related to the movement of work.
It is well settled that information concerning wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment for unit employees is presumptively relevant to the union's role as exclusive
collective-bargaining representative. See Southern California Gas Co., 344 NLRB 231, 235
(2005). The Board has repeatedly held that the relocation of work directly impacts the terms and 40
conditions of employment of affected employees and information including studies regarding
such is presumptively relevant. See Galicks, Inc., 354 NLRB 295, 310 (2009), enfd. NLRB v.
Galicks, Inc., 671 F.3d 602 (6th Cir. 2012); North Star Steel, 3 4 7 N L R B 1 3 6 4 ( 2 0 0 6 ) ;
E.I. du Pont Nemours & Co., 346 NLRB 553, 578 (2006); Litton Microwave Cooking Products
Div., 283 NLRB 973, 974–975 (1989); Whitehead Bros. Co., 263 NLRB 895, 900 (1982);45
Safeway Stores, 252 NLRB 682, 685–686 (1980).
JD(SF)–26–15
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C. Respondent’s Contentions
The Respondent contended that it had no duty to provide the information to the union 5
regarding “possible” movement of work for which it had made no decision. (R. Br. at 21.) I am
not persuaded by Respondent’s argument. Although in other contexts Respondent’s argument
might be persuasive, under the facts of this case, Respondent’s argument does not carry the day.
Respondent argues that employers have no obligation to disclose to a union “every thought or
possibility” discussed by management concerning potential decisions that might impact the terms 10
and conditions of the bargaining unit (citing Valley Mould & Iron Co., 226 NLRB 1211, 1213
(1976)).” (R. Br. at 22.) Respondent’s argument ignores two important undisputed facts, first the
union was directly informed by Zarfos that more movement of work would impact the Puget
Sound area and secondly 8 days after the date of Marx’s April 2, 2014 letter, the Company
announced at the April 10, 2014 JWC meeting that it had completed a study and decided to15
move 1000 jobs to Southern California. Unlike Valley Mould, in this case the employer had
taken “sufficiently concrete” actions to warrant disclosure. It is patently obvious that the actions
surrounding the moving of 1000 jobs were not simply “ideas written on napkins” as Respondent
suggests. (Tr. 111.) It simply was not true (as alleged by Respondent) that the union sought
information about “potential movement of work for which Boeing had not yet made a decision.” 20
As noted above, both the testimony of Zarfos and the actions of Boeing make clear that in fact
Boeing did make decisions. Respondent nevertheless failed to provide the union with any
information. Respondent’s attempt to hide behind the union’s use to the term “possible” to
shield it from producing information about decisions that were concrete and in the process of
being implemented is simply semantic gamesmanship designed to keep the union in the dark 25
about its plans. If Respondent believed the use of the term “possible” was ambiguous it had a
duty to seek clarification. Respondent concedes that “if an employer believes a request is
ambiguous or overbroad it must seek clarification or comply with the request to the extent it
encompasses relevant information.” Superior Protection Inc., 341 NLRB 267, 269 (2004), enfd.
401 F.3d 282 (5th Cir. 2005), cert denied 546 U.S. 874 (2005). 30
a. SPEEA Did Not Waive Its Right To Receive Information and the Information
Request was Neither Overly Broad and\or Unduly Burdensome
35
Despite Zarfos’s vague assertions to the contrary (which I do not credit and are
unsubstantiated by any written documentation in record) there is no credible evidence that
Boeing genuinely sought to clarify the breadth of the SPEEA’s request. (Tr. 172.) Boeing was
in a better position to seek clarification from the union if it was inclined to do so but other than to
ask the union to identify specific relocation meetings it didn’t make any genuine attempt to seek 40
clarification or narrow down the requests. (GC Exhs. 7 and 9.) For example, the record is
devoid of any instance where Boeing asked whether the union wanted only information
regarding decisions or studies that were completed. Instead, Respondent in its response to the
information request denied that it was even seeking to move work in the Puget Sound area. (GC
Exh. 7.) I concur with Charging Party that if Boeing was concerned about the “over breadth of 45
the request or confused over what kind of materials, exactly SPEEA sought, Boeing had the duty
JD(SF)–26–15
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to inquire.” (CP Br. at 9.) There is nothing in the record to suggest, as Respondent asserts, that
“Boeing promptly and repeatedly asked SPEAA to clarify its information requests.” (R. Br. at
29). In view of this fact, Respondent’s arguments of waiver premised upon this failure to clarify
must necessarily fail.
I also find that the information requested was not overly broad. Despite the “wide net” 5
that was cast by SPEEA, it is clear from an objective reading of the requests that each item
requested was tailored around only one specific subject area (the movement of work). Although
SPEEA’s request was aimed at discovering all relevant information related to the movement of
work (a topic which it was under an obligation to inquire about) there is nothing in the record
except vague assertions to establish that the production of the information would have been 10
burdensome. Any claim that documents cannot be produced or are too burdensome to be
produced must be asserted and proven. Vague assertions of burdensomeness are insufficient to
carry the Respondent’s burden. Lenox Hill Hospital & the New York Professional Nurses Union,
362 NLRB No. 16 (2015). Despite Respondent’s duty to provide the information in its
possession, make a reasonable effort to secure any unavailable information, and, if any 15
information remained unavailable, explain and document the reasons for its continued
unavailability, the record is devoid of any evidence to establish that Respondent made any
genuine effort to provide SPEEA with any of the requested information. See Garcia Trucking
Service, 342 NLRB 764 (2004).
20
b. Decisional Bargaining
Respondent asserts that California Pacific Medical Center, 337 NLRB 910 (2002), and
Ingham Medical Center, 342 NLRB 1259 (2004), support its decision to not provide the
requested information. These cases stand for the proposition that a union cannot demonstrate 25
relevance of the information request if the Respondent had no duty to bargain about the
underlying decision. Respondent’s reliance upon these and other similar cases are inapposite
because they fail to address the issues presented in this case and/or are readily distinguishable.
That is to say that Respondent relies upon article 8.2 of the CBA for the proposition that the
employer retained the right to relocate bargaining unit work without first bargaining with the 30
union. Respondent argued that because it had no duty to bargain about the movement of work,
the information sought by SPEEA was irrelevant.
I am not persuaded by this argument because article 8.2 does not clearly establish that
Respondent had no duty to bargain. A close reading of article 8.2 of CBA the reveals that it 35
addresses “workforce reductions” not work relocation. Under the facts presented, the workforce
was not being “reduced,” rather the work was simply being moved to a different location
(presumably to be performed by nonunion personnel who were not members of the bargaining
unit). Accordingly, article 8.2 has questionable applicability because as the union argued, under
Dubuque Packing, 303 NLRB 386 (1991),enfd. 1 F.3d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1993), a duty to engage in 40
decisional bargaining may in fact have arisen. Given the complexities surrounding the Dubuque
Packing analysis whether any duty regarding decisional bargaining had or hadn’t arisen could
only be answered by referencing the very information sought. This information, in essence,
would provide SPEEA with the information necessary for it to determine whether it was or was
not appropriate to demand decisional bargaining. (See CP. Br. at 14.) 45
JD(SF)–26–15
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Upon careful review, it also becomes evident that the cases cited by Respondent do not
address the specific question regarding whether the information sought was necessary for the
union to determine whether to engage in effects bargaining. In her letter of April 30, 2014, Marx
stated, “[w]e note that there is no pending request for effects bargaining, but we remain
more than willing to engage in such discussions and to provide information reasonably5
necessary to effectuate them.” (GC Exh. 9.) Marx misses the point because as pointed
out by the court in Florida Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 601 F.2d 125, 129 (4th Cir. 1979), “the
discovery standard of relevance applies precisely because the union cannot decide what role it
will seek to play until it obtains concrete, adequate information.” Without the requested
information the union is unable to determine what effects bargaining might even be appropriate. 10
Moreover, there is no evidence from which to conclude that SPEEA waived its right to
engage in effects bargaining. Marx concedes that effects bargaining may in fact be appropriate.
Regardless, of whether there is any right to bargain over the movement of work, the CBA
specifically contains terms that might be implicated triggering residual bargaining obligations 15
regarding the movement of work. For example, article 21 contains specific contractual terms
related to layoffs. Clearly, even if for the sake of argument, the union could not engage in
decisional bargaining regarding the movement of work, article 21 gives employees certain rights
related to layoffs which SPEEAA is under a statutory obligation to ensure are adequately
recognized. See Torrington Co. v. NLRB, 545 F.2d 840 (2nd Cir. 1976). Respondent’s 20
assertions simply fail to rebut the presumption of relevance and/or establish lack of relevance of
the information requested by SPEEA. See Certco Distribution Centers, 346 NLRB 1214, 1215
(2006); AK Steel Corp., 324 NLRB 173, 183 (1997).
The Respondent also asserts that article 2 of the CBA and past practices vests 25
Respondent with broad authority to relocate work and thus by implication the union waived its
right to information concerning the relocation of work. The joint stipulation makes clear that
there has been a history of Respondent unilaterally relocating work without SPEEA making any
demand or request to bargain over the decisions. See (Jt. Exh. 1). Nevertheless, the record
contains no showing of “clear and unmistakable waiver.” See Metropolitan Edison Co., v. 30
NLRB, 406 U.S. 708 (1983). Nor do I find that past practices operated to forever waive
SPEEA’s future statutory rights. See E.R. Steubner, 313 NLRB 459 (1993). There is simply no
evidence in the record to support a finding that, “the matter claimed to have been waived was
fully discussed by the parties and that the party alleged to have waived its rights consciously
yielded its interest in the matter.” Allison Corp., 330 NLRB 1363, 1365 (2000).35
c. The Failure to Provide Relevant Information.
The union was entitled to all of the presumptively relevant information referenced above
and I find that Respondent’s refusal and/or failure to provide the information violated the Act. It 40
is undisputed that although Marx in her letters of April 2 and 30, 2014, promised to provide
some information that might have been responsive to some part to the information request, the
promised information was never provided. (GC Exhs. 7, 9, Tr. 54.) “The refusal of an employer
to provide a bargaining agent with information relevant to the union’s task of representing its
constituency is a per se violation of the act without regard to the employer’s subjective good or 45
bad faith.” Piggly Wiggly Midwest, LLC, 357 NLRB 191 (2012), Brooklyn Union Gas Co., 220
JD(SF)–26–15
14
NLRB 189, 191 (1975); Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 237 NLRB 747, 751 (1978), enfd. 603
F.2d 1310 (8th Cir. 1979). Furthermore, an unreasonable delay in furnishing such information is
as much of a violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act as a refusal to furnish the information at all.
Valley Inventory Service, 295 NLRB 1163, 1166 (1989), Woodland Clinic, 331 NLRB 735, 736
(2000). It is undisputed that Respondent failed to provide any of the requested information and 5
in doing so its actions were in direct contravention of the Act.

Conclusions of Law
1. The Respondent, The Boeing Company, is an employer within the meaning of Section 10
2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The Charging Party the Society of Professional Engineering Employees in Aerospace,
affiliated with International Federation of Professional and Technical Engineers, Local
2001 (Union) is a labor organization with the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.15
3. At all material times the Union has been the designated exclusive collective-bargaining
representative of the following bargaining units of Respondent's employees:
a) Professional Unit20
Professional employees, working at Respondent’s facilities in the units
described in Articles 1.1(a), 1.1(b), 1.1(c), 1.1(d) and 1.1(e) of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement for the Professional Bargaining Units.
25
b) Technical Unit
Technical employees, working at Respondent’s facilities in the units
described in Articles 1.1(a), 1.1(b), 1.1(c), of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement for the Technical Bargaining Units.30
4. The Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by failing and refusing to
provide information requested by the Union and relevant to the Union's representational
duties.
5. The unfair labor practices committed by the Respondent affect commerce within the 35
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
Remedy
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I find 40
that it must be ordered to cease and desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
The Respondent shall provide the Union with the information requested in paragraphs 1a-
f, of its March 27, 2014 request for information. 45
JD(SF)–26–15
15
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the
following recommended
Order
5
The Respondent, The Boeing Company, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Failing and/or refusing to provide information requested by the Union 10
that is relevant and necessary to the Union's representational status.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the
Act.
15
(a) In a timely manner, furnish the Union with the information requested
by the Union in paragraphs 1a-f of its March 27, 2014 request for
information.
(b) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its facility in 20
Seattle, Washington, copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix.”28
Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 19, after being signed by the Respondent's authorized
representative shall be posted by the Respondent and maintained for 60
consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places where notices 25
to employees are customarily posted. In addition to the physical posting of
paper notices, notices shall be distributed electronically, such as by email,
posting on an intranet or an internet site, or other electronic means, if the
Respondent customarily communicates with its employees by such means.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondents to ensure that the 30
notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(c) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional
Director a sworn certification of a responsible official on a form provided
by the Region attesting to the steps that the Respondent has taken to 35
comply.1
Dated, Washington, D.C. July 14, 2015 __________________________
Dickie Montemayor40
Administrative Law Judge

1 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of the United States court of appeals, the words in the
notice reading, “posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board Shall read, “Posted
Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National
Labor Relations Board.”
JD(SF)–26–15
APPENDIX
Notice to Employees
Mailed by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to
post, mail, and obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO:
• Form, join, or assist a union
• Choose a representative to bargain with us on your behalf
• Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
• Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities.
WE WILL NOT do anything to prevent you from exercising the above rights.
WE WILL NOT refuse/ and/or fail to provide the Union with requested information that is
relevant and necessary to the performance of its duties as the collective-bargaining
representative of our employees in the units as described in article 1 of the most recent collective-
bargaining professional and technical agreements between the Union and us.
WE WILL provide the Union with the information it requested in its information request of
March 27, 2014.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with your rights under Section 7 of the Act.
THE BOEING COMPANY
(Respondent)
Dated:__________________________By:_______________________________________
(Representative) (Title)
The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency created in 1935 to enforce
the National Labor Relations Act. We conduct secret-ballot elections to determine whether
employees want union representation and we investigate and remedy unfair labor practices by employers
and unions. To find out more about your rights under the Act and how to file a charge or election
petition, you may speak confidentially to any agent with the Board’s Regional Office set forth below
or you may call the Board's toll-free number 1-866-667-NLRB (1-866-667-6572). Hearing impaired
persons may contact the Agency's TTY service at 1-866-315-NLRB. You may also obtain information
from the Board’s website: www.nlrb.gov.
915 2nd Ave., Ste 2948, Seattle, WA 98174-1006
(206) 220-6300 Hours of Operation: 8:15 a.m. to 4:45 p.m.
JD(SF)–26–15
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found at www.nlrb.gov/case/19-CA-128941 or by using the QR code
below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board,
1099 14th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling (202) 273-1940.
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE
THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE DATE OF POSTING AND MUST NOT BE
ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY OTHER MATERIAL. ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS NOTICE OR
COMPLIANCE WITH ITS PROVISIONS MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE ABOVE REGIONAL OFFICE’S
COMPLIANCE OFFICER, (206) 220-6284.