Tharo Varnado Jr., Complainant,v.Anthony J. Principi, Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionApr 5, 2004
07A30101 (E.E.O.C. Apr. 5, 2004)

07A30101

04-05-2004

Tharo Varnado Jr., Complainant, v. Anthony J. Principi, Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency.


Tharo Varnado Jr. v. Department of Veterans Affairs

07A30101

April 5, 2004

.

Tharo Varnado Jr.,

Complainant,

v.

Anthony J. Principi,

Secretary,

Department of Veterans Affairs,

Agency.

Appeal No. 07A30101

Agency No. 2003-1205

Hearing No. 310-A1-5304X

DECISION

Following its May 19, 2003 final order, the agency filed a timely appeal

which the Commission accepts pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405. On appeal,

the agency requests that the Commission affirm its rejection of an EEOC

Administrative Judge's (AJ) finding that the agency discriminated against

complainant on the basis of retaliation with respect to his nonselection

dated June 7, 2001. The agency also requests that the Commission affirm

the AJ's finding that complainant was not discriminated against due to

his race, sex and age in connection with his nonselections dated July

21, 2000, August 10, 2000 and June 7, 2001. For the following reasons,

the Commission REVERSES the agency's final order in part.

Complainant, a Police Officer employed at the agency's VA Hospital in

Temple, Texas (�facility�), filed a formal EEO complaint with the agency

on September 3, 2000, alleging that the agency had discriminated against

him in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title

VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq., and the Age Discrimination

in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 621 et seq., on

the bases of race (African-American), sex (male), age (D.O.B. 3/22/47),

and reprisal for prior EEO activity when: (1) he was not selected for

promotion to the position of Supervisory Police Officer, GS-083-7 on

July 21, 2000; and (2) he was not selected for the position of Police

Officer Trainer on August 10, 2000. Complainant then filed a formal

complaint alleging discrimination on the bases of race and retaliation

when he was not selected for the position of Supervisory Police Officer

(SPO), GS-083-7, on June 7, 2001.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was provided a

copy of the investigative report and requested a hearing before an AJ.

The AJ held hearings on June 19, 2002, October 30, 2002 and November 30,

2002 and issued a bench decision on December 1, 2002.

In her decision, the AJ found that complainant was retaliated against

for prior EEO activity when he was not selected for the SPO position on

June 7, 2001. As a result, the AJ ordered the remedies of: (1) back pay

with interest, from the time of his non-selection for the SPO on June 7,

2001 until the date of his selection to a similar position on January 26,

2003; (2) non-pecuniary compensatory damages in the amount of $5,000.00;

and (3) the posting of a notice in the facility. The AJ found that

the agency did not discriminate against complainant on any basis in

connection with his nonselections dated July 21, 2000 and August 10,

2000, nor did the agency discriminate against complainant on the bases

of race, sex or age regarding the June 7, 2001 non-selection. The AJ

also found that complainant was not entitled to an award of attorney's

fees, due to the finding that complainant's counsel was delinquent in

providing damages information to the AJ. In so finding, the AJ denied

complainant's second untimely motion to extend the time within which to

provide data on compensatory damages.

The agency's final order rejected the AJ's decision in part. The final

order agreed with and accepted the AJ's finding that complainant was

discriminated against due to retaliation regarding his nonselection

dated June 7, 2001. In addition, the final order agreed with the AJ's

decision that complainant was not discriminated against on any basis with

regard to his other claims of discrimination. The final order further

stated that while the agency accepted the remedial relief ordered,

it disagreed with and rejected that part of the AJ's decision which

provided an award of $5,000.00 in compensatory damages. As a result,

the final order stated that the agency would not fully implement the AJ's

decision, but did accept the AJ's remedies of back pay with interest

from June 7, 2001 through January 26, 2003 as well as the placing of a

posting at the facility. The agency subsequently stated that it would

delay payment of the compensatory damages ordered in the AJ's decision

until after the appeal was resolved before the Commission. In support

of its finding, the agency stated that there was no basis upon which to

find that complainant's sleep disorder, headaches, marital acrimony or

other mental health issues such as post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)

were related to his non-selection in June of 2001. Further, the agency

contended that the conditions complainant described were pre-existing

before his non selections. As such, the agency alleged that if the

Commission found the act of discrimination exacerbated complainant's PTSD,

the award of compensatory damages must be decreased proportionately to

represent that share of damages caused by the agency actions.<1>

Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a), all post-hearing factual findings by

an AJ will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence in the record.

Substantial evidence is defined as �such relevant evidence as a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.� Universal

Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951)

(citation omitted). A finding regarding whether or not discriminatory

intent existed is a factual finding. See Pullman-Standard Co. v. Swint,

456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982). An AJ's conclusions of law are subject to a

de novo standard of review, whether or not a hearing was held.

Addressing the merits of complainant's allegations, after a careful

review of the record we discern no basis to disturb the AJ's finding of

discrimination on the basis of retaliation regarding his nonselection for

the SPO position on June 7, 2001. The findings of fact are supported

by substantial evidence, and the AJ correctly applied the appropriate

regulations, policies, and laws. In addition, the Commission concurs

with the AJ's finding that complainant failed to establish that he was

discriminated against on any basis regarding his non selections for the

other positions at issue in 2000 and 2001.

Turning to the AJ's award of non-pecuniary compensatory damages, we

note that when discrimination is found, the agency must provide the

complainant with a remedy that constitutes

full, make-whole relief to restore him as nearly as possible to the

position he would have occupied

absent the discrimination. See, e.g., Franks v. Bowman Transportation

Co., 424 U.S. 747, 764 (1976); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422

U.S. 405, 418-19 (1975); Adesanya v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Appeal

No. 01933395 (July 21, 1994). Pursuant to section 102(a) of the Civil

Rights Act of 1991, a complainant who establishes unlawful intentional

discrimination under either Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

(Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. or Section 501 of

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29

U.S.C. 791 et seq. may receive compensatory damages for past and future

pecuniary losses (i.e., out-of-pocket expenses) and non-pecuniary losses

(e.g., pain and suffering, mental anguish) as part of this "make whole"

relief. 42 U.S.C. � 1981a(b)(3). In West v. Gibson, 119 S.Ct. 1906

(1999), the Supreme Court held that Congress afforded the Commission

the authority to award compensatory damages in the administrative process.

To receive an award of compensatory damages, a complainant must

demonstrate that he has been harmed as a result of the agency's

discriminatory action; the extent, nature, and severity of the harm; and

the duration or expected duration of the harm. Rivera v. Department of

the Navy, EEOC Appeal No. 01934157 (July 22, 1994), req. for recons. den.,

EEOC Request No. 05940927 (December 11, 1995); Enforcement Guidance:

Compensatory and Punitive Damages Available Under Section 102 of the Civil

Rights Act of 1991, EEOC Notice No. 915.002 (July 14, 1992), at 11-12, 14.

Compensatory damages may be awarded for the past pecuniary losses,

future pecuniary losses, and non-pecuniary losses which are directly or

proximately caused by the agency's discriminatory conduct. EEOC Notice

No. 915.002 at 8. Objective evidence of compensatory damages can include

statements from the complainant concerning his or her emotional pain

or suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life,

injury to professional standing, injury to character or reputation, injury

to credit standing, loss of health, and any other nonpecuniary losses that

are incurred as a result of the discriminatory conduct. Statements from

others, including family members, friends, health care providers, other

counselors (including clergy) could address the outward manifestations

or physical consequences of emotional distress, including sleeplessness,

anxiety, stress, depression, marital strain, humiliation, emotional

distress, loss of self-esteem, excessive fatigue, or a nervous breakdown.

See Lawrence v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01952288

(April 18, 1996), citing Carle v. Department of the Navy, EEOC Appeal

No. 01922369 (January 5, 1993).

The agency argues on appeal that prior to its unlawful retaliatory action,

and as early as November of 2000, complainant was seeking therapy for

sleep disorder, headaches, marital disorder and PTSD, and that this fact

mandates a reduction in the AJ's nonpecuniary damages award. We disagree.

The amount of an award for non-pecuniary compensatory damages must also

consider the extent of the agency's liability when the harm caused by its

discriminatory action may be an aggravation of a pre-existing condition.

Where a complainant has a pre-existing emotional condition and that

condition deteriorates as a result of discriminatory conduct, the agency

is liable for all additional harm. Enforcement Guidance at 11.

In considering such cases, the Commission relies on the principle that

"a tortfeasor takes its victims as it finds them." Wallis v. United

States Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 01950510 (Nov. 13, 1995) (citing

Williamson v. Handy Button Machine Co., 817 F.2d 1290, 1295 (7th

Cir. 1987)). There are two exceptions to this general rule, however.

First, when a complainant has a pre-existing condition, the agency

is liable only for the additional harm or aggravation caused by the

discrimination. Enforcement Guidance at 12. Second, if the complainant's

pre-existing condition inevitably would have worsened, the agency is

entitled to a reduction in damages reflecting the extent to which the

condition would have worsened even absent the discrimination. Wallis

v. United States Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 01950510 (Nov. 13, 1995)

(citing Maurer v. United States, 668 F.2d 98, 99-100 (2d Cir. 1981).

The evidence presented by complainant regarding the nature, severity, and

duration of the nonpecuniary harm he suffered as a result of the unlawful

retaliation included his own testimony at the hearing. Complainant

testified that subsequent to the retaliatory non selection, he had medical

problems, including PTSD, stress headaches, problems sleeping and marital

difficulties. The AJ found that while complainant's testimony on these

matters related to an earlier promotion for which discrimination was not

found, this evidence was generally related to complainant's non-selections

in the instant case since it covered essentially the same time period.

However, the AJ noted that other than listing these items of distress,

complainant failed to offer additional evidence of harm.

In the instant case, we concur with the AJ's finding that complainant's

testimony regarding his emotional harm is sufficient to establish his

entitlement to non-pecuniary compensatory damages. While the agency is

correct that complainant sought counseling for his emotional problems

prior to the discriminatory non selection in June of 2001, we find that

complainant's testimony makes clear that any progress he was having by

undergoing counseling was retarded by the discriminatory non selection

at issue. At the hearing on October 30, 2002, complainant stated that

he has PTSD, and had been attending PTSD counseling since filing his

first EEO complaint in 2000. October 30, 2002 Hearing Transcript (HT)

at 72-73. Complainant stated that his stress level has been constantly

increasing since filing his initial EEO complaint. He also stated

that although his PTSD was rated as 70% due to his service in Vietnam

in the 1970s, his level of stress has been increasing since October or

November of 2000. Id. Complainant stated that he had not needed to

get professional help for his PTSD until around the time of his initial

EEO complaints, at which time he had to seek counseling. HT at 75.

He also stated that he did not believe that he would have had to seek

professional help had it not been for the exacerbating stress associated

with the EEO complaints. HT at 76. As such, complainant's testimony

establishes that while his PTSD was clearly a pre-existing condition

and his need for counseling began with the filing of his initial EEO

complaint in 2000, his level of stress increased during the period before

the October 2002 hearing, which included the discriminatory nonselection

at issue in June of 2001. It appears reasonable that had complainant not

been discriminated against by the agency, his PTSD stress level may have

decreased and he may not have needed to continue professional counseling.

Further, some of complainant's other symptoms such as stress headaches

may have ceased had the discriminatory non selection not occurred,

and the agency has proffered no evidence to contradict complainant's

hearing testimony. As we find that complainant's uncontradicted testimony

establishes that his PTSD stress level and related symptoms continued or

increased at least in part due to the discriminatory non selection at

issue, we must consider whether the AJ's award of compensatory damages

was consistent with awards in similar cases.

Court awards for emotional distress or mental anguish which, as here,

did not include major depression have ranged from $500.00 to $100,000.00.

After a thorough review of the record, and given the severity, nature and

duration of distress experienced by complainant, we find that the AJ's

award of $5,000.00 is supported by substantial evidence. Complainant has

not testified that he was unable to work or otherwise function as a result

of PTSD, and he has not stated the need for counseling other than the

PTSD sessions that he described in at the hearing. In concurring with

the AJ's finding regarding compensatory damages, we have considered the

agency's contention that complainant's PTSD and other emotional conditions

existed prior to the act of discrimination. However, as stated above,

we credit complainant's testimony that his stress level increased

during the period he was not selected for the SPO position in June of

2001 and he continued to have stress headaches and trouble sleeping.

We note that non-pecuniary compensatory damages are designed to remedy

a harm and not to punish the agency for its discriminatory actions.

Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 311-12 (1986)

(stating that compensatory damages determination must be based on

the actual harm sustained and not the facts of the underlying case).

We further note that this award is not "monstrously excessive" standing

alone, is not the product of passion or prejudice, and is consistent

with the amount awarded in similar cases, as cited above. Ward- Jenkins

v. Department of the Interior, EEOC Appeal No. 01961483 (March 4, 1999)

(citing Cygnar v. Chicago, 865 F. 2d 827, 848 (7th Cir. 1989)).

Therefore, after a careful review of the record, including arguments

and evidence not specifically discussed in this decision, the Commission

reverses the agency's final order in part and remands the matter to the

agency to take corrective action in accordance with this decision and

the Order below.

ORDER

Within thirty (30) calendar days of the date this decision becomes final,

and to the extent it has not already done so, the agency is ordered to

take the following remedial action:

1. The agency shall determine the appropriate amount of back pay (with

interest, if applicable) and other benefits due complainant, pursuant to

29 C.F.R. � 1614.501. The back pay period shall be calculated from June

7, 2001 through January 26, 2003. Complainant shall cooperate in the

agency's efforts to compute the amount of back pay and benefits due,

and shall provide all relevant information requested by the agency.

If there is a dispute regarding the exact amount of back pay and/or

benefits, the agency shall issue a check to complainant for the

undisputed amount within thirty (30) calendar days of the date the

agency determines the amount it believes to be due. The complainant may

petition for enforcement or clarification of the amount in dispute.

The petition for clarification or enforcement must be filed with the

Compliance Officer, at the address referenced in the statement entitled

"Implementation of the Commission's Decision."

2. The agency shall tender to complainant non-pecuniary compensatory

damages in the amount of $5,000.00.

3. The agency shall post copies of the attached notice in accordance

with the statement entitled

"Posting Order."

The agency is further directed to submit a report of compliance, as

provided in the statement entitled "Implementation of the Commission's

Decision." The report shall include supporting documentation of the

agency's actions in accordance with this order.

POSTING ORDER (G0900)

The agency is ordered to post at its Temple, Texas facility in copies of

the attached notice. Copies of the notice, after being signed by the

agency's duly authorized representative, shall be posted by the agency

within thirty (30) calendar days of the date this decision becomes final,

and shall remain posted for ninety (90) consecutive days, in conspicuous

places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily

posted. The agency shall take reasonable steps to ensure that said

notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. The

original signed notice is to be submitted to the Compliance Officer

at the address cited in the paragraph entitled "Implementation of the

Commission's Decision," within ten (10) calendar days of the expiration

of the posting period.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0501)

Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory. The

agency shall submit its

compliance report within thirty (30) calendar days of the completion of

all ordered corrective action. The report shall be submitted to the

Compliance Officer, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848, Washington, D.C. 20036.

The agency's report must contain supporting documentation, and the

agency must send a copy of all submissions to the complainant. If the

agency does not comply with the Commission's order, the complainant

may petition the Commission for enforcement of the order. 29 C.F.R. �

1614.503(a). The complainant also has the right to file a civil action

to enforce compliance with the Commission's order prior to or following

an administrative petition for enforcement. See 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407,

1614.408, and 29 C.F.R. 1614.503(g). Alternatively, the complainant

has the right to file a civil action on the underlying complaint in

accordance with the paragraph below entitled "Right to File A Civil

Action." 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407 and 1614.408. A civil action for

enforcement or a civil action on the underlying complaint is subject

to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999).

If the complainant files a civil action, the administrative processing of

the complaint, including any petition for enforcement, will be terminated.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.409.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

April 5, 2004

__________________

Date

NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES

POSTED BY ORDER OF THE

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

An Agency of the United States Government

This Notice is posted pursuant to an Order by the United States Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission, dated ___________________, which

found that a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

(Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq., has occurred at the

Department of Veterans Affairs facility in Temple, Texas (hereinafter

the facility).

Federal law requires that there be no discrimination against any

employee or applicant for employment because of the person's RACE,

COLOR, RELIGION, SEX, NATIONAL ORIGIN, AGE or PHYSICAL OR MENTAL

DISABILITY with respect to hiring, firing, promotion, compensation,

or other terms, conditions or privileges of employment.

The facility was found to have violated Title VII when an employee was

not selected for a position due to retaliation for prior EEO activity.

The facility was ordered to: (1) award the employee back pay and

benefits; (2) pay the employee compensatory damages in the amount of

$5,000.00; and (3) post this notice.

The facility will comply with such federal law and will not in any

manner restrain, interfere, coerce, or retaliate against any individual

who exercises his or her right to oppose practices made unlawful by,

or who participates in proceedings pursuant to, federal equal employment

opportunity law.

______________________________

Date Posted: ____________________

Posting Expires: _______________

29 C.F.R. Part 1614

1 The Commission notes that complainant has not challenged the AJ's

finding that attorney's fees would not be awarded in the instant

case due to counsel's delinquency in providing relevant information

regarding damages. We also note that complainant has not challenged

the AJ's findings that he was not discriminated against with regard to

the non selections in July of 2000 and August 2000.