Terry Hightower, Appellant,v.F. Whitten Peters, Acting Secretary, Department of the Air Force, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionMar 12, 1999
01973637 (E.E.O.C. Mar. 12, 1999)

01973637

03-12-1999

Terry Hightower, Appellant, v. F. Whitten Peters, Acting Secretary, Department of the Air Force, Agency.


Terry Hightower v. Department of the Air Force

01973637

March 12, 1999

Terry Hightower, )

Appellant, )

) Appeal No. 01973637

v. ) Agency No. SAC-95-AF-0184-E

) EEOC No. 380-96-8048X

F. Whitten Peters, )

Acting Secretary, )

Department of the Air Force, )

Agency. )

___________________________________)

DECISION

Appellant timely appealed the agency's final decision that it had not

discriminated against him in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq., the Age Discrimination

in Employment Act (ADEA) of 1967, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �621 et seq.,

and �501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �791

et seq. The Commission accepts this appeal in accordance with EEOC

Order No. 960.001.

Appellant, a WG-10 Mason, filed a formal complaint of discrimination in

which he claimed discrimination on the bases of race (African-American),

age (DOB: 6/13/51) and physical disability (carpel tunnel syndrome).

After a careful review of the entire record, including the hearing

transcript and Investigative Report, we find the following accurately

defines the issues in the instant complaint. Specifically, appellant

alleged he was discriminated against on the aforementioned bases when:

(1) as a result of a Reduction in Force (RIF) which occurred in February

1995, he was deprived of upward mobility within his assigned organization;

(2) when, subsequent to the RIF, he was not placed in the position of WG-8

Cement Finisher (Engineering Equipment Operator), but rather was placed

in the WG-8 Motor Vehicle Operator position; and (3) on March 9, 1995, he

was not referred for promotion consideration to an Engineering Equipment

Operator, WS-5716-11 position. The agency accepted the complaint and

conducted an investigation. At the conclusion of the investigation,

appellant requested a hearing before an Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission administrative judge (AJ). A hearing was conducted on

September 9, 1996.

On December 4, 1996, the AJ issued a recommended decision (RD) finding

no discrimination. The AJ concluded that appellant failed to establish a

prima facie case on any bases. Additionally, the AJ found that the agency

had articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions,

for which appellant had failed to prove were pretext for discrimination.

Specifically, On February 28, 1995, appellant was offered, and accepted

the position of WG-8 Motor Vehicle Operator in lieu of separation.

The comparative (Caucasian), who had been working as a WG-10 Engineering

Equipment Operator, was offered the position of WG-8 Cement Finisher

(Engineering Equipment Operator).

In response to appellant's allegations, the EEO/Staffing Specialist

(Specialist) testified that the comparative, not appellant, was offered

the position of Cement Finisher in lieu of separation, because appellant

did not have a Commercial Driver's Licence, whereas the comparative did.

In her RD, the AJ found that prior to the RIF, management had decided to

waive certain qualifications of a job in order to prevent an individual

from being separated from the agency due to the RIF. For instance, in

order for appellant to qualify for the Motor Vehicle Operator position,

the agency, without knowledge as to who would ultimately occupy the

position, waived the requirement of experience with K-loader equipment

because it was a noncritical qualification. The Specialist testified that

she had asked management if the Commercial Driver's License requirement

could be waived, but it could not as it was critical to the position.

Meanwhile, unrelated to the RIF, a competitive merit promotion certificate

was announced for a WS-5716-11 Supervisory Engineering Equipment Operator

position. The comparative was referred, considered, and ultimately

selected on March 9, 1995, for this position. Although appellant produced

little, if any evidence, that he was qualified for this position, the

Specialist testified that appellant was not qualified for the position

because he did not have airfield clearing equipment operator experience,

whereas the comparative did. In sum, the AJ found that appellant failed

to produce sufficient evidence that the agency's reasons for its actions

were pretext for discrimination, and that appellant was not discriminated

against as alleged.

On February 25, 1997, the agency issued a final decision adopting

the AJ's finding of no discrimination. In its decision, the agency

found that appellant had failed to establish a prima facie case, and

that it had artilcuated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its

actions. Furthermore, it found that even if appellant had initially

been placed in the WG-8 Cement Finisher position following the RIF, his

qualifications for the WS-11 Supervisory Engineering Equipment Operator

position would not have been enhanced as he lacked significant airfield

clearing experience. Therefore, the agency denied that appellant had

been denied upward mobility or consideration for the WS-11 position,

rather he failed to meet the qualification standards for the position.

Specifically, appellant did not have sufficient experience with the

operation of airfield clearing equipment.

After a careful review of the record in its entirety, the Commission finds

that the AJ's Recommended Decision accurately analyzed the appropriate

regulations, policies and laws. We further find that the agency's final

decision accurately sets forth the relevant facts, and also analyzed the

appropriate regulations, policies and laws. We find no basis to overturn

the AJ's or agency's decisions. We note appellant has not raised any

contentions on appeal. Accordingly, it is the decision of the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission to AFFIRM the agency's finding of no

discrimination.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0795)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if appellant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available

when the previous decision was issued; or

2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,

regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or

3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial

precedential implications.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST

BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive this

decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive

a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any argument in

opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to reconsider

MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party

WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the request

to reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.407. All requests and arguments

must bear proof of postmark and be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark,

the request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on the date it is received

by the Commission.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances

have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration,

a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the

delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your

request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests

for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited

circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.604(c).

RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0993)

It is the position of the Commission that you have the right to file

a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court WITHIN

NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision.

You should be aware, however, that courts in some jurisdictions have

interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner suggesting that

a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the

date that you receive this decision. To ensure that your civil action

is considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN THIRTY (30)

CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision or to consult

an attorney concerning the applicable time period in the jurisdiction

in which your action would be filed. If you file a civil action,

YOU MUST NAME AS THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE

OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS

OR HER FULL NAME AND OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in

the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the

national organization, and not the local office, facility or department

in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a

civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative

processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

March 12, 1999 ____________________________

DATE Ronnie Blumenthal, Director

Office of Federal Operations