05970506
11-13-1998
Teresa G. Noonan, Appellant, v. Robert E. Rubin, Secretary, Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, Agency.
Teresa G. Noonan v. Department of the Treasury
05970506
November 13, 1998
Teresa G. Noonan, )
Appellant, )
)
v. ) Request No. 05970506
) Appeal No. 01964414
Robert E. Rubin, ) Agency No. TD 94-3140
Secretary, )
Department of the Treasury, )
Internal Revenue Service, )
Agency. )
___________________________________)
DECISION ON REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION
INTRODUCTION
On February 21, 1997, the agency timely initiated a request to the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission to reconsider the decision in Teresa
G. Noonan v. Robert E. Rubin, Secretary, Department of the Treasury -
Internal Revenue Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01964414 (January 15, 1997),
which it received on January 22, 1997. EEOC Regulations provide that
the Commissioners may, in their discretion, reconsider any previous
Commission decision. 29 C.F.R. �1614.407(a). The party requesting
reconsideration must submit written argument or evidence which tends to
establish one or more of the following three criteria: new and material
evidence is available that was not readily available when the previous
decision was issued, 29 C.F.R. �1614.407(c)(1); the previous decision
involved an erroneous interpretation of law, regulation or material fact,
or misapplication of established policy, 29 C.F.R. �1614.407(c)(2);
and the previous decision is of such exceptional nature as to have
substantial precedential implications, 29 C.F.R. �1614.407(c)(3). For
the reasons below, the Commission grants the agency's request.
ISSUE PRESENTED
Whether the agency breached a settlement agreement with appellant.
BACKGROUND
The agency employed appellant as an examiner in its Manhattan district
office, examination branch 2. She filed a complaint in which she
alleged that, in January 1994, her group manager and the branch 2 chief
discriminated against her on the basis of national origin (Columbian) by
not certifying her as ready to hold a managerial position. The parties
entered into a settlement agreement on August 16, 1995, the pertinent
provision of which stated:
The agency agrees that within six months of the execution of this
settlement agreement, [appellant] will be placed on a two-month detail
to an acting managerial position at the agency's Manhattan district
office in either a group within an examination division branch other
than branch 2 or in the training group of examination division branch
2. [Appellant's] performance while on the detail will be valuated at
the end of the detail.
In accordance with this provision of the settlement agreement, appellant
was placed in an acting group manager position within Manhattan district
office examination branch 3. The detail lasted from January 22 to March
22, 1996. On April 11, 1996, she was given feedback by her immediate
supervisor, the branch 3 chief.
By letter dated April 22, 1996, appellant notified the agency that it
had breached the settlement agreement. She alleged that the branch
2 chief, who in June 1994 had been promoted to assistant division
chief, was present at a January 18, 1996 meeting when the branch 3
chief outlined his expectations for her performance in the detail.
Appellant maintained that the presence of the former branch 2 chief at
that January 1996 meeting presented a conflict of interest, since the
former branch 2 chief was named in appellant's complaint. She further
asserted that the unfavorable evaluation she received at the end of the
detail also violated the agreement. The agency issued a final decision
finding that it had not breached the settlement agreement.
The previous decision found that the agency violated the above provision
of the settlement agreement by assigning appellant to a branch under the
former branch 2 chief's line of authority as the assistant division chief.
The previous decision stated that, even though the agreement did not
explicitly provide that appellant would not be assigned to another
branch where the former branch 2 chief might play a supervisory role,
the parties intent in excluding appellant's assignment to branch 2 was
to avoid continuing the same conflict with the former branch 2 chief.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
The previous decision correctly points out that when the provisions
of the settlement agreement are unambiguous, the meaning of those
provisions is derived from the four corners of the document, without
resort to extrinsic evidence. Klein v. Department of Housing and
Urban Development, EEOC Request No. 05940033 (June 30, 1994); Brown
v. Department of Commerce, EEOC Request No. 05921059 (June 24, 1993).
In this case, the settlement provision at issue required the agency to
place appellant into a two-month detail to a managerial position within
6 months of the execution of the agreement, and to evaluate appellant's
performance at the end of the detail. Appellant does not contest that
the agency carried out all of the steps required of it by this provision.
We find that the previous decision erred in finding that the agency
breached the agreement. The former branch 2 chief had managerial
responsibilities which covered the entire examination division. Appellant
was well aware of this since the former branch 2 chief was promoted into
her current position in June 1994, over a year before the settlement
agreement was entered into. Appellant was therefore fully aware
that she would have been within the former branch 2 chief's line of
authority regardless of what branch she was assigned to. Moreover,
although appellant's detail was in a branch within the examination,
the former branch 2 chief was not personally involved in the supervision
of appellant during her acting managerial detail. She was likewise not
involved in providing any feedback to appellant relating to the detail
or in evaluating her performance in the detail. Thus, the conflict
of interest claim which underlies appellant's breach allegation is
unsupported by the record.
Finally, we note that appellant did not raise objections to the former
branch 2 chief's presence at the January orientation meeting before her
detail commenced. Appellant filed her breach allegation only after
she received an unfavorable performance evaluation from the branch
3 chief. Appellant's unhappiness with the outcome of her performance is
insufficient cause to nullify a valid settlement agreement. We therefore
find that the agency fully and properly complied with the settlement
agreement provision at issue.
CONCLUSION
After a review of the agency's request for reconsideration, appellant's
response, the previous decision, and the entire record, the Commission
finds the agency's request meets the criteria of 29 C.F.R. �1614.407(c),
and it is the decision of the Commission to grant the agency's request.
The decision of the Commission in Appeal No. 01964414, finding that
the agency breached the settlement agreement entered into on August 16,
1995, is reversed, and the order set forth in that decision is rescinded.
There is no further right of administrative appeal from a decision of
the Commission on a request for reconsideration.
RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (P0993)
This decision of the Commission is final, and there is no further right of
administrative appeal from the Commission's decision. You have the right
to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court.
It is the position of the Commission that you have the right to file
a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court WITHIN
NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision.
You should be aware, however, that courts in some jurisdictions have
interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner suggesting that
a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the
date that you receive this decision. To ensure that your civil action
is considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN THIRTY (30)
CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision or to consult
an attorney concerning the applicable time period in the jurisdiction
in which your action would be filed. If you file a civil action,
YOU MUST NAME AS THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE
OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS
OR HER FULL NAME AND OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in
the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the
national organization, and not the local office, facility or department
in which you work.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
NOV 13, 1998
_______________ ______________________________
Date Frances M. Hart
Executive Officer
Executive Secretariat