Teradata US, Inc.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Feb 24, 2022

2020005635 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 24, 2022)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 15/386,053 12/21/2016 Douglas P. Brown 15-1022 9600 26890 7590 02/24/2022 Randy Campbell TERADATA US, INC. P.O. Box 190 Englewood, OH 45322 EXAMINER LE, HUNG D ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2161 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 02/24/2022 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): michelle.boldman@teradata.com randy.campbell@teradata.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ________________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ________________ Ex parte DOUGLAS P. BROWN, THOMAS JULIEN, and FRANK RODERIC VANDERVORT ________________ Appeal 2020-005635 Application 15/386,053 Technology Center 2100 ________________ Before CARL W. WHITEHEAD JR., JASON V. MORGAN, and JAMES B. ARPIN, Administrative Patent Judges. MORGAN, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1-18. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. 1 “Appellant” refers to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies Teradata US, Inc., as the real party in interest. Appeal Br. 2. Appeal 2020-005635 Application 15/386,053 2 SUMMARY OF THE DISCLOSURE Appellant’s claimed subject matter relates to “dynamic in-flight [or in-process] database request throttling” that “includes monitoring a database or multi-database system Workload Definition (WD) to identify queuing of a higher priority request while the database system is processing requests of a lower priority.” Spec., Abstr.; see id. ¶ 36. REFERENCES The Examiner relies on the following references (only the first named inventor of each reference is listed): Name Reference Date Brown ’570 US 2007/0271570 A1 Nov. 22, 2007 Richards US 2010/0153958 A1 June 17, 2010 Brown ’001 US 2014/0108001 A1 Apr. 17, 2014 REJECTIONS The Examiner rejects claims 1-18 as follows: Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Citation 1-5, 7-11, 13-17 103 Richards, Brown ’570 Final Act. 4-8 6, 12, 18 103 Richards, Brown ’570, Brown ’001 Final Act. 9-10 ANALYSIS Representative claim 1 is reproduced below (disputed limitations emphasized and bracketed numeral added). 1. A method comprising: monitoring, by a database management system, at least one database system Workload Definition (WD) to identify queuing of a higher priority request while the at least one database system is processing requests of a lower priority; Appeal 2020-005635 Application 15/386,053 3 [1] when queueing of a higher priority request is identified, adjusting, by the database management system, a metric throttle for the WD to a new metric throttle level Cn; evaluating, by the database management system, lower priority in-flight requests for the current workload to identify abort candidate requests to abort; aborting, by the database management system, the identified abort candidate requests. Appeal Br. 11 (Claims App.). In rejecting claim 1, the Examiner finds that Richards’ adjustment of a concurrency throttle (Cn) of a workload teaches or suggests [1] “when queueing of a higher priority request is identified, adjusting, by the database management system, a metric throttle for the WD to a new metric throttle level Cn.” Final Act. 5 (citing Richards ¶¶ 80-81). Appellant contends the Examiner errs because the claimed method “adjusts a throttle when the queuing of a higher priority request is identified[,] not at a specified interval.” Appeal Br. 9. The Examiner, however, finds that “Richards teaches a metric throttle which acts on prioritized allocation groups (AG) and for which the metric throttle need not be enforced.” Ans. 13 (citing Richards ¶ 38). Appellant responds by emphasizing “[t]he routine for conditional resource throttle evaluation and adjustment illustrated in Figure 9 of Richards and described in paragraphs [0075] through [0081] is invoked upon expiration of an event interval (EI), as stated in paragraph [0076].” Reply Br. 3. Claim 1, as originally filed, recited, “when queuing of a higher priority request is identified, adjusting a metric throttle for the WD to a new metric throttle level Cn,” which is similar to recitation [1] as currently amended. But Appellant does not identify any disclosure in the Specification Appeal 2020-005635 Application 15/386,053 4 that illustrates what it means to perform such an adjustment “when queuing of a higher priority request is identified.” Instead, Appellant points to Figure 3 and paragraph 31. Appeal Br. 3. But these disclosures are silent as to what triggers the analysis that leads to adjustment of a metric throttle. A different disclosure in the Specification describes the use of a Traffic Cop event interval (e.g., “every 60, 600, 3600 seconds, etc.”) as the basis for “performing . . . [an] analysis and concurrency throttle adjustment,” including “[a]djust[ing] the WD’s concurrency throttle . . . Cn = AVG(Cc, Cr).” Spec. ¶ 32. Moreover, claim 1 does not include limitations that preclude also adjusting the metric throttle adjustments at times when queuing of a higher priority request has not been identified. Thus, the broadest reasonable interpretation for adjusting a metric throttle adjustment “when queuing of a higher priority request is identified” does not require that the identification of a higher priority request trigger the metric analysis that leads to a metric throttle adjustment. Rather, such adjustment, given the broadest reasonable interpretation of the disputed limitations, may take place at intervals, as disclosed in both the Specification and in Richards. Id.; Richards ¶ 76. Furthermore, as the Examiner correctly finds, Richards teaches that throttling may not be enforced against high-priority work. Richards ¶ 38 (cited at Ans. 13). Richards notes that “medium to low priority work may [still] be subject to a CPU resource throttle equivalent to the portion of the database system that the corresponding division is funding or is otherwise allocated.” Id. Thus, when an unthrottled, high-priority request is identified in Richards, resources available for lower priority requests, which are subject to throttling, are more limited. An artisan of ordinary skill would Appeal 2020-005635 Application 15/386,053 5 have recognized that such limiting could reduce the number of queries of the workload definition that could be concurrently processed, thus leading to an adjustment of the concurrency throttle. Richards ¶¶ 80-81. That is, even if the analysis that leads to adjustment of the concurrency throttle takes place at specific intervals, identification of a high-priority request (not subject to throttling) is what is used in the analysis in Richards to adjust the concurrency throttle. Therefore, we agree with the Examiner that Richards teaches or suggests disputed limitation [1]. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of claim 1, and of claims 2-18, which Appellant argues are patentable for similar reasons. Appeal Br. 9-10. DECISION SUMMARY In summary: Claim(s) Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1-5, 7-11, 13-17 103 Richards, Brown ’570 1-5, 7-11, 13-17 6, 12, 18 103 Richards, Brown ’570, Brown ’001 6, 12, 18 Overall Outcome 1-18 TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE No time period for taking subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED