TELEFONAKTIEBOLAGET LM ERICSSON (PUBL)

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Dec 15, 2020

2019005172 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 15, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/453,081 03/08/2017 Ayodele DAMOLA 0111-060-CON-2/
P034952US4
8525
113648 7590 12/15/2020
Patent Portfolio Builders, PLLC
P.O. Box 7999
Fredericksburg, VA 22404-7999
EXAMINER
QIN, ZHIREN
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2411
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/15/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
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PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte AYODELE DAMOLA and LARS WESTBERG
________________

Appeal 2019-005172
Application 15/453,081
Technology Center 2400
____________

Before LINZY T. McCARTNEY, MATTHEW J. McNEILL, and
MICHAEL T. CYGAN, Administrative Patent Judges.

McNEILL, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
rejection of claims 21‒24, 28‒31, and 35‒38. 1 Claims 25‒27, 32‒34, and
39‒41 are also pending, but have not been rejected by the Examiner. See
Ans. 4‒11. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We reverse.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies Lenovo (Singapore) PTE LTD as the
real party in interest. Appeal Br. 3.
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Application 15/453,081

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Introduction
Appellant’s application relates to streaming multimedia content to a
user device, and in particular to saving power in the user device by adjusting
the transmission rate of the multimedia content. Spec. ¶¶ 2‒18. Claim 21 is
illustrative of the appealed subject matter and reads as follows:
21. A method for managing reception of content, the method,
comprising:
receiving, by a user equipment, the content at one of a
first transmission rate and a second transmission rate, wherein
the second transmission rate is lower than the first transmission
rate, wherein the user equipment receives the content at one of
the first and second transmission rates based on an amount of
the content already received by the user equipment exceeding
an amount of the content used by the user equipment, wherein
the user equipment uses less power for second transmission rate
than for the first transmission rate.
The Examiner’s Rejections
Claims 21‒24, 28‒31, and 35‒38 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103
as unpatentable over Hamel (US 2011/0161493 A1; June 30, 2011) and the
Background section of the instant application. See Final Act. 2‒5.
ANALYSIS
The Examiner finds Hamel teaches “wherein the user equipment
receives the content at one of the first and second transmission rates . . .
based on an amount of the content already received . . . by the user
equipment exceeding an amount of the content used by the user equipment.”
See Final Act. 3 (citing Hamel Fig. 11, ¶¶ 121, 123 (emphasis omitted)). In
particular, the Examiner finds Hamel teaches reducing transmission rate to a
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Application 15/453,081

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media player if the amount of data received by the media player is less than
the amount of data required for playback. Ans. 9 (citing Hamel ¶ 123).
Appellant argues the Examiner errs in rejecting claim 21 because
Hamel does not teach or suggest “wherein the user equipment receives the
content at one of the first and second transmission rates based on an amount
of the content already received by the user equipment exceeding an amount
of the content used by the user equipment.” See Appeal Br. 7‒11. In
particular, Appellant argues that Hamel teaches reducing a streaming
transmission rate based on one of two criteria being met: (1) time passing
after playback of a media clip is initiated, or (2) after a predetermined
amount of additional data is received, where this additional data is data that
is stored in a buffer, not data that has been played to the user. See id. at 8.
Appellant argues data stored in the buffer is not “content used by the user
equipment” as claimed and, therefore, Hamel does not teach or suggest the
“based on” limitation. See id. at 10.
Appellant has persuaded us of Examiner error. Hamel teaches “the
process reduces the transmission bit rate after a predetermined time has
passed after playback has been initiated or after a predetermined amount of
additional data for the media clip has been buffered.” Hamel ¶ 123. Hamel’s
second condition for reducing the transmission rate relies on data being
buffered, not data being played to the user.
Claim 21 recites receiving content at one of the transmission rates
“based on an amount of the content already received by the user equipment
exceeding an amount of the content used by the user equipment.” Thus, the
issue before us is whether “content used by the user equipment” includes
content buffered by the user equipment, but not played back to the user.
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Application 15/453,081

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As a matter of claim construction, we apply the broadest reasonable
interpretation of claim terms, consistent with the specification, as would be
understood by one of ordinary skill in the art. In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech
Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004). “Above all, the broadest
reasonable interpretation must be reasonable in light of the claims and
specification.” PPC Broadband, Inc. v. Corning Optical Commc’ns RF,
LLC, 815 F.3d 747, 755 (Fed. Cir. 2016). As our reviewing Court held,
“[t]he protocol of giving claims their broadest reasonable interpretation . . .
does not include giving claims a legally incorrect interpretation.” Microsoft
Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc., 789 F.3d 1292, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing In re
Skvorecz, 580 F.3d 1262, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (alteration in original).
Claim 21 recites a comparison between two amounts of content: “an
amount of the content already received by the user equipment” must exceed
“an amount of the content used by the user equipment.” The first half of the
comparison refers to “content already received” and this is compared to
“content used.” In the context of streaming multimedia content to user
equipment, we determine the “content already received” limitation refers to
content that has been received and buffered by the user equipment, while the
“content used” limitation refers to content played on the user equipment. In
other words, content that has been “used” in the context of the claim refers
to content that has been “played.” Thus, considering the claim language as a
whole, we agree with Appellant that the “amount of content used by the user
equipment” means the amount of content that has been played, but does not
include content that has been buffered. See Reply Br. 3. The Examiner’s
interpretation of “content used” would include content that has been
buffered and not played, but this interpretation ignores that the first half of
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the comparison (“content already received”) already refers to content that
has been buffered.
The Specification discloses that the period of using the first, higher
transmission rate may last until the whole content is delivered “or only as
long as to buffer enough delivered content to ensure that an amount of the
content already received by the content user exceeds an amount of the
content used by the content user, while delivering the content.” Spec. ¶ 44.
In other words, the Specification refers to buffering enough content to
ensure that content already received (i.e., content already buffered) exceeds
content used by the user. Considering that this disclosure is in the context of
ensuring enough content is available to the user, the “content used” language
refers to content played by the user. Thus, the Specification confirms our
interpretation of the claim.
Because Hamel teaches changing the transmission rate based on the
amount buffered by the media player, not the amount played by the media
player, we agree with Appellant that the Examiner errs in finding Hamel
teaches this limitation.
For these reasons, we do not sustain the obviousness rejection of
claim 21.2 We also do not sustain the obviousness rejection of independent
claims 28 and 35, which recite commensurate subject matter. We also do not
sustain the obviousness rejection of dependent claims 22‒24, 29‒31, and
36‒38 for the same reasons.

2 Because we agree with at least one of the dispositive arguments advanced
by Appellant, we need not reach the merits of Appellant’s other arguments.
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Application 15/453,081

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CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
21‒24, 28‒
31, 35‒38
103 Hamel, AAPA 21‒24, 28‒
31, 35‒38

REVERSED