TELEFONAKTIEBOLAGET LM ERICSSON (PUBL)Download PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardDec 15, 20202019005172 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 15, 2020) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 15/453,081 03/08/2017 Ayodele DAMOLA 0111-060-CON-2/ P034952US4 8525 113648 7590 12/15/2020 Patent Portfolio Builders, PLLC P.O. Box 7999 Fredericksburg, VA 22404-7999 EXAMINER QIN, ZHIREN ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2411 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 12/15/2020 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): Mailroom@ppblaw.com eofficeaction@appcoll.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte AYODELE DAMOLA and LARS WESTBERG ________________ Appeal 2019-005172 Application 15/453,081 Technology Center 2400 ____________ Before LINZY T. McCARTNEY, MATTHEW J. McNEILL, and MICHAEL T. CYGAN, Administrative Patent Judges. McNEILL, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s rejection of claims 21‒24, 28‒31, and 35‒38. 1 Claims 25‒27, 32‒34, and 39‒41 are also pending, but have not been rejected by the Examiner. See Ans. 4‒11. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We reverse. 1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies Lenovo (Singapore) PTE LTD as the real party in interest. Appeal Br. 3. Appeal 2019-005172 Application 15/453,081 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Introduction Appellant’s application relates to streaming multimedia content to a user device, and in particular to saving power in the user device by adjusting the transmission rate of the multimedia content. Spec. ¶¶ 2‒18. Claim 21 is illustrative of the appealed subject matter and reads as follows: 21. A method for managing reception of content, the method, comprising: receiving, by a user equipment, the content at one of a first transmission rate and a second transmission rate, wherein the second transmission rate is lower than the first transmission rate, wherein the user equipment receives the content at one of the first and second transmission rates based on an amount of the content already received by the user equipment exceeding an amount of the content used by the user equipment, wherein the user equipment uses less power for second transmission rate than for the first transmission rate. The Examiner’s Rejections Claims 21‒24, 28‒31, and 35‒38 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Hamel (US 2011/0161493 A1; June 30, 2011) and the Background section of the instant application. See Final Act. 2‒5. ANALYSIS The Examiner finds Hamel teaches “wherein the user equipment receives the content at one of the first and second transmission rates . . . based on an amount of the content already received . . . by the user equipment exceeding an amount of the content used by the user equipment.” See Final Act. 3 (citing Hamel Fig. 11, ¶¶ 121, 123 (emphasis omitted)). In particular, the Examiner finds Hamel teaches reducing transmission rate to a Appeal 2019-005172 Application 15/453,081 3 media player if the amount of data received by the media player is less than the amount of data required for playback. Ans. 9 (citing Hamel ¶ 123). Appellant argues the Examiner errs in rejecting claim 21 because Hamel does not teach or suggest “wherein the user equipment receives the content at one of the first and second transmission rates based on an amount of the content already received by the user equipment exceeding an amount of the content used by the user equipment.” See Appeal Br. 7‒11. In particular, Appellant argues that Hamel teaches reducing a streaming transmission rate based on one of two criteria being met: (1) time passing after playback of a media clip is initiated, or (2) after a predetermined amount of additional data is received, where this additional data is data that is stored in a buffer, not data that has been played to the user. See id. at 8. Appellant argues data stored in the buffer is not “content used by the user equipment” as claimed and, therefore, Hamel does not teach or suggest the “based on” limitation. See id. at 10. Appellant has persuaded us of Examiner error. Hamel teaches “the process reduces the transmission bit rate after a predetermined time has passed after playback has been initiated or after a predetermined amount of additional data for the media clip has been buffered.” Hamel ¶ 123. Hamel’s second condition for reducing the transmission rate relies on data being buffered, not data being played to the user. Claim 21 recites receiving content at one of the transmission rates “based on an amount of the content already received by the user equipment exceeding an amount of the content used by the user equipment.” Thus, the issue before us is whether “content used by the user equipment” includes content buffered by the user equipment, but not played back to the user. Appeal 2019-005172 Application 15/453,081 4 As a matter of claim construction, we apply the broadest reasonable interpretation of claim terms, consistent with the specification, as would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art. In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004). “Above all, the broadest reasonable interpretation must be reasonable in light of the claims and specification.” PPC Broadband, Inc. v. Corning Optical Commc’ns RF, LLC, 815 F.3d 747, 755 (Fed. Cir. 2016). As our reviewing Court held, “[t]he protocol of giving claims their broadest reasonable interpretation . . . does not include giving claims a legally incorrect interpretation.” Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc., 789 F.3d 1292, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing In re Skvorecz, 580 F.3d 1262, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (alteration in original). Claim 21 recites a comparison between two amounts of content: “an amount of the content already received by the user equipment” must exceed “an amount of the content used by the user equipment.” The first half of the comparison refers to “content already received” and this is compared to “content used.” In the context of streaming multimedia content to user equipment, we determine the “content already received” limitation refers to content that has been received and buffered by the user equipment, while the “content used” limitation refers to content played on the user equipment. In other words, content that has been “used” in the context of the claim refers to content that has been “played.” Thus, considering the claim language as a whole, we agree with Appellant that the “amount of content used by the user equipment” means the amount of content that has been played, but does not include content that has been buffered. See Reply Br. 3. The Examiner’s interpretation of “content used” would include content that has been buffered and not played, but this interpretation ignores that the first half of Appeal 2019-005172 Application 15/453,081 5 the comparison (“content already received”) already refers to content that has been buffered. The Specification discloses that the period of using the first, higher transmission rate may last until the whole content is delivered “or only as long as to buffer enough delivered content to ensure that an amount of the content already received by the content user exceeds an amount of the content used by the content user, while delivering the content.” Spec. ¶ 44. In other words, the Specification refers to buffering enough content to ensure that content already received (i.e., content already buffered) exceeds content used by the user. Considering that this disclosure is in the context of ensuring enough content is available to the user, the “content used” language refers to content played by the user. Thus, the Specification confirms our interpretation of the claim. Because Hamel teaches changing the transmission rate based on the amount buffered by the media player, not the amount played by the media player, we agree with Appellant that the Examiner errs in finding Hamel teaches this limitation. For these reasons, we do not sustain the obviousness rejection of claim 21.2 We also do not sustain the obviousness rejection of independent claims 28 and 35, which recite commensurate subject matter. We also do not sustain the obviousness rejection of dependent claims 22‒24, 29‒31, and 36‒38 for the same reasons. 2 Because we agree with at least one of the dispositive arguments advanced by Appellant, we need not reach the merits of Appellant’s other arguments. Appeal 2019-005172 Application 15/453,081 6 CONCLUSION In summary: Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 21‒24, 28‒ 31, 35‒38 103 Hamel, AAPA 21‒24, 28‒ 31, 35‒38 REVERSED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation