Teamsters Local 277 (J & J Farms Creamery)

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 27, 2001

335 N.L.R.B. 1031 (N.L.R.B. 2001)

TEAMSTERS LOCAL 277 (J & J FARMS CREAMERY) 1031
Local 277, International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
AFL–CIO and J & J Farms Creamery Co., Inc. Case
29–CE–110
August 27, 2001
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN HURTGEN AND MEMBERS
LIEBMAN
AND TRUESDALE
On February 25, 2000, Administrative Law Judge
Howard Edelman issued the attached decision. The Re-
spondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and brief and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,1 and conclusions and
to adopt the recommended Order.
The complaint alleges that the Respondent Union vio-
lated Section 8(e) of the Act on or about June 11, 1999,
pursuant to an arbitration award which reaffirmed a con-
tractual provision (article 30) and thereby required Char-
ging Party J & J Farms Creamery Co., Inc. (the Em-
ployer) not to do business with another employer or per-
son. The judge found a violation, and we affirm for the
reasons set forth below.
In January 1999, the Employer decided to discontinue
its trucking operations and subcontract that part of its
business to an independent trucker. Thereafter, the Re-
spondent informed the Employer that subcontracting of
the drivers’ work would violate various provisions of the
parties’ collective-bargaining agreement, including Arti-
cle 30. In pertinent part, article 30 states as follows:
ARTICLE 30-PARTNERSHIP
AND CORPORATIONS
In case of a partnership, or corporation, one
member thereof, to wit:______________, may per-
form necessary services usually performed by em-
ployees covered by this agreement, but only within
the provisions of this contract, without being a
member of the Union. All other partners or mem-
bers of the firm or stockholders who perform ser-
vices usually performed by an employee covered by
this agreement shall be required to become or remain
members of the Union, in accordance with the provi-
sions of paragraph 2(a) hereof. It is agreed that all
merchandise sold to retailers shall be picked up and
delivered only by members of the Union, anything in
this agreement to the contrary notwithstanding. In
any event, all working Employers, Union or non-
Union, must conform with Article 8 of this agree-
ment.

1 The correct name of the decision referred to in the first paragraph
of the “Analysis and Conclusion” section of the judge’s decision is A.
Duie Pyle v. NLRB, 383 F.2d 772 (3d Cir. 1967).

On April 22, the Employer made a demand for arbitra-
tion. The arbitrator considered article 30 with article 29
of the parties collective-bargaining agreement. Article
29 provides, inter alia, that:

The work shall be performed by the employees
of the Employer employed pursuant to the wage
scale and working conditions set forth in the agree-
ment, or by employees of any other employer who
enjoys at least the same wages, hours and working
conditions as employees covered by the agreement.

On June 11, the arbitrator issued his award finding, in
relevant part, as follows:

The Company may subcontract or out-source its truck-
ing operation to a subcontractor or other independent
employer, and layoff its present trucking operation em-
ployees provided:
1. It subcontracts to a subcontractor or independ-
ent employer who his (sic) a collective bargaining
agreement with the Union (i.e. Local 277); and pro-
vided
2. The subcontractor, or independent employer,
hires the bargaining unit employees of the Company
who are laid off, to perform the subcontract work (or
other comparable employment) and accords them,
under the collective bargaining agreement “at least
the same wages, hours and working condition” en-
joyed by them under the instant contract between the
Company and the Union.

We agree with the judge that the arbitration award,
“reaffirming” or interpreting contractual Article 30, vio-
lated Section 8(e) because it required the Employer to
subcontract work only to an employer who is a signatory
to a collective-bargaining agreement with the Respon-
dent. Such a “union signatory” clause is secondary in
character and, therefore, violates Section 8(e). Retail
Clerks Local 1288 (Nickel’s Pay-Less Stores), 163
NLRB 817, 819 (1967).2
Contrary to our dissenting colleague, the effect of arti-
cle 30, as interpreted by the arbitrator, is not limited to
the preservation of bargaining unit work. This is so be-
cause the award on its face, in its first paragraph, dictates
that the universe of potential subcontractors is limited to
2 We note that, subsequent to the award, the Respondent embraced
the award by notifying the Employer, on June 18, 1999, that it “ac-
cept(ed) the Award as written.”
335 NLRB No. 81
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1032
a subcontractor “who has a collective bargaining agree-
ment with the Union.” By doing so, the award plainly
limits subcontracting to union “signatory” employers and
thereby violates Section 8(e).3
As our colleague construes the arbitrator’s award, the
subcontractor will hire the unit employees and then will
cover them with the union contract. However, the award
reads precisely the other way. The subcontractor, in order
to be eligible, must be signatory to a union contract. Sec-
ondly, the subcontractor must hire the unit employees.
Chairman Hurtgen agrees with the above, but also
takes the following position. If the provision were se-
quentially reversed, i.e., providing that the subcontractor
would hire the employees and then cover them with the
union contract, the result should be the same. The Union
may have a legitimate interest in securing jobs for the
signatory’s employees. And, the Union may have an
interest in protecting its economic standards after the
subcontractor hires employees. However, the Union has
no legitimate interest in imposing a union contract on the
subcontractor, a separate employer. Phrased differently,
under the arbitral award, a subcontractor would not be
eligible even if he hired the unit employees and applied
to them the Union’s economic standards. In order to be
eligible, the subcontractor would have to be signatory to
a union contract. That is, classically, a union-signatory
requirement proscribed by Section 8(e). (Compare a
lawful “union-standards” clause and an unlawful “union-
signatory” clause. See Orange Belt Dist. Council of
Painters v. NLRB, 328 F.2d 534.) In Chairman Hurtgen
view, Liquid Carbonic is contrary to Orange Belt and he
therefore would not follow it.
Accordingly, we adopt the judge’s findings that the
Respondent violated Section 8(e) as alleged.4
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge and
orders that the Respondent, Local 277, International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL-CIO, its officers, agents,
and representatives, shall take the action set forth in the
Order.

3 Liquid Carbonic Corp., 277 NLRB 851 (1985), cited by the dis-
sent, is distinguishable. In that case, unlike here, the contract provision
did not limit subcontracting to union signatories, in the first instance.
4 In finding the Sec. 8(e) violation, Member Truesdale relies solely
on the arbitrator’s interpretation of art. 30, as the complaint alleges. He
finds it unnecessary to pass on the judge's finding that art. 30 on its face
violates Sec. 8(e).
In adopting the judge’s findings and recommended Order, Chairman
Hurtgen does not adopt the judge’s comment at fn. 2 of his decision
that an award of damages for a violation of Sec. 8(e) is beyond the
remedial scope of the Act.

MEMBER LIEBMAN, dissenting.
I would find that the arbitration award does not violate
Section 8(e) because the primary effect of the award is
the preservation of existing bargaining unit jobs.
The arbitration award at issue here requires the con-
tracting employer to ensure (1) that the incumbent em-
ployees, who have traditionally performed the work at
issue, will continue to perform that work in the event that
the work is subcontracted; and (2) that these incumbent
employees, when employed by the subcontractor, will
continue to be covered under a collective-bargaining
agreement with the Union providing at least the same
terms and working conditions that they currently enjoy.
As construed by the arbitrator, the parties’ contract
does not provide for a “typical” subcontracting arrange-
ment. More typically, a subcontractor either uses its own
existing work force to perform the new subcontracted
work or hires new employees, who are strangers to the
work, to perform the new work. In those circumstances,
a contractual provision that limits subcontracting to em-
ployers who are signatories to a union contract serves to
satisfy general union objectives pertaining to a group of
employees who have no previous direct relationship to
traditional unit work. Absent such a relationship to tradi-
tional unit work, such “union signatory” clauses ordinar-
ily are secondary in character and, therefore, violate Sec-
tion 8(e). Heavy Highway, Building & Construction
Teamsters Council (California Dump Truck Owners),
227 NLRB 269 (1976); National Woodwork Mfrs. Assn.
v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612 (1967).
In the present case, however, the award requires the
subcontractor to hire the incumbent employees who have
traditionally performed the work, a primary objective.
And, unlike a true “union signatory” provision, applica-
tion of the contract here simply follows, and is incidental
to, the preservation of the jobs and benefits of the em-
ployees who have traditionally performed the work at
issue. Indeed, the award can only be satisfied by hiring
the employees who traditionally have performed the unit
work and is not satisfied simply by entering into a con-
tract with an employer who is signatory to a union con-
tract.1
In my view, this provision, as construed, is primary in
character and, therefore lawful under Section 8(e). See
Liquid Carbonic Corp., 277 NLRB 851 (1985) (contrac-
tual provision not violative of Section 8(e) when it re-
quired employer to arrange for continued employment of
1 In my view, the concluding paragraphs of the award must be read
together and in conjunction with one another. As such, I do not con-
strue the award as “first” requiring the contracting employer to seek out
only union signatories, as does the majority.
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 277 (J & J FARMS CREAMERY) 1033
its drivers with subcontractor who would agree to provi-
sions of entire collective-bargaining agreement).2
My colleagues construe the arbitration award here to
first require the subcontractor to be a signatory to a union
contract, and only second to require the subcontractor to
hire the unit employees; indeed, they expressly distin-
guish Liquid Carbonic on that basis. Chairman Hurtgen,
however, says he would reach the same result even if the
sequence were reversed. In my view, the sequence
makes no difference because Board precedent clearly
indicates that where, as here, a provision requires contin-
ued application of an existing contract to incumbent em-
ployees after they are hired by a subcontractor, it is pri-
mary in character and does not violate Section 8(e).
It is well settled that “where the clause is not clearly
unlawful on its face, the Board will interpret it to require
no more than what is allowed by law.” Teamsters Local
982 (J. K. Barker Trucking Co)., 181 NLRB 515, 517
(1970). Because the arbitration award interprets the par-
ties’ contract in a manner lawful on its face, I would dis-
miss the complaint.3
Accordingly, I would dismiss the complaint.

2 Compare Chicago Dining Room Employees Local 42, 248 NLRB
604 (1980), where the provision at issue did not call for the hiring of
incumbent unit hotel employees in the event the hotel was leased and
the provision, therefore, violated Sec. 8(e). In contrast to the present
case, the Board noted there that “(t)he clause does not in any way limit
its effect to the preservation of the jobs of any unit employees that are
employed in the leased portion of the hotel. Rather, it requires the
leasee to become bound to the contract regardless of whether or not
those unit employees lose their jobs” (emphasis added). 248 NLRB at
607. Compare also National Maritime Union (Commerce Tankers
Corp.), 196 NLRB 1100 (1972), enfd. 486 F. 2d 907 (2d Cir. 1973),
where the subject clauses required that, in the event of sale, the vessel
would be sold “with the complement of employees who either are or
shall be provided by the Union” and the signatory employer would
require the purchaser to apply the terms of the Agreement. The Board
found that these clauses violated Sec. 8(e) because, in the maritime
industry, although each employee is referred to a ship on a permanent
basis, when a ship is sold the employees lose their jobs and a new crew
is referred through the Union’s hiring hall. In light of this practice, the
Board found that
As a practical matter therefore . . . the clauses in question in fact do
not protect [the vessel’s workforce] at all in the event of sale, but in-
stead . . . serve to preserve those jobs for those other seaman who
may be eligible for referral through the NMU hiring hall at the port out
of which the new owner is to operate. In these circumstances, these
clauses place restrictions on sales which are not strictly “germane to the
economic integrity of the principal work unit . . . . Instead they only
insure that the purchasing employer is under contract with the NMU.
Id. at 1101.
3 Additionally, and apart from the arbitration award, I find that art.
30, on its face, does not violate Sec. 8(e). art. 30 appears to apply to
the performance of unit work by nonunit persons or parties under the
terms of the union-security provision of the agreement. On its face, art.
30 does not appear to limit “subcontracting” in a manner violative of
Sec. 8(e).
Haydee Rosario, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Thomas Murray, Esq. (Spivak, Lipton, Watanabe, Spivak &
Moss), for the Respondent.
Roger H. Madon, Esq. (Roger H. Madon, LLP), for the Charg-
ing Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
HOWARD EDELMAN, Administrative Law Judge. This
case was tried before me on November 3, 1999, in Brooklyn,
New York.
On June 24, 1999, J & J Farms Creamery, Co., Inc. (the Em-
ployer), filed an unfair labor practice charge against Local 277
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL–CIO (Respon-
dent). On August l8, 1999, a complaint issued alleging that
Respondent had entered into an agreement prohibited by Sec-
tion 8(e) of the Act.
On the entire record in this case, including my observation of
the demeanor of the witnesses, and a consideration of the briefs
filed by counsel for the General Counsel, counsel for the Em-
ployer, and counsel for Respondent, I make the following find-
ings of fact.
The Employer is a New York corporation with its principal
office and place of business located in Maspeth, New York,
where it is engaged in the nonretail sale of dairy products. The
Employer, annually, during the normal course of its business
operations, purchases and receives at its Maspeth facility,
goods and other materials valued at in excess of $50,000, di-
rectly from points located outside the State of New York.
It is admitted and I find that the Employer is engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of
the Act.
It is also admitted, and I find that Respondent is a labor or-
ganization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
At all times material herein, Respondent and the Employer
have been parties to a series of collective-bargaining agree-
ments covering a unit of the “Employers’ chauffeurs, helpers,
dairy and food handlers, egg handlers, egg inspectors butter
packaging employees, cheese packaging employees, egg break-
ers and office employees.”
The Employer employs 10 drivers, or chauffeurs, who are re-
sponsible for delivering its dairy products to various retailers.
The Employer owns the trucks driven by its drivers.
The most recent collective-bargaining agreement is an exten-
sion of the prior agreement covering the period of March l,
1998, through February 28, 200l. Simon Friedman, an owner is
responsible for handling all matters relating to the parties col-
lective-bargaining agreements.
Sometime in January 1999, the Employer decided because of
various economic considerations, and because of the growing
practice of the industry to subcontract out delivery operations,
that it would be expedient to discontinue its delivery operation,
and to subcontract this part of its business to an independent
trucker. On January 29, Friedman sent a letter to Respondent
advising Respondent of its intention to discontinue its trucking
operations and to meet with Respondent to bargain over the
effects of this decision.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1034
By a letter dated February 1, Respondent Attorney Ann
Shulman informed the Employer that any subcontracting of the
drivers work would be in violation of various provisions of
their collective-bargaining agreement including article 30 of
their agreement which provides.

It is agreed that all merchandise sold to retailers shall be
picked up and delivered only by members of the Union, any-
thing in this contract notwithstanding [emphasis added].

Following Shulman’s letter, Friedman met with Jasper
Brown, Respondent president. Brown took the position that any
subcontracting of the drivers work would be in violation of
their agreement. Friedman reiterated his intention to subcon-
tract out the driver’s work, but proposed giving the drivers
severance pay.
Another meeting was held in March. Present at this meeting
were Friedman and Brown and the attorneys for both parties,
Shulman for Respondent and Roger Madon for the Employer.
Friedman again proposed a severance pay. Shulman reiterated
the position taken in her February 21 letter.
On April 22, the Employer, pursuant to the terms of the col-
lective-bargaining agreement made a demand for arbitration.
On June 11, the arbitrator issued his decision. The arbitrator
considered article 30, set forth and described above with article
29 of the parties’ collective-bargaining agreement. Article 29
provides inter alia, that:

The work shall be performed by the employees of the
Employer employed pursuant to the wage scale and work-
ing conditions set forth in the agreement, or by employees
of any other employer who enjoys at least the same wages,
hours and working conditions as employees covered by
the agreement.

The arbitrator concluded that the Employer may subcontract
its trucking operations to a subcontractor and lay off its present
trucking employees provided that it complies with the follow-
ing:

It subcontract to a subcontractor or independent em-
ployer who has a collective-bargaining agreement with the
Union (i.e. local 27); and provided
The subcontractor, or independent employer hires the
bargaining unit employees of the Company who are laid
off, to perform the subcontracted work ( or other compa-
rable employment) and accords them under the collective-
bargaining agreement “ at least the same wages, hours and
working conditions” enjoyed by them under the instant
contract between the Company and Union.

By a letter dated June 16, the Employers’ attorney stated that
he believed the arbitrator’s award violated Section 8(e) of the
Act and that he wanted to discuss a modification of the award.
By a letter dated June 18, Respondent’s attorney stated that she
considered the award legal “since it is essentially a ‘work pres-
ervation’ which does not run afoul of 8(e)”. Thereafter the
Employer filed the instant charge.1

1 The parties met after the charge was filed for the purpose of trying
to settle the charge. Respondent objected to any testimony as it related
Analysis and Conclusion
Section 8(e) of the Act proscribes entering into any contract
or agreement, express or implied, whereby an employer agrees
not to handle products of, or agrees to cease doing business
with, any other person. It does not prohibit all union-employer
agreements which may have the incidental effect of a cessation
of business with other employers. As observed by the Court in
National Woodwork Mfrs. Assn. v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 637–
639 (1967), Congress intended that Section 8(e) of the Act
would embody the same distinction between lawful “primary”
and “unlawful” secondary activity which is contained in Sec-
tion 8(b)(4) of the Act. Generally, contract clauses which seek
to limit subcontracting of bargaining unit work to employers
who maintain prevailing wages are lawful, as they are consid-
ered to effect a primary objective, i.e., the preservation of unit
work. Heavy Highway, Building & Construction Teamsters
Council (California Dump Truck Owners), 227 NLRB 269
(1976). Accord, A. Duie Pyle v. NLRB, 383 F.2d 772, 777 (3d
Cir. 1967).
The applicable standard for determining whether a contract
clause contains a secondary objective which violates Section
8(e), was articulated by the Board in Retail Clerks Local 1288
(Nickel’s Pay-Less Stores), 163 NLRB 817, 819 (1967), when
it held that:

Contract provisions are secondary and unlawful if they are to
have as their principal objective the regulations of the labor
policies of other employers and not the protection of the unit.
Typical of such proscribed provisions are those which limit
subcontracting to employers who recognize the union or who
are signatory to a contract with it. [Emphasis added.]

Article 30 of the Parties’ collective-bargaining agreement,
which requires that all of the Employer’s merchandise be
picked up and delivered “only by members of the Union,”
clearly violates Section 8(e) of the Act, for two reasons. First,
because of its secondary purpose in safeguarding the Union’s
interest and second, because is aimed at assisting union mem-
bers in general. Further, Respondent’s contention that article
29 of the agreement is a “work preservation” clause, which has
as its primary objective preserving unit work, is not supported
by the record evidence. The language of article 30, the lan-
guage of the arbitration award, which requires the Employer to
subcontract work only to an employer who has a collective-
bargaining agreement with Respondent, and Respondent’s at-
torney’s assertion by her February 1 and June 18 letters, that

to settlement negotiations, which Respondent Counsel argued were
inadmissible under the Fed.R.Evd. Rule 408. I overruled Respondent’s
objection. Freedman’s testified that during this meeting he agreed that
he would subcontract the driving work to an independent employer who
would provide the laid-off employees the same wages, hours, and
working conditions they presently enjoyed under their present agree-
ment with Respondent. However, Shulman, who was representing
Respondent at this meeting took the position the arbitrator’s award was
legally correct, and that Respondent would continue to insist that any
subcontract must be with an employer who has a collective-bargaining
agreement with the Union. I conclude that I need not decide whether
such testimony is within the probation of Rule 408 since Shulman has
taken the same position in her February 1 and June 18 letters.
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 277 (J & J FARMS CREAMERY) 1035
under the award the Employer is required “to stay with Local
277” demonstrate the unlawful nature of the agreement.
Moreover, although article 29 of the collective-bargaining
agreement contains a valid “work preservation” clause aimed at
preserving the wages and employment benefits of the employ-
ees in the unit, article 30 provides that all merchandise shall be
picked up and delivered “only by members of the Union, any-
thing in this contract notwithstanding agreement to the con-
trary notwithstanding . . . ”(emphasis added). The clear mean-
ing of article 30 is that it supercedes any article in the parties
collective-bargaining agreement including article 29. In this
regard, the arbitrator’s award was consistent with such interpre-
tation. His award provided that if the Employer subcontract
unit work, such subcontract must be to a subcontractor, or inde-
pendent employer who has a collective-bargaining agreement
with the Union.
I find such interpretation is clear and unambiguous and is en-
tirely consistent with the terms of the parties agreement, and
Shulman’s February 1 and June 18 letters to the Employer.
Section 8(e)’s “entering into” requirement pertains to both
the initial agreement and any subsequent bilateral affirmation
or interpretation which may be deemed unlawful. Carpenters
Local 745 (SC Pacific Corp.), 312 NLRB 903 (1993), citing
Elevator Constructors (Long Elevators), 289 NLRB 1095
(1988). Moreover, an arbitrator’s award which violates Section
8(e) is sufficient to satisfy the “entering into” requirement to
establish an 8(e) violation. See Sheet Metal Workers Local 27,
321 NLRB 540 (1996), (where the Board held that an arbitra-
tor’s award is sufficient to establish the requisite “agreement’
for an 8(e) violation. In so doing, the Board relied solely on the
arbitrator’s unlawful interpretation of a valid subcontracting
clause). See also Carpenters Local 745 (SC Pacific Corp.), 312
NLRB at 904 fn. 5, and Teamsters Local 610 (Kutis Funeral
Home Inc.), 309 NLRB 1204 (1992). The instant case involves
a contract clause and the arbitrator’s award, which are facially
unlawful. The award, which requires the Employer to subcon-
tract work to an employer who has collective-bargaining
agreement with Respondent, clearly runs afoul of Section 8(e)
and thus, is sufficient to satisfy the “entering into” element of
the violation.
Accordingly I conclude that article 30 of the parties collec-
tive-bargaining agreement, which supercedes all other articles
in the agreement requires the Employer to subcontract only to a
subcontractor who has a collective-bargaining agreement with
Respondent is a clause prohibited by Section 8(e) and that the
Employer comply with the agreement as interpreted by the
arbitrator is a violation of Section 8(e) of the Act.2

2 Counsel for the Employer seeks as part of an appropriate remedy
that a recommended Order include that I sustain the arbitrators award in
all respects except to recommend that those portion of the Agreement
which are in violation of Sec. 8(e) be expungated. The Employer’s
attorney also requests that a recommended Order fashion a ruling that
the Employer have the opportunity to prove its damages due to Re-
spondents unlawful violation of Sec. 8(e). I conclude such proposed
remedial action is beyond the scope of the Act. Carpenters Local 745;
Teamsters Local 610, supra.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Employer is an employer, engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. Respondent is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By demanding in the June 18, 1999 letter that the Em-
ployer must comply with the arbitrator’s decision interpreting
the parties collective-bargaining argument to require any sub-
contract of bargaining unit work to be only with a subcontractor
who has a collective-bargaining agreement with Respondent,
Respondent has violated Section 8(e) of the Act.
REMEDY
I recommend an Order requiring Respondent to cease and
desist from the conduct described in my conclusions of law and
take the following affirmative action designed to effectuate the
policies of the Act. I recommend Respondent notify the Em-
ployer in writing that it will no longer demand that the Em-
ployer subcontract its driving work, or any other unit work only
to subcontractors who have a collective-bargaining agreement
with Respondent. I also recommend that Respondent be or-
dered to post the attached notice to inform employees and
members of this matter.
On these findings of fact, conclusions of law, and on the en-
tire record, I issue the following recommended3
ORDER
Respondent, Local 277 International Brotherhood of Team-
sters, AFL–CIO, its officers, agents and representatives, shall
1. Cease and desist from requiring J & J Farms Creamery
Co., the Employer herein, to subcontract out its driving and
delivery work, or any other unit work only to subcontractors or
other employers who have a collective-bargaining agreement
with Respondent or entering into any other agreement, express
or implied, whereby an employer agrees to cease and refrain
from handling, using, selling, transporting, or otherwise dealing
in any of the products of any other employer, or from doing
business with any other person in violation of Section 8(e) of
the Act.
(a) Notify the Employer in writing the Respondent will no
longer require the Employer to subcontract its driving, delivery
work or any other unit work to an employer or subcontractor
who has a collective-bargaining agreement with Respondent.
3 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s
Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended
Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the
Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur-
poses.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1036
(b) Post at its offices and meeting halls copies of the at-
tached notice marked “Appendix.’’4 Copies of the notice, on
forms provided by the Regional Director for NLRB Region 29,
after being signed by the Respondent’s authorized representa-
tive, shall be posted by the Respondent immediately on receipt
and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places
including all places where notices to members are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to
ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by
any other material.
(d) Sign and return to the Regional Director of Region 29,
sufficient copies of the notice for posting by J & J Farms
Creamery Co., if willing, at all places where notices to employ-
ees are customarily posted.
(e) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official
on a form provide by Region attesting to the steps that the Re-
spondent has taken to comply.

4 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”

APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the
National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to post and abide
by this notice.

WE WILL cease and desist from requiring J & J Farms
Creamery Co., the Employer herein, to subcontract out its driv-
ing and delivery work, or any other unit work only to subcon-
tractors or other employers who have a collective-bargaining
agreement with Respondent or entering into any other agree-
ment, express or implied, whereby an employer agrees to cease
and refrain from handling, using, selling, transporting, or oth-
erwise dealing in any of the products of any other employer, or
from doing business with any other person in violation of Sec-
tion 8(e) of the Act.
WE WILL notify the Employer in writing the Respondent
will no longer require the Employer to subcontract its driving,
delivery work or any other unit work to an employer or subcon-
tractor who has a collective-bargaining agreement with Re-
spondent.
LOCAL 277 INTERNATIONAL
BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, AFL–
CIO