Team Financial Manage-ment Systems, Inc.

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

Jul 23, 2001

No. 75584594 (T.T.A.B. Jul. 23, 2001)

7/23/01 Paper No.
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EWH

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
________________

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
_______________

In re Team Financial Management Systems, Inc.
________________

Serial No. 75/584,594
_______________

Dennis L. Thomte for Team Financial Management Systems,
Inc.

Lesley LaMothe, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office
103 (Michael Hamilton, Managing Attorney).
________________

Before Cissel, Hanak and Chapman, Administrative
Trademark Judges.

Opinion by Hanak, Administrative Trademark Judge:

Team Financial Management Systems, Inc. (applicant)
seeks to register in typed drawing form TELE TEAM for
“computer software for use in an automated telephone time
keeping and attendance management system, namely,
computer software for use in verification of employee
attendance and location, employee scheduling and work
scheduling.” The application was filed on November 4,
1998 with a claimed first use date of February 1, 1997.
Citing Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act, the
Examining Attorney has refused registration on the basis
THIS DISPOSITION
IS NOT CITABLE AS PRECEDENT
OF THE T.T.A.B.
that applicant’s mark, as applied to applicant’s goods,
is likely to cause confusion with the mark TELETEAM,
previously
Ser. No. 75/584,594

registered in typed drawing form for “computer software
and instructional manuals sold therewith for integration
of telephone technology, equipment, systems and services
into a call center or help-desk environment.”
Registration No. 1,994,575.
When the refusal to register was made final,
applicant appealed to this Board. Applicant and the
Examining Attorney filed briefs. Applicant did not
request a hearing.
In this case, applicant’s mark TELE TEAM and the
cited mark TELETEAM are virtually identical. Thus, the
critical issue in this case is whether applicant’s goods
and registrant’s goods are related in a manner such that
the use of virtually identical marks on both sets of
goods would be likely to cause confusion amongst the
relevant purchasing public.
At the outset, we note that the Examining Attorney
has made of record no evidence. Thus, the Examining
Attorney has not established that the same companies
market both computer software for employee attendance
verification and scheduling (applicant’s goods) and
computer software for use in a call center or help-desk
environment (registrant’s goods).
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Ser. No. 75/584,594

Obviously, both applicant’s goods and registrant’s
goods are computer software. However, computer software
covers a vast array of very different products that are
employed in everything from toys to nuclear reactors.
Indeed, over fifteen years ago this Board took note of
this very fact in making the following observations:
As a result of the veritable explosion of
technology in the computer field over the last
several years and the almost limitless number
of specialized products and specialized uses in
this industry, we think that a per se rule
relating to source confusion vis-a-vis computer
hardware and software is simply too rigid and
restrictive an approach and fails to consider the
realities of the marketplace.

In re Quadram Corp., 228 USPQ 863, 865 (TTAB 1985). See
also Information Resources v. X-Press Information
Services, 6 USPQ2d 1034, 1038 (TTAB 1988) (“Moreover,
there is no ’per se’ rule mandating that likelihood of
confusion is to be found in all cases where the goods or
services in question involve computer software and/or
hardware.”).
The Examining Attorney states that “both the
applicant’s software and the registrant’s software are
business applications which would be marketed and sold to
the same consumers,” namely, “larger organizations such
as corporations or universities.” (Examining Attorney’s
brief
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Ser. No. 75/584,594

pages 4 and 5). While the Examining Attorney has offered
no evidence in support of the foregoing argument, even if
we accept its accuracy, this does not mean that
applicant’s computer software and registrant’s computer
software are related in a manner such that the use of
nearly identical marks is likely to result in confusion.
In this regard, we note that our primary reviewing Court
found no likelihood of confusion resulting from the
contemporaneous use of opposer’s mark EDS and applicant’s
virtually identical mark E.D.S. despite the fact that
opposer had proven that “the two parties conduct business
not only in the same fields but also with some of the
same companies.” Electronic Design & Sales v. Electronic
Data Systems, 954 F.2d 713, 21 USPQ2d 1388, 1391 (Fed.
Cir. 1992).
Thus, absent a showing that the relevant purchasing
public would expect that both computer software for
employee attendance verification and scheduling
(applicant’s goods) and computer software for use in a
call center or help-desk environment (registrant’s goods)
would emanate from a common source, we cannot find that
there exists a likelihood of confusion. This is
particularly true given the Examining Attorney’s argument
that the common purchasers of both types
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Ser. No. 75/584,594

of software are “larger organizations such as
corporations or universities” whose buyers “are
sophisticated or knowledgeable.” (Examining Attorney’s
brief pages 5 and 6). As our primary reviewing Court has
made clear, purchaser “sophistication is important and
often dispositive because sophisticated consumers may be
expected to exercise greater care.” Electronic Design &
Sales, 21 USPQ2d at 1392.
In short, based upon this particular evidentiary
record (or lack thereof), we cannot find that there
exists a likelihood of confusion when virtually identical
marks are used on applicant’s specialized computer
software and registrant’s specialized computer software.
Decision: The refusal to register is reversed.

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