Tanya W. Jordan, Complainant,v.Donald L. Evans, Secretary, Department of Commerce, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionJul 26, 2001
01A12260_r (E.E.O.C. Jul. 26, 2001)

01A12260_r

07-26-2001

Tanya W. Jordan, Complainant, v. Donald L. Evans, Secretary, Department of Commerce, Agency.


Tanya W. Jordan v. Department of Commerce

01A12260

July 26, 2001

.

Tanya W. Jordan,

Complainant,

v.

Donald L. Evans,

Secretary,

Department of Commerce,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A12260

Agency Nos. 96-51-0110, 97-51-0189, 98-51-0069

DECISION

On February 16, 2001, complainant timely appealed to this Commission,

claiming breach of a June 12, 1998 settlement agreement.<1> Complainant

argues that the agency's decision to transfer her to the Office of

Financial Management (OFM), along with the rest of her office, violates

the settlement agreement. According to complainant, she agreed to

the settlement only because it provided for her transfer out of OFM,

and she believed that she would never have to return to OFM absent a

Reduction-in-Force.

The settlement agreement provided, in pertinent part, that the agency

would:

(a) Promote complainant . . . to the position of Accountant GS-14,

step-4, effective the first pay period after December 23, 1997, with

all appropriate back pay, interest and retirement contributions, and

simultaneously reassign Complainant to the position of Management and

Program Analyst, GS-14, in OEBAM [Office of Executive Budgeting and

Assistance Management].

The settlement included provisions addressing complainant's duties,

including:

(a) Upon her promotion from the position of Accountant, GS-510-13 to

Accountant GS-510-14, Office of Financial Policy and Assistance (OFPA),

OFM, [complainant must] accept a simultaneous realignment to the position

of Management and Program Analyst, GS-343-14, OEBAM. . . .

In its final decision, the agency found that complainant's claim of

breach addressed matters outside the scope of the settlement agreement.

It noted that the agreement did not prohibit the agency from transferring

complainant back to OFM. Absent such a term, the agency found that its

plans to move the duties of complainant's office under the direction of

OFM did not violate the settlement agreement. The agency also found that

since complainant had not worked in OFM for two years, it complied with

the agreement. The agency explained that the agreement did not provide

for complainant to remain in her reassigned position indefinitely.

Even if the reassignment caused breach of the agreement, the agency

argued that no breach had occurred. According to the agency, it merely

proposed the realignment in several different forms as part of an office

reorganization, but never obtained the necessary approvals to enact it.

On appeal, complainant asserts that the term �reassignment� means a

permanent position with an unlimited term. Complainant contends that

if the parties intended to allow complainant to stay in the OEBAM for a

limited period of time, then the agreement would have provided complainant

with a �temporary appointment� or a �detail,� not a reassignment.

Further, complainant asserts that the move back to OFM already has

taken effect � she notes that the OFM phone list included her name,

the Director of OBEAM informed complainant that she must report to OFM

rather than him, and she understood that an OFM manager would sign her

performance appraisal.

A settlement agreement constitutes a contract between the employee and

the agency, to which ordinary rules of contract construction apply. See

Herrington v. Department of Defense, EEOC Request No. 05960032 (December

9, 1996). The intent of the parties as expressed in the contract,

not some unexpressed intention, controls the contract's construction.

Eggleston v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05900795

(August 23, 1990). In ascertaining the intent of the parties with regard

to the terms of a settlement agreement, the Commission has generally

relied on the plain meaning rule. See Hyon v. United States Postal

Service, EEOC Request No. 05910787 (December 2, 1991). This rule states

that if the writing appears to be plain and unambiguous on its face,

its meaning must be determined from the four corners of the instrument

without resort to extrinsic evidence of any nature. See Montgomery

Elevator Co. v. Building Eng'g Servs. Co., 730 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1984).

In the instant case, the agreement does not specifically forbid the

agency from returning complainant to OFM. Although complainant has

a right to believe that the reassignment would be permanent, it is

subject to exceptions. See Pyles v. United States Postal Service,

EEOC Request No. 05920044 (April 22, 1992). When the agreement fails

to specify a time period for complainant to remain in a position, the

agency need not retain complainant in that position forever. See Holley

v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05950842 (Nov. 13,

1997) (citations omitted) (agency complied with settlement agreement

when kept claimant in position for four years until changing his duties

through a reorganization). In the present case, complainant was retained

in her current position for approximately two years, and was returned

to OFM pursuant to a reorganization. Under the present circumstances,

the Commission finds that the agency substantially complied with the

settlement agreement.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the agency's finding is AFFIRMED.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

July 26, 2001

__________________

Date

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

For timeliness purposes, the Commission will presume that this decision

was received within five (5) calendar days after it was mailed. I certify

that this decision was mailed to complainant, complainant's representative

(if applicable), and the agency on:

__________________

Date

______________________________

1The parties argue of whether the appeal was premature. Complainant filed

her appeal on the thirty-fifth day after alleging breach of the agreement.

Therefore, her complaint was not premature. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.504.

Further, although the agency did not mail its final decision until

February 14, 2001 (and complainant did not receive it until after filing

the instant appeal), it was completed and signed February 5, 2001 -

prior to complainant's appeal.