Tampa Ship Repair and Dry Dock Co., Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Mar 13, 1973

202 N.L.R.B. 368 (N.L.R.B. 1973)

368 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Tampa Ship Repair and Dry Dock Company, Inc. and
Lodge No. 570, International Association of Ma-
chinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO. Case
12-CA-5583
March 13, 1973
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS
KENNEDY AND PENELLO
On September 13, 1972, Administrative Law Judge
Sydney S. Asher issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding. Thereafter, the Respondent filed excep-
tions and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief
and finds merit in certain of the Respondent's
exceptions. Accordingly, while we have decided to
affirm the Administrative Law Judge's findings and
conclusions to the extent consistent herewith, we
shall dismiss the complaint in its entirety.
The Administrative Law Judge found that Respon-
dent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by
refusing to bargain with the Union as the certified
representative of a unit of machinists after the Union
had timely and unequivocally requested separate
bargaining. We disagree.
After a consent election, the Union was certified on
August 3, 1949, as the representative of a unit of "all
machinists (including toolroom machinists) and
machinists' helpers" at Respondent's ship repair and
conversion facility in Tampa, Florida. From then
until April 1960 Respondent and the Union negotiat-
ed and executed several agreements. During this
period Respondent also employed members of
various other crafts who were represented by the
traditional craft unions. By at least 1958 the
AFL-CIO metal trades department had chartered
the Tampa Metal Trades Council (herein the
Council) which was composed of representatives of
the craft unions representing Respondent's employ-
ees. Prior to the expiration of its contract in April
1960, the Union joined the Council.
In early 1960 the council members met and
formulated joint demands which were presented to
Respondent. The negotiating sessions, which were
chaired by the council's president, resulted in a
contract effective from May 1, 1960, to April 30,
1962. It was automatically renewable thereafter from
year to year. The 1960 contract's preamble listed
Respondent and each of the unions, including
Machinists, followed by the words "individually and
severally." A representative of each craft union
separately signed the agreement. The Council was
not mentioned and, although the unit was described
as "all employees represented by the above named
Unions of" Respondent, the contract further stated:
The above described bargaining unit covers the
Company's employees as above limited perform-
ing work which is normally and traditionally
performed by such employees in this yard and/or
this port.
The contract provided that each union shall process
its own grievances, select its own stewards, and retain
"the right of crafts to perform . . . work in
accordance with established shipyard practice." An
identical contract was executed in 1962, following
the same procedure; the parties did not negotiate
again until 1969.
The 1969-72 agreement was negotiated in the same
manner as the earlier agreements. It was basically the
same contract except that a step three grievance was
to be submitted to a six-man committee-three from
Respondent and three from the Tampa Metal Trades
Council. Also, a pension fund "for each of the crafts
covered by this contract" was negotiated.
On February 9, 1972, the Union by letter informed
Respondent that it was exercising its contractual
right to terminate the contract on April 30, 1972, its
expiration date. The Union suggested that negotia-
tions begin so that a contract would be in effect by
May 1, 1972, and stated that "both our interests
would be best served by an Agreement separate and
aside from the involvement of other Unions."
On February 22, Council President Causey wrote
Respondent "requesting that we enter into negotia-
tions for a renewed agreement." Thereafter, by letter
dated February 29, Respondent declined to enter
separate negotiations with the Union. It stated that,
given, the bargaining history, the Council is the
bargaining agent for the entire complement of its
organized employees and the various craft unions
negotiate "collectively as a single bargaining agent
rather than as separate bargaining agents for their
respective locals."
About this time, notwithstanding its February 9
letter, the Union attended a council meeting where
the unions' joint bargaining proposals were dis-
cussed. Thereafter, the Union mailed its demands to
Causey. Despite an invitation from Respondent to
join the council negotiations, the Union did not
participate. However, Council President Causey
stated to Respondent that the Council was negotiat-
ing for all crafts, including the Union. During the
negotiations, Causey presented the Union's separate
but similar demands to Respondent. At various times
Causey informed the Union by telephone of the
202 NLRB No. 62
TAMPA SHIP REPAIR AND DRY DOCK CO.
progress of negotiations and, after tentative agree-
ment had been reached with Respondent, the Union
told Causey it would look at the contract to see if it
liked it.
A 3-year agreement effective May 1, 1972, was
subsequently executed. Its nomenclature was
changed from that of earlier contracts. Thus, the
parties are Respondent and the Council, "consisting
of" the listed unions, including Machinists, and the
Council is recognized as the bargaining agent for all
employees. Causey signed for the Council and each
union's representative also signed, except Machinists.
The Judge found that after the 1949-60 period of
separate. bargaining between Respondent and the
Union there was no clear and unequivocal showing
that the parties intended to abandon separate craft
bargaining and merge the separate Machinists unit
into a larger multicraft unit. He concluded that the
crafts bargained together merely as a matter of
convenience and that, because the Union's February
9 request to Respondent for separate bargaining was
timely and unequivocal, Respondent thereafter was
under a statutory duty to recognize and bargain with
the Union in the certified unit. By refusing to bargain
with the Union, the Judge concluded, Respondent
dealt with the Council at its peril with respect to the
Machinists and thus violated the Act.
We find, contrary to the Administrative Law
Judge, that the Union's purported withdrawal from
multicraft bargaining was not unequivocal. Thus,
after attending the meeting where the other unions
discussed the Council's joint bargaining demands,
the Union submitted its bargaining proposals to the
Council and during the negotiations, Council Presi-
dent Causey presented the Union's demands to
Respondent. Throughout the multicraft negotiations
the Union was informed by Causey as to their
progress, and the Council advised Respondent that it
was authorized to negotiate for the Union. Although
after tentative agreement had been reached, the
Union refused to sign, we find that its prior conduct
during the negotiations was not consistent with an
unequivocal withdrawal from multicraft bargaining.
Accordingly, we do not find, under these particular
facts and circumstances, that Respondent violated
the obligations of Section 8(a)(5) by its insistence and
adherence to the bargain reached in the multicraft
negotiations and its correlative refusal to negotiate
separately with the mechanists Union after the
multicraft agreement had been reached.
I The Respondent is, and at all material times has been , a Florida
corporation with its principal place of business in Tampa, Florida, where it
repairs and converts domestic and foreign ships. The Respondent annually
369
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board hereby orders that the complaint
herein be, and it hereby is, dismissed in its entirety.
DECISION
SYDNEY S. ASHER, Administrative Law Judge: On March
30, 1972, Lodge No. 570, International Association of
Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO (Machin-
ists), filed charges against Tampa Ship Repair and Dry
Dock Company, Inc. (Respondent), Tampa, Florida.
Based on these charges, the General Counsel of the
National Labor Relations Board (General Counsel) on
May 10, 1972, issued a complaint alleging that since on or
about February 29, 1972, the Respondent has refused to
recognize and bargain with the Machinists as the exclusive
representative of all employees in an appropriate unit,
despite the selection of the Machinists as such representa-
tive, although requested by the Machinists to do so. It is
alleged that this conduct violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of
the National Labor Relations Act (the Act), as amended
(29 U.S.C. Sec. 151, et seq.). Thereafter the Respondent
filed an answer denying that the unit described in the
complaint was appropriate for purposes of collective
bargaining, and denying that the Machinists was the
exclusive bargaining representative for all employees in the
said unit. Affirmatively, the answer alleges that the
Machinists designated the Tampa Metal Trades Council
(Council) as the exclusive bargaining representative of all
employees of the Respondent, including employees in the
alleged appropriate unit, and that since then the Council
has served as such. The answer admits, however, that the
Machinists demanded recognition as the exclusive bargain-
ing representative of the employees in the alleged appropri-
ate unit and that since on or about February 29, 1972, the
Respondent has continuously refused to recognize and
bargain with the Machinists as such.
Upon due notice, a hearing was held before me on June
13 and 14, 1972, at Tampa, Florida. All parties were
represented and participated fully in the hearing. After the
close of the hearing, the General Counsel, at my request,
filed a proposed remedial order. Although given an
opportunity to do so, no party has filed any other brief.
Upon the entire record, and from my observation of the
witnesses, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
A. Preliminary Matters
The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and it is
found, that the Respondent is, and at all material times has
been, an employer engaged in commerce as defined in the
Act, and its operations meet the Board's jurisdictional
standards; I and that the Machinists is, and at all material
times has been, a labor organization as defined in the Act.
receives at its Tampa, Florida, shipyard materials valued at more than
$50,000, shipped directly from origins outside the State of Florida. The
(Continued)
370 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
B. The Setting
Respondent was originally incorporated in 1948. It
engaged primarily in topside repair of ships.2 What has
been described by one of the General Counsel's witnesses
as corporate "reorganization" of the Respondent took
place in January 1951; and "dissolution" of the "old
company" and establishment of the "new company"
occurred in 1964. Whatever the exact nature of these
transactions, it appears that the composition of the work
complement remained substantially unchanged. In the
parlance of labor law, the "employing industry" continues
as before, without meaningful alteration.
During all material times, the Respondent employed
members of various crafts, such as boilermakers, machin-
ists, painters, carpenters, plumbers, etc. Sometimes mem-
bers of different crafts work side by side aboard ship. Some
of their work is a highly integrated operation, each craft
assisting the other in the completion of the total job. With
regard to machinists, the Respondent employs two categor-
ies: Inside machinists operate lathes, drill presses, and
other tools in the shop. They perform repair and mainte-
nance of parts which are taken off the ship and brought to
the shop to be worked on, and after repair are taken back
to the ship. Outside machinists work aboard ship and open
up machinery for repair. Sometimes they take parts to the
shop for repair, and after repair, return them aboard ship
and reassemble them. Machinists and their helpers engage
in the traditional work of their craft at the Respondent's
yard, and do not perform the work of any other traditional
crafts. Throughout the events related below, each craft has
maintained its separate seniority list, and each craft has
selected its own union stewards. The machinists have had
assigned to them a designated locker room separate from
those occupied by other crafts. Identification badges issued
by the Respondent to its employees include different
designation numbers for each craft.
C. Bargaining History Prior to 1972
On June 28, 1949, the Machinists filed with the Board a
petition seeking to represent a separate unit of machinists
and machinists' helpers employed by the Respondent
(Case 10-RC-650). Thereafter the Machinists and the
Respondent entered into an agreement for consent
election, which describes the appropriate unit as:
All machinists (including tool room machinists) and
machinists' helpers, excluding all office, clerical, guard
or watchmen, janitorial, professional employees, and
supervisors as defined in the Act.
The Machinists won the ensuing election and was certified
by the Acting Regional Director on August 3, 1949.
Thereafter bargaining began between representatives of the
Respondent and representatives of the Machinists. This
culminated early in 1950 in the execution of a collective-
bargaining agreement covering employees in the above-
Respondent derives annual income of more than $50,000 from repair and
conversion of ships engaged in foreign and interstate commerce.
2 Topside repair involves work that does not require the ship to be put
into dry dock In short, it is work that can be accomplished while she is
afloat or while there is live steam in her boilers.
3 There is some indication in the record that, although the Machinists
signed a separate contract in 1957, the negotiations leading up to this
defined machinists' unit. On March 18, 1957, the same
parties entered into another bargaining contract covering
the same employees, to expire April 30, 1960, unless
automatically extended from year to year.3
In the meantime (perhaps as early as 1956, certainly by
1958) the Metal Trades Department in Washington, D. C.
(Department) affiliated with the AFL-CIO, had chartered
the Tampa Trades Council (Council), composed of
representatives of those craft unions which represented
craft employees at the Respondent's shipyard.4 It is not
clear when the Machinists joined the Council, but clearly
the Machinists had affiliated with the Council sometime
before April 30, 1960, the date when its separate contract
with the Respondent expired.
In preparation for negotiations with the Respondent in
early 1960 the Council, through its officers, called a
meeting of representatives of its member unions, including
the Machinists. Together they worked out joint demands
covering the employees of all the crafts, and presented
them to the Respondent's representatives at a meeting
attended by representatives of each craft union, and
chaired by the Council's president. The Machinists
participated fully. After bargaining in this joint fashion, the
parties entered into a contract effective from May 1, 1960,
to April 30, 1962, and automatically renewable thereafter
from year to year. The preamble lists the Respondent and
each of the craft unions, including the Machinists, then
adds the words "individually and severally." The contract
is signed by a representative of the Respondent and by a
representative of each of the craft unions separately,
including the Machinists. Nowhere in the document is the
Council mentioned. The unit covered is described as "all
employees represented by the above named Unions of
Tampa Ship Repair & Dry Dock Co., Inc., at its plant or
ports in Tampa, Florida," with certain exclusions not here
material. There follows this language:
The above described bargaining unit covers the
Company's employees as above limited performing
work which is normally and traditionally performed by
such employees in this yard and/or this port.
The grievance machinery is set up so that each separate
craft union processes the grievances arising within its own
ranks. For example, in describing the final step, arbitra-
tion, the Respondent is required to communicate certain
information "to the Union involved." There are these
further provisions:
Article 11. Work Assignments; Safety
A. None but mechanics regularly employed as such
shall do mechanics' work as covered by the jurisdiction
of the Union coming under the provisions of this
Agreement.
B. The Company agrees, as a general policy in the
assignment of work, to recognize the right of crafts to
perform such work in accordance with established
shipyard practice. This, however, shall not be construed
agreement may have been jointly with other crafts.
4 There is testimony that an earlier Tampa Metal Trades Council had
been chartered by the AFL in 1938 (before the merger of the AFL and the
CIO) and that it had been dissolved in 1950
The General Counsel originally contended that no such organization as
the Council existed prior to February 29, 1972 He later abandoned that
position
TAMPA SHIP REPAIR AND DRY DOCK CO. 371
as a basis for a Union to claim, through technical and
arbitrary interpretations hereof, the right to create
unnecessary jobs.
C. None but mechanics in their respective crafts
shall operate oxyacetylene torches or electric welding
apparatus.
D. Where oxyacetylene torches or other welding
processes are used, each craft shall perform the work
which was generally recognized as work belonging to
that craft prior to the introduction of such processes.
E. Craftsmen when working independently will be
furnished sufficient competent help when needed to
handle the work.
Article 13. Hiring of Men, Management 's Responsibili-
ties, Etc.
contracts. The grievance machinery is changed: at the third
step the dispute is to be submitted to a committee of six
members , one half representing the Respondent and the
other half to be "members from the Metal Trades
Council." This is the only mention of the Council in the
agreement . The above-quoted provisions of the 1960
contract (from article 11 and article 13, also the visitation
rights of union representatives), which are iterated in the
1962 contract, are reiterated in the 1969 contract. The 1969
contract added a new provision , as follows:
In addition to the above wages, the Company shall also
pay into a Pension Fund for each of the crafts covered
by this contract, beginning May 1, 1969, the sum of five
cents (5 ¢ ) per hour for each hour worked by each
member of that craft. . . . Said five cents (50) paid
into said Pension Funds shall be increased to ten cents
(10 Q) per hour effective May 1, 1970, and to fifteen
cents (15 ¢ ) per hour effective May 1, 1971.
The 1969 contract was ratified by the employees in the
same manner used in 1960 and 1962.
C. During short periods when work for one
particular group within the craft may be delayed, the
mechanics and helpers thus unemployed may be
distributed temporarily to do work of their craft for
which they may be individually adapted, in preference
to a lay-off, providing such distribution of employees
will not cause displacement of employees in other
groups.
In article 15, Union Representation, "representatives of
the Unions on official business" are granted access to the
plant.
This contract was ratified by employees of all the crafts
involved (members of all the various unions) at a joint
meeting presided over by an official of the Council. All the
ballots were comingled in a single ballot box.
Preparation for the 1962 contract, and bargaining for it,
proceeded in the same pattern as had been used 2 years
earlier. Ultimately the Respondent and the craft unions
"individually and severally" entered into a new contract
effective from May 1, 1962, to April 30, 1963, automatical-
ly renewable thereafter from year to year. The provisions
of the 1960 contract discussed and quoted above were
retained, word for word, in the 1962 contract. As in the
1960 contract, the 1962 contract makes no mention of the
Council. The 1962 contract was signed and ratified in the
same manner as the 1960 contract had been, and the
Machinists participated fully, as it had in 1960.5
The next negotiations between the parties took place in
1969. Here again the unions followed their former method
of meeting together and agreeing to joint demands before
negotiations began. As before, the Machinists participated
along with the other unions in the formulation of joint
demands and in negotiations. The negotiations proceeded
as before, with one new element: the Department, at the
request of the Council, sent an observer. The negotiations
culminated in a new contract, effective from May 1, 1969,
to April 30, 1972, and thereafter renewable from year to
year in the absence of 60 days' written notice. The
preamble is the same as that in the 1960 and 1962
5 In 1962 the parties initialed a memorandum amending the 1962
contract regarding matters not here material.
D. The 1972 Negotiations
Early in 1972, the Machinists joined with the other craft
unions in the preparation of joint demands to be presented
to the Respondent in the forthcoming negotiations looking
toward a new contract.
However, on February 9,6 the Machinists wrote to the
Respondent in pertinent part as follows:
You are hereby notified that pursuant to Article 23
of the current Agreement between Tampa Ship Repair
& Dry Dock Company, Inc., Tampa, Florida, and the
International Association of Machinists and Aerospace
Workers, Local No. 570, AFL-CIO, the Union exercis-
es its sixty (60) day minimum notification right to
terminate the Agreement covering the employees of the
Machinist craft effective April 30, 1972.
May we suggest, that negotiations begin at an early
date so that a new Agreement may be consummated
and placed into effect May 1, 1972. At this time it is our
resolve that both our interests would be best served by
an Agreement separate and aside from the involvement
of other Unions and expect to enter negotiations with
this contention.
On February 22 the president of the Council wrote to the
Respondent "requesting that we enter into negotiations for
a renewed agreement." On February 29 counsel for the
Respondent, on the Respondent's behalf, wrote to the
Machinists as follows:
The Company hereby notifies you of its declination
to enter separate negotiations with Lodge No. 570 with
respect to what you have termed "employees of the
Machinist craft." The Company feels that it is quite
clear from more than two decades of bargaining history
that the Metal Trades Council is the bargaining agent
for the entire complement of organized employees at its
Tampa Shipyard facility. Although the various crafts or
skills are represented on the Council and each
participates in the negotiations , they do so collectively
6 All dates hereafter refer to the year 1972, unless otherwise noted.
372 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
as a single bargaining agent rather than as separate
bargaining agents for their respective Locals.
Assuming that Lodge No. 570 is still a member of
the Council, the Company invites your attendance and
participation during the forthcoming negotiations
between the Company and the Metal Trades Council.
Negotiations between representatives of the Respondent
and representatives of the Council and the various unions
began shortly after this. A representative of the Depart-
ment participated. No representative of the Machinists
attended. At the beginning of the negotiations either
Chester H. Ferguson, Esq., the Respondent's attorney, or
Sam Davis, president of the Respondent, asked R. H.
Causey, president of the Council, where the Machinists'
representative was. Causey replied that the Machinists'
representative had been notified, but was not present.
Ferguson showed Causey the letter of February 9 from the
Machinists demanding. separate negotiations. Causey
stated that the Council was negotiating on behalf of all its
constituents, including the Machinists. The representative
of the Department also informed Causey "that they were
negotiating for all crafts including the machinists." Four
negotiating sessions were held; the Machinists were not
represented at any of them. Ultimately, the parties signed a
contract effective May 1, 1972, through April 30, 1975, and
automatically renewable thereafter from year to year in the
absence of notice to the contrary. The parties are described
as the Respondent, and the Council, "consisting of" the
individual unions listed by name, including the Machinists.
The recognition clause recognizes the Council as the
exclusive bargaining agent for all employees of the
Respondent, with certain exceptions not here material. The
agreement is signed by Davis for the Respondent, and
Causey for the Council. Each participating union's
representative signed the document separately. Although a
signature line was prepared for the Machinists' representa-
tive, no agent of the Machinists ever signed. This contract
was at first rejected by the members of the participating
unions at a ratification meeting. But at a later such meeting
it was ultimately ratified. Both ratification meetings were
open to all union members, including members of the
Machinists. Although the record does not show whether
members of the Machinists participated in either of the
ratification votes, it is clear that no official of the
Machinists attended either of the ratification meetings in a
representative capacity.
R. Contentions of the Parties
Counsel for the General Counsel contends that not only
was the Machinists separately certified by the Board in
1949, but "there has been a definite preservation through-
out the entire bargaining relationship of craft identities."
He stated in oral argument at the hearing : "We are not
seeking here craft severance. We are simply seeking to
bargain on behalf of craft employees , individually, with a
traditional representative."
On the other hand , the Respondent maintains that "by
virtue of the history from 1960 up until February of 1972,
r In its answer the Respondent seems to base a defense on the corporate
reorganization alleged to have taken place in 1951. At the hearing, the
Respondent appears to have abandoned that position. In any event, the
there was a merger of the bargaining unit . . . into the
overall unit." So far as the separate certification of the
Machinists in 1949 is concerned, the Respondent urges
that consent election units are not controlling on the
Board, and in any event "a unit certification is not
forever." The former separate craft unit having been
"merged," according to the Respondent, the only proper
way for the Machinists to obtain separate bargaining rights
would be through a representation proceeding seeking
craft severance under the Board' s usual guidelines for such
severance. Furthermore, the Respondent takes the position
that from 1960 on "the Machinists delegated bargaining
authority to the Tampa Metal Trades Council." Finally,
the Respondent seems to hint that the Machinists, in
withdrawing from multicraft bargaining without the prior
consent of the other craft unions involved, acted in
violation of the constitution and bylaws of the Metal
Trades Department of the AFL-CIO.7
F. Conclusions
Let us turn first to the 1949 certification of the
Machinists in a separate craft unit. It is true, as the
Respondent points out, that a stipulated unit is not binding
on the Board and that units are not set in perpetuity; we
must look to events which took place after the certification.
In this case, the separate certified unit was honored by
both contracting parties by the signing of a separate
contract covering a machinists' unit from 1949 until 1960.
This 11-year bargaining history cannot be lightly set aside
as no longer important, unless thereafter the parties clearly
and unequivoally showed their intent to abandon separate
craft bargaining and to merge the separate machinists' unit
into a larger multicraft unit. The Respondent contends that
the 12-year joint bargaining from 1960 to 1972 demon-
strates just such an intent. I cannot agree. Although some
factors point in that direction (such as mention of the
Council at the third step of arbitration in the 1969 contract
and the method of jointly ratifying the contracts) they are
relatively unpersuasive. More compelling are the indica-
tions that no such merger was contemplated: (1) the
conventional craft nature of the Machinists' unit, histori-
cally recognized; (2) the fact that representatives of every
union involved participated in the negotiations; (3) the
naming of each union separately in the contracts' pream-
bles; (4) the above-quoted provisions of articles 11 and 13
of the contracts; (5) the separate plant visitation rights
granted in article 15 of the contract; (6) the separate
seniority lists; (7) the separate union stewards; (8) the
separate pension funds; (9) the individual craft indications
on the identity badges; and (10) the separate lockerroom
facilities provided for machinists. On balance, I am
convinced that during the period in question (1960-72) the
machinists preserved their identity as members of a craft
separate and, apart from the various other crafts, and that
they bargained together with the other craft unions merely
defense lacks merit, because it is clear that the employing industry remained
the same after 1951.
TAMPA SHIP REPAIR AND DRY DOCK CO.
as a matter of convenience. Accordingly, it is found that no
merger of the machinists' unit with other crafts took place.8
If, as the Respondent argues, the Machinists had
"delegated" its bargaining authority to the Council, the
Machinists letter of February 9 provided adequate notice
to the Respondent that such "delegation" had been
terminated. Thereafter the Respondent dealt with the
Council at its peril, so far as employees in the machinists'
unit were concerned. Finally, the question whether the
Machinists did or did not violate the Department's
constitution or bylaws by withdrawing from joint bargain-
ing without the consent of the other unions involved need
not be answered. This is purely an internal union matter
which cannot affect the Respondent's obligation to bargain
set forth in Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. As the Machinists'
request for separate bargaining was timely and unequivo-
cal, the Respondent was under a statutory duty to
recognize and bargain with the Machinists as the bargain-
ing agent for the employees in the certified unit .9 This the
Respondent failed to do.
Upon the above findings of fact, and upon the entire
record, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Tampa Ship Repair and Dry Dock Company, Inc.,
is, and at all material times has been , an employer within
the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of
the Act.
8 Pacific Coast Shipbuilding Association, 157 NLRB 384; and Shell Oil
Company, 116 NLRB 203.
9 A good-faith doubt of the unit's appropriateness does not provide a
373
2. Lodge No. 570, International Association of Ma-
chinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, is, and at all
material times has been, a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
3. All machinists (including toolroom machinists) and
machinists' helpers, excluding all office, clerical, guard or
watchmen, janitorial, professional employees, and supervi-
sors as defined in the Act constitute a unit appropriate for
the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of
Section 9(b) of the Act.
4. The above-named labor organization is, and at all
material times has been, the exclusive representative of all
employees in the unit described above for the purposes of
collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(a) of
the Act.
5. By refusing, on and after February 29, 1972, to
bargain collectively with the above-named labor organiza-
tion as the exclusive representative of all employees in the
aforesaid unit, the Respondent has engaged in and is
engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of
Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.
6. By the above-described conduct, thereby interfering
with, restraining, and coercing its employees in the exercise
of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, the
Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
7. The above-described unfair labor practices tend to
lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing com-
merce and the free flow of commerce, and constitute unfair
labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
[Recommended Order omitted from publication.]
valid defense to the Respondent' s refusal to bargain. Emerald Maintenance,
Inc. v. N.LR.B., 464 F.2d 698 (C.A. 5).
r