Tamie K. Rain, Complainant,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionFeb 19, 2004
01A35103_r (E.E.O.C. Feb. 19, 2004)

01A35103_r

02-19-2004

Tamie K. Rain, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


Tamie K. Rain v. United States Postal Service

01A35103

February 19, 2004

.

Tamie K. Rain,

Complainant,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A35103 Agency No. 1C-171-1041-95

Hearing

No. 170-96-8450X

DECISION

The record reveals that on August 11, 1997, complainant and the agency

entered into a settlement agreement regarding complainant's EEO complaint.

The settlement provided, in pertinent part, as follows:

1. Complainant will submit a written request for permanent reassignment

to light duty to Harrisburg Plant Manager, [Plant Manager], in accordance

with the requirements set forth in Article 13 of the national agreement

(at page 75).

2. It is understood that, as long as complainant follows the procedures

set forth in Article 13, referenced above, her request will be approved

by Plant Manager.... Complainant will be assigned to perform her

current duties. The schedule will be 7:00 a.m. - 3:30 p.m. with a half

hour lunch. Non-scheduled days will be Friday and Saturday as approved

by Plant Manager.

3. Complainant will be required to provide updated medical documentation

no less frequently than each January and July.

4. Complainant, by virtue of her approved request for permanent

reassignment, hereby relinquishes her present bid position as of the

date her light duty assignment becomes effective.

By letter dated March 19, 2002, the agency informed complainant that due

to several operational changes on tour 2, she would become excess to the

needs of her section. Complainant was informed that as a junior full-time

employee within the section, she would become an unassigned regular

and involuntarily reassigned effective April 5, 2002. Subsequently,

complainant claimed that the agency had breached the settlement agreement

when, effective May 11, 2002, her scheduled reporting time was changed

from 7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m.

In a previous decision, Tamie K. Rain v. United States Postal Service,

EEOC Appeal No. 01A24266 (June 26, 2003), the Commission found that the

agency had notice of complainant's breach claim and remanded this matter

to the agency for an investigation of complainant's breach claim.

By agency decision dated July 28, 2003, the agency determined that it

had not breached the settlement agreement. According to the agency,

a reduction in staffing on tour 2 and increased staffing on tour 3 were

necessary due to declining mail volumes in manual operations and the need

to improve efficiency in automated and mechanized work areas. The agency

stated that when a reduction in staffing occurs on a tour, the collective

bargaining agreement must be followed. According to the agency, Article

12, Section 5 of the collective bargaining agreement's Principles of

Seniority, Posting and Reassignments, requires that employees excess to

the needs of their section be moved by seniority and level. The agency

stated that complainant lacked sufficient seniority to attain a position

for either a 7:00 a.m. or 12:00 p.m. manual position and therefore

her position was abolished and she was assigned to a 3:00 p.m. start

time on tour 3. The agency concluded that the Rehabilitation Act does

not require that complainant be provided a position that is in direct

contravention of the collective bargaining agreement.

On appeal, complainant contends that the application of the collective

bargaining agreement is not an appropriate reason for removing her

reasonable accommodation.

In response, the agency asserts that complainant held the job provided

under the settlement agreement for almost three years. The agency

maintains that it has substantially complied with the settlement

agreement. According to the agency, it cannot maintain complainant in

her previous position because to do so would violate the collective

bargaining agreement. The agency states that neither party knew at

the time the settlement agreement was executed that changes would

occur necessitating complainant's reassignment. The agency notes that

complainant was informed by the Plant Manager that as positions become

vacant on tour 2, they would be posted and eventually complainant will

regain a tour 2 position based on her seniority.

EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. �1614.504(a) provides that any settlement

agreement knowingly and voluntarily agreed to by the parties, reached at

any stage of the complaint process, shall be binding on both parties.

If the complainant believes that the agency has failed to comply with

the terms of a settlement agreement or final action, the complainant

shall notify the EEO Director, in writing, of the alleged noncompliance

within 30 days of when the complainant knew or should have known of the

alleged noncompliance. The complainant may request that the terms of

the agreement be specifically implemented, or, alternatively, that the

complaint be reinstated for further processing from the point processing

ceased.

The Commission has consistently held that settlement agreements are

contracts between the complainant and the agency, and it is the intent of

the parties as expressed in the contract, not some unexpressed intention,

that controls the contract's construction. Eggleston v. Department

of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05900795 (August 23, 1990).

In ascertaining the intent of the parties with regard to the terms of a

settlement agreement, the Commission has generally relied on the plain

meaning rule. See Hyon v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Request

No. 05910787 (December 2, 1991). This rule states that if the writing

appears to be plain and unambiguous on its face, its meaning must be

determined from the four corners of the instrument without resort to

extrinsic evidence of any nature. See Montgomery Elevator Co. v. Building

Eng'g Servs. Co., 730 F.2d 377, 381 (5th Cir. 1984).

In the instant case, we find that the agency has not breached the

settlement agreement. The Commission has held that where an individual

bargains for a position without any specific terms as to the length of

service, it would be improper to interpret the reasonable intentions of

the parties to include employment in that exact position ad infinitum.

See Holley v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05950842

(November 13, 1997); Parker v. Department of Defense, EEOC Request

No. 05910576 (August 30, 1991). In the instant case, we find that the

agency did not breach the settlement agreement by reassigning complainant

to tour 3 due to business necessity after complainant had held the

position provided for in the settlement agreement for approximately

three years. The agency has established that its operational needs and

the application of the collective bargaining agreement necessitated the

reassignment of complainant from tour 2 to tour 3. We find that the

agency substantially complied with the settlement agreement by providing

complainant with a light duty assignment on tour 2 for almost three years.

Accordingly, the agency's decision finding that it did not breach the

settlement agreement was proper and is AFFIRMED.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

February 19, 2004

__________________

Date