Sylvia Hall-Broden, Complainant,v.Anthony J. Principi, Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionOct 30, 2001
01994148 (E.E.O.C. Oct. 30, 2001)

01994148

10-30-2001

Sylvia Hall-Broden, Complainant, v. Anthony J. Principi, Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency.


Sylvia Hall-Broden v. Veterans Affairs

01994148

10-30-01

.

Sylvia Hall-Broden,

Complainant,

v.

Anthony J. Principi,

Secretary,

Department of Veterans Affairs,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01994148

Agency No. 98-2958

DECISION

INTRODUCTION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from a final agency decision

concerning her formal complaint of unlawful employment discrimination

in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII),

as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. The appeal is accepted pursuant

to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405. For the following reason, the final agency

decision is AFFIRMED.

ISSUE PRESENTED

The issue presented herein is whether complainant has proven

by preponderant evidence that she was harassed on the bases of sex

(female) and reprisal (prior EEO activity) when she was monitored and

singled out by her supervisor regarding her lunch break, her supervisor

breached the confidentially of a mediation session in which the two of

them participated, and she was given an unfair rating on an appraisal

for promotion.

BACKGROUND

At the time of this complaint, complainant was employed by the agency

as Supervisor, Income Verification Section, Customer Services Division,

GS-11. On December 11, 1997, her supervisor approached her to discuss

complainant's lunch breaks. During this discussion, the supervisor

pointed out that complainant had returned from lunch late on November 25,

December 2, December 3, and December 10, 1997. Complainant stated that

this is evidence that she was being watched, monitored, and singled out

by her supervisor regarding her lunch breaks. Complainant's supervisor

stated that she was not monitoring complainant's lunch breaks, but rather

was not able to find complainant on those dates and thus approached her to

discuss her lunch break. During this discussion, complainant's supervisor

informed complainant that it was complainant's responsibility to adhere

to the agency's policy regarding lunch breaks, and if she needed extra

time for lunch, she should have requested it, and it probably would

have been granted. Complainant's supervisor stated further that other

employees were counseled on the agency's lunch break policy as well.

On January 12, 1998, complainant, her supervisor, the Staff Director,

and complainant's attorney attended a mediation session regarding

another EEO complaint filed by complainant.<1> During the session,

complainant stated that she had a stomach disorder that she attributed

to work-related stress. At the conclusion of the session, those

in attendance signed an agreement which indicated that everything

discussed therein would remain confidential. The next day complainant

received a memorandum from her supervisor suggesting that complainant

complete the Notice of Occupational Disease and Claim Compensation form.

Complainant believed that it was inappropriate for her supervisor to

send her the form because it was her understanding that the issues

discussed at the mediation session would not be discussed further.

Complainant's supervisor stated that she suggested that complainant fill

out the form because all employees who claimed a work-related injury,

which is what she considered complainant's stomach illness to be in

light of the discussion that took place during the mediation session,

should fill out such a form. Complainant's supervisor stated further

that the memorandum, only one of which existed as it was not copied,

was hand-carried to and discussed with complainant in private so the

confidentiality of the mediation's contents was not breached.

On March 31, 1998, complainant's supervisor completed a supervisory

appraisal for promotion concerning complainant. In that appraisal,

complainant's supervisor rated complainant a �zero� in the category of

�skill in applying principles, practices, and techniques of education

training sufficient to develop, revise, and present a full range of

employment development courses.� On April 8, 1998, complainant applied

for the position of Employee Development Specialist (EDS). She stated

that her supervisor rated her a �zero� to keep complainant from getting

another position or getting a position that had mobility potential.

Complainant noted that in her previous evaluation for the rating period

that preceded the supervisory appraisal was �outstanding.� Complainant's

supervisor stated that complainant received only a �passing� evaluation

in her previous appraisal, and notwithstanding that, the performance

appraisal of employees for the year of performance does not equal a

supervisor's appraisal for promotion. Complainant's supervisor further

stated that she rated complainant a �zero� in the above-referenced

category because that category was not directly applicable to

complainant's job duties. Complainant admitted that when she inquired

about the supervisor appraisal for promotion, her supervisor told her

that the ratings were due to differences in her current position and

the EDS position.

Believing she had been the victim of discrimination regarding the

above-referenced employment actions, complainant initiated contact with

an EEO counselor. When the counseling session failed to resolve the

matter informally, complainant filed a formal complaint on February 26,

1996, in which she alleged that she had been discriminated against on the

above-referenced bases. The complaint was accepted for investigation.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was informed of her

right to elect either a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ)

or an immediate final agency decision. When complainant failed to make

an election, the agency issued a final agency decision in which it found

no discrimination. It is from that decision that complainant appeals.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Harassment

Harassment of an employee that would not occur but for the employee's

race, color, sex, national origin, age, disability, or religion is

unlawful. McKinney v. Dole, 765 F.2d 1129, 1138-1139 (D.C. Cir. 1985).

Complainant alleges that she was subjected to a hostile work environment

and harassment. To establish a claim of hostile environment harassment,

a complainant must show that: (1) s/he is a member of a statutorily

protected class; (2)s/he was subjected to harassment in the form of

unwelcome verbal or physical conduct involving the protected class;

(3) the harassment complained of was based on the statutorily protected

class; and (4) the harassment affected a term or condition of employment

and/or had the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with the

work environment and/or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive

work environment. Humphrey v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Appeal

No. 01965238 (October 16, 1998); 29 C.F.R. �1604.11.

Complainant alleged that she was harassed when her supervisor monitored

her lunch breaks, discussed the confidential contents of a mediation

session, and rated her lower than she should have on the supervisory

appraisal for promotion. However, she presented no evidence that any

of these acts, if true, were based on sex or reprisal. For that reason,

the Commission finds that she failed to establish a claim of harassment.

Disparate Treatment

In the absence of direct evidence of discrimination, the allocation of

burdens and order of presentation of proof in a Title VII case alleging

discrimination is a three-step process. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,

411 U.S. 792, 802-803 (1973); see, Hochstadt v. Worcester Foundation

for Experimental Biology, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 318 (D. Mass. 1976),

aff'd 545 F.2d 222 (1st Cir. 1976) (applying McDonnell Douglas to

retaliation cases). First, complainant must establish a prima facie

case of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained,

reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination; i.e., that a

prohibited consideration was a factor in the adverse employment action.

McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. Next, the agency must articulate a

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason(s) for its actions. Texas Department

of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). If the agency

is successful, then the complainant must prove, by a preponderance of

the evidence, that the legitimate reason(s) proffered by the agency was

a pretext for discrimination. Id. at 256.

Although the initial inquiry in a discrimination case usually focuses

on whether the complainant has established a prima facie case, following

this order of analysis is unnecessary when the agency has articulated a

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. See Washington

v. Department of the Navy, EEOC Petition No. 03900056 (May 31, 1990).

In such cases, the inquiry shifts from whether the complainant has

established a prima facie case to whether s/he has demonstrated by a

preponderance of the evidence that the agency's reasons for its actions

merely were a pretext for discrimination. Id.; see also United States

Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714-717 (1983).

Here, we find that the agency stated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons

for its actions. The complainant's supervisor stated that she did not

monitor complainant's work breaks, but counseled complainant regarding

the agency's lunch break policy when she could not find the complainant

when the supervisor needed to have a business related discussion with

complainant. The supervisor further stated that she did not divulge any

of the confidentiality agreements of the mediation session, but simply

advised complainant, in private, to fill out the Notice of Occupational

Disease and Claim Compensation form in light of what appeared to be

a Worker's Compensation claim. Finally, the supervisor stated that

complainant's supervisory performance appraisal for promotion was not the

same as her performance appraisal for the year because the two appraisals

served different purposes and concerned different skills.

Because the agency has proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for

the alleged discriminatory events, complainant now bears the burden of

establishing that the agency's stated reasons were merely a pretext for

discrimination. Shapiro v. Social Security Administration, EEOC Request

No. 05960403 (December 6, 1996). Complainant can do this by showing

that the agency was motivated by a discriminatory reason. Id. (citing

St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993)). In this case,

complainant has failed to meet that burden. Complainant submitted no

evidence which suggests that the agency's stated reasons are a pretext

to mask unlawful discrimination. For that reason, her claim of being

treated differently based on race and reprisal fails.

CONCLUSION

Therefore, after a careful review of the record, including complainant's

contentions on appeal, the agency's response thereto, and arguments and

evidence not specifically addressed in this decision, we hereby AFFIRM

the final agency decision.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

___10-30-01_______________

Date

1That complaint, filed on December 2, 1996, concerned a nonpromotion.