0120110468
05-16-2012
Sylvia E. Ragland-Carter, Complainant, v. Patrick R. Donahoe, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Eastern Area), Agency.
Sylvia E. Ragland-Carter,
Complainant,
v.
Patrick R. Donahoe,
Postmaster General,
United States Postal Service
(Eastern Area),
Agency.
Appeal No. 0120110468
Hearing No. 530-2008-00329X
Agency No. 1C-192-0022-07
DECISION
Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405, the Commission accepts Complainant's appeal from the Agency's October 13, 2010 final order concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the final order.
BACKGROUND
At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as a Manager, Distribution Operations at the Bulk Mail Center (BMC) in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. In September 2006, the Agency conducted a climate assessment at the Philadelphia BMC. The climate assessment concluded that most of the workplace complaints were centered on Complainant's and another manager's behavior. Managers, supervisors and craft employees complained that Complainant used profanity, made threats, and showed favoritism in scheduling. On September 8, 2006, Complainant was temporarily assigned to the Philadelphia Air Mail Facility pending the outcome of a management investigation at the Philadelphia BMC. On August 10, 2007, the BMC Plant Manager (M1) ordered Complainant to return to the Philadelphia BMC.
Upon her return on August 13, 2007, Complainant was issued a Performance Improvement Plan (PIP), which she refused to sign. Additionally, M1 instructed Complainant to submit all leave requests in advance and ordered her to complete a series of eLearning classes. M1 subsequently met with BMC supervisors to inform them of Complainant's return and encouraged them to report any problems they encountered with her.
On October 9, 2007, Complainant filled out a leave request for the next day, October 10, 2007, and asked another employee to submit it for her. On October 10, 2007, M1 denied the leave request because Complainant failed to submit the request in advance.
On January 22, 2008, Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that the Agency discriminated against and subjected her to a hostile work environment on the bases of sex (female) and in reprisal for prior protected EEO activity when:
1. On August 13, 2007, Complainant was ordered to return to work at the Philadelphia BMC, issued a Letter of Instruction and placed on a PIP;
2. On August 13 and 14, 2007, M1 subjected her to a hostile work environment when she discussed Complainant's return to the Philadelphia BMC with subordinate supervisors; and
3. On October 10, 2007, Complainant was denied leave.
At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the report of investigation (ROI) and notice of her right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant timely requested a hearing. Over Complainant's objections, the AJ assigned to the case granted the Agency's motion and issued a decision without a hearing on September 14, 2010.
In her decision, the AJ assumed arguendo that Complainant had established a prima facie case of discrimination and determined that the Agency had articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. The AJ concluded that Complainant had presented no evidence showing that the Agency's reasons were pretextual. The AJ further determined that the alleged incidents were not sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile work environment. As a result, the AJ held that Complainant had not been discriminated or retaliated against as alleged. The Agency subsequently issued a final order fully adopting the AJ's decision. Complainant submitted no arguments on appeal.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
AJ's Issuance of a Decision without a Hearing
The Commission must first determine whether it was appropriate for the AJ to have issued a decision without a hearing on this record. The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after the summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment is appropriate where a court determines that, given the substantive legal and evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exists no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court's function is not to weigh the evidence but rather to determine whether there are genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249. The evidence of the non-moving party must be believed at the summary judgment stage and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor. Id. at 255. An issue of fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving party. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is "material" if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case.
Upon review of the record, the Commission determines that there are no genuine issues of material fact or any credibility issues which required a hearing and therefore the AJ's issuance of a decision without a hearing was appropriate. When a party moves for a decision without a hearing, such as the Agency did here, the non-moving party's opposition must consist of more than bare assertions, general denials, conclusory allegations or mere suspicion and must be supported by affidavits or other competent evidence setting forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for hearing. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. Complainant failed to show that there was a genuine issue of material fact in this case. Thus, the Commission finds that the AJ's issuance of a decision without a hearing was appropriate.
Disparate Treatment
To prevail in a disparate treatment claim such as this, Complainant must satisfy the three-part evidentiary scheme fashioned by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). She must generally establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that she was subjected to an adverse employment action under circumstances that would support an inference of discrimination. Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). The prima facie inquiry may be dispensed with in this case, however, since the Agency has articulated legitimate and nondiscriminatory reasons for its conduct. See U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-17 (1983); Holley v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05950842 (Nov. 23, 1997). To ultimately prevail, Complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Agency's explanation is a pretext for discrimination. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133. 143 (2000); St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502. 519 (1993); Tx. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981); Holley v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05950842 (Nov. 13, 1997); Pavelka v. Dep't of the Navy, EEOC Request No. 05950351 (Dec. 14, 1995).
In the instant case, the Commission agrees with the AJ that the Agency articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. Specifically, a workplace climate assessment revealed that managers, supervisors and craft employees complained that Complainant did not assign overtime fairly, made threats and racial comments, and used profanity. ROI, Ex. 3. The Workplace Improvement Analyst concluded that most of the negative perceptions at the Philadelphia BMC were centered on Complainant. Id. M1 affirmed that when Complainant returned to the Philadelphia BMC, she was given a memorandum which showed her work schedule for the week (not a Letter of Instruction) and a PIP. ROI, at 176. Further, M1 stated that Complainant was issued the PIP to correct her performance deficiencies. Id.
In addition, M1 asserted that she met with the supervisors and informed them of Complainant's return to the facility as a Manager. ROI, at 178. M1 avowed that the purpose was to inform the supervisors of what she expected them to do if they encountered problems with Complainant or any other manager. Id. M1 denied that she later checked up on Complainant; rather, she stated that she visited the supervisors to ask if they were having any difficulties in their positions with any of their managers and if they were getting the resources they needed. Id. M1 contended that she did not constantly question Complainant's work performance, but she did question all managers daily to gain information on daily operations and for planning purposes. Id.
Finally, in regard to the denial of leave, M1 noted that she met with Complainant when she returned to the Philadelphia BMC to discuss her work schedule while completing eLearning courses and the policy regarding requesting personal time in advance. ROI, at 179. M1 affirmed that on October 9, 2007, Complainant saw her several different times that day and failed to request leave at any point. Id. M1 did not receive the leave request until the day for which it was requested, and as a result, it was denied. Id.
Because the Agency has proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the alleged discriminatory events, Complainant now bears the burden of establishing that the Agency's stated reasons are merely a pretext for discrimination. Shapiro v. Soc. Sec. Admin., EEOC Request No. 05960403 (Dec. 6, 1996). Complainant can do this directly by showing that the Agency's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence. Tx. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256. Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to Complainant, the Commission finds that the record is devoid of any evidence that Complainant's protected classes were a factor in any of the Agency's actions. At all times, the ultimate burden remains with Complainant to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the Agency's reasons were not the real reasons and that the Agency acted on the basis of discriminatory or retaliatory animus. Complainant has failed to carry this burden. Accordingly, the Commission finds that Complainant has failed to show that she was discriminated or retaliated against as alleged.
Hostile Work Environment
Finally, to the extent that Complainant contends that she was subjected to a hostile work environment with respect to the matters herein, the Commission find that under the standards set forth in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993), Complainant's claim of hostile work environment must fail. See Enforcement Guidance on Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., EEOC Notice No. 915.002 (Mar. 8, 1994). A finding of a hostile work environment is precluded by the Commission's determination that Complainant failed to establish that any of the actions taken by the Agency were motivated by discriminatory or retaliatory animus. See Oakley v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 01982923 (Sept. 21, 2000).
CONCLUSION
After a review of the record in its entirety, including consideration of all statements submitted on appeal, it is the decision of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to AFFIRM the Agency's final order, because the Administrative Judge's issuance of a decision without a hearing was appropriate and a preponderance of the record evidence does not establish that discrimination occurred.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0610)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the Agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at 9-18 (Nov. 9, 1999). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0610)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File a Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
May 16, 2012
Date
2
0120110468
U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of Federal Operations
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, DC 20013