Statoil Petroleum AS

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Mar 4, 2020

14365290 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Mar. 4, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/365,290 06/13/2014 Susann Wienecke 3912-0191PUS1 6889
127226 7590 03/04/2020
BIRCH, STEWART, KOLASCH & BIRCH, LLP
8110 Gatehouse Road
Suite 100 East
Falls Church, VA 22042-1248
EXAMINER
JOHANSEN, JOHN E
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2127
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
03/04/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
mailroom@bskb.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte SUSANN WIENECKE and CHRISTOPHER STADTLER 1
___________

Appeal 2018-007517
Application 14/365,290
Technology Center 2100

____________

Before CAROLYN D. THOMAS, CARL W. WHITEHEAD JR. and
MICHAEL J. STRAUSS, Administrative Patent Judges.

WHITEHEAD JR., Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant is appealing the final rejection of claims 1–6, 8–17, 19,
20, 22, and 23 under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a). Appeal Brief 26. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42(a). Appellant identifies STATOIL PETROLEUM AS as the real
party in interest. Appeal Brief 1.
Appeal 2018-007517
Application 14/365,290
2

Introduction
According to Appellant, “the present invention relates to a method of
and apparatus for identifying anomalous areas of the Earth’s crust.”
Specification 1.
Representative Claim
1. A method for use in identifying anomalous areas of the
lower crust of a region of the earth, each anomalous area of the
lower crust being an area of interest for further exploration, and
for use in exploring at least one area of interest to determine the
presence of oil and/or gas, the method comprising:
providing information relating to a geometry of a Moho
for the region, the Moho representing a transition between the
upper mantle and the lower crust for the region,
determining a geometry of an intra-crustal layer for the
region, the intra-crustal layer representing a transition between
the lower crust and the middle or upper crust for the region,
using observed gravity data to determine a density
distribution between the intra-crustal layer and the Moho,
comparing the determined density distribution to a
reference density distribution or reference density value for the
lower crust, the comparison enabling the identification of
anomalous areas of the lower crust for the region, wherein each
of the anomalous areas of the lower crust is an area of interest
for further exploration using seismic measurements or drilling,
and
exploring at least one area of interest based on the
identification of anomalous areas of the lower crust for the
region to determine the presence of oil and/or gas by
performing seismic measurements on, or drilling in, the at least
one area of interest.

Appeal 2018-007517
Application 14/365,290
3

References
Name Reference Date
Ellis US 2013/0289958 A1 October 31, 2013
Ranalli Ranalli et al., “Rheological
stratification of the
lithosphere” Tectonophysics,
132 281–95.
1987

Rejections on Appeal
Claims 1–6, 8–17, 19, 20, 22, and 23 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 as being directed to patent ineligible subject matter. Final Action 25–
31.
Claims 14 and 23 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112 (pre-AIA),
second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and
distinctly claim the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor, or
for pre-AIA the Appellant, regards as the invention. Final Action 31–33.
Claims 1–6, 8–17, 19, 20, 22, and 23 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Ranalli and Ellis. Final Action 34–50.

ANALYSIS
Rather than reiterate the arguments of Appellant and the Examiner,
we refer to the Appeal Brief (filed March 1, 2018), the Final Action (mailed
July 26, 2017) and the Answer (mailed May 9, 2018), for the respective
details.

Appeal 2018-007517
Application 14/365,290
4

35 U.S.C. § 101 Rejection
PRINCIPLES OF LAW
A. Section 101
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the U.S. Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to
include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573
U.S. 208, 216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Court’s two-part framework, described in Mayo and Alice.
Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.,
566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, we first
determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at
219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
Appeal 2018-007517
Application 14/365,290
5

(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making waterproof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not
become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula.”
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We view respondents’ claims as
nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an
attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having said that, the Court
also indicated that a claim “seeking patent protection for that formula in the
abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, and this
principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the
formula to a particular technological environment.” Id. (citation omitted)
(citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that
an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known
structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second part
of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the elements of
the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient
to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application.”
Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted). “A claim that recites an
abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is
more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id.
(alterations in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely
Appeal 2018-007517
Application 14/365,290
6

requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that
abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
B. USPTO Section 101 Guidance
In January 2019, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
published revised guidance on the application of § 101. 2019 Revised Patent
Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019)
(“2019 Revised Guidance”).2 “All USPTO personnel are, as a matter of
internal agency management, expected to follow the guidance.” Id. at 51;
see also October 2019 Update at 1.
Under the 2019 Revised Guidance and the October 2019 Update, we
first look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract
ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing
human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental
processes) (“Step 2A, Prong One”); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th ed.
Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018)) (“Step 2A, Prong Two”).3

2 In response to received public comments, the Office issued further
guidance on October 17, 2019, clarifying the 2019 Revised Guidance.
USPTO, October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (the “October
2019 Update”) (available at
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019_update.p
df).
3 This evaluation is performed by (a) identifying whether there are any
additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception, and
(b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to
Appeal 2018-007517
Application 14/365,290
7

2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55.
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look, under
Step 2B, to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not
“well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of
generality, to the judicial exception.
2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–56.
The Examiner determines 1–6, 8–17, 19, 20, 22, and 23 are rejected
under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to a judicial exception (i.e., an
abstract idea) without significantly more. Final Action 25; see Alice, 573
U.S. at 217 (describing the two-step framework “for distinguishing patents
that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those
that claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts”).
We are not persuaded the Examiner’s rejection is in error. Unless
otherwise indicated, we adopt the Examiner’s findings and conclusions as
our own. We add the following primarily for emphasis and clarification
with respect to the Revised Guidance.
Alice/Mayo—Step 1 (Abstract Idea)
Step 2A–Prongs 1 and 2 identified in the Revised Guidance
Step 2A, Prong One

determine whether the claim as a whole integrates the exception into a
practical application. See 2019 Revised Guidance - Section III(A)(2), 84
Fed. Reg. 54–55.
Appeal 2018-007517
Application 14/365,290
8

Appellant contends the claims are not directed to an abstract idea. See
Appeal Brief 10 (“[C]laim 1, when considered as a whole and in light of the
Specification, is not directed to any judicial exception, but recites a concrete
technological implementation to solve a technological problem, and is
directed to an improved technological process.”).
The Specification discloses in the background section that “[i]n
obtaining geological information about less explored areas of the Earth, it is
desirable to obtain a wide-angle view of the Earth’s features” and “[o]ne
approach is to consider the flexural rigidity of the crust by observing and
modelling the flexure of crustal plates and the presence of tectonic
structures.” Specification 1. The Specification further discloses that:
[T]he presence of a mountain on a crustal plate suggests
that the plate is bending under the load of the mountain. The
bending is resisted by the stiffness of the plate to reach an
equilibrium point. This stiffness is described mathematically by
flexural rigidity, denoted D, which is derived from the linear
stiffness, termed Young’s Modulus, denoted E.
Specification 1.
The Specification discloses in regard to the claimed invention: “First
and second different geometries for the intra-crustal layer can be used, with
the density distribution being determined using some combination of the
first and second geometries.” Specification 20; Appeal Brief 3. The
Specification provides an example:
[T]he step of calculating the NDF [normalized density
factors] can be divided into several steps to produce a combined
NDF. With such a scheme, in a first step the NDFs is calculated
between the seismic ICL [intra-crustal layer] (9) (first geometry)
and the Moho (11), and in a second step NDFi is calculated
Appeal 2018-007517
Application 14/365,290
9

between the isostatic ICL (8) (second geometry) and the Moho4
[Mohorovicic discontinuity] (11).
Specification 20.
Claim 1 recites a method for identifying anomalous areas of the lower
crust within a region of Earth for use in exploring at least one area of interest
to determine the presence of oil and/or gas wherein:
[1] providing information relating to a geometry of a Moho for
the region, the Moho representing a transition between the upper
mantle and the lower crust for the region,

[2] determining a geometry of an intra-crustal layer for the
region, the intra-crustal layer representing a transition between
the lower crust and the middle or upper crust for the region,

[3] using observed gravity data to determine a density
distribution between the intra-crustal layer and the Moho,

[4] comparing the determined density distribution to a reference
density distribution or reference density value for the lower crust,
the comparison enabling the identification of anomalous areas of
the lower crust for the region, wherein each of the anomalous
areas of the lower crust is an area of interest for further
exploration using seismic measurements or drilling.

These steps comprise utilizing “Mathematical concepts—
mathematical relationships, mathematical formulas or equations,
mathematical calculations” Revised Guidance, Section I (Groupings of
Abstract Ideas); see Specification 20–26. Our reviewing court has found
claims to be directed to abstract ideas when they recited similar subject

4 Moho “is the boundary between the Earth’s crust (both oceanic and
continental) and the upper mantle. The Moho’s position will depend on the
isostatic balance of the topographic external load which causes the plate to
bend, the internal load variations of the plate, the stiffness (flexural
rigidity) of the plate and the restoring force of the mantle.” Specification 1.
Appeal 2018-007517
Application 14/365,290
10

matter. See Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86,
94 (1939) (“[A] scientific truth, or the mathematical expression of it, is not
patentable invention.”); SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161,
1163 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (holding that claims to a “series of mathematical
calculations based on selected information” are directed to abstract ideas);
Digitech Image Techs., LLC v. Elecs. for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344, 1350
(Fed. Cir. 2014) (holding that claims to a “process of organizing information
through mathematical correlations” are directed to an abstract idea);
Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can. (U.S.), 687 F.3d
1266, 1280 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (identifying the concept of “managing a stable
value protected life insurance policy by performing calculations and
manipulating the results” as an abstract idea). Therefore, we conclude the
claims recite an abstract idea pursuant to Step 2A, Prong One of the Revised
Guidance. See Revised Guidance, Section III(A)(1) (Prong One: Evaluate
Whether the Claim Recites a Judicial Exception).
Step 2A, Prong Two (Integration into a Practical Application)
Step 2A, Prong Two
Under Prong Two of the Revised Guidance, we must determine
“whether the claim as a whole integrates the recited judicial exception
into a practical application of the exception.” It is noted that a “claim that
integrates a judicial exception into a practical application will apply, rely on,
or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on
the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort
designed to monopolize the judicial exception.” Revised Guidance, Section
III(A)(2).
Appeal 2018-007517
Application 14/365,290
11

Appellant contends, “according to the guidelines for determining what
the claim is directed to, provided by the Federal Circuit in Enfish5 and
McRO, the Examiner is respectfully requested to consider the claim as a
whole in view of the Specification.” Appeal Brief 12. Appellant further
contends:
[I]n view of McRO6 and Diehr, claim 1 in the present case, when
considered as a whole and in view of the Specification, provides
a concrete and technological implementation to solve a
technological problem, recites a practical use of the claimed
method, and is directed to a patentable, technological
improvement over the existing technology, and therefore is not
directed to an abstract idea.
Appeal Brief 17.
In McRO, the Federal Circuit concluded that the claim, when
considered as a whole, was directed to a “technological improvement over
the existing, manual 3–D animation techniques” through the “use[] [of]
limited rules . . . specifically designed to achieve an improved technological
result in conventional industry practice.” McRO, 837 F.3d at 1316; see
Appeal Brief 12–13. Specifically, the Federal Circuit found that the claimed
rules allow computers to produce accurate and realistic lip synchronization
and facial expressions in animated characters that previously could only be
produced by human animators; and the rules are limiting because they define
morph weight sets as a function of phoneme sub–sequences. McRO, 837
F.3d at 1313.

5 Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
6 McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1303 (Fed.
Cir. 2016).
Appeal 2018-007517
Application 14/365,290
12

We find insufficient evidence of record here that the present situation
is like the one in McRO where computers were unable to make certain
subjective determinations, i.e., regarding morph weight and phoneme
timings, which could only be made prior to the claimed invention by human
animators. See Appeal Brief 12–13. The Background section of the McRO
‘576 patent includes a description of the admitted prior art method and the
shortcomings associated with that prior method. See McRO, 837 F.3d at
1303–06. There is no comparable discussion in Appellant’s Specification or
elsewhere of record. Subsequently, we ascertain no additional element (or
combination of elements) recited in Appellant’s representative claim 1 that
integrates the judicial exception into a practical application. See Revised
Guidance, Section III(A)(2); see also MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h).
We note that a finding of novelty or non-obviousness does not require
the conclusion that the claimed subject matter is patent-eligible. Although
the second step in the Mayo/Alice framework is termed a search for an
“inventive concept,” the analysis is not an evaluation of novelty or
nonobviousness, but, rather, is a search for “an element or combination of
elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to
significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.’” Alice,
573 U.S. at 217–18 (alteration in original). “Groundbreaking, innovative, or
even brilliant discovery does not by itself satisfy the § 101 inquiry.” Ass’n
for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 591 (2013).
A novel and nonobvious claim directed to a purely abstract idea is,
nonetheless, patent ineligible. See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 90; see also Diehr, 450
U.S. at 188–89 (“The ‘novelty’ of any element or steps in a process, or even
of the process itself, is of no relevance in determining whether the subject
Appeal 2018-007517
Application 14/365,290
13

matter of a claim falls within the § 101 categories of possibly patentable
subject matter.”); see also Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1335–36 (“[W]e find it
relevant to ask whether the claims are directed to an improvement to
computer functionality versus being directed to an abstract idea . . . the focus
of the claims is on the specific asserted improvement in computer
capabilities (i.e., the self-referential table for a computer database) or,
instead, on a process that qualifies as an ‘abstract idea’ for which computers
are invoked merely as a tool.”).
Accordingly, we determine the claim does not integrate the recited
judicial exception into a practical application. See Revised Guidance,
Section III(A)(2) (Prong Two: If the Claim Recites a Judicial Exception,
Evaluate Whether the Judicial Exception Is Integrated Into a Practical
Application).
Alice/Mayo—Step 2 (Inventive Concept)
Step 2B identified in the Revised Guidance
Step 2B
Next, we determine whether the claim includes additional elements
that provide significantly more than the recited judicial exception, thereby
providing an inventive concept. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (quoting Mayo,
566 U.S. at 72–73).
We do not find that claim 1 recites additional elements that provide
significantly more than the recited judicial exception. See Revised
Guidance, Section III(B); see also Appeal Brief 18. Further, in Bascom7, our
reviewing court found that, while the claims of the patent were directed to an

7 Bascom Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341
(Fed. Cir. 2016.).
Appeal 2018-007517
Application 14/365,290
14

abstract idea, the patentee alleged an “inventive concept can be found in the
ordered combination of [the] claim limitations that transform the abstract
idea of filtering content into a particular, practical application of that abstract
idea.” Bascom, 827 F.3d at 1352. In particular, the patent claimed “a
technology-based solution (not an abstract-idea-based solution implemented
with generic technical components in a conventional way) to filter content
on the Internet that overcomes existing problems with other Internet filtering
systems.” Bascom, 827 F.3d at 1351. Claim 1 is immediately
distinguishable, as it recites an abstract-idea-based solution that identifies
anomalous areas of Earth’s regions using mathematical concepts. Therefore,
we are not persuaded that ordered combinations of steps in claim 1 provide
an inventive concept. See Revised Guidance at 56.
Accordingly, we conclude claims 1–6, 8–17, 19, 20, 22, and 23 are
directed to using Mathematical concepts—mathematical relationships,
mathematical formulas or equations, mathematical calculations identified in
the Revised Guidance and are therefore directed to an abstract idea wherein
the claims do not recite limitations that amount to significantly more than
the abstract idea itself. We sustain the Examiner’s § 101 rejection of claims
1–6, 8–17, 19, 20, 22, and 23.

35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, Rejection
Claim 14 is reproduced below:
14. A method of assessing the likelihood of or potential
for oil and/or gas fields in a region of the earth, comprising
using the determined density distribution or the output of the
comparing step or the determined amount of anomalousness
according to claim 13.
Appeal 2018-007517
Application 14/365,290
15

Appellant contends: “The Examiner asserts that the term ‘likelihood
of’ in claim 14 is a relative term which renders the claim indefinite.
Appellant respectfully disagrees and submits that the skilled person would
not find any lack of clarity.” Appeal Brief 5. The Examiner determines that
“[t]he term “likelihood of” is not defined by the claim, the specification
does not provide a standard for ascertaining the requisite degree, and one of
ordinary skill in the art would not be reasonably apprised of the scope of the
invention.” Final Action 32.
Appellant argues, “Since the prediction of claim 14 cannot provide
absolute certainty, it is clear that the prediction must provide a likelihood or
a measure of potential (i.e., a point on the spectrum between absolute
certainty of presence, and absolute certainty of absence) in accordance with
the ordinary meaning of the recitation of ‘likelihood of or potential for.’
Appeal Brief 5. We agree with Appellant that one of ordinary skill in the art
would have understood the term “likelihood of” to mean a measure of
certainty of the prediction. We find that the claim language clearly defines
the boundaries of what constitutes the invention. See MPEP §§ 2171–2174.
Claim 23 is reproduced below:
23. The method as claimed in claim 14, wherein the oil
and/or gas fields are giant oil and/or gas fields.
Appellant further contends: “The Examiner asserts that the term
‘giant’ in claim 23 is a relative term which renders the claim indefinite.
Appellant respectfully disagrees and submits that the skilled person would
not find any lack of clarity.” Appeal Brief 6–8. The Examiner determines:
The term ‘giant’ is not defined by the claim, the
specification does not provide a standard for ascertaining the
requisite degree, and one of ordinary skill in the art would not be
Appeal 2018-007517
Application 14/365,290
16

reasonably apprised of the scope of the invention. The term
‘giant’ implies a large size and does not quantify how large it
would be.
Final Action 33.
An applicant for patent may be his own lexicographer so long as an
applicant for patent clearly sets forth in applicant's specification the
definition applicant intends for a particular claim term, even when that
definition is different from the conventional, art-recognized
definition. Beachcombers, Int. v. WildWoode Creative Products, Inc., 31
F.3d 1154, 1158, 31 USPQ2d 1653 (Fed. Cir. 1994); ZMI Corp. v. Cardiac
Resuscitator Corp., 844 F.2d 1576, 1579, 6 USPQ2d 1557, 1560 (Fed. Cir.
1988); Envirotech Corp. v. Al George, Inc., 730 F.2d 753, 759, 221 USPQ
473, 477 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Appellant defines the disputed term as follows:
“Giant oil and gas fields are considered those with 500 million barrels of
ultimately recoverable oil or gas equivalent.” Specification 11 (lines 6–7).
We find Appellant has provided a definition of the disputed term that clearly
sets forth the meaning of a giant oil and/or gas fields. See MPEP §§ 2171–
2174.

35 U.S.C. § 103(a) Rejection
Appellant contends that Ranalli fails to disclose “using observed
gravity data to determine a density distribution between the intra-crustal
layer and the Moho,” as recited in claim 1. Appeal Brief 20, 21. Appellant
argues that “Ranalli only refers to a specific density value, not a density
distribution between the intra-crustal layer and the Moho.” Appeal Brief 20,
21. The Examiner finds that “Ranalli teaches a density over a region as
demonstrated by Fig. 11.” Answer 17. The Examiner finds:
Appeal 2018-007517
Application 14/365,290
17

... using observed gravity data to determine a density
distribution between the intra-crustal layer and the Moho ... (On
page 291 left column paragraph 1, Ranalli teaches to use the
observed gravity to determine density distribution and
models it in Fig. 11. “This lithology is consistent ... with the
density determined from gravity models ...”).
Final Action 35.
Renalli discloses: This lithology is consistent with the
seismic velocity (around 6.5 km s-1 from 5 to 40 km) measured
in seismic refraction surveys (Chandra and Cumming, 1972;
Berry and Forsyth, 1975; Cumming, 1977; Mereu et al., 1977)
and with the density determined from gravity models (2.9 to 3.0
x 103kg m-3; Stacey, 1973).

Renalli 291; Chandra, N.N. and Cumming, G.L., Seismic refraction studies
in western Canada., Can. J. Earth Sci., 9:1099–1109 (1972); Berry, M.J. and
Forsyth, D.A., Structure of the Canadian Cordillera from seismic refraction
and other data, Can. J. Earth Sci., 12:182–208 (1975); Cumming, W B.,
Crustal structure from a seismic refraction profile across southern British
Columbia, Ph. D. Thesis, University of British Columbia, Vancouver. B.C.
82 pp. (1977) (unpublished); Mereu, R.F. et al., The structure of the crust
and upper mantle under the highest ranges in the Canadian Rockies from a
seismic refraction survey, Can. J. Earth Sci., 14:196–208 (1977).

Renalli’s Figure 11 is reproduced below:
Appeal 2018-007517
Application 14/365,290
18

Strength vs. depth profiles at five locations in the
continental margin sequence before and after emplacement of
Terrane I are shown in Figs. 11 and 12. In these profiles, the
supracrustal basaltic volcanics and sediments and oceanic crustal
basement of Terrane I are modelled with the rheology of diabase.
The supracrustal sediments of the continental margin sequence,
although heterogeneous, contain a significant proportion of
coarse grained, quartzo-feldspathic clastic rocks and are
therefore modelled with a wet granite rheology. The crustal
basement of the continental margin sequence and the craton is
modelled with the rheology of a plagioclase-rich, quartz-poor,
intermediate to basic igneous rock (diorite or anorthosite).
Ranalli 290–91.
We find Appellant’s arguments persuasive because Ranalli appears to
indicate only a specific density value collected from a reference. See Ranalli
291 (Stacey8, 1973). However, it is not evident that Ranalli discloses a

8 Stacey, R.A., Gravity anomalies, crustal structure and plate tectonics in
the Canadian Cordillera, Can. J. Earth Sci., 10:615–28 (1973).
Appeal 2018-007517
Application 14/365,290
19

density distribution between the intra-crustal layer and the Moho as recited
in claim 1. Ellis does not address Ranalli’s deficiency. See Final Action
36–37. Accordingly, we reverse the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of
independent claim 1, as well as, independent claim 19 commensurate in
scope. We also reverse the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of dependent
claims 2–6, 8–17, 20, 22, and 23.

CONCLUSION
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–6, 8–17,
19, 20, 22,
23
101 Eligibility 1–6, 8–17,
19, 20, 22,
23

29–34 112, second
paragraph
Indefiniteness 14, 23
1–6, 8–17,
19, 20, 22,
23
103(a) Ranalli, Ellis 1–6, 8–17,
19, 20, 22,
23
Overall
Outcome
1–6, 8–17,
19, 20, 22,
23

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(v).

AFFIRMED