Spencer T.,1 Complainant,v.Elaine L. Chao, Secretary, Department of Transportation (Federal Aviation Administration), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

Aug 2, 2019

0120180241 (E.E.O.C. Aug. 2, 2019)

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of Federal Operations
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, DC 20013

Spencer T.,1
Complainant,

v.

Elaine L. Chao,
Secretary,
Department of Transportation
(Federal Aviation Administration),
Agency.

Appeal No. 0120180241

Agency No. 2016-26774-FAA-03

DECISION

On October 20, 2017, Complainant, through counsel, filed a timely appeal with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commission), pursuant to 29 C.F.R. §
1614.403(a), from the Agency’s September 26, 2017 decision concerning his equal employment
opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. For the
reasons which follow, the Commission AFFIRMS the Agency’s decision.

ISSUE PRESENTED

Whether Complainant showed by a preponderance of the evidence that he was subjected to an
unlawfully hostile work environment and that he was not selected for a position for discriminatory
reasons?

BACKGROUND

At the time giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked for the Agency’s Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) as a Civil Engineer (also referred to as a Program Analyst) at Jackson Evers
International Airport in Jackson, Mississippi.

1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant’s name
when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission’s website.
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On May 11, 2016, Complainant filed a discrimination complaint alleging that the Agency
discriminated against him on the bases of age (56) and reprisal for prior protected EEO activity
when:

A. The Agency subjected Complainant to a hostile work environment when the following
incidents occurred:

1. In 2008, his second level supervisor questioned the age of people Complainant dated,
showed hostility toward him by making condescending remarks about his daughter in 2010
and insisted that he not use crutches in the office after his surgery in 2011.
2. On May 7, 2014, his first level supervisor told him that he used the wrong code for his
Consolidated Automated System for Time and Labor Entry (CASTLE). When
Complainant explained that he had trouble reading the small font, his supervisor laughingly
said, “We’re all old now.”
3. On October 29, 2014, a coworker told Complainant that he was going to get a reputation
for filing discrimination complaints.
4. On January 15, 2015, his flash drive containing his EEO case file was taken.
5. On May 7, 2014 and April 20, 2015, his first and second level supervisors made jokes
directly related to his discrimination complaints.
6. On December 14, 2015, his first level supervisor increased his workload when he was
fully aware that Complainant was working on four discrimination cases.
7. His first level supervisor forced him to attend a work-related meeting on his telework
day.

B. On March 8, 2016, he learned that he was not selected for the position of Lead Civil
Engineer announced under Vacancy Announcement # ASO-ARP-16-B025-44470.

Between August 15 and January 2017, the Agency conducted an investigation. It issued its Report
of Investigation (ROI) on February 7, 2017 which was received by Complainant on February 9,
2017. When the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the report of investigation, the
Agency also provided Complainant with notice of his right to request a hearing before an Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission Administrative Judge or to request an Agency decision.
Complainant requested an Agency decision. The Agency issued its decision pursuant to 29 C.F.R.
§ 1614.110(b). Therein, the Agency concluded that Complainant failed to prove that the Agency
subjected him to discrimination as alleged.

CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL

Complainant contends that the Investigator assigned to the complaint was biased and not objective;
failed to conduct a complete investigation of 45 incidents of alleged harassment; failed to interview
witnesses; and produced only summaries of affidavits to Complainant.

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Complainant also challenges the framing of his non-selection claim and maintains that each of the
incidents identified in the Agency’s decision, and which he addresses, establish that the Agency
discriminated against him. He also identified new harassment claims that he alleged that he
provided to the Investigator that were not considered.
The Agency urges that its decision finding no discrimination be affirmed. The Agency asserts that
it properly found that Complainant failed to prove that he was subjected to an unlawfully hostile
work environment, noting that the incidents of which Complainant complained were not severe or
pervasive; and that he was not selected because he was not ranked highly in the interview process.
The Agency also contends that claims being raised for the first time on appeal should not be
considered.2

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Standard of Review

This is an appeal from a decision issued without a hearing, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110(b),
the Agency's decision is subject to de novo review by the Commission. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a).
See Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614, at Chapter 9,
§ VI.A. (Aug. 5, 2015) (explaining that the de novo standard of review “requires that the
Commission examine the record without regard to the factual and legal determinations of the
previous decision maker,” and that EEOC “review the documents, statements, and testimony of
record, including any timely and relevant submissions of the parties, and . . . issue its decision
based on the Commission’s own assessment of the record and its interpretation of the law”).

Applicable Law

1. Disparate Treatment

In the absence of direct evidence of discrimination, a discrimination claim is analyzed under the
three-part analysis first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973). For a complainant to prevail, he must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination
by presenting facts that, if unexplained, reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e.,
that a prohibited consideration was a factor in the adverse employment action. See McDonnell
Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). The burden
then shifts to the agency to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. See
Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). Once the agency
has met its burden, the complainant bears the ultimate responsibility to persuade the fact finder by
a preponderance of the evidence that the agency acted on the basis of a prohibited reason. See St.
Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).

2 Complainant replied to the Agency’s brief which the Agency opposed. Our regulations do not
provide for Complainant to make this submission. Moreover, we exercise our discretion not to do
so.
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This established order of analysis in discrimination cases, in which the first step normally consists
of determining the existence of a prima facie case, need not be followed in all cases. Where the
agency has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions, the factual inquiry
can proceed directly to the third step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis to the ultimate issue of
whether complainant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the agency's actions were
motivated by discrimination. See U.S. Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S.
711, 713-714 (1983).

2. Hostile Work Environment

Complainant also alleged that he was subjected an unlawfully hostile work environment. A
harassment claim is examined under the standards set forth in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510
U.S. 17, 21 (1993). See also Enforcement Guidance on Harris v. Forklift Systems. Inc., EEOC
Notice No. 915.002 (Mar. 8, 1994). To establish this claim, a complainant must show that: (1) he
belongs to a statutorily protected class; (2) he was subjected to harassment in the form of
unwelcome verbal or physical conduct involving the protected class; (3) the harassment
complained of was based on his statutorily protected class; (4) the harassment affected a term or
condition of employment and/or had the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with the
work environment and/or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment; and (5)
there is a basis for imputing liability. A hostile work environment exists when the workplace is
permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or
pervasive to alter the condition of the complainant's employment. See Harris, supra; see also
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Svcs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998).

The Court in Harris explained that an “objectively hostile or abusive work environment [is created
when] a reasonable person would find [it] hostile or abusive” and the complainant subjectively
perceives it as such. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-22. Whether the harassment is sufficiently severe to
trigger a violation must be determined by looking at all the circumstances, including “the
frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or
humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an
employee's work performance.” Id. at 23.

3. Reprisal

Complainant has also alleged that he was subjected to reprisal and has identified incidents that
allegedly occurred as evidence of prohibited actions.

In accordance with the burdens set forth in McDonnell Douglas, and Coffman v. Dep't of Veteran
Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05960473 (Nov. 20, 1997), a complainant may establish a prima facie
case of reprisal by showing that: (1) he engaged in a protected activity; (2) the agency was aware
of the protected activity; (3) subsequently, he was subjected to adverse treatment by the agency;
and (4) a nexus exists between the protected activity and the adverse treatment. Whitmire v. Dep't
of the Air Force, EEOC Appeal No. 01A00340 (Sept. 25, 2000).

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The Commission has stated that adverse actions need not qualify as “ultimate employment actions”
or materially affect the terms and conditions of employment to constitute retaliation. Lindsey v.
U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Request No. 05980410 (Nov. 4, 1999) (citing EEOC Compliance
Manual, No. 915.003 (May 20, 1998)). Instead, the statutory retaliation clauses prohibit any
adverse treatment that is based upon a retaliatory motive and is reasonably likely to deter the
charging party or others from engaging in protected activity. Id.

We also note that when a supervisor's behavior has a potentially chilling effect on the use of the
EEO complaint process – the ultimate tool that employees have to enforce equal employment
opportunity – the behavior is a per se violation. See Vincent v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal
No. 0120072908 (Aug. 3, 2009) (per se violation found where supervisor mentioned EEO
complaints had been filed and said, “What goes around, comes around”); Woolf v. Dep't of Energy,
EEOC Appeal No. 0120033727 (June 4, 2009) (per se violation found when a labor management
specialist told the complainant, “as a friend,” that her EEO claim would polarize the office);
Bensing v. Dep't of the Navy, EEOC Appeal No. 01970742 (Oct. 3, 2000) (per se violation found
where supervisor conceded that he had objected to complainant's contacts with EEO office and
union representative).

Analysis

a. Adequacy of the Investigation

Complainant has challenged the adequacy of the investigation and questioned the impartiality of
the Investigator.

Investigations of discrimination complaints are governed by 29 C.F.R. § 1614.108 and the
instructions contained in the Commission's Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (Aug.
5, 2015) (MD-110). See MD-110, Chap. 6 (“Development of Impartial and Appropriate Factual
Records”). An adequate agency investigation is one that is developed impartially and contains an
appropriate factual record. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.108(b). “An appropriate factual record is one that
allows a reasonable fact finder to draw conclusions as to whether discrimination occurred.” 29
C.F.R. § 1614.108(b); MD-110, Chap. 6, § § I, IV.B., IV.C. An investigator must be unbiased,
objective and thorough. Id. at § V.C. The investigator must obtain all relevant evidence from all
sources regardless of how it may affect the outcome. Id. at § V.D.

Having considered all of Complainant’s arguments, we find that the Investigator conducted a
thorough and impartial investigation, having identified and obtained relevant evidence, regardless
of how it may have affected the outcome. Id. The Investigator did not interview the subject matter
expert who rated the 13 candidates based on their application packets and criteria provided to him.
The absence of his affidavit, under the circumstances of this case, is not fatal. Here, the record
does contain a copy of the application packet review results and the scores that the subject matter
expert gave to the 13 candidates on each criterion and, also, the record also contains the scoring of
the interview panel. Accordingly, the fact finder can make appropriate conclusions regarding the
non-selection claim.
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The Commission notes that although an investigator is required to exhaust those sources of
information likely to support the positions of a complainant and the agency, this requirement does
not compel the investigator to engage in “irrelevant and superfluous” inquiry. See Dominique N.
v. Dep’t of Veterans Aff., EEOC Appeal No. 0120171544 (Sept. 20, 2017); Rusacki v. U.S. Postal
Serv., EEOC Request No. 05880892 (Feb. 14, 1990) (evidence lacking relevance and
unnecessarily cumulative disallowed by AJ). Further, Complainant has made no proffer of the
testimony that witnesses he may have wanted to be interviewed would provide in support of his
claims; nor has he shown how the lack of their testimony was relevant and affected the outcome
of this complaint. Of note is that Complainant requested an Agency decision and did not request
a hearing. The hearing is part of the investigative process. Part of the AJ’s function is to oversee
the development of the record. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(a); MD-110 Chap. 7, § I.

b. Claim A – Hostile work environment

Upon review, the Commission finds that Complainant failed to establish either that some of the
hostile incidents even occurred; or that the alleged discriminating officials were aware of the
incidents; or that the incidents occurred as a result of Complainant’s membership in protected
groups. In addition, regarding some of the incidents, including Complainant’s non-selection, the
Agency has articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. Complainant has
asserted that his complaint consisted of numerous incidents not specifically identified in Claim A.
We have reviewed the record in its entirety. We recognize that a hostile work environment is
comprised of a series of separate acts that collectively constitute one unlawful employment
practice. National Railroad Passenger Corporation v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 117 (2002). Such a
claim is based on the cumulative effect of individual actions or treatment, some of which may not
be individually actionable. Id. at 115; Zachary V. v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No.
0120151238 (May 2, 2017). However, making a finding of unlawful harassment depends on
more than the sheer number of incidents of alleged harassment. Lamar D. v. Dep’t of
Transportation, EEOC Appeal No. 0120180677 (Jan. 26, 2018). Ultimately it is Complainant’s
burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that discriminatory animus motivated the
Agency. Complainant has failed to carry this burden.

Regarding A1, the incidents date back several years having allegedly occurred in 2008, 2010 and
2011. Complainant has not shown how remarks allegedly made by S2, his second level supervisor,
about Complainant’s daughter in 2010 and his use of crutches in the office after his surgery in
2011 were attributable to prohibited discrimination. S2 was the Jackson Airports District Office
Manager. S2 was not aware of Complainant’s prior protected activity until summer of 2013 when
Complainant told him that he had filed a discrimination complaint. He stated that he had known
Complainant for over 20 years both as a supervisor and a co-worker and the two have discussed
their families and children as the families and children have grown.

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Regarding the use of crutches mentioned in claim A1, S2 stated that several staffers had surgeries
and have used crutches, including himself. He noted that Complainant’s surgery occurred years
ago. He offered Complainant the use of his crutches, but Complainant did not need them because
he decided to use a knee scooter.

S2 also stated that he vaguely remembered discussing the age of persons whom Complainant was
dating following his divorce 10 years prior and any comments that he made were intended to help
a friend through a difficult life event. S2 explained also that Complainant’s daughter had an
accident in 2010 which he and others in the office discussed with Complainant. He stated that
they discussed options for him to recover damages including hiring an attorney or filing insurance
claims. He denied that he questioned Complainant’s leave requests after his daughter had an
accident. Any questions would have concerned identifying the type of leave to be charged.

Concerning A2, Complainant’s first level supervisor was S1. S1 became his supervisor in April
2014 when he became the Assistant Manager. S1’s first level supervisor was S2. S1 did not
recall the CASTLE incident (claim A2) in May 2014 or making age-based derogatory remarks,
which Complainant alleged had occurred two years previously. S1 also stated that if he did say
what Complainant is asserting he did with regard to the age comment, that they were all old now,
and he would not have used it derisively. He explained that Complainant never mentioned
anything to him about the alleged statement. In addition, Complainant’s rebuttal affidavit reveals
that he and S1, by his own admission, often shared life events as co-workers and friends.
Complainant stated that the two had a “genuine friendly” working relationship.

Concerning A3, the co-worker denied making any statement to Complainant that he would get a
reputation for filing discrimination complaints. He told the Investigator that Complainant’s claim
was fabricated.

Claim A4 is the allegation that Complainant’s flash drive containing his discrimination complaint
file was taken. Other than his assertion that this incident occurred, there is no evidence in the
record that the incident in fact occurred. Also, there is no evidence, only Complainant’s suspicion,
that S2 was the person who took it.

Regarding A5, Complainant alleged that S1 and S2 made jokes related to his discrimination
complaints. S2 denied that either he or S1 made any jokes about Complainant’s discrimination
complaints. In his rebuttal affidavit, the Commission notes that Complainant stated S1 “always
seemed to be sympathetic” when he discussed discrimination with him.

Regarding claim A6, a claim that S1 increased his workload, S1 stated that there were two
vacancies, so the work load was distributed to other Program Managers including Complainant.
He also stated that the distribution was done as evenly as possible. Complainant has not shown
that the Agency’s reason was not the real reason for its action. Not only Complainant but other
employees were affected because the office was understaffed.

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In claim A7, Complainant alleged he was forced to report to work on his telework day in an attempt
to prevent him from preparing his discrimination complaint. As explanation, S1 stated that the
meeting in question was about the most important meeting held each year where they met with the
state agencies to formulate and finalize the state program. Meeting dates and times were
established weeks ahead and Complainant was aware of the process which was known to all
Program Managers. The Commission finds that the Agency has articulated a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its action and Complainant has not shown that the Agency’s reason
was false. 3

Regarding the foregoing claims and a review of the record as a whole, we find no evidence that
the Agency subjected Complainant to a hostile work environment. The Commission notes that
there is no probative evidence that Complainant communicated to his supervisors that the remarks
were unwelcome. Further, the alleged age remarks, even if they occurred, do not establish
discriminatory animus. Neither do the statements, on their face, demonstrate an ageist bias. We
have long held that the discrimination statutes are not civility codes. The statements allegedly
made and the alleged conduct were not severe or pervasive that would reasonably constitute
workplace harassment; nor do we find persuasive evidence that age or reprisal played any role.

c. Claim B – Non-selection

Regarding his non-selection, the Commission finds neither age nor reprisal discrimination. The
selectee was the same age as Complainant. Therefore, no age discrimination exists. Complainant
has participated in prior protected activity. However, the Agency articulated legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions for which Complainant has shown no pretext. Rankings
were provided by an interview panel and a subject matter expert who reviewed the application
packets. The selectee was chosen because the interview panel and the subject matter expert who
reviewed the application packets both ranked him #1. The selectee scored 89 and Complainant
scored 71 in the interview process. Complainant ranked 6 of the 13 qualified candidates on his
interview. He ranked 11 of 13 on his application review. S1 was the selecting official.

The record reveals that a three-member panel interviewed 13 candidates who were deemed
qualified for the position. Each candidate was asked the same 10 questions and the panel had to
rate each candidate on a scale of 1 to 10 on the candidate’s responses. All candidates interviewed
were asked the same questions. The individual scoring of the 13 candidates by each panelist is
contained in the record.

3 EEOC Regulation 29 C.F. R. 1614.605(b) provides that a complainant shall be given a reasonable
amount of official time, if otherwise on duty, to prepare a complaint and to respond to agency and
EEOC requests for information. An allegation pertaining to the denial of official time states a
separately processable claim alleging a violation of the Commission's regulations, without
requiring a determination of whether the action was motivated by discrimination. See Edwards v.
U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Request No. 05960179 (Dec. 23, 1996). The focus is not on the
motivation, but, rather, on the justification of why the complainant was denied a reasonable amount
of official time. The record does not establish that Complainant made a request for official time.
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The 13 candidates were to be assessed on communication skills, knowledge of the FAA’s Airports
Division programs, processes, standards and engineering knowledge. The candidates were also
assessed on an additional selective factor of knowledge of airport design, construction standards,
and methods. The subject matter expert, who was chosen from outside the Jackson Airports
District Office, also reviewed the application packets and scored the candidates on nine criteria on
a 100-point scale. He, as did the interview panel, ranked the selectee first. He was to evaluate
each candidate’s knowledge, skills and abilities (KSA) plus a knowledge of airport design,
construction standards and methods. Complainant received a total score of 310, out of a total score
of 900, or a rank of 11. The selectee received a total score of 550 out of a score of 900, or a rank
of 1. The rankings were forwarded to S1 who was the selecting official. After reviewing the
interview ratings for each of the 13 candidates and their application packets, S1 chose the selectee.

The selectee ranked first in both ratings. Additionally, the record discloses that the selectee was
chosen because he performed better in communicating his knowledge and skills pertaining to the
position. Complainant’s application was not well put together. Although his knowledge of Agency
processes and programs were comparable to the selectee, the selectee had a broader experience in
engineering. Complainant also did not answer some KSAs and rambled and went off topic on
some questions.

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the Agency articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for not selecting Complainant and Complainant has failed to show pretext. Pretext can be
shown in a selection case if the complainant’s qualifications are plainly superior to those of the
selectee. See Bauer v. Bailar, 647 F.2d 1037, 1048 (10th Cir. 1981); Wasser v. Dep't of Labor,
EEOC Request No. 05940058 (Nov. 2, 1995). Complainant has failed to make this showing. Mere
years of service or length of experience does not necessarily make a candidate more qualified.
Absent prohibited animus, the Commission will not substitute its judgment or second guess an
Agency’s personnel decisions. See Shapiro v. Soc. Sec. Admn., EEOC Request No. 05960403
(Dec. 6, 1996). Complainant may disagree with the design of the selection process, but
Complainant’s mere disagreement does not lead to a finding of discrimination. Pretext inquiry is
not concerned with bad judgment, impeccability, dislike, or a mistake. Marvin W. v. Dep’t of
Homeland Security, EEOC Appeal No. 0120170438 (Dec. 12, 2018); Tyra F. v. General Svcs.
Admn., EEOC Appeal No. 0120170252 (Apr. 4, 2018). The question is not whether the agency
made the best, or even a sound, business decision; it is whether the real reason is discrimination.

CONCLUSION

Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal, including those not
specifically addressed or referenced herein, we conclude that Complainant failed to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the Agency discriminated against him. Accordingly, we
AFFIRM the Agency’s finding of no discrimination.

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STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0617)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or
the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish
that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or
law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or
operations of the Agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal
Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision. A party shall have
twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party’s timely request for reconsideration in
which to submit a brief or statement in opposition. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment
Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 § VII.B
(Aug. 5, 2015). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Complainant’s request may be
submitted via regular mail to P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail to 131
M Street, NE, Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to
reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration
of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. The agency’s request must be submitted
in digital format via the EEOC’s Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. §
1614.403(g). The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as
untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any
supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The
Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited
circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety
(90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must
name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department
head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result
in the dismissal of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the national organization,
and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider
and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of
your complaint.
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RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815)
If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may request
permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or costs.
Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may request the
court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or
appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole
discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter the time limits for
filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant’s Right to File a Civil Action for
the specific time limits).
FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden’s signature
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations

August 2, 2019
Date