Southwest Regional Council of Carpenters, et al. (Held Properties, Inc.)

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Oct 27, 2010

356 N.L.R.B. 21 (N.L.R.B. 2010)

SOUTHWEST REGIONAL COUNCIL OF CARPENTERS 21
Southwest Regional Council of Carpenters and Car-
penters Local Union No. 1506 United Brother-
hood of Carpenters and Joiners of America and
Held Properties, Inc. and The Laser Institute for
Dermatology & European Skin Care. Case 31–
CC–2115 and 31–CC–2117
October 27, 2010
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN LIEBMAN AND MEMBERS BECKER,
PEARCE, AND HAYES
This case concerns whether the Respondent Unions vi-
olated Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act by displaying
large, stationary banners proclaiming a “labor dispute” at
the business locations of a secondary employer.1 The
judge found that these banner displays violated Section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act because they were akin to pick-
eting and constituted threats, coercion, or restraint with
an unlawful cease-doing-business objective.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to
reject the judge’s conclusions consistent with our recent
decisions in Carpenters Local 1506 (Eliason & Knuth of
Arizona), 355 NLRB 797 (2010), Carpenters Local 1506
(AGC San Diego Chapter), 355 NLRB 1137 (2010)
(AGC), and for the reasons stated below. In Eliason,
supra, we concluded that the union’s display of large
stationary banners did not violate Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)
of the Act. We find that the banner displays in this case
were, for all relevant purposes, the same as the conduct
found lawful in Eliason.
We address only one aspect of this case: whether
picketing that preceded the banner display in this case
creates any meaningful factual distinction from Eliason.
Here, the Union engaged in area standards picketing 5
days before it began displaying the banner. The judge
found that the picketing occurred in the plaza between
two office buildings and in front of both entrances to the
building containing the office of secondary employer and
Charging Party Laser Institute for Dermatology and Eu-
ropean Skin Care. The picket signs identified only the
primary employer, Gingerich Construction. The banners,
in contrast, were displayed in front of the entrance to the
plaza, 50 feet from the entrance to the building, and
named only the secondary employer, Laser Institute for
Dermatology. There is no evidence that the prior picket-
1 On April 2, 2004, Administrative Law Judge Burton Litvack issued
the attached decision. The Charging Party and the Respondent each
filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and the General Counsel filed
cross-exceptions and a supporting brief. The Charging Party filed an
answering brief to the Respondent’s exceptions, and the Respondent
filed an answering brief to the General Counsel’s cross-exceptions.
ing or the subsequent banner display caused any employ-
ees to cease work.
The General Counsel does not allege that the prior
picketing was unlawful or that it would have become
unlawful if it had continued. Nor does the General
Counsel allege that the prior picketing made the banner
displays unlawful. Applying Eliason, and well-
established Board doctrine, we conclude that there was
no violation of the Act.
1. This case is most closely analogous to decisions in
which the otherwise lawful distribution of handbills was
preceded by picketing. In such cases decided after Ed-
ward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building
Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568 (1988),2 the Board has
uniformly held that prior picketing does not render oth-
erwise lawful distribution of handbills unlawful.3 In-
deed, handbilling has been found lawful even when it
immediately followed unlawful secondary picketing.4
We find in this case that, just as prior picketing does not
render the peaceful distribution of handbills coercive, it
does not render the peaceful display of stationary banners
coercive.
2. In Eliason, we distinguished a number of prior cas-
es in which the Board had found conduct not containing
all the elements of traditional, ambulatory picketing nev-
ertheless to be recognitional “picketing” barred by Sec-
tion 8(b)(7), on the grounds that the unions in the earlier
cases had engaged in picketing prior to the activity at
issue while there was no prior picketing in Eliason.5
2 As discussed in Eliason, supra, slip op. at 11–12, the Court in De-
Bartolo held that the distribution of handbills urging customers not to
patronize a secondary employer did not violate Sec. 8(b)(4)(ii)(B).
3 See Service Employees Local 525 (General Maintenance Service
Co.), 329 NLRB 638, 681 (1999), enfd. 52 Fed. Appx. 357 (9th Cir.
2002) (“[T]he Board has posited that handbilling is not to be regarded
as coercive simply because picketing either precedes or follows it, even
where no hiatus occurs between the two.”).
4 For example, in Laborers Local 332 (CDG, Inc.), 305 NLRB 298
(1991), about 100 union members handbilled for 2 days at the entrances
to an office building. A week later, after a brief period of handbilling
in the morning, 300 to 400 persons, many carrying signs, held a 30-
minute rally in which they marched around the building, blocking all
entrances. After the rally, 20 members remained to distribute handbills.
The Board found that the march and rally constituted unlawful picket-
ing, but that the handbilling before and after the rally was lawful. Id. at
298, 304–305. See also Operating Engineers Local 139 (Oak Con-
struction), 226 NLRB 759, 759–760 (1976) (pre-DeBartolo case hold-
ing that simultaneous picketing and handbilling were unlawful, but
handbilling that continued after the picketing ceased was lawful under
the publicity proviso).
5 Sec. 8(b)(7) proscribes recognitional picketing by a union under
any of the following conditions: where the employer has lawfully rec-
ognized another union; where the picketing union has lost a valid elec-
tion in the preceding 12 months; and—subject to a proviso for informa-
tional picketing—where the picketing has been conducted without a
representation petition being filed within a reasonable period of time,
not to exceed 30 days from the commencement of the picketing.
356 NLRB No. 11

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 22
There was prior picketing in this case, but it was area-
standards picketing and not recognitional picketing gov-
erned by Section 8(b)(7). Properly conducted area-
standards picketing is lawful, and there are no limitations
on how long it may continue.6 By contrast, in the 8(b)(7)
cases cited in Eliason, the unions, which the Board de-
termined were acting with a recognitional object, could
not lawfully have continued picketing.7 Thus, the con-
duct at issue in those cases served as a means of circum-
venting the statutory limitations on recognitional picket-
ing—of continuing to obtain the benefits of picketing
after it became unlawful without engaging in conduct
displaying all the elements of traditional picketing.
Moreover, in the 8(b)(7) cases, the picketing involved
signs that named only the primary employer and the later
conduct continued to be expressly directed at the same
primary employer (indeed, often using the same picket
signs but without accompanying patrolling). Thus, the
Board, explicitly or implicitly, found that the unions in
these prior cases intended their conduct to operate as a
signal to employees to continue to honor the prior picket
lines.8
For all of these reasons, we conclude that the prior
picketing in this case does not distinguish the facts here
from those in Eliason.9 To rule otherwise, we would
have to conclude that the lawful display of the banner
somehow became unlawful because it was preceded by
picketing which was not alleged to be unlawful and
6 “The law is settled that if a union pickets using a sign which on its
face is aimed at forcing an employer, which in fact pays substandard
wages, to conform to area standards, . . . the picketing is lawful unless
there is independent evidence to controvert the Union’s overt represen-
tations of its objective.” Carpenters Local 1622 (Paul E. Iacono Struc-
tural Engineer, Inc.), 250 NLRB 416, 418 (1980); Giant Food Markets,
241 NLRB 727, 728 (1979), order set aside on other grounds 633 F.2d
18 (6th Cir. 1980).
7 See NLRB v. United Furniture Workers, 337 F.2d 936, 938 (2d Cir.
1964) (union had lost a valid election within the last 12 months); Law-
rence Typographical Union No. 570 (Kansas Color Press), 169 NLRB
279, 284 (1968), enfd. 402 F.2d 452 (10th Cir. 1968) (same); Lumber
& Sawmill Workers Local 2797 (Stoltze Land & Lumber Co.), 156
NLRB 388, 394 (1965) (same); Teamsters Local 812 (Woodward Mo-
tors), 135 NLRB 851 (1962), enfd. 314 F.2d 53 (2d Cir. 1963) (same);
Mine Workers Local 1329 (Alpine Constr. Corp.), 276 NLRB 415, 431
(1985), vacated 812 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (union failed to file a
representation petition within 30 days).
8 It apparently was understood as such in Woodward Motors, supra.
When the union stopped its ambulatory picketing and instead posted
two picket signs in a snowbank at the company’s entrance, deliveries
were interrupted when drivers refused to pass the picket signs. 135
NLRB at 857.
9 Having concluded that the banner displays did not “threaten, co-
erce, or restrain” the secondary employer and therefore did not violate
Sec. 8(b)(4)(ii)(B), we need not reach Charging Party Held Properties’
exception to the judge’s finding that, under common-law agency prin-
ciples, Respondent Southwest Regional Council of Carpenters was not
legally responsible for the banner displays.
could have lawfully continued. We see no basis in law
or logic for such an outcome.
ORDER
The complaint is dismissed.

MEMBER HAYES, dissenting.
The bannering activity at issue in this case is essential-
ly the same as in Carpenters Local 1506 (Eliason &
Knuth of Arizona), 355 NLRB 797 (2010). For the rea-
sons fully set forth in the joint dissent in that case, I
would find a violation here.1 The bannering involves the
placement of union agents holding large banners proxi-
mate to the premises of neutral employers who are doing
business with an employer who is the primary target in a
labor dispute with the Respondents. The predominate
element of such bannering is confrontational conduct,
rather than persuasive speech, designed to promote a
total boycott of the neutral employers business, and
thereby to further an objective of forcing those employ-
ers to cease doing business with the primary employer in
the labor dispute. Like picketing, this bannering activity
is the precise evil that Congress intended to outlaw
through Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B), and the proscription of
this conduct raises no constitutional concerns. I there-
fore dissent from my colleagues’ failure to enforce the
Act as intended.

Katherine B. Mankin, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Gerald V. Selvo, Esq. (DeCarlo, Connor & Selvo), of Los An-
geles, California, for the Respondents.
Jonathan A. Goldstein, Esq. (Goldstein, Kennedy & Petito), of
Los Angeles, California, for Held Properties, Inc.
Karen L. Stephenson, Esq. (Katten, Muchin, Zavis & Rosen-
man), of Los Angeles, California, for The Laser Institute for
Dermatology & European Skin Care.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
BURTON LITVACK, Administrative Law Judge. Held Proper-
ties, Inc. (Held) filed the original and amended unfair labor
practice charges in Case 31–CC–2115 on September 10 and 18,
2003, respectively, and the original and amended unfair labor
practice charges in Case 31–CC–2117 were filed by The Laser
Institute for Dermatology & European Skin Care (Laser Insti-
tute) on September 11 and 18, 2003, respectively. Based upon
investigations of the above unfair labor practice charges on
September 23, 2003, the Regional Director for Region 31 of the
National Labor Relations Board (the Board), issued a consoli-
dated complaint, alleging that Southwest Regional Council of
Carpenters (Respondent Regional Council) and Carpenters
1 Unlike in Eliason, the bannering here was preceded by picketing.
While I would find the bannering unlawful even in the absence of pick-
eting, the occurrence of picketing soon before or after bannering serves
to underscore the common coercive aspects of the two activities.

SOUTHWEST REGIONAL COUNCIL OF CARPENTERS 23
Local Union No. 1506, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and
Joiners of America (Respondent Local 1506) and together
called Respondents, engaged in, and are engaging in, an unfair
labor practice within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of
the National Labor Relations Act (the Act). Each Respondent
filed an answer, denying the commission of the alleged unfair
labor practice. Pursuant to a notice of hearing, a trial was held
before the above-named administrative law judge on November
3, 2003,1 in Los Angeles, California. At the trial, all parties
were afforded the right to call witnesses, to cross-examine wit-
nesses, to offer into the record all relevant documentary evi-
dence, to argue legal positions orally, and to file posthearing
briefs. The latter documents were filed by counsel for the Gen-
eral Counsel, counsel for Held, and counsel for Respondents,
and each brief has been closely examined. Accordingly, based
upon the entire record herein, including the posthearing briefs
and my observation of the testimonial demeanor of the witness-
es, I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
At all times material herein, Held, with an office and primary
place of business located in Los Angeles, California, has been
engaged in business as a property management real estate bro-
kerage and a licensed contractor. During the 12-month period
immediately preceding the issuance of the consolidated com-
plaint, in connection with its above-described business opera-
tions, Held purchased and received goods and products, valued
in excess of $50,000, directly from suppliers located outside the
State of California. Respondents admit that Held is, and has
been at all times material herein, an employer engaged in com-
merce or in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning
of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
At all times material herein, Laser Institute, which has an of-
fice and principle place of business, located at 2021 Santa Mon-
ica Boulevard, Santa Monica, California, has been engaged in
the business of providing a spectrum of services for skin care
and beauty. In connection with its business operations, during
the 12-month period immediately preceding issuance of the
consolidated complaint, Laser Institute purchased and received
goods and products, valued in excess of $50,000, directly from
suppliers located outside the State of California. Respondents
admit that, at all times material here, Laser Institute has been an
employer engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of
the Act.
II. LABOR ORGANIZATIONS
Respondent Regional Council and Respondent Local 1506
each admits that, at all times material herein, it has been a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE ISSUES
The consolidated complaint alleges that, since in or about
February 2003, Held has been engaged as a general contractor
to perform expansion/construction work at an office suite locat-
1 Unless otherwise stated, all events herein occurred during 2003.
ed in an office building at 2021 Santa Monica Boulevard in
Santa Monica, California, which is owned by Medical Associ-
ates, d/b/a Medical Centre of Santa Monica (Medical Associ-
ates); that the lessee of the above-office suite in the building
located at 2021 Santa Monica Boulevard, is Laser Institute;
that, in connection with the construction work, Held contracted
with Gingerich Construction to perform drywall services in the
office suite; that, at all times material herein, Respondents have
been engaged in a primary labor dispute with Gingerich Con-
struction; that, at no material time herein, have Respondents
been engaged in a primary labor dispute with Held, Laser Insti-
tute, or Medical Associates; and that, from September 8, 2003
through, at least, September 23, 2003, Respondents engaged in
conduct, violative of Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act, by, in
furtherance of their labor dispute with Gingerich Construction,
displaying a banner at the building located at 2021 Santa Mon-
ica Boulevard, which states: “LABOR DISPUTE” and
“SHAME ON LASER INSTITUTE FOR DERMATOLOGY &
EUROPEAN SKIN CARE.” The consolidated complaint fur-
ther alleges that the displaying of the above banner constituted
signal picketing and that, in the above-described circumstances,
the language of the banner constituted fraudulent, unprotected
speech. Respondents deny the commission of the alleged un-
fair labor practice and contend that displaying the banner did
not constitute picketing and that the wording of the banner was
privileged by the first amendment to the Constitution of the
United States.
IV. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE
A. The Facts2
Santa Monica Boulevard, a portion of which runs through
Santa Monica, California, is a major Los Angeles area east-
west thoroughfare, which is subject to heavy vehicular traffic in
both directions, and St. John’s Hospital is located near the in-
tersection of 21st Street and Santa Monica Boulevard in Santa
Monica on the northside of Santa Monica Boulevard. Directly
to the west of the hospital and adjacent to it is the office build-
ing, located at 2021 Santa Monica Boulevard (the 2021 build-
ing), which is owned by Medical Associates; to the west of the
2021 building and separated by a plaza area, in which are two
planted areas, is another office building, the address of which is
2001 Santa Monica Boulevard; and separate parking structures
are located behind the 2021 building and the office building at
2001 Santa Monica Boulevard. There are three entrances to the
2021 building—a front entrance off the public sidewalk on
Santa Monica Boulevard, an entrance from the plaza, which
leads into the lobby area, and an entrance to the second floor of
the building from the parking garage. Directly across Santa
Monica Boulevard from the 2021 building is a public parking
lot.
Held manages the 2021 building and enforces all lease
agreements for Medical Associates, and there are between 30
and 50 tenants, presumably either all doctors or others offering
2 The facts herein are based upon stipulations of the parties and un-
controverted testimony. In this circumstance and, inasmuch as neither
appeared to be inherently incredible, I credit and rely upon the testimo-
ny of Robert Held and Dr. Ava Shamban.

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 24
medical services, in the building. Dr. Ava Shamban, who has a
medical degree and is a board-certified dermatologist, is the
lessee of a suite of offices located on the sixth floor of the 2021
building, does business under the name, The Laser Institute For
Dermatology & European Skin Care, and is engaged in provid-
ing a “spectrum” of services for skin care and beauty. All cli-
ents, visitors, and suppliers of Laser Institute must enter the
2021 building through the lobby and take the elevator to the
sixth floor.3 Pursuant to a lease expansion agreement between
Laser Institute and Medical Associates, in or about February,
acting as a general contractor, Held commenced performance of
an expansion/construction project at the Laser Institute’s office
suite (the jobsite). The purpose of this project was to increase
the square footage of the existing office space of Laser Insti-
tute’s office suite. In connection with the expansion project,
Held contracted with various subcontractors, including Gin-
gerich Construction, to perform construction work; the latter’s
contract concerned the performance of drywall services for the
expansion project.4 Gingerich Construction’s employees
worked at the jobsite from August until October 15, and their
normal hours of work were from midnight through 10 a.m.5
Neither Held nor Laser Institute employs individuals working
as carpenters.
While Respondent Regional Council denied such a dispute,
Respondent Local 15066 admitted that it has been engaged in a
primary labor dispute with Gingerich Construction. In this
regard, early in the morning on September 3, Robert Held, the
president of Held, received a telephone call, informing him that
there was picketing activity at the 2021 building. He immedi-
ately drove to the 2021 building, and, arriving at approximately
10, Held observed “40 plus or minus people picketing counter-
clockwise on the [plaza], making a lot of noises and disturb-
ances. Creating a distraction for the patients and staff.” The
individuals were marching in the plaza area “between the two
buildings and in front of both entrances” to the 2021 building,
and they were carrying placards, which read, “GINGERICH—
UNFAIR to CARPENTERS UNION 1506—NOT PAYING
AREA STANDARD WAGES AND FRINGE BENEFITS” and
yelling “Gingerich is a rat.” Inasmuch as the picketing ap-
peared to be disrupting the traffic flow into the entrances to the
2021 building, Held telephoned the police, and police officers
eventually arrived at the site of the picketing. Twenty minutes
later, Held met with one of the pickets, Rick Whittey, and a
3 There is no direct entrance from the parking garage to the sixth
floor of the 2021 building.
4 Held, Laser Institute, Medical Associates, and Gingerich are per-
sons engaged in commerce or in industries affecting commerce within
the meaning of Sec. 8(b)(4) of the Act.
5 There is no evidence that Respondents ever attempted to ascertain
the working hours for Gingerich Construction’s employees.
6 The parties stipulated that Respondent Local 1506 does not negoti-
ate its own collective-bargaining agreements and that all collective-
bargaining agreements, which are binding upon affiliates of Respond-
ent Regional Council, including Respondent Local 1506, are negotiated
by Respondent Regional Council itself. Nevertheless, there is no rec-
ord evidence to suggest that Respondents are anything but separate
entities.
police officer. Whittey7 handed Held a business card, which
read, “Rick Whittey, Business Representative—Southwest
Regional Council of Carpenters, United Brotherhood of Car-
penters & Joiners of America,” and Held asked him “. . . why
he was picketing. . . . He told me that he wanted for me to quit
doing business with Gingerich and start doing business with
only union contractors, union carpenters. . . . I told him that I
used both union and non-union and I pick the lowest [sic] quali-
fied contractor.” Also, as a police officer had gone up to Laser
Institute’s offices and confirmed that Gingerich Construction’s
employees were no longer working that day, Held asked Whit-
tey why he was picketing, “. . . and he said that he needed proof
that they were not there. I told him that [Gingerich Construc-
tion’s employees] usually worked from midnight until about
10:00 in the morning.” During cross-examination, Held admit-
ted not confirming his statement to Whittey with a letter and
recalled Whittey using the term, area standards, during their
conversation. On the latter point, Held recalled Whittey saying
that “he thought that Gingerich was not paying the same wages
that a union was.”
The parties stipulated that, commencing 5 days later, on Sep-
tember 8, and continuing until October 15, from approximately
9 a.m. until 3 p.m. on each Monday through Friday during this
time period, Respondent Local 1506 displayed a banner on the
public sidewalk on the northside of Santa Monica Boulevard
between 20th

Street and 21st

Street in Santa Monica. The ban-
ner, which was approximately 20 feet by 4 feet in size, was
erected each day directly in front of the plaza area between the
building at 2001 Santa Monica Boulevard and the 2021 build-
ing. At this location, the banner was in front of the plaza en-
trance to the 2021 building and 50 feet from the front door
entrance, and Respondents admit that the placement of the ban-
ner was selected so as to maximize exposure to the general
public, including passing pedestrians, clients, patients, vendors,
and motorists.8 As it had no base or “feet,” each day, at least
three bearers, who were either employed by or were members
of Respondent Local 1506, were necessary in order to hold the
banner erect, and, except for staggered break periods, these
three individuals performed their display functions throughout
the entire day. Once the banner was erected at the beginning of
each day, it was not moved, and it remained stationary until
taken down. There is no record evidence that Rick Whittey or
any individual, employed by Respondent Regional Council,
ever was in the vicinity of, or participated in, the displaying of
the banner.
The banner itself was white and on it were the words
“LABOR DISPUTE” in black 2-foot capital letters and
“SHAME ON LASER INSTITUTE FOR DERMATOLOGY”
7 The parties stipulated that Whittey is a business representative em-
ployed by Respondent Regional Council; that, with respect to the ban-
nering, Whittey worked as an agent of Respondent Local 1506 but did
not occupy any of the offices in Local 1506; that, while working as an
agent for Respondent Local 1506, Whittey’s full salary was paid by
Respondent Regional Council; and that, when performing work for
Respondent Local 1506, the latter did not reimburse Respondent Re-
gional Council for Whittey’s time.
8 As St. John’s Hospital is located adjacent to the 2021 building, this
area is a particularly heavy vehicular and pedestrian traffic area.

SOUTHWEST REGIONAL COUNCIL OF CARPENTERS 25
in red two-foot capital letters. Also, the banner bearers distrib-
uted handbills to pedestrians, who passed by the banner. The
handbills, one white and one teal in color, depict a rat gnawing
through an American flag and read, in part, as follows:

A rat is a contractor that does not pay all of its em-
ployees prevailing wage, including either providing or
making payments for health care and pension benefits. . . .
Held Properties, Inc. has contracted with Gingerich
Construction to do tenant improvements for The Laser In-
stitute For Dermatology. . . . Gingerich Construction is
self-performing the drywall and acoustical work. Gin-
gerich Construction does not meet area labor standards for
that work—they do not pay prevailing wages to all of their
employees doing that work, including fully paying for
family health care and pension.
Carpenters Local 1506 objects to substandard employ-
ers like Gingerich Construction working in the communi-
ty. . . .
Carpenters Local 1506 believes that The Laser Insti-
tute for Dermatology has an obligation to the community
to see that contractors who perform work on buildings
they occupy meet area labor standards. They should not
be allowed to insulate themselves behind “independent”
contractors. For this reason, Local 1506 has a labor dis-
pute with all of these companies.9

Dr. Shamban experienced consternation and some humiliation
because of the wording on the banner and the picture and lan-
guage of the handbills. “The effect of this banner on my prac-
tice has been a besmirching of my reputation. I have nothing to
be ashamed of which is something that I had to repeat on may
[sic] occasions to my patients, to people who saw it on the
street, to employees of the hospital, to enumerable people who
called on the telephone. . . . I am a well-known figure in the
community and people were extremely concerned that I was
abusing my employees in some way.”
B. Legal Analysis
At the outset, while Respondent Regional Council specifical-
ly disclaimed amenability, Respondent Local 1506 admitted
that it was responsible for the displaying of the above-described
banner at the 2021 building from September 8 through October
15. The amended complaint alleges that Respondents together
acted in violation of Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act by dis-
playing the banner, and, in her posthearing brief, counsel for
the General Counsel avouches an agency theory for Respondent
Regional Council’s liability. In this regard, I note that Re-
spondents are separate and distinct labor organizations within
the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act and that a labor organi-
zation is not automatically responsible for the actions of its
affiliate. Carbon Fuel Co. v. Mine Workers, 444 U.S. 212
(1979). Nevertheless, in 1947, Congress specifically amended
the Act, in part, to make both unions and employers subject to
9 The only difference between the two handbills is in the second par-
agraph. Thus, on one handbill, the paragraph begins “[Laser Institute]
has contracted with Gingerich Construction . . . ,” and, on the other
handbill, the paragraph begins “[Held] has contracted with Gingerich
Construction.”
the common law rules of agency, “. . . and the Board has a clear
statutory mandate to apply the ordinary law of agency to its
proceedings.” Mine Workers District 2, 334 NLRB 677, 684
(2001); California Saw & Knife Works, 320 NLRB 224, 250
(1995). Counsel for the General Counsel relies upon the fol-
lowing facts for her assertion that Respondent Regional Coun-
cil was, and remains, responsible for Respondent Local 1506’s
displaying of the banner—that Respondents admit Rick Whit-
tey, employed by Respondent Regional Council, was on loan to
Respondent Local 1506 and was present at the picketing on
September 3, that Whittey held himself out as the person in
charge of said picketing, and that Respondent Local 1506 was
not required to reimburse Respondent Regional Council for
Whittey’s time. However, while Respondent Regional Council
negotiates collective-bargaining agreements on behalf of Re-
spondent Local 1506 and while it may be true that, under the
Act, agency principles must be construed expansively when
dealing with issues of responsibility for acts and conduct, there
is no record evidence that Whittey, acting on behalf of Re-
spondent Regional Council, actually planned or assisted Re-
spondent Local 1506 in its act of displaying the banner at issue
herein, and there is no record evidence that he or any other paid
employee of Respondent Regional Council controlled, or was
present during, the displaying of the banner. Further, the plac-
ards, held aloft by the pickets on September 3, and the hand-
bills, distributed by the banner bearers, mention only Respond-
ent Local 1506 as having a labor dispute with Gingerich Con-
struction and claiming responsibility for the picketing and dis-
playing of the banner. The Board has recently held that an
agency relationship, between labor organizations, arises only
where one labor organization “has the right to control” the con-
duct of its asserted agent, the other labor organization, regard-
ing the matters “entrusted to [it].” Overnite Transportation Co.
(Dayton, Ohio Terminal), 334 NLRB 1074, 1078 (2001). Here-
in, there is no record evidence that Respondent Regional Coun-
cil specifically loaned its employee Whittey to Respondent
Local 1506 in order for him to plan or assist in the displaying of
the banner or that Respondent Regional Council controlled,
advocated, instigated, supported, condoned, or was aware of
Respondent Local 1506’s acts and conduct. In short, I do not
believe that the mere fact Whittey continued to be paid by Re-
spondent Regional Counsel during his work as Respondent
Local 1506’s agent is sufficient to make Respondent Local
1506 the agent of Respondent Regional Council for the display-
ing of the instant banner.10 Accordingly, as to whether the
displaying of the banner may have been violative of Section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act, I shall recommend that the consolidat-
ed complainant be dismissed as to Respondent Regional Coun-
cil.
Turning to the alleged unfair labor practice herein, a viola-
tion of Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act, the provision of the
Act reads as follows:

10 I have considered the fact that Whittey’s business card identified
him as a business agent of Respondent Regional Council. However,
this fact may be susceptible of many interpretations and is not itself
sufficient to establish an agency relationship between Respondents for
the picketing or displaying of the banner.

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 26
Sec. 8(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organi-
zation or its agents. . . .

(4)(ii) To threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in
commerce or in a business affecting commerce where . . . an
object thereof is. . . .

(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling,
handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the product of
any other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease
doing business with any other person. . . . Provided, That
nothing contained in this clause (B) shall be construed to
make unlawful, where not otherwise unlawful, any primary
strike or primary picketing. . . .

Provided Further, That for the purpose of this paragraph (4)
only, nothing contained in such paragraph shall be construed
to prohibit publicity, other than picketing, for the purpose of
truthfully advising the public . . . of . . . a primary labor dis-
pute. . . .

As the Supreme Court has explained, the above-quoted provi-
sion of the Act reflects “the duel congressional objectives of
preserving the right of labor organizations to bring pressure to
bear upon offending employers in primary labor disputes and of
shielding unoffending employers and others from pressure in
controversies not their own.” NLRB v. Denver Building Trades
Council, 341 U.S. 675, 692 (1951). Thus, while Section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act leaves unfettered a labor organiza-
tion’s traditional right to engage in direct action against an
employer, with which it is engaged in a primary labor dispute,
the provision’s more “narrowly focused” purpose is to “restrict
the area of industrial conflict insofar as this could be achieved
by prohibiting the most obvious, wide-spread, and . . . danger-
ous practice of unions to widen that conflict” and coerce neutral
employers not concerned with the primary labor dispute. Car-
penters Los Angeles County District Council Local 1976 v.
NLRB, 357 U.S. 93, 100 (1958). There are essentially two
elements necessary to establish a violation of Section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act. First, a labor organization must en-
gage in conduct, which threatens, coerces, or restrains any per-
son. Second, an object of the foregoing conduct must be to
force or require any person to cease dealing with or doing busi-
ness with any other person. Electrical Workers Local 761 v.
NLRB, 366 U.S. 667, 673 (1961); Food & Commercial Workers
Local 1776 (Carpenters Health Fund), 334 NLRB 507, 507
(2001); Service Employees Local 87 (Trinity Maintenance), 312
NLRB 715, 742–743 (1993). In the latter regard, it is not nec-
essary that such be the “sole object” of the alleged unlawful
conduct. Denver Building Trades Council, supra at 689. Fur-
ther, it is no less a violation of Section 8(b)(4)(B) of the Act for
a labor organization to disrupt the business of an unoffending
neutral employer, which has no business relationship with the
primary employer, in the hope that said neutral will be pres-
sured into interceding in a labor dispute between the labor or-
ganization and the primary employer. Iron Workers Local 272
(Miller & Solomon), 195 NLRB 1063 (1972); Los Angeles
Newspaper Guild Local 69 (Hearst Corp.), 185 NLRB 303,
322 (1970).
Clearly, the classic form of conduct, which restrains or co-
erces employers within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4)(ii), in-
volves picketing, a type of action, which “may induce action of
one kind or another irrespective of the nature of the ideas which
are being disseminated,”11 with individuals patrolling at the
entrances to a jobsite or a business while carrying placards,
attached to sticks. Painters District Council No. 9 (We’re As-
sociates), 329 NLRB 140 (1999); Teamsters Local 315
(Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co.), 306 NLRB 616
(1992). In contrast, the instant matters concern the erection and
stationary displaying of a banner, by Respondent Local 1506,
on the sidewalk in front of the entrances to an office building in
which a suite of offices, the jobsite, was located. While con-
ceding that the latter’s conduct herein may not have constituted
“traditional picketing,” counsel for the General Counsel notes
that Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) proscribes “. . . all conduct where it
was the union’s intent to coerce, threaten, or restrain third par-
ties to cease doing business with a neutral employer . . .” and
argues that Respondent Local 1506 engaged in two different
types of 8(b)(4)(ii) proscribed acts and conduct herein—signal
picketing, which is activity “short of a true [traditional] picket
line” but which acts as a signal to neutrals that sympathetic
action is desired, and the use of “fraudulent language,” de-
signed to deceive the public into believing it had a primary
labor dispute with Laser Institute, on its banner. Having con-
sidered counsel’s arguments and those of counsel for Held, I
find neither theory particularly convictive or compelling. With
regard to the General Counsel’s signal picketing theory, I be-
lieve that counsel has misunderstood and misapplied this Board
concept. At the outset, rather than individuals patrolling at
entrances to a jobsite with placards, what is termed “signal
picketing” usually involves more subtle activity—for example,
the stationing of union business agents some distance away
from, but not at, the neutrals’ entrance to a jobsite or the plac-
ing of placards near such an entrance, positioned so that anyone
approaching is able to read the printed message. Iron Workers
Pacific NW Council (Hoffman Construction), 292 NLRB 562,
571–572 (1989); Laborers Local 389 (Calcon Construction),
287 NLRB 570, 571–572 (1987); Operating Engineers Local
12 (Hensel Phelps Construction Co)., 284 NLRB 246, 248
(1987); Teamsters Local 182 (Woodward Motors), 135 NLRB
851, 851 fn. 1, 857 (1962). While it is true that the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has broadly de-
fined the message of such activity as a signal to “neutrals” for
desired sympathetic action,12 the Board defines the message of
signal picketing, in 8(b)(4)(i) terms, as conduct intended “. . . as
a signal to induce action by those to whom the signal is given.”
Teamsters Local 688 (Levitt Furniture Co. of Missouri), 205
NLRB 1131, 1133 (1973). Moreover, in Laborers Local 389,
supra at 574, the Board found that picket signs, which had been
stuck in or lying on the ground near a neutrals’ gate, were “. . .
designed . . . to induce employees of subcontractors and other
secondary employers who were unionized to withhold their
11 Teamsters Local 802 v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 776 (1942) (Douglas,
J. concurring).
12 Iron Workers Local 433 (R. F. Erectors) v. NLRB, 598 F.2d 1154,
1158 fn. 6 (9th

Cir. 1979).

SOUTHWEST REGIONAL COUNCIL OF CARPENTERS 27
labor from the site;” in Iron Workers NW Council, supra at 583,
the Board noted that the effect of men gathered around a picket
sign near a neutrals’ entrance “constituted a signal to the “em-
ployees” of secondary and neutral employers to withhold their
services; and, likewise, in Plumbers Local 274 (Stokely-
VanCamp, Inc.), 267 NLRB 1111, 1114 (1983), the Board not-
ed that retired members, who were patrolling the sides of a
street near an entrance for neutral employers, acted as a signal
to the employees of the neutrals not to enter into the jobsite and
work.13 What is clear from the foregoing is that signal picket-
ing is, in reality, conduct, which “induces or encourages” craft
employees not to cross a picket line and perform services for
their respective employers on jobsites—put another way, Sec-
tion 8(b)(4)(i) proscribed conduct. While signal picketing may
also arise to the level of Section 8(b)(4)(ii) conduct, it does so
only derivatively as the “inevitable consequence of successfully
inducing or encouraging employees of secondary employers to
refuse to perform their work tasks. . . . Food & Commercial
Workers Local 1776, supra at 509 fn. 8; Teamsters Local 315,
supra at 631. In my view, the foregoing establishes that con-
duct, which is described as signal picketing, does not directly
threaten, coerce, or restrain persons engaged in commerce or in
industries affecting commerce within the meaning of Section
8(b)(4)(ii). Accordingly, as Respondent Local 1506’s intent, by
displaying its banner on the public sidewalk in front of the 2021
building’s plaza area, was to maximize its exposure to the gen-
eral public, including passing pedestrians, patients, clients,
vendors, and motorists and as the General Counsel alleged this
as constituting only Section 8(b)(4)(ii) violative conduct, coun-
sel’s signal picketing theory is without merit.
Turning to the General Counsel’s second theory for estab-
lishing the threatening and coercive nature of Respondent Local
1506’s display of the banner, that the language of the banner
was fraudulent and designed to deceive the general public,
counsel for the General Counsel argues that the banner failed to
name the primary employer, with whom the labor organization
was engaged in a labor dispute, Gingerich Construction, and
that “. . . it proclaimed the existence of a labor dispute and
painted the named neutral as deserving “shame” from the
community due to the dispute.” In short, counsel argues, “the
natural and foreseeable [impression] the public would draw
from [Respondent local 1506’s] language was that [it] had a
primary labor dispute with [Laser Institute]. The conclusion, as
a result, is that the public was being called upon to boycott
[Laser Institute].” Contrary to counsel, I do not believe the
language on the banner was, in fact, false. In this regard the
language of the banner proclaims the existence of a labor dis-
pute between Respondent Local 1506 and Laser Institute and
describes the latter in disparaging terms. As to the existence of
a labor dispute, while Respondent Local 1506 admitted it had a
primary labor dispute with Gingerich Construction, the latter’s
work was being performed for the benefit of Laser Institute,
13 In Iron Workers Local 433 (R. F. Erectors), 233 NLRB 283, 287
(1977), the Board decision underlying the above-cited Ninth Circuit
decision, the Board noted that the intended effect of the actions of the
respondent’s agents was to signal to the employees of the neutral em-
ployers not to enter onto the jobsite.
and it might convincingly be argued that Dr. Shamban pos-
sessed some degree of sway over the selection of the drywall
subcontractor, which was performing the drywall work on her
suite of offices and that she was unsympathetic to the terms and
conditions of employment under which the Gingerich Construc-
tion employees worked. Moreover, the handbills, which were
distributed by the banner bearers, explained the labor dispute in
detail. Section 2(9) of the Act defines a “labor dispute” as in-
cluding “. . . any controversy concerning terms, tenure, or con-
ditions of employment . . . regardless of whether the disputants
stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee,” and
the almost identical provision of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29
U.S.C. 113(c) has been interpreted as covering “secondary”
employers. Smith’s Management Corp. v. Electrical Workers
Local 357, 737 F.2d 788 (9th

Cir. 1984).14 In this regard, I
believe that few, if any, members of the general public, who
passed by the banner, were cognizant of the Act’s definition of
a labor dispute or, if such had been the wording of the banner,
would have understood the distinction between a primary and a
secondary labor dispute. As to the banner’s deprecating lan-
guage regarding Laser Institute, I think the general public un-
derstood that labor disputes are often heated and invoke distor-
tions and imprecatory language. Linn v. Plant Guard Workers
of America, 383 U.S. 53, 58 (1974). Moreover, I note that
counsel for the General Counsel elicited testimony from Dr.
Shamban, describing her consternation and embarrassment
caused by the language of the banner. However, as appeals
leading to “embarrassment and persuasion” of a neutral are
permissible (NLRB v. Business Machine & Office Appliance
Mechanics Conference Board (Royal Typewriter Co.), 228 F.2d
553, 560 (2d

Cir. 1955), cert denied 351 U.S. 962 (1956)), a
statement that a neutral engaged in shameful acts and conduct
appears to be likewise acceptable.15 Accordingly, I do not
believe that the language of the banner constituted coercion or
restraint within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4)(ii).
Notwithstanding my conclusions that the theories of counsel
for the General Counsel are without merit, I believe that Re-
spondent Local 1506 did, in fact, engage in Section 8(b)(4)(ii)
proscribed conduct as, in the instant circumstances, the display-
ing of the banner constituted picketing or, at least, a form of
picketing. Thus, notwithstanding the above-described classic
description of picketing, patrolling alone, patrolling combined
with the carrying of placards attached to sticks, or confrontation
do not appear to be essential elements for a finding of picket-
ing. Rather, the Board has traditionally held that “. . . the im-
portant feature of picketing appears to be the posting by a labor
organization . . . of individuals at the approach to a place of
business to accomplish a purpose which advances the cause of
the union, such as keeping employees away from work or keep-
14 I recognize that, for purposes of Sec. 8(b)(4)(B), it is erroneous to
conclude “. . . that neutrals must be totally disengaged from a labor
dispute. That is not the law.” Service Employees Local 525 (General
Maintenance Co.), 329 NLRB 638, 640 (1999). However, at this point,
I am only concerned with the truth or falsity of Respondent Local
1506’s language on the banner.
15 I am cognizant that Royal Typewriter predates the 1959 amend-
ments to the Act; however, I have found no Board or court decision
overruling its continued viability.

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 28
ing customers away from the employer’s business.” Service
Employees Local 87, supra at 743; Laborers Local 389, supra at
573; Lumber & Sawmill Workers Local 2797 (Stoltze Land &
Lumber Co.), 156 NLRB 388, 394 (1965).16 Herein, Respond-
ent Local 1506’s banner bearers erected and displayed their
banner directly in front of the 2021 building’s plaza, where the
only building entrance leading to its lobby is located, and a
mere 50 feet from the sidewalk entrance to the building, and the
location of the banner was close to the location of the picketing
activity on September 3. Further, viewing the record evidence
in a light most favorable to Respondent Local 1506, assuming
arguendo the latter stationed its banner at the above location in
order to advance its cause of publicizing a labor dispute with
Laser Institute, the location of the activity nevertheless man-
dates a conclusion that Respondent Local 1506’s acts and con-
duct fall within the Board’s broad parameters for the act of
picketing, and I so find.
In defense, counsel for Respondent Local 1506 argues that
the Board’s definition of picketing incorrectly emphasizes its
object and should take into account the nature of the activity
and, on this point, canonically asserts that patrolling with picket
signs and confrontation must be present for a labor organiza-
tion’s conduct to be considered picketing. At the outset, as
counsel assuredly recognizes, I am bound by Board law and,
accordingly, must adhere to the Board’s definition of picketing,
and, while noting counsel’s contention, I do not believe that
one may reasonably contend that an individual, who is passive-
ly carrying a placard and standing in a stationary manner at an
entrance to a jobsite, is not engaged in picketing. Contrary to
counsel’s determinate view of picketing, the Board’s definition
is purposefully broad, designed to encompass conduct seeming-
ly not fitting within the classic notion of picketing, including
the longstanding concept of signal picketing, which, as stated
above, sometimes involves the mere placement of a picket sign
near an entrance to a jobsite. Further, requiring patrolling with
picket signs would mean that conduct, which is not classic
picketing but which, the Board has concluded, oversteps the
bounds of propriety and goes beyond persuasion so as to be-
come “coercive to a very substantial degree,”17 would no long-
er be proscribed by Section 8(b)(4)(ii). On this point, in Mine
Workers District 29 (New Beckley Mining Corp.), 304 NLRB
16 Counsel for Respondent Local 1506 argues that this definition is
“no longer good law” as handbilling, which, the Supreme Court, in
Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building Trades
Council, 485 U.S. 568 (1988), found, does not threaten, coerce, or
restrain within the meaning of Sec. 8(b)(4)(ii), falls within it and as it
makes the object of the conduct an element of the definition and disre-
gards the first amendment to the Constitution—an error of law. I am
not sure I understand counsel’s latter assertion. He cited no authority in
support, and his First Amendment argument assumes that the Board
was defining unlawful picketing. In any event, a union’s cause or
purpose for picketing does not have to involve the First Amendment.
As to his DeBartolo argument, it is true that the Board’s definition of
picketing seemingly incorporates handbilling and that the Supreme
Court differentiated between handbilling and picketing. However,
considering handbilling as an exception does not, in my view, vitiate
the validity of the Board’s definition.
17 Service Employees Local 399 (William J. Burns International De-
tective Agency), 136 NLRB 431, 437 (1962).
71, 72 (1991), which involved an estimated crowd of between
50 and 140 persons gathered in the parking lot and surrounding
areas of a motel in the early morning hours, notwithstanding the
absence of patrolling or picket signs, the Board found the “mass
activity” to be a form of picketing proscribed by Section
8(b)(4)(ii). Counsel for Respondents’ narrow view of picketing
would eviscerate the coercive nature of such lesser forms of
picketing. Moreover, the Board has never required intrusive or
imperious behavior to be elements of picketing. In this regard,
in Service Employees Local 254 (Womens & Infants Hospital),
324 NLRB 743, 749 (1997), a labor organization argued that,
individuals, who were wearing signs and carrying placards and
who were peacefully standing at parking lot entrances and pe-
destrian entrances to a college campus and distributing hand-
bills, were not engaged in picketing. Notwithstanding the lack
of evidence of confrontational behavior, the Board adopted an
administrative law judge’s conclusion that picketing had oc-
curred as “the carrying and/or wearing of signs and placards
place[d r]espondent’s activities beyond the mere dissemination
of ideas.” Next, counsel compares the erection and displaying
of the banner to handbilling, which under DeBartalo, supra,
unaccompanied by picketing, does not itself constitute picket-
ing, and characterizes it as a “disciplined, passive, and direct
display of information,” a “pure speech” activity entitled to full
First Amendment protection. However, I agree with counsel
for the General Counsel that Respondent Local 1506’s banner
was more akin to a picket sign than a handbill in that its display
was sententiously more dramatic. On this point, Respondent
Local 1506’s 20-foot wide and 4-foot high banner dwarfed the
size of a leaflet, and its 2-foot high message was obviously
designed to more rapidly catch the attention of pedestrians and
motorists, who passed by, than the lengthy message on the
handbill, which the banner bearers distributed. In fact, as in
Service Employees Local 254, supra, one may reasonably argue
that, given its size, the banner itself was far more significant to
Respondent Local 1506’s objectives than the idea, which the
words on the banner conveyed. Further, while one may, of
course, avoid the message of a handbill by not choosing to
accept it; there could be no such choice with the obtrusive mes-
sage on the banner displayed by Respondent Local 1506. Ac-
cordingly, for the above reasons, I believe that Respondent
Local 1506’s arguments are without merit and that the latter’s
displaying of its banner constituted picketing in another guise.18
Having concluded that Respondent Local 1506 engaged in
picketing, I must next determine whether an object of its acts
and conduct was to force Held, Laser Institute, or any other
person to cease doing business with Gingerich Construction.
At the outset, in cases involving picketing, allegedly violative
of Section 8(b)(4)(B) of the Act, an office building, such as the
2021 building, has been classified, by the Board as a common
situs (Service Employees Local 87, supra; Building Service
Employees Local 254 (Lechmere Sales), 173 NLRB 280
(1968)), and, based upon its admission and the handbills, which
18 My finding is wholly dependent upon the Board’s definition of
picketing and the fact matrix herein, and I express no opinion or make
any finding regarding the display of the banner in any other location or
at any other distance from the 2021 building entrances.

SOUTHWEST REGIONAL COUNCIL OF CARPENTERS 29
were distributed to pedestrians by the banner bearers, Respond-
ent Local 1506’s primary labor dispute was with Gingerich
Construction. Clearly, then, for purposes of this section of the
Act, Held, Laser Institute, and every other tenant of the 2021
building were neutral, secondary employers with regard to Re-
spondent Local 1506’s primary labor dispute with Gingerich
Construction. However, the Board and courts have held that,
“. . . picketing at the premises of a neutral, secondary employer
. . . is not per se a violation of the Act.” Food & Commercial
Workers Local 1776, supra at 508–509. Thus, a union’s sec-
ondary picketing of retail stores, which is confined to persuad-
ing customers to cease buying the product of the primary em-
ployer, does not violate Section 8(b)(4)(II)(B) of the Act.
NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers Local 760, supra.19 “The
test for determining whether such picketing is lawful is the
objective of the secondary activity, as gleamed from the sur-
rounding circumstances.” Food & Commercial Workers Local
1776, supra at 509. Further, the substitution of violent coercion
in place of peaceful persuasion, such as herein involved, would
not itself remove the acts and conduct from the proscription of
Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B), for “it is the object of union [coercion]
that is proscribed by that section, rather than the means adopted
to make it felt.” NLRB v. International Rice Milling Co., 341
U.S. 665, 672 (1951). Adhering to these principles, while I
believe that, by erecting and displaying its banner, Respondent
Local 1506’s intent may have been to protest Gingerich Con-
struction’s failure to pay the labor organization’s area standard
wages and fringe benefits to its employees and Laser Institute’s
apparent lack of interest as to whether Gingerich was, in fact,
paying prevailing area standard wages and fringe benefits, Re-
spondent Local 1506’s acts and conduct clearly also had an
unlawful cease doing business objective. As to this, during the
incident on September 3, asked why Respondent Local 1506
was picketing at the 2021 building, Rick Whittey, acting in his
capacity as an agent for the former, told Robert Held “. . . that
he wanted . . . me to quit doing business with Gingerich and
start doing business with only union contractors. . . .” Moreo-
ver, that Respondent Local 1506’s erection and displaying of its
banner, which, I believe, was a form of picketing, failed to
conform to the Moore Dry Dock20 standards for picketing at a
common situs, such as the 2021 building, is further evidence of
a secondary object.21 In this regard, notwithstanding that Rob-
19 Likewise, in Carpenters District Council of Detroit (Douglas
Co.), 322 NLRB 612, 612 (1996), the union’s jobsite picketing was
“engaged in solely for the lawful purpose of protesting [the primary’s]
failure to meet area standards.” As the picket signs correctly identified
the primary and as there was no evidence of a secondary object, the
Board found that the picketing did not violate Sec. 8(b)(4)(B) of the
Act.
20 Sailors Union (Moore Dry Dock), 92 NLRB 547 (1950).
21 The four criteria require that (1) the picketing be strictly limited to
times when the situs of the dispute is located on the secondary employ-
er’s premises; (2) the primary employer be engaged in its normal busi-
ness at the situs at the time of the picketing; (3) the picketing be limited
to places reasonably close to the location of the situs; and (4) the pick-
eting disclose clearly that the dispute is with the primary employer. If
the picketing conforms to these criteria, it is presumed to be lawful
primary picketing. Oil Workers Local 1-591 (Burlington Northern
Railroad), 325 NLRB 324, 327 fn. 11 (1998).
ert Held informed Whittey the Gingerich employees worked,
each day, from midnight to 10 a.m.; Respondent Local 1506
erected and displayed its banner each day when no Gingerich
Construction employees were working inside the Laser Institute
office suite, and, of course, the banner failed to disclose that
Local 1506’s primary dispute was with Gingerich Construc-
tion.22 In these circumstances, including Whittey’s admission
and the nature of Respondent Local 1506’s conduct, I believe
the latter’s displaying of the banner at the 2021 building had a
clear secondary objective—that of placing pressure upon Laser
Institute and the other tenants of the 2021 building to, in turn,
place pressure upon Held to force it to cease doing business
with Gingerich Construction. In these circumstances, I find
that Respondent Local 1506’s acts and conduct were violative
of Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act. Service Employees Local
87, supra.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Held is, and has been at all times material, an employer
engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. Laser Institute is, and has been at all times material, an
employer engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of
the Act.
3. Respondent Local 1506 is, and has been at all times mate-
rial, a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act.
4. Held, Laser Institute, Medical Associates, and Gingerich
Construction are, and have been at all times material, persons
engaged in commerce or in businesses affecting commerce
within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4) of the Act.
5. From September 8 through and including October 15,
2003, by picketing at the 2021 building by means of a banner,
which failed to identify Gingerich Construction as the employer
with which it had a primary labor dispute, at times when Gin-
gerich Construction employees were not working at the Laser
Institute’s suite of offices, Respondent Local 1506 engaged in
said acts and conduct for an object of placing pressure upon
Laser Institute and the other tenants of the 2021 building to, in
turn, place pressure upon Held to force it to cease doing busi-
ness with Gingerich Construction.
6. The aforementioned unfair labor practices affect com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent Local 1506 has engaged in
certain unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section

22 Bluntly put, while the wording on the banner was not untruthful,
in the circumstances of this case, the display of the banner constituted
picketing. Thus, Respondent Local 1506’s failure to name the primary
employer on its banner evidenced a secondary object.

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 30
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act, I shall recommend that Respondent
Local 1506 be ordered to cease and desist from engaging in

said acts and conduct and to take certain affirmative actions
designed to effectuate the purposes and policies of the Act.
[Recommended Order omitted from publication.]