Sharon M Tambini-Simpkins, Appellant,v.John H. Dalton, Secretary, Department of the Navy, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionOct 30, 1998
01975627 (E.E.O.C. Oct. 30, 1998)

01975627

10-30-1998

Sharon M Tambini-Simpkins, Appellant, v. John H. Dalton, Secretary, Department of the Navy, Agency.


Sharon M Tambini-Simpkins v. Department of the Navy

01975627

October 30, 1998

Sharon M Tambini-Simpkins, )

Appellant, )

)

v. ) Appeal No. 01975627

) Agency No. 97-00203-003

John H. Dalton, )

Secretary, )

Department of the Navy, )

Agency. )

)

DECISION

The appellant timely filed an appeal with this Commission from a final

decision, dated June 25, 1997, which the agency issued pursuant to EEOC

Regulation 29 C.F.R. �1614.107(b). The Commission accepts the appellant's

appeal in accordance with EEOC Order No. 960, as amended.

The final agency decision defined six allegations raised by the

appellant's complaint. The decision accepted five allegations for

investigation and dismissed one allegation for untimely EEO counselor

contact. Therein, the appellant alleged that on June 17 1996, she was

harassed by the Chief when she accused her of not being sick, she did

not want to grant her additional sick leave for a follow-up appointment,

and she indicated that the appellant had had a history of sick leave

abuse since 1993.

On appeal, the appellant contends that she contacted Counselor L on June

17, 1996. The appellant also represents that she subsequently withdrew her

informal complaint about the June 17, 1996 incident because a supervisory

counselor advised her to do so and because she told her she would help

her get a job elsewhere. The appellant indicates that she requested

reopening of the informal complaint after talking with someone in the

Office of Special Counsel.

In response, the agency submits a copy of a telephone log which indicates

that the appellant contacted Counselor L on August 26, 1996. The agency

also contends that even if the appellant's EEO counselor contact is

deemed timely, the allegation at issue fails to state a claim.

The Commission concludes that the appellant timely sought counseling

on June 17, 1996. The Commission bases this finding on the agency's

failure to submit a copy of Counselor L's telephone log for June 17, 1996.

The Commission also finds that it is possible that the agency induced

the appellant to withdraw her informal complaint in violation of EEOC

Regulation 29 C.F.R. �1614.105(g) in that the agency has not contested

the appellant's representations regarding the circumstances which led

her to withdraw her initial informal complaint.

However, the Commission agrees with the agency that the June 17,

1996 incident does not state an independent claim of employment

discrimination. The appellant did not allege that she was denied sick

leave on June 17, 1996. She also does not allege that she was disciplined

for abuse of sick leave on that occasion. The Commission finds that the

Chief's alleged remarks on June 17, 1996, although allegedly offensive,

were not sufficiently severe to constitute a change in the terms,

conditions, or privileges of the appellant's employment. See Miller

v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05941016 (June 2,

1995) (an oral admonishment was not sufficient to state a hostile work

environment claim); Backo v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Request

No. 05960227 (June 10, 1996) (supervisor's remarks on several occasions,

unaccompanied by any concrete action, were not sufficient to state a

claim); Henry v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05940695

(February 9, 1995) (allegation, that on one occasion a supervisor

questioned the complainant about his requested schedule revisions,

did not state a claim); and Larotonda v. United States Postal Service,

EEOC Appeal No. 01933846 (November 12, 1993) (allegation that supervisor

told the complainant that he was wearing a "filthy" shirt and uniform

did not state a claim). For this reason, the Commission affirms the

agency's dismissal of the appellant's June 17, 1996 allegation.

The Commission reminds the agency, however, that it is required to

investigate the June 17, 1996 incident to the extent that it provides

background evidence for the appellant's other allegations, especially

the appellant's incentive award allegation. The Commission further

reminds the agency that it is required to investigate the allegations

as stated in the appellant's complaint unless those allegations are

properly dismissed.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Commission AFFIRMS the agency's

dismissal of the appellant's June 17, 1996 complaint allegation.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0795)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the appellant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available

when the previous decision was issued; or

2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,

regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or

3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial

precedential implications.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST

BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive this

decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive

a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any argument in

opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to reconsider

MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party

WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the request

to reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.407. All requests and arguments

must bear proof of postmark and be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark,

the request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on the date it is received

by the Commission.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances

have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration,

a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the

delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your

request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests

for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited

circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.604(c).

RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0993)

It is the position of the Commission that you have the right to file

a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court WITHIN

NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision.

You should be aware, however, that courts in some jurisdictions have

interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner suggesting that

a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the

date that you receive this decision. To ensure that your civil action

is considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN THIRTY (30)

CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision or to consult

an attorney concerning the applicable time period in the jurisdiction

in which your action would be filed. If you file a civil action,

YOU MUST NAME AS THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE

OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS

OR HER FULL NAME AND OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in

the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the

national organization, and not the local office, facility or department

in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a

civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative

processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

October 30, 1998

______________

Date Ronnie Blumenthal, Director

Office of Federal Operations