Sharon L. White, Appellant,v.Andrew M. Cuomo, Secretary, Department of Housing and Urban Development, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionNov 25, 1998
01981009 (E.E.O.C. Nov. 25, 1998)

01981009

11-25-1998

Sharon L. White, Appellant, v. Andrew M. Cuomo, Secretary, Department of Housing and Urban Development, Agency.


Sharon L. White v. Department of Housing and Urban Development

01981009

November 25, 1998

Sharon L. White, )

Appellant, )

) Appeal No. 01981009

v. ) Agency No. FW 95-04

) Hearing No. 220-96-8297X

Andrew M. Cuomo, )

Secretary, )

Department of Housing )

and Urban Development, )

Agency. )

)

DECISION

Appellant timely initiated an appeal to the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (EEOC) from the final decision of the agency concerning her

allegation that the agency violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act

of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq. The Commission hereby

accepts the appeal in accordance with EEOC Order No. 960, as amended.

The issues presented are whether appellant proved, by a preponderance

of the evidence, that:

(1) she was discriminated against because of her race (Black) when

she was placed in an AWOL status on August 8, 1990, for two hours and

on August 9, 1990, for eight hours when she refused to sign for leave

after being absent from her assigned duty station without permission,

while other employees under the same circumstances were not required to

submit a leave slip;

(2) she was reprised against (prior EEO activity) and harassed when she

was denied a promotion, had leave restrictions imposed, was required

to document her leave when her mother was ill, was issued a letter of

proposed suspension, and was constructively discharged from her position

as a Closing Clerk on August 21, 1990; and

(3) she was discriminated against because of sex (female) and reprisal

(prior EEO activity) when she was harassed by the Office Manager and

Deputy Director when these individuals accused her of unauthorized use

of government property, and the police were called to escort her out of

the building during her attempt to file an EEO complaint.

On appeal, appellant contends that the agency's failure to process her

complaint in a timely manner seriously hampered her ability to present

a prima facie case because three of her most important witnesses died

and other prospective witnesses resigned from the agency before the

investigation and hearing took place. In response, the agency explained

that appellant had mailed her formal EEO complaint to an authorized

non-agency federal government official for forwarding to the agency

EEO office, but the official apparently thought the complaint was

a courtesy copy and destroyed it. The official was not under the

authority or control of the agency. When appellant finally inquired

of the agency about her complaint, the EEO Counselor's Report had also

been destroyed, and it took several years of correspondence to establish

that the complaint had indeed been filed on September 5, 1990, and that a

complaint investigation should go forward. The agency then had appellant

refile her complaint on October 24, 1994, and declared it timely.

During the relevant time, appellant was employed by the agency as

a Closing Clerk, GS-04, but resigned her position on August 21,

1990, because of severe stress allegedly placed on her by management

officials. Believing that she was a victim of discrimination, appellant

sought EEO counseling and later filed a formal EEO complaint dated

September 9, 1990, wherein she alleged that she had been discriminated

against when the above three agency actions occurred.

The agency complied with all procedural and regulatory prerequisites,

and on August 7, 1997, the EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ) issued a

Recommended Decision (RD) finding no discrimination or harassment based

on race, sex, or reprisal, and that appellant failed to establish a

prima facie case for each one of her allegations. Subsequently, the

agency adopted the RD as its own final decision.

After a careful review of the record in its entirety, the Commission

finds that the AJ's RD summarized the relevant facts and referenced the

appropriate regulations, policies, and laws. We therefore discern no

basis to disturb the AJ's finding of no discrimination.

In particular, we note that appellant's Motion for Summary Judgement on

the grounds that the agency's inordinate delay in investigating her case

had damaged her ability to present a prima case was denied by the AJ.

He pointed out that the purpose of discovery at the hearing was "to

supplement the record by addressing deficiencies found by either party."

Thus, the AJ determined that the hearing would give appellant the

opportunity to supplement the record with enough evidence to prove her

case and therefore denied her Motion for Summary Judgment. The AJ has

broad discretion in the conduct of a hearing, and we find that the AJ

did not abuse his discretion in the matter. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.109(c).

We also note that the agency was not at fault for the delay in the

investigation, since the authorized official who received and then

destroyed the original complaint in 1990 was not an agency employee

or under its authority. Thus, the agency never accepted the complaint

in 1990 and did not violate the relevant regulation at that time, 29

C.F.R. �1613.606. It is accordingly the decision of the EEOC to AFFIRM

the agency's final decision.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0795)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the appellant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available

when the previous decision was issued; or

2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,

regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or

3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial

precedential implications.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST

BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive this

decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive

a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any argument in

opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to reconsider

MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party

WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the request

to reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.407. All requests and arguments

must bear proof of postmark and be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark,

the request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on the date it is received

by the Commission.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances

have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration,

a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the

delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your

request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests

for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited

circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. �l6l4.604(c).

RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0993)

It is the position of the Commission that you have the right to file

a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court WITHIN

NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision.

You should be aware, however, that courts in some jurisdictions have

interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner suggesting that

a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the

date that you receive this decision. To ensure that your civil action

is considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN THIRTY (30)

CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision or to consult

an attorney concerning the applicable time period in the jurisdiction

in which your action would be filed. If you file a civil action,

YOU MUST NAME AS THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE

OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS

OR HER FULL NAME AND OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in

the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the

national organization, and not the local office, facility or department

in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a

civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative

processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42, U.S.C. �2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

Nov 25, 1998

DATE Ronnie Blumenthal, Director

Office of Federal Operations