Shannon Elizabeth. KlingmanDownload PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardMay 1, 20202019000606 (P.T.A.B. May. 1, 2020) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/613,420 02/04/2015 Shannon Elizabeth Klingman Klingman-U3 3514 66125 7590 05/01/2020 JEFFREY DEAN LINDSAY 20 DIANE LANE APPLETON, WI 54915 EXAMINER CHANG, KYUNG SOOK ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 1613 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 05/01/2020 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): jeff@jefflindsay.com jeff@magicinnovation.com ldsfaq@gmail.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE _________________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD _________________ Ex parte SHANNON ELIZABETH KLINGMAN _________________ Appeal 2019-000606 Application 14/613,420 Technology Center 1600 _________________ Before FRANCISCO C. PRATS, RAE LYNN P. GUEST, and DEBORAH KATZ, Administrative Patent Judges. KATZ, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON REQUEST FOR REHEARING Appellant1 requests rehearing of our Decision on Appeal, issued December 30, 2019 (“Decision”). (Request for Reconsideration, filed February 28, 2020 (“Request”).) We affirmed the Examiner’s rejection of claims 15–26 in the Decision. We DENY the request for rehearing and decline to modify the Decision. 1 We use the word “Appellant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Inventor Shannon Elizabeth Klingman is identified as the real party-in-interest. (Appeal Br. 4.) Appeal 2019-000606 Application 14/613,420 2 A request for rehearing is a request that the original decision be modified because of “points believed to have been misapprehended or overlooked by the Board,” which must be stated by Appellant with particularity. 37 C.F.R. § 41.52(a)(1). To have misapprehended or overlooked a fact or an issue, Appellant must have made us aware of it in the briefing for appeal. Appellant raises 12 issues to argue that we should rehear our Decision affirming the Examiner’s rejection of claims 15–26 as being obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over So,2 Hart,3 Klier,4 Casas-Sanchez,5 and Vagisil.6 (See Request 4.) In Issue 1, Appellant argues that because the Examiner failed to respond to arguments about the enablement of the teachings of So, the rejection should have been reversed. (See Request 4.) We addressed Appellant’s argument regarding the asserted lack of enablement of So in the Decision. (See Decision 11.) We explained that we were persuaded by the Examiner’s reliance on the suggestion in So that vaginitis causes malodor and that mandelic acid can be used to treat vaginitis for the rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103. (See id., citing Final Act. 5.) The 2 So and Jeon, WO 2006/132515 Al, published December 14, 2006. 3 Hart, U.S. Patent 4,078,050, issued March 7, 1978. 4 Klier et al., EP 0775486 Al, published May 28, 1997 (English Translation). 5 Casas-Sanchez et al., EP 1982689 Al, published October 22, 2008. 6 Vagisil Medicated Wipes (pramoxine hydrochloride) cloth, (2005) retrieved from http://dailymed.nlm.nih.gov/ dailymed/lookup .cfm? setid=5df5243a-30ef-4c54-b 19b-50335bac0d84. Appeal 2019-000606 Application 14/613,420 3 Examiner stated: “So teaches an active agent for the treatment of vaginitis containing mandelic acid (claim 1 of prior art) . . . [and teaches] vaginitis causes bad odors in the secretion due to increase in pH (page 2, lines 15–21) . . . .” (Final Act. 5.) The Examiner did not rely on the experimental evidence reported in So. (See id.) As we noted, each reference need not be enabling of the claimed subject matter in the context of an obviousness rejection. (See Decision 9, 11, citing Symbol Tech., Inc. v. Opticon, Inc., 935 F.2d 1569, 1578 (Ed. Cir. 1991).) Appellant argued in the Appeal Brief that So provides only in vitro laboratory experiments, not any clinical trials or human case studies. (See Appeal Br. 17–20.) Appellant’s argument does not address the Examiner’s rejection because it focuses on the experimental evidence in So, which was not relied upon as a basis for the rejection. Because Appellant’s argument for lack of enablement failed to address the Examiner’s rejection, the Examiner’s response was not a reason for reversing the rejection. Accordingly, we are not persuaded that we misapprehended or overlooked any points raised by Appellant on the basis of Issue 1. In Issue 2, Appellant argues that claim 16 should have been allowed in light of what Appellant characterizes as an admission by the Examiner regarding the narrower pH range recited in the claim. (See Rehearing 5.) In the Appeal Brief, Appellant argued: Claim 16 further distinguishes over the art by requiring “at least 1 % by weight of a second carboxylic acid component” and a “pH of said acidifying composition . . . between 3.2 and 4.5.” Essentially the same arguments for Claim 15 apply here. In the final Office Action, the Examiner states that while So lacks the second carboxylic acid, that deficiency is cured by the combination of Klier, Hart, and Casas- Sanchez (final Office Action, p. 9), but these references again fail to Appeal 2019-000606 Application 14/613,420 4 teach Applicant's method and the use of both mandelic acid and a second carboxylic acid as claimed by Applicant to reduce fishy odor from the pudendum. (Appeal Br. 36.) This argument does not cite to any alleged admission by the Examiner regarding pH. Similarly, Appellant does not cite to any findings or conclusions regarding pH in the Reply Brief. (See Reply Br. 51– 52.) Because Appellant failed to raise an argument for the patentability of claim 16 based on a finding regarding pH in the briefing on appeal, we could not have misapprehended or overlooked the argument. Accordingly, we are not persuaded that we misapprehended or overlooked any points raised by Appellant on the basis of Issue 2. In Issue 3, Appellant asserts that we “erred in conflating generic ‘bad odors’ with the specific issue of feminine fishy odor from sources other than vaginosis.” (See Request 5.) According to Appellant, the problem solved by the claimed method is prevention of feminine fishy odor from sources other than vaginosis, not general bad odors. (See id. at 5–7) We addressed this issue at least on pages 14–16 of the Decision. We explained that Appellant claims a method with the steps of: (1) providing a composition of mandelic acid and (2) providing instructions to apply it to the entire pudendum, not inside the vagina.7 Even if one of ordinary skill in the 7 The second step of Appellant’s claim 15 recites “providing directions to the user to apply the acidifying composition to the entire pudendum and not inside the vagina . . . .” (Appeal Br. 57.) Claim limitations directed to printed matter, or information that would be printed, are not entitled to patentable weight unless the printed matter is functionally related to the substrate on which the printed matter is applied. See Praxair Distribution, Appeal 2019-000606 Application 14/613,420 5 art would not have known the source of the odor was from something other than vaginosis, the prior art demonstrates that it would have been obvious to perform these recited steps. Appellant’s discovery of the source of the odor does not render the claimed method non-obvious because the prior art shows that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reason to apply mandelic acid to reduce fishy odor from the teachings of So and would have known that applying mandelic acid externally can reduce malodor of the genital area. (See id.) Thus, despite Appellant’s argument in the Request, we considered the totality of the evidence. We were not persuaded that, even if the specific problem to be solved by Appellant was not appreciated as Appellant presents it, the claimed steps would have been non-obvious. Inc. v. Mallinckrodt Hosp. Prod. IP Ltd., 890 F.3d 1024, 1031 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Under this doctrine, merely adding an instruction sheet or other informational content to a drug product has been held to be insufficient to create a functional relationship to the drug. See AstraZeneca LP v. Apotex, Inc., 633 F.3d 1042, 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2010); see also In re Ngai, 367 F.3d, 1336, 1339 (holding that instructions in a kit fail to make the kit patentable because they merely provide a new use for an existing product). Furthermore, claim limitations directed to providing informational content have been considered to be mental steps that lack patentable weight in an obviousness analysis. See Praxair, 890 F.3d at 1033 (holding that claims to a method of providing nitric oxide gas that includes providing information to a medical provider are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103 because, in part, the limitation of providing information requires the medical provider to only think about the information and therefore is an unpatentable mental step). Although our Decision is based on the obviousness of applying mandelic acid to the pudendum to treat odor, we note that Appellant’s claimed method reasonably might be interpreted to require only the step of providing a user with a composition and directions. The step of providing directions to apply the composition to the pudendum and not inside the vagina reasonably might be interpreted to be non-limiting. Appeal 2019-000606 Application 14/613,420 6 “[T]the analysis [of obviousness] need not seek out precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.” KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007). Appellant does not point to any facts or issues that we did not consider in our Decision. Thus, we are not persuaded that we misapprehended or overlooked any points raised by Appellant on the basis of Issue 3. In Issue 4, Appellant argues that we misunderstood Hart because (1) we made an “implicit suggestion” that Hart teaches applying mandelic acid to various areas of the human body and (2) we found that Hart was known to work with other ingredients in the genital/anal area of animals for odor control. (See Request 7–9.) Appellant asserts that when the Decision is read “in context,” we found that Hart teaches applying mandelic acid to areas on the human body other than the vagina. (See Rehearing 7.) Appellant fails to cite to such a finding in the Decision and we did not make one. Instead, we found: “Hart teaches the application of deodorant to the genital and anal areas of cats and dogs to control offensive odors. (See Hart 2:25–32.)” (Decision 3, Finding of Fact (“FF”) 4.) We stated further: “The Examiner relied on Hart to show that mandelic acid was known to work with other ingredients in the genital/anal area of animals. (See Final Act. 6.)” (Decision 7.) These are not findings that Hart teaches that mandelic acid can be applied to areas other than the human vagina. Appeal 2019-000606 Application 14/613,420 7 As we explained, “Hart may not teach using mandelic acid in exactly the same way as claimed, but its teachings of the use of mandelic acid on the external genitalia of animals are cited along with the teachings of So and Klier for using mandelic acid in humans to suggest the claimed method.” (Decision 7.) Thus, our findings regarding Hart were in the context of our findings regarding the teachings of the other cited prior art for the Examiner’s obviousness rejection. As the Supreme Court explained: Often, it will be necessary for a court to look to interrelated teachings of multiple patents; the effects of demands known to the design community or present in the marketplace; and the background knowledge possessed by a person having ordinary skill in the art, all in order to determine whether there was an apparent reason to combine the known elements in the fashion claimed by the patent at issue. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398,418 (2007). Furthermore, we addressed Appellant’s further argument regarding the teaching in Hart of dioxanes in the Decision by explaining that the argument does not accurately reflect the Examiner’s rejection. (See Decision 10–11; see Request 7–8.) We also addressed Appellant’s argument that because Hart teaches dioxane is an alkaline deodorant, one of ordinary skill would not understand that mandelic acid could be added to increase effectiveness. (See Request 8– 9.) Specifically, we cited the abstract of Hart, which states: “Offensive odors of animal origin are lessened or neutralized by application of deodorant compositions comprising [dioxanes]. The effectiveness of the compositions toward specific odors is increased by incorporation of acidic or basic components.” (See Decision 10.) As we explained, Hart teaches other Appeal 2019-000606 Application 14/613,420 8 alternative treatments, without criticizing the claimed solution such as by teaching that mandelic acid would not be useful in reducing odors on pet genitalia. (See id. at 9–10.) Appellant fails to identify any points raised by Appellant that we misapprehended or overlooked on the basis of Issue 4. In Issue 5, Appellant argues that we erred in finding that the term “pudendum” is not limited to humans. (See Request 9–10.) Appellant cites to footnote 8 on page 7 of the Decision, which notes that claim 15 does not expressly recite human subjects and that the Specification does not include a limitation to human in the definition of “pudendum.” (See Decision 7 n.8.) Appellant cites a dictionary definition of the term that refers to women and portions of the Specification that refer to women. (See Request 9–10.) Appellant asserts that this alleged error “was an improper shrinking of the gap between Applicant's product for controlling odor in the complex environment of the pudendum and Hart’s teachings for treating pets with his dioxane compounds” (Id. at 10.) We did not misapprehend the claim term “pudendum” because we did not interpret claim 15 as being broader than providing directions to apply the composition to a female human body. We merely noted that claim 15 does not expressly recite human subjects and that the Specification does not include a limitation to humans. The Decision was based on the combination of teachings in the prior art of applying mandelic acid to women to prevent odor and of applying mandelic acid to the external genitalia to prevent odor. Thus, our findings and conclusions are consistent with the definitions provided by the Appellant. Appeal 2019-000606 Application 14/613,420 9 Accordingly, we are not persuaded that we misapprehended or overlooked any points raised by Appellant on the basis of Issue 5. In Issue 6, Appellant argues that we overlooked alleged “gaps” in the teachings of So. (See Request 11–13.) Appellant argues that So presents only in vitro data and, therefore, cannot be relied upon to demonstrate that mandelic acid can be actually useful in treating humans with vaginosis or in reducing odor. (See id. at 10–12.) We addressed this argument in our analysis of Issue 1, above. Appellant argues further that So fails to establish successful control of odor-producing microbes. (See id. at 12–13.) According to Appellant, mere suggestion is not the standard required for So as the primary reference in this particular rejection, given the unpredictability of medical treatment and the complexities of an internal human environment vs. a Petri dish. So does not provide a reasonable expectation that mandelic acid can treat vaginosis, and provides no evidence, in vitro or in vivo, that mandelic acid can reduce fishy odor from sources other than vaginosis in an environment outside the vagina or outside the Petri dish that So examined. (Request 12.) Appellant argues that the lack of certain test results in So means So cannot be used to “guide one skilled in the art to use mandelic acid in treating humans having odor arising from a different source in a different environment.” (Request 11 (emphasis omitted).) This argument fails to address the combination of the teachings of each of the cited prior art references. (See Decision 7, 14.) The Supreme Court has explained that “[c]ommon sense teaches, however, that familiar items may have obvious uses beyond their primary purposes, and in many cases a person of ordinary skill will be able to fit the teachings of multiple patents together like pieces of a puzzle.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 420. Appellant’s Appeal 2019-000606 Application 14/613,420 10 arguments focus only on the lack of certain test results in So, without considering the teaching of all the cited prior art together, without addressing the totality of the record. The Examiner provided at least three references (So, Hart, and Klier) that all teach the odor reducing properties of mandelic acid. Thus, we are not persuaded that we misapprehended or overlooked any points raised by Appellant in that Decision. Accordingly, we are not persuaded that we misapprehended or overlooked anything on the basis of Issue 6. In Issue 7, Appellant again argues that we failed to apply the proper standard for an obviousness rejection because there was an inadequate demonstration of a reasonable expectation of success. (See Request 13–15.) As explained above, we addressed this issue in the Decision and are not persuaded that it should be modified. Appellant argues further that one of ordinary skill in the art would not have combined Klier with the other references because it is related to a problem with “no clear relevance to the challenge of fishy odor.” (Request 15.) We addressed this argument in the Decision, finding it to be unpersuasive because Klier teaches using mandelic acid as a deodorant. (See Decision 14.) Deodorants are used to reduce bad odor, regardless of the specific scent. Accordingly, we are not persuaded that we misapprehended or overlooked any points raised by Appellant on the basis of Issue 7. In Issue 8, Appellant argues we improperly relied on market demand as a motivation in affirming the Examiner’s rejection for obviousness. (See Request 15.) Appellant acknowledges, “there is market demand for eliminating fishy odor, . . .” but argues that the market did not realize that Appeal 2019-000606 Application 14/613,420 11 there was a problem of fishy odor due to sources other than vaginosis. (Id.) Thus, Appellant relies on the discovery of a new source of odor to argue for the obviousness of the claimed method. These arguments do not persuade us to modify the Decision because they are contrary to the law of obviousness. If the steps of the claimed method would have been obvious in light of the art available at the time, discoveries that lead to the obvious method do not render it non-obvious, regardless of whether the results were recognized in the art. See In re May, 574 F.2d 1082, 1090 (CCPA 1978) (holding that discovery of the unknown property of nonaddictiveness of a species disclosed in the prior art does not constitute a new use); see also In re Tomlinson, 363 F.2d 928, 934 (CCPA 1966) (claims to a process of inhibiting degradation of polypropylene caused by exposure to light by mixing a certain genus of compounds with polypropylene held to have been obvious because the prior art reference taught mixing a species falling within the claimed genus with polypropylene for the purpose of preventing heat degradation during extrusion.) We are not persuaded that we misapprehended or overlooked any points raised by Appellant in that Decision on the basis of Issue 8. In Issue 9, Appellant argues that we failed to show how the references as a whole lead one to recognize and solve the problem targeted by the invention. (See Request 15–17.) Appellant argues “there is no obvious ‘demand for a treatment’ of the problem of fishy odor arising from sources other than vaginosis.” (Request 16.) Appellant argues further: Applicant has explained that the references individually and cumulatively do not lead to Applicant’s discovery as claimed, foremost because they fail to even recognize the problem that Appeal 2019-000606 Application 14/613,420 12 needs to be solved, that of reducing fishy odor arising on the pudendum from sources other than vaginosis. (Id.) Thus, Appellant again relies on the argument that the discovery of a new problem addressed by steps that would have been obvious in light of the prior art renders the method non-obvious because the reason to perform the obvious steps were not recognized in the art. As explained above, this argument is contrary to the law. Appellant argues further that there would not have been a reason to combine the teachings of Casas-Sanchez or Vagisil with So and Hart because they are not analogous art. (See Decision 16–17.) According to Appellant, because Casas-Sanchez teaches a shelf-stable wet wipe solution without antimicrobials or harsh chemicals it is not taught to be a treatment for vaginitis or for reducing odors. (See id. at 16.) Similarly, Appellant argues that because Vagisil teaches preservatives that provide “odor block,” its teachings are not combinable with Casas-Sanchez. (See id. at 17.) We addressed these arguments in the Decision, explaining that they do not address the teachings of Casas-Sanchez and Vagisil that were cited by the Examiner. (See Decision 12–13.) We are not persuaded that we misapprehended or overlooked any points raised by Appellant regarding Issue 9. In Issue 10, Appellant argues that we erroneously characterized Appellant’s statement about the use of wipes to prevent odor as an admission. (See Request 17–19.) In the Appeal Brief, Appellant stated: Based on the formulation, the Vagisil product may be useful for cleansing and providing relief for itching, but it is not relevant to the claimed invention except to document what the Applicant freely recognizes, that cleansing wipes for the perineum are known. Appeal 2019-000606 Application 14/613,420 13 (Appeal Br. 27.) In the Decision, we stated: Whether or not the product described in Vagisil actually works, it demonstrates what was understood in the art at the time – that external-use wipes could be useful in preventing odor. Appellant "freely recognizes" this fact. (Appeal Br. 27.) (Decision 13.) Appellant now argues that the statement in the Appeal Brief only acknowledged that cleansing wipes for the perineum were known. (See Request 17.) Appellant argues that the statement in the Appeal Brief was not an admission that cleansing wipes such as taught in Vagisil have any utility in reducing fishy odor as claimed. (See id.) Appellant emphasizes that Vagisil does not provide any basis for believing that its wipes control fishy odor. (See Request 16.) Appellant also emphasizes that the action of the wipes taught in Vagisil is based on the preservatives used. (See id.) These points are not relevant to the teachings of Vagisil that were the basis of the Examiner’s rejection. As we explained in the Decision, Vagisil was cited for its teaching of using a wipe intended for use on the external vaginal area to block odor. (See Decision 13, citing Final Act. 8; see also Final Act. 16 (“Vagisil teaches that anti-itch medicated wipes have odor block protection and is adopted to disclose application method to external area.”).) This teaching is relevant not only to the step in Appellant’s claim 15 of providing directions to the user to apply a mandelic acid composition to the pudendum, and not inside the vagina, but also to the recitation in claim 23 of treating a pudendum with a wipe comprising the mandelic acid composition. The teaching in Vagisil demonstrates that those of skill in the art knew that odor blocking compositions, could be applied with a wipe to the pudendum, not only inside the vagina. Appeal 2019-000606 Application 14/613,420 14 Appellant argues that it is unreasonable to separate the functionality of the wipes from their ingredients and that the reference must be considered as a whole. (See Request 18–19.) The test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference; nor is it that the claimed invention must be expressly suggested in any one or all of the references. Rather, the test is what the combined teachings of the references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art. In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981). Thus, we are not persuaded that relying on Vagisil for the teaching of using a wipe on the pudendum to block odor was improper. We are not persuaded that we misapprehended or overlooked any points raised by Appellant regarding Issue 10. In Issue 11, Appellant argues that we erred in affirming the rejection of claim 18 because we considered the claimed “non-zero yield stress” to be a natural result and inherent property of the ingredients recited. (See Request 19.) Appellant argues that it is hindsight to use an inherent property as evidence of obviousness where the cited art does not provide a missing element. (See id.) Appellant asserts that the intended result of the claimed method is to the problem of fishy odor on the pudendum from sources other than vaginosis – not the general problem of bad odor. (See id.) As explained above, arguments based on the discovery that the method steps of claim 15 will treat fishy odor from sources other than vaginosis are not persuasive of the non-obviousness of the method steps recited in Appellant’s claims. Appeal 2019-000606 Application 14/613,420 15 Furthermore, the term “non-zero yield stress” in claim 18 is extremely broad, excluding only compositions with zero yield stress. In the Appeal Brief, Appellant stated: For an externally used wipe to be effective in treating vaginitis according to So, if one were somehow motivated to attempt the use of a wipe, then Applicant submits that one skilled in the art would likely be motivated to ensure that the externally applied active ingredient has a chance to migrate into the vagina to have a chance of treating the vaginitis. Thus, the carrier should have low viscosity and low resistance to flowing. (Appeal Br. 37.) Thus, Appellant stated that even when the intent would be to have a composition move to a different location on the body, such as into the vagina, the yield stress would be “low,” not zero. Appellant fails to direct us to an example of or an explanation of a composition with a zero yield stress. Given Appellant’s statement that even compositions appearing to have characteristics not beneficial to the claimed method have a non-zero yield stress, we are not persuaded that we overlooked or misapprehended any points raised by Appellant in determining that compositions useful in Appellant’s claimed method would inherently have non-zero yield stress. We are also unpersuaded by Appellant’s argument that we implied that Vagisil teaches a treatment for some forms of malodor, but not fishy. (See Request 19.) As explained above, the Examiner’s rejection was not based on a teaching in Vagisil of treating fishy odor, but on the teaching of using a wipe on the external genitalia to block odor, in general. We are not persuaded that we misapprehended or overlooked any points raised by Appellant regarding Issue 11. Appeal 2019-000606 Application 14/613,420 16 In Issue 12, Appellant argues that we made errors regarding Klier. (See Request 20.) Appellant argues that we improperly shifted the burden to Appellant to show that the Gram-positive bacteria referred to in Klier do not cause fishy odor and that there would not have been a reasonable expectation of success in using Klier to address the problem of Gram- negative vaginosis taught in So. (See Request 20.) As we explained, Klier teaches using mandelic acid as a deodorant and “intimate cleansing agent.” (See Decision 14.) Therefore, we are persuaded that it contributes to the other cited art, which also teach using mandelic acid to prevent odor, to render Appellant’s claimed method obvious. Klier need not have taught that mandelic acid is useful in treating Gram-negative bacteria or in treating fishy odor because, as explained above, those of ordinary skill in the art would have understood from its teachings, as well as the teachings of the other cited art, that mandelic acid could be used to treat odor in the “intimate” or genital area. Thus, we are not persuaded that we improperly shifted a burden to Appellant in regard to the teachings of Klier. Accordingly, we are not persuaded that we misapprehended or overlooked any point raised by Appellant on the basis of Issue 12. Conclusion Outcome of Decision on Rehearing: Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § References/Basis Affirmed Reversed 15–26 103(a) So, Hart, Klier, Casas-Sanchez, Vagisil 15–26 Appeal 2019-000606 Application 14/613,420 17 Final Outcome of Appeal After Rehearing Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § References/Basis Affirmed Reversed 15–26 103(a) So, Hart, Klier, Casas-Sanchez, Vagisil 15–26 No period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1). DENIED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation