Service Employees Local 715 (Stanford Hospital)

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 6, 2010

355 N.L.R.B. 353 (N.L.R.B. 2010)

SERVICE EMPLOYEES LOCAL 715 (STANFORD HOSPITAL)
355 NLRB No. 65
353
Service Employees International Union, Local 715
and Stanford Hospital and Clinics/Lucile Pack-
ard Children’s Hospital. Cases 32–CB–6237,
32–CB–6350, and 32–CB–6351
August 6, 2010
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN LIEBMAN AND MEMBERS SCHAUMBER
AND PEARCE
On August 4, 2008, Administrative Law Judge John J.
McCarrick issued the attached decision. The Respondent
and the Charging Party each filed exceptions and sup-
porting briefs, the General Counsel filed a brief in an-
swer to the Respondent’s exceptions and in support of
the judge’s decision, and the Charging Party filed an an-
swering brief to the Respondent’s exceptions.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings, and conclusions as
modified and to adopt the recommended Order.
I. INTRODUCTION
This case concerns information requests that the
Charging Party, Stanford Hospital and Clinics/Lucile
Packard Children’s Hospital (Stanford), made to the Re-
spondent, Service Employees International Union, Local
715. Stanford made the requests due to its uncertainty
whether Local 715 continued to be its employees’ bar-
gaining representative. A principal issue is whether Lo-
cal 715 was obligated to provide information concerning
its sister local, Service Employees International Union,
Local 521.
II. FACTS
Since 1998, Local 715 has been the bargaining repre-
sentative of Stanford’s nonprofessional employees who
perform service and patient care functions.1 In January
2006, Stanford and Local 715 entered into a new collec-
tive-bargaining agreement for this bargaining unit effec-
tive from January 2006 to November 2008. In February
2006, about a month after the start of the new contract
with Local 715, representatives of United Healthcare
Workers West (UHW) informed Stanford that UHW was
now representing the bargaining unit. In response to
Stanford’s inquiries, Local 715 stated that it continued to
represent unit employees but had entered into an agree-
ment with UHW to help service the employees. UHW,
however, continued to claim that it represented the unit
and directed Stanford to remit dues directly to it.

1 The unit description is set forth in the judge’s decision.
In June 2006, Stanford raised concerns to Local 715
that it was abandoning representation of the unit and
stated that it did not assent to Local 715’s assignment of
representation rights to UHW. Stanford further stated
that it would not meet with UHW representatives until
Local 715 provided documentation of its relationship
with UHW. Stanford then dealt only with its shop stew-
ards concerning collective-bargaining matters.
In June 2006, the Service Employees International Un-
ion (SEIU) announced a new jurisdictional plan for its
California local unions under which several locals, in-
cluding Local 715, would be merged into a new public
sector local, subsequently named Local 521. However,
representation of private sector hospital units previously
represented by these locals (such as the Stanford unit)
would be transferred to UHW.
Stanford repeatedly expressed concern to Local 715
that it was abandoning the bargaining unit. In response,
Local 715 in August 2006 provided Stanford with its
service agreement with UHW.2 Stanford advised Local
715 that it did not believe that the actual arrangements
between Local 715 and UHW comported with those set
forth in the service agreement and that, therefore, it
would not recognize the service agreement. Stanford
further stated: “[T]he Hospitals are obligated to recog-
nize SEIU Local 715, and only SEIU Local 715, as the
exclusive representative of unit employees unless and
until proper steps have been taken to change the repre-
sentative, and doing so de facto through a purported ser-
vice agreement is not the appropriate method.”
In January 2007,3 Robert Rutledge, the bargaining
unit’s chief steward, informed Stanford by email that
Local 715 no longer existed and that UHW represented
the unit. At a subsequent meeting with Stanford,
Rutledge stated that Local 715 had ceased to exist and
that UHW, not Local 715, represented the unit employ-
ees. On March 1, Local 715’s website was updated so
that, when one attempted to view it, the website for Local
521 appeared. Local 521’s website indicated that Local
715 had merged into Local 521. Stanford, however, was
not included on the Local 521 website’s list of employers
whose employees were represented by Local 521.
Rather, UHW’s website listed Stanford as one of the em-
ployers whose employees UHW represented. Neverthe-
less, in response to an inquiry from Stanford, Local 715’s

2 The service agreement specified that UHW staff would provide
unit employees with representation in grievance procedures, arbitra-
tions, and labor-management meetings, and would assist members
appearing before the NLRB. It further provided that Local 715 would
continue to administer dues collection and would have access to all
membership meetings and records associated with the unit.
3 All dates are in 2007, unless otherwise indicated.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

354
attorney from the law firm of Weinberg, Roger &
Rosenfeld (Weinberg firm) stated that Local 715 contin-
ued to exist and would represent the Stanford unit.
Given its uncertainty about the status of Local 715 as
the bargaining agent for its employees, Stanford sent an
information request to Local 715 on March 29.4 The
request sought, for the most part, facts about Local 715–
including Local 715’s officers, agents, employees, and
assets–but also sought a description of Local 521’s cur-
rent assets and the identity of Local 521’s officers, direc-
tors, executives, and managerial employees.5 On April 9,
Local 715, through its Weinberg firm attorney, refused to
provide the requested information, stating that it was
irrelevant, was available to Stanford, or was in the pos-
session of another local that had no bargaining relation-
ship with Stanford.6
On June 14, an individual named Bruce Smith notified
Stanford that the SEIU had placed Local 715 in trustee-
ship and appointed Smith as trustee. On June 18, attor-
ney Barbara Chisholm, from the law firm of Altshuler
Berzon (Altshuler firm), responded to the information
request on behalf of Smith. She stated that Local 715’s
officers and directors had been removed, Local 715 had
no employees, Smith had sole authority to manage Local
715’s affairs and would direct all representational matters
concerning Stanford’s employees, UHW would continue
to service Stanford’s employees under the service agree-
ment between Local 715 and UHW, and no information
regarding Local 521 would be provided.
On August 1,7 Stanford made a second information re-
quest to Local 715, seeking:
1. The name and position held of each employee on
the active payroll and who received pay in the first pay

4 Stanford repeated this request on May 15 and June 22.
5 The complete information request, excluding items no longer in is-
sue, asked for the following:
1. Identity of officers, directors, executives and managerial employees
of SEIU Local 715.
2. Identity of officers, directors, executives and managerial employees
of SEIU Local 521.
3. Identity of SEIU Local 715’s employees.
4. Identity of all individuals authorized to act on behalf of SEIU Local
715.
5. Identity of all individuals who receive paychecks reflecting the
name and address of the legal entity of the employer as SEIU, Local
715, pursuant to California Labor Code 226 (a)(8).
10. A description of SEIU, Local 715’s current assets.
11. A description of SEIU, Local 521’s current assets.
6 Local 715 now concedes in its brief, however, that the information
requested with respect to Local 715 “may have been necessary.”
7 Stanford reiterated this request on October 8 and December 27.
period of each of the months of April, May, and June of
2007, and the name of each employee on the active
payroll on June 7, 2007.
2. The name and title of each officer of Local 715 as of
the first day of each of the months of April, May, and
June of 2007, and on June 7, 2007, and the amounts of
compensation and expense reimbursements paid to
each.
3. A list of assets as the first day of each of the months
of April, May, and on June of 2007.
4. A list of assets transferred or sold in each of the
months of April, May and June of 2007.
5. A list of assets acquired in each of the months of
April, May and June of 2007.
Stanford received no response to this request.
On August 22, an attorney from the Weinberg law
firm, on behalf of Local 715, demanded that Stanford
cease implementing any new work rules policy. On Au-
gust 24, and again on October 5 and 16, and December
27, Stanford asked Chisholm (from the Altshuler law
firm) if her firm represented Local 715 and if the
Weinberg law firm represented UHW under the Local
715-UHW service agreement. Chisholm did not reply.
On November 1, a Weinberg firm attorney wrote to Stan-
ford on behalf of Local 715 concerning dues payments.
On November 9, Stanford asked trustee Smith if he had
retained the Weinberg firm to represent Local 715 or
whether the Weinberg firm was providing services for
UHW under the Local 715-UHW service agreement.
On December 14, Smith advised Stanford that he au-
thorized only the Weinberg law firm to represent Local
715 in all aspects of the arbitration process. He made no
representation as to the Altshuler law firm’s status as
Local 715’s counsel. Other than Smith’s December 14
response, Local 715 did not provide the information that
Stanford requested concerning Local 715’s status or the
status of its legal representatives.
III. JUDGE’S DECISION
The judge found that Local 715 violated Section
8(b)(3) of the Act. He found that a union has a duty to
furnish relevant information that is necessary for an em-
ployer to fulfill its contractual obligations and that the
standard of relevance for such information is a broad one
akin to a discovery standard. He further found that in-
formation to assist an employer to ascertain with which
entity it has a bargaining obligation is necessary and
relevant to the employer’s duties and responsibilities in
the collective-bargaining process. Given the conflicting
information that Stanford had received concerning the
SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION LOCAL 715 (STANFORD HOSPITAL)

355
status of Local 715, the judge found that Stanford was
entitled to the information it requested to establish
whether it had an ongoing obligation to bargain and to
honor its collective-bargaining agreement with Local
715.8
The judge also found that Local 715 had an obligation
to attempt to provide the requested information that was
in the possession of Local 521. The judge analogized to
an employer’s duty to furnish information possessed by a
third party with which the employer has a business rela-
tionship. He found that Local 715 had a close relation-
ship with Local 521, as the two locals operated from the
same office and had similar officers and executive board
members.
The judge further found that, in view of the conflicting
and incomplete information that Stanford received re-
garding which law firm represented Local 715, the in-
formation that Stanford requested concerning Local
715’s legal representatives was relevant and necessary
for it to determine with which of Local 715’s agents it
was obligated to bargain. Therefore, Local 715 had an
obligation to furnish Stanford with information as to
which law firm or firms represented Local 715.
The judge dismissed one aspect of the complaint. He
found that Local 715 had no obligation to provide Stan-
ford with information concerning whether the Weinberg
firm’s representation of Local 715 was based on the
UHW service agreement. The judge reasoned that Local
715 was free, if it so chose, to have the Weinberg firm
represent it under the UHW service agreement, and in-
formation concerning such an arrangement was not nec-
essary or relevant to the collective-bargaining relation-
ship between Local 715 and Stanford.
IV. DISCUSSION
We adopt the judge’s finding that Local 715 violated
Section 8(b)(3) by failing to provide the requested infor-
mation other than information concerning whether the
Weinberg firm represented Local 715 based on the UHW
service agreement.
A union’s duty to furnish information is well estab-
lished. In Iron Workers Local 207 (Steel Erecting Con-
tractors), 319 NLRB 87 (1995), the Board stated:

8 The judge further found that the conflicting information that Stan-
ford received concerning the status of Local 715 gave rise to a “ques-
tion concerning representation.” We decline to adopt this finding.
Under the Act, the phrase “question concerning representation” is a
term of art indicating circumstances under which a representation elec-
tion would be warranted. See, e.g., Raymond F. Kravis Center for the
Performing Arts, 351 NLRB 143, 145–146 (2007), enfd. 550 F.3d 1183
(D.C. Cir. 2008). As this case does not present that issue, we have no
need to address it.
An employer has a duty to provide to a union, on re-
quest, information that is relevant to the collective-
bargaining relationship between the employer and the
union and which is reasonably necessary for the un-
ion’s performance of its function as bargaining repre-
sentative. Conversely, a union’s duty to furnish such
relevant and necessary information to an employer is
commensurate with and parallel to an employer’s duty
to furnish it to a union.9
The standard for relevance of the requested information
does not vary, regardless of whether it is a union or an em-
ployer to which the request is made. “In analyzing whether
requested information is relevant, a ‘liberal, discovery-type
standard’ is utilized by the Board, one which requires only
the ‘probability that the desired information [is] relevant,
and that it would be of use to the [requesting party] in carry-
ing out its statutory duties and responsibilities.’”10
The present case, in which the Employer received con-
flicting information regarding the union to which it had a
bargaining obligation, is in some respects parallel to
cases where a union believes that a third party is an alter
ego of the employer with which the union has a bargain-
ing relationship. In alter-ego situations, a union may
desire to obtain information concerning the third party
with which it has had no relationship. Similarly, in the
situation raised by this case, the employer may desire to
obtain information concerning a union with which it has
had no relationship.
When a union requests information pertaining to a
suspected alter-ego relationship, the union must establish
the relevance of the requested information.11 A union
cannot meet that burden based on a mere suspicion that
an alter-ego relationship exists; it must have an objective,
factual basis for believing that the relationship exists.12
By analogy, we find that when an employer requests in-
formation pertaining to an outside union, it must have an
objective, factual basis for believing that such informa-
tion would be relevant in determining the union to which
it has a collective-bargaining obligation. Of course, as
noted above, the standard for establishing such relevance
is a liberal, discovery-type standard that requires only the
probability that the desired information would be of use

9 Id. at 90 (citations omitted).
10 Hotel & Restaurant Employees Local 226 (Caesars Palace), 281
NLRB 284, 288 (1986), citing NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co., 385 U.S.
432 (1967); Bohemia, Inc., 272 NLRB 1128 (1984). In addition, re-
quested information must be provided if it is “reasonably calculated to
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” Westinghouse Electric
Corp., 304 NLRB 703, 708 (1991) (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted).
11 Contract Flooring Systems, Inc., 344 NLRB 925 (2005).
12 M. Scher & Son, Inc., 286 NLRB 688, 691 (1987).
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

356
to the employer in carrying out its duties and responsi-
bilities under the Act.
While the judge did not expressly apply the “objective,
factual basis” standard, we agree with his finding that
Stanford made a sufficient showing that the information
that it sought, except for information concerning whether
the Weinberg firm’s representation of Local 715 was
based on the UHW service agreement, was relevant in
determining the union to which it had a collective-
bargaining obligation. Applying the “objective, factual
basis” standard, we find that the requested information
was relevant to Stanford’s legitimate interest in deter-
mining whether Local 715 continued to exist. As de-
scribed above, soon after Stanford signed a new collec-
tive-bargaining agreement with Local 715, UHW repre-
sentatives claimed that UHW represented the Stanford
bargaining unit, and the SEIU announced that Local 715
was being merged into Local 521. Subsequently, Stan-
ford’s chief steward told Stanford that Local 715 no
longer existed. Nevertheless, Local 715’s representatives
insisted all along that Local 715 continued to represent
the Stanford unit.
Under these circumstances, we find that the informa-
tion requested concerning Local 521, as well as Local
715, was relevant to the Stanford’s legitimate interest in
determining whether Local 715 continued to exist.13

13 We do not rely on the judge’s rationale to the extent that he found
the requested information relevant to ascertaining whether there was
substantial continuity between Local 715 and the local union into which
it purportedly merged, Local 521. Local 521 made no demand for
recognition as the bargaining representative of Stanford’s employees,
nor did it otherwise claim to represent them. Consequently, it was
unnecessary for Stanford to ascertain whether there was substantial
continuity between Local 715 and Local 521.
Contrary to his colleagues, Member Schaumber would adopt in full
the judge’s rationale concerning the relevancy of the requested infor-
mation. In his view, Stanford’s request for information regarding Local
521’s assets was relevant with respect to continuity of representative
between Local 715 and UHW, which did assert a claim to represent
Stanford’s employees. To the extent that such information revealed
that Local 715’s former assets were absorbed by Local 521, it would be
relevant to showing whether the resources that could be committed to
the representational needs of the Stanford’s employees had been dimin-
ished, which is a factor in determining continuity of representation.
See CPS Chemical Co., 324 NLRB 1018, 1024 (1997), enfd. 160 F.3d
150 (3d Cir. 1998); Toyota of Berkeley, 306 NLRB 893, 900 (1992),
vacated in part on other grounds by Matter of Watson-Tansey, 313
NLRB 628 (1994).
In discussing whether an employer’s duty to bargain continues after
a union merger, the judge stated that, in addition to continuity of repre-
sentative, the Board also examines whether there was an adequate
opportunity for the affected employees to participate in the merger
process. However, the Board eliminated this requirement in Raymond
F. Kravis Center for the Performing Arts, above, as inconsistent with
the Supreme Court’s decision in NLRB v. Financial Institution Employ-
ees of America Local 1182 (Seattle-First), 475 U.S. 192 (1986). The
judge’s misstatement, however, did not materially affect his analysis.
Thus, even if the information that Stanford requested
about Local 521 would not, in itself, be dispositive of
whether Local 715 continued to exist, it would at least be
of use in resolving this question. For example, the in-
formation might show that substantial assets formerly
possessed by Local 715 were now owned by Local 521.
We, thus, find the information relevant.14 See, e.g., Pub-
lic Service Electric & Gas Co., 323 NLRB 1182, 1186
(1997), enfd. 157 F.3d 222 (3d Cir. 1998) (“burden of
[establishing relevancy] is not an exceptionally heavy
one, requiring only that a showing be made of a ‘prob-
ability that the desired information is relevant, and that it
would be of use to the union in carrying out its statutory
duties and responsibilities,’” quoting NLRB v. Acme In-
dustrial Co., 385 U.S. 432, 437 (1967)); Postal Service,
332 NLRB 635, 636 (2000) (“Under that [discovery-
type] standard, even potential or probable relevance is
sufficient to give rise to an employer’s obligation to pro-
vide information.”). Moreover, the Board has found that
a union may be required to furnish, or at least attempt to
obtain, relevant, requested information that is not in its
possession or control but to which it has access. See
Hospital Employees District 1199E (Johns Hopkins), 273
NLRB 319, 320, 326 (1984). Local 715 made no such
effort here.
However, we agree with the judge that Local 715 had
the right to freely select its representative, and if it chose
to do so by an arrangement under the UHW service
agreement, such a decision is not relevant to the collec-
tive-bargaining relationship between Local 715 and Stan-
ford or to the issue of whether Local 715 remained in
existence. Thus, we adopt the judge’s dismissal of the
allegation respecting this information.15
Accordingly, we affirm the judge’s finding that, except
for information concerning whether the Weinberg firm’s
representation of Local 715 was based on the UHW ser-
vice agreement, Local 715 violated Section 8(b)(3) of the
Act by failing to provide the information that Stanford
requested.

14 Beyond contesting the relevance of the information that Stanford
requested, Local 715 did not assert any other ground for concluding
that the information sought should not be provided. Thus, Local 715
did not contend that the information sought was confidential, nor did it
assert that production of the information would be excessively burden-
some.
15 Contrary to his colleagues, Member Schaumber would find that
Local 715’s failure to provide Stanford with information concerning
whether the Weinberg firm’s representation of Local 715 was based on
the UHW service agreement also violated Sec. 8(b)(3). Stanford had a
reasonably based view that the UHW service agreement was invalid.
Assuming that view was correct, Stanford would have no obligation to
deal with the Weinberg firm as Local 715’s representative if that firm’s
representation of Local 715 were based on the UHW service agree-
ment.
SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION LOCAL 715 (STANFORD HOSPITAL)

357
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge and
orders that the Respondent, Service Employees Interna-
tional Union, Local 715, San Jose, California, its offi-
cers, agents, and representatives, shall take the action set
forth in the Order.

Amy Berbower, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Bruce A. Harland, Esq. (Weinberg, Roger and Rosenfeld), of
Alameda, California, for the Respondent.
Laurence R. Arnold, Esq. and Nina Kani, Esq. (Foley and
Lardner LLP), of San Francisco, California, for the Charg-
ing Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JOHN J. MCCARRICK, Administrative Law Judge. This case
was tried in Oakland, California, on May 6, 2008, based upon
the Order Consolidating Cases, consolidated complaint, and
notice of hearing1 (complaint) issued by the Acting Regional
Director for Region 32 issued on February 28, 2008. The com-
plaint alleges that Respondent Service Employees International
Union, Local 715 (Respondent or Respondent Local 715), vio-
lated Section 8(b)(3) of the Act by refusing to furnish informa-
tion to Stanford Hospital and Clinics/Lucile Packard Children’s
Hospital (Employer) necessary and relevant to the Employer’s
administration and enforcement of its collective-bargaining
agreement with Respondent. Respondent filed a timely answer
to the complaint denying any wrongdoing.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Upon the entire record herein, including the briefs from the
General Counsel, Respondent, and Charging Party, I make the
following findings of fact.
I. JURISDICTION
The employer, a California corporation, with an office and
place of business in Palo Alto, California, has been engaged in
the business of operating an acute-care hospital and medical
clinics providing inpatient and outpatient medical care. During
the past 12 months, the employer, in the course of its business
operations derived gross revenues in excess of $250,000 and
during that same period purchased and received goods valued
in excess of $5000 that originated outside the State of Califor-
nia.
Based upon the above, the employer has been at all times
material an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning
of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.

1 At the hearing counsel for the General Counsel (CGC) moved to
amend the complaint at subpar. 8(a) to delete items 6 through 9 and 12.
In addition CGC moved to add “and December 27, 2007” after June 22,
2007, in the first line of subpar. 8(a), “and December 27, 2007” after
October 8, 2007, in the first line of subpar. 8(b) and “and December 27,
2007” after November 9, 2007, in the second line of subpar. 9(a).
There being no objections to the amendments, the motion was granted.
II. LABOR ORGANIZATION
Respondent admitted in its answer and I find that it is a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Refusal to Provide Information to the Employer
1. The facts
The facts in this case are not in serious dispute. Since 1998
Respondent has been the exclusive collective-bargaining repre-
sentative of the following unit of the Employer’s employees:

All full-time, part-time and relief non-professional employees
performing service and patient care functions, employed at
Stanford hospital, Lucile Packard Children’s Hospital, Welch
Road and Blake Wilbur Drive locations in positions or classi-
fications listed as included in Appendix A of Respondent and
the Employers’ January 20, 2006 through November 4, 2008
collective-bargaining agreement (Agreement); excluding em-
ployees employed in those positions or classifications listed as
excluded in Appendix A of the Agreement, employees repre-
sented by any other labor organization, managerial, supervi-
sory or confidential employees within the meaning of the Act,
and all other employees.

Respondent and the Employer have been parties to a succes-
sion of collective-bargaining agreements, the most recent of
which runs through November 2008.
The issue of who was representing the Employer’s above-
described bargaining unit employees began at the end of Febru-
ary 2006 when Laurie Quintel (Quintel), the Employer’s direc-
tor of labor relations met with Rachel Deutsch (Deutsch) and
Ella Hereth (Hereth), representatives of SEIU United Health-
care Workers West (UHW). Deutsch told Quintel that UHW
was representing the hospital’s bargaining unit employees. At
this time the Employer had no collective-bargaining agreements
with UHW nor had it recognized UHW as representative of its
bargaining unit employees. Quintel told Deutsch that the em-
ployees were represented by the Respondent and that there was
nothing to discuss with her.
Following the meeting with Deutsch, on March 1, 2006,
Quintel sent an email to Greg Pullman (Pullman), Respondent’s
organizing director2 noting that the Employer had a contract
with Respondent and asked for clarification as to whether
UHW was taking over representation at the Employer. Later on
March 1, Pullman responded via email3 and confirmed that
Respondent continued to represent employees at Stanford Hos-
pital and Clinics but that Respondent had entered into an
agreement with UHW to help service the Employer’s employ-
ees covered by the contract between Respondent and the Em-
ployer.
On March 10, 2006, Quintel received a letter from Hereth di-
recting all SEIU correspondence to her and Deutsch at their San
Francisco, California office and requesting the names, ad-
dresses, phone numbers, benefited status, social security num-

2 GC Exh. 2.
3 GC Exh. 3.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

358
bers, department, worksite, shift, and classification of all bar-
gaining unit employees.4
On April 17, 2006, William Sokol (Sokol), of the Weinberg,
Roger & Rosenfeld law firm (the Weinberg firm), as counsel
for UHW, wrote5 to Quintel asking the Employer to provide the
information requested in Hereth’s March 10 letter when it sub-
mitted dues for employees represented by UHW.
On April 25, 2006,6 Laurence Arnold (Arnold), counsel for
the Employer, responded to Sokol’s April 17 letter and advised
that UHW did not represent any of the Employer’s employees.
Arnold stated further that Respondent had assured the Em-
ployer that it continued to represent the bargaining unit em-
ployees and that UHW was providing contract administrative
services on behalf of Respondent. Arnold declined to forward
dues or dues information to UHW as they had no collective-
bargaining relationship with the Employer nor had employees
authorized UHW to receive dues.
On April 25, 2006, UHW began submitting grievances7 on
behalf of bargaining unit employees in the name of UHW and
its member.
On May 1, 2006, Quintel received a letter8 from Pullman ad-
vising the UHW had a service agreement with Respondent to
handle all representational matters with the Employer.
On May 18, 2006, Quintel wrote9 to Pullman advising that
the Employer did not recognize UHW as having any relation-
ship with the Employer’s employees.
In a series of emails10 on May 22, 2006, Pullman and Joceyln
Olick, a UHW organizer, advised the Employer that UHW was
handling all representational matters for Respondent. In an
additional email on May 30, 2006,
11 Pullman told Quintel that
UHW had authority to propose revisions to the new collective-
bargaining agreement between the Employer and Respondent.
On June 7, 2006, Arnold wrote to Pullman,12 addressing the
Employer’s concerns that Respondent was abandoning its rep-
resentation of employees in the bargaining unit. Arnold stated
further that the Employer did not assent to assignment of Re-
spondent’s representation rights to UHW. In view of the facts
set forth in the letter, Arnold demanded assurances, in the form
of documentation of the relationship between Respondent and
UHW, that Respondent remained the exclusive bargaining rep-
resentative of its employees. Arnold advised that until such
assurances were received, the Employer would not meet with
UHW representatives.
On June 20, 2006, Arnold again wrote13 to Pullman and
raised further concerns concerning Respondent’s status as col-
lective-bargaining representative in view of the SEIU hearing
officers’ joint report and recommendations14 and the June 11,

4 GC Exh. 4.
5 GC Exh. 5.
6 GC Exh. 6.
7 GC Exh. 7.
8 GC Exh. 8.
9 GC Exh. 9.
10 GC Exh. 10.
11 GC Exh. 11.
12 GC Exh. 12.
13 GC Exh. 14.
14 GC Exh. 15(b).
2006 memorandum15 from SEIU President Andrew Stern
(Stern) to all affected SEIU Locals in California. In his memo
Stern advised that the SEIU International Executive Board
(IEB) had approved new jurisdictional plans for California
local unions based upon the hearing officers’ joint report and
Recommendations. The memo noted that “Private sector hospi-
tal units currently represented by Locals 535, 707, 715, 2028,
and 4988 will merge into UHW.”16 The memo also noted that
the IEB had approved creation of four new regional SEIU lo-
cals in California including a North Central Regional Public
Sector Local. The North Central Regional Public Sector Local
would be comprised of former SEIU Locals 415, 535, 700, 715,
and 817. The SEIU hearing officers’ joint report and recom-
mendations adopted by the IEB noted that UHW was servicing
the Employer’s bargaining unit and jurisdiction would be
granted to UHW for the Employer’s bargaining unit as soon as
feasible.17 Arnold again called for documents establishing
Respondent’s active representation of the Employer’s employ-
ees.
On about August 15, 2006, Pullman provided the Employer
with a copy of the servicing agreement18 between UHW and
Respondent dated February 20, 2006. On August 29, 2006,19
Arnold advised Kristy Sermersheim (Sermershiem) Respon-
dent’s executive secretary, that it did not recognize the servic-
ing agreement.
Ballot materials20 sent to affected SEIU members voting on
the reorganization plan confirmed that a new Central North
Public Local would consist of SEIU Locals 415, 535, 700, 715,
excluding workers at Stanford/Lucile Packard Hospital, Stan-
ford University, Santa Clara University, Santa Clara Mission
Cemetery, and Bon Appetit/Compass. An SEIU website print-
out from September 25, 2006,21 showed that the Employer’s
employees would be assigned from Respondent to UHW.
After the SEIU members approved the reorganization, a
January 31, 2007 email22 to the Employer from Robert
Rutledge, Respondent’s chief steward, stated in pertinent part
that “SEIU 715 no longer exists and a service agreement be-
tween the former 715 and UHW has been in place since March
first of 2006.” The following day a meeting took place be-
tween Quintel and Rutledge concerning layoffs. During the
meeting, Rutledge told Quintel that Local 715 no longer repre-
sented the employees at the hospital, that Local 715 ceased to
exist and that UHW represented the employees.
On February 12, 2007, Quintel printed out Respondent’s
website23 which reflected that Local 715 was transitioning to
new Local 521 and as of March 1, 2007, the new local’s web-
site www.seiu521.org would have chapter pages. As of March
1, 2007, the Local 715 website defaulted to the new Local 521

15 GC Exh. 15(a).
16 Id. at p. 4.
17 GC Exh. 15(b) at pp. 65, 68.
18 GC Exh. 16.
19 GC Exh. 17.
20 GC Exh. 18.
21 GC Exh. 19.
22 GC Exh. 20.
23 GC Exh. 23.
SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION LOCAL 715 (STANFORD HOSPITAL)

359
website. A March 2, 2007 printout24 from the local 521 website
confirmed that Local 715 was merged into Local 521. A search
of the UHW website on the same date reflected that Stanford
University Health Center, which includes the Employer, was an
employer whose employees are represented by UHW.25 A
similar search at the Local 521 website did not produce a listing
for the Employer.26
Despite the above pronouncements on both the Respondent
and Local 521’s websites, a March 5, 2007 letter27 from Sokol
advised Quintel that Respondent Local 715 continued to exist,
represented the bargaining unit at the Employer, and that dues
should be remitted to Respondent.
On March 6, 2007, Quintel responded in writing28 to Sokol
and raised concerns about the viability of Respondent Local
715, citing a website announcing that Local 715 had become
part of Local 521, that Sermershiem, Local 715’s executive
director, was the new Local 521 president, that the resources of
the five former locals were transferred to Local 521, and that
Local 521 was operating from Respondent’s former office.
Sokol replied on March 14, 2007,29 reiterating that Respon-
dent continued to exist with assets as a labor organization and
would represent the Employer’s employees.
On March 29, 2007, Quintel sent an information request to
Respondent asking for information concerning the change in
Respondent’s affiliation.30 The information requested the fol-
lowing:

1. Identity of officers, directors, executives and managerial
employees of SEIU Local 715.
2. Identity of officers, directors, executives and managerial
employees of SEIU Local 521.
3. Identity of SEIU Local 715’s employees.
4. Identity of all individuals authorized to act on behalf of
SEIU Local 715.
5. Identity of all individuals who receive paychecks reflecting
the name and address of the legal entity of the employer as
SEIU, Local 715, pursuant to California Labor Code
226(a)(8).
6. The current organization chart of SEIU, Local 715.
7. The organization chart of SEIU, Local 521.
8. SEIU Local 715’s current bylaws.
9. SEIU Local 521’s current bylaws.
10. A description of SEIU, Local 715’s current assets.
11. A description of SEIU, Local 521’s current assets.
12. Any documents filed with the State of California or the
U.S. Department of Labor regarding any change in the status
of Local SEIU, 715.31

24 GC Exh. 25.
25 Id. at p. 10.
26 Id. at p.11.
27 GC Exh. 26.
28 GC Exh. 28.
29 GC Exh. 29.
30 GC Exh. 30. The information was again requested on May 15,
2007, and June 22, 2007. GC Exhs. 33 and 38.
31 Items 6–9 and 12 of the Employer’s information request are not
part of the litigation herein as a result of the General Counsel’s
amendment to the complaint referred to above in fn. 1.
On April 9, 2007,32 Bruce Harland (Harland) of the
Weinberg firm replied to Quintel’s March 29, 2007 information
request. Harland stated that the information request had been
forwarded from Respondent to him for a response. Harland
said that all of the information requested was irrelevant, was
available to the Employer, or was in the possession of another
local that has no bargaining relationship with the Employer.
Accordingly, Respondent had no duty to furnish the informa-
tion.
On June 14, 2007, Bruce Smith (Smith) wrote to Quintel to
advise that SEIU President Stern had taken control of all opera-
tions of Respondent,33 removed all Respondent’s officers and
placed it in trusteeship with Smith as trustee with full authority
to act on behalf of Respondent. Smith stated further that all
matters relating to representation of the Employer’s employees
would be handled under his direction and the servicing agree-
ment with UHW would remain in effect.
On June 18, 2007, Barbara Chisholm (Chisholm) of the Alt-
shuler Berzon law firm in a phone conversation with Arnold
advised that her firm had been retained to represent trustee
Smith and Respondent. On the same date Chisholm, on behalf
of trustee Smith, responded to Quintel’s March 29, 2007 infor-
mation request. Chisholm stated that Respondent’s officers and
directors had been removed and Smith had sole authority to
manage Respondent’s affairs, that no information regarding
Local 521 would be provided, that Respondent had no employ-
ees, that Smith would direct all representational matters con-
cerning the Employer’s employees, that UHW would continue
to service the Employer’s employees under the servicing
agreement between Respondent and UHW, that Respondent did
not have an organizational chart and that Respondent did not
possess documents filed with the State of California or the U.S.
Department of Labor regarding any change in the status of
SEIU Local 715. In addition on this date Smith wrote to Quin-
tel providing essentially the same information.34
On August 1, October 8, and December 27, 2007,35 Arnold,
on behalf of the Employer made an information request of Re-
spondent through Chisholm. The information requested in-
cluded:

1. The name and position held of each employee on the ac-
tive payroll and who received pay in of the first pay period of
each of the months of April, May, and June of 2007, and the
name of each employee on the active payroll on June 7, 2007.
2. The name and title of each officer of Local 715 as of the
first day of each of the months of April, May, and June of
2007, and on June 7, 2007, and the amounts of compensation
and expense reimbursements paid to each.
3. A list of assets as the first day of each of the months of
April, May, and on June of 2007.
4. A list of assets transferred or sold in each of the months of
April, May and June of 2007.
5. A list of assets acquired in each of the months of April,
May and June of 2007.

32 GC Exh. 31.
33 GC Exh. 35(a).
34 GC Exh. 35(b).
35 GC Exhs. 41, 45, and 52.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

360

On August 22, 2007, Vincent Harrington of the Weinberg
firm on behalf of Respondent wrote36 to Quintel demanding
that the Employer cease implementing any new policy concern-
ing work rules.
On August 24, October 5 and 16, and December 27, 2007,
Arnold wrote to Chisholm asking if her law firm represented
Respondent and if the Weinberg law firm represented UHW
under the Local 715-UHW service agreement.37 Chisholm re-
fused to reply. On November 9, 2007, Arnold wrote to trustee
Smith and asked if Smith had retained the Weinberg firm to
represent Respondent or whether the Weinberg firm was pro-
viding services for UHW under the Local 715-UHW service
agreement.38
On November 1, 2007, Sokol wrote to Quintel on behalf of
Respondent concerning dues payments.
On December 14, 2007,39 Smith advised Quintel that he au-
thorized only the Weinberg law firm to represent Respondent in
all aspects of the arbitration process. However, no representa-
tion was made as to the Altshuler Berzon law firm’s status as
Respondent’s counsel.
To date, other than Smith’s December 14, 2007 response,
Respondent has not provided the information the Employer has
requested concerning Respondent’s status or the status of its
legal representatives.
2. The analysis
The duty to furnish information is not an obligation limited
to employers under Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. In a collective-
bargaining relationship, a union also has a parallel duty under
Section 8(b)(3) of the Act to furnish relevant information that is
necessary for the employer to fulfill its contractual obligations.
Graphic Communications Local 13 (Oakland Press Co.), 233
NLRB 994 (1977); Teamsters Local 500 (Acme Mkts.), 340
NLRB 251 (2003).
The standard for relevance is a broad one akin to a discovery
standard, that is, the information must be directly related to the
party’s function vis-à-vis bargaining and that it is reasonably
necessary for the performance of that function. North Star
Steel Co., 347 NLRB 1364 (2006).
In this case the Employer has requested information that falls
into two categories: Information concerning the status of Re-
spondent and information concerning which law firm repre-
sented Respondent.
a. The request for information concerning Respondent’s status
Counsel for the General Counsel (CGC) argues that Respon-
dent was under an obligation to provide the Employer with the
information requested in its March 29, 2007, and subsequent
information requests since the information was necessary and
relevant to the Employer’s obligation to determine with whom
it had an obligation to bargain. Respondent contends that it
provided the information requested in its June 18, 2007 letter
from Smith to Quintel, that the information was not relevant to

36 GC Exh. 42.
37 GC Exhs. 43, 44, 47, and 52.
38 GC Exh. 50.
39 GC Exh. 51.
the collective-bargaining relationship between Respondent and
the Employer, that it has no obligation to provide information
in the possession of Local 521, that it has no obligation to pro-
vide information related to its attorney-client relationship with
the Weinberg firm or its representatives and, that it told the
Employer the Weinberg firm represented it with respect to
grievance arbitration matters.
The Employer’s first request for information concerning Re-
spondent’s ongoing status was made on March 29, 2007, be-
cause the Employer was unsure whether Respondent, the labor
organization with which it had an obligation to bargain, contin-
ued to exist.
Obviously an employer may bargain only with its employ-
ees’ statutory bargaining representative. Nevada Security Inno-
vations, Ltd., 341 NLRB 953, 955 (2004). Information to assist
the Employer ascertain with which entity it has a continuing
bargaining obligation is both necessary and relevant to the Em-
ployer’s duties and responsibilities in the collective-bargaining
process. Graphic Communications Local 13 (Oakland Press
Co.), supra.
Because an employer may bargain only with an exclusive
bargaining representative, where there has been a merger of
local unions it is relevant and necessary for an employer to
have information to ascertain if there is substantial continuity in
identity of the bargaining representatives such that there is an
ongoing obligation to bargain.
Where there is an intraunion merger of local unions, in order
for the successor union to compel the employer to extend rec-
ognition to it and to honor the collective-bargaining agreement,
the Board has traditionally looked at whether there has been an
adequate chance for those affected to participate in the merger
process and whether there is substantial continuity in the iden-
tity of the bargaining representatives. News/Sun Sentinel Co.,
290 NLRB 1171 (1988).
The second part of the test in the case of merged of unions
looks at whether the organizational changes that accompany the
merger are substantial enough to create a different entity, that
is, does the new organization operate in substantially the same
way as its predecessor before the merger. NLRB v. Financial
Institution Employees Local 1182 (Seattle-First National
Bank), 475 U.S. 192, 200 (1986); Seattle-First National Bank v.
NLRB, 892 F.2d 792 (9th Cir. 1989). In Western Commercial
Transport, 288 NLRB 214, 217 (1988), the Board listed various
factors to consider in determining whether there is substantial
continuity:

[C]ontinued leadership responsibilities by existing union offi-
cials; the perpetuation of membership rights and duties, such
as eligibility for membership, qualification to hold office,
oversight of executive council activity, the dues/fee structure,
authority to change provisions in the governing documents,
the frequency of membership meetings, the continuation of
the manner in which contract negotiations, administration,
and grievance processing are effectuated; and the preservation
of the certified union’s physical facilities, books and assets.

Whether Respondent, in fact, continues to exist under trus-
teeship as Respondent contends, or whether Local 521or UHW
are successors to Respondent are not issues before me to de-
SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION LOCAL 715 (STANFORD HOSPITAL)

361
termine. Rather, the issue is a narrow one. Do the facts estab-
lish that the Employer was entitled to information from Re-
spondent in order to establish whether it had an ongoing obliga-
tion to bargain with Respondent or some other entity and to
honor the extant collective-bargaining agreement?
The substantial weight of the evidence here reflects that the
Employer’s March 29, August 1, October 8, and December 27,
2007 information requests were both relevant and necessary for
the Employer to determine the identity of the labor organization
with which it had an obligation to bargain. When the Employer
made its first information request on March 29, 2007, it had
been confronted by among other things: the February 2006
statements by UHW representatives that they were representing
the Employer’s employees; the March 2006 correspondence
from UHW requesting bargaining unit employees’ personal
information; the submission of grievances by UHW for bar-
gaining unit employees commencing in April 2006; Respondent
Local 715 Pullman’s assertions in May 2006 that UHW would
handle all representational matter for Respondent and that
UHW had authority to propose revisions to the new collective-
bargaining agreement negotiated by Respondent; the merger of
Respondent into a new regional local and the assignment of the
Employer’s bargaining unit employees to UHW; the January
2007 statements by Robert Rutledge, Respondent’s chief stew-
ard, that Respondent no longer existed and no longer repre-
sented the employees at the hospital but that UHW represented
the employees; a February 2007 SEIU website which reflected
that Respondent was transitioning to new Local 521; the March
2, 2007 Local 521 website that confirmed Respondent was
merged into Local 521; a March 6, 2007 SEIU website an-
nouncing that Respondent had become part of Local 521, that
Sermershiem, Respondent’s executive director, was the new
Local 521 president, that the resources of the five former locals,
including Respondent, were transferred to Local 521, and that
Local 521 was operating out of Respondent’s former office.
The August 1, and October 8, 2007 information requests of
Respondent were made even more meaningful by trustee
Smith’s June 14, 2007 statement that SEIU President Stern had
taken control of all operations of Respondent Local 715, had
removed all Respondent’s officers, had placed Respondent in
trusteeship with Smith as trustee with full authority to act on
behalf of Respondent, that all matters relating to representation
of the Employer’s employees would be handled under Smith’s
direction and that the UHW servicing agreement would remain
in effect.
The above-cited facts gave rise to a legitimate question con-
cerning representation on the part of the Employer and made
the information requested both necessary and relevant to the
Employer’s ongoing duty to bargain with Respondent. Each
item of information requested by the Employer tracks the
Board’s various factors to consider in determining whether
there is substantial continuity in a merged labor organization.
Neither Harland’s April 9, nor Chisholm’s June 18, 2007 re-
ply to Quintel’s March 29, 2007 information request provided
the information requested other than Chisholm’s’ response that
Respondent’s officers and directors had been removed, that
Respondent had no employees, that Respondent did not have an
organizational chart and that Respondent did not possess
documents filed with the State of California or the U.S. De-
partment of Labor regarding any change in the status of Local
SEIU, 715.
In neither Harland’s nor Chisholm’s responses was there an
attempt made to secure the information requested from Local
521. Having found that the information requested was neces-
sary and relevant to the Employer’s duty to bargain, I find that
Respondent had an obligation to attempt to provide the re-
quested information in the possession of Local 521. This situa-
tion is analogous to the duty an employer would have to furnish
information that was in the possession of a third party with
whom the employer had a business relationship. United
Graphics, 281 NLRB 463, 466 (1986). Here there is a close
relationship between Respondent and Local 521. They operate
from the same office, they have similar officers and executive
board members, and they share the same resources and assets.
Respondent is under an obligation to provide information re-
sponsive to the Employer’s information requests of March 29,
as repeated on August 1, October 8, and December 27, 2007,
for the: Identity of officers, directors, executives and manage-
rial employees of SEIU Local 715; Identity of officers, direc-
tors, executives and managerial employees of SEIU Local 521;
Identity of SEIU Local 715’s employees; Identity of all indi-
viduals authorized to act on behalf of SEIU Local 715; Identity
of all individuals who receive paychecks reflecting the name
and address of the legal entity of the employer as SEIU, Local
715, pursuant to California Labor Code 226(a)(8); A descrip-
tion of SEIU, Local 715’s current assets; A description of
SEIU, Local 521’s current assets.
In addition Respondent must provide information responsive
to the Employer’s requests of August 1, as repeated on October
8, and December 27, 2007, for: The name and position held of
each employee on the active payroll and who received pay in of
the first pay period of each of the months of April, May, and
June of 2007, and the name of each employee on the active
payroll on June 7, 2007; The name and title of each officer of
Local 715 as of the first day of each of the months of April,
May, and June of 2007, and on June 7, 2007, and the amounts
of compensation and expense reimbursements paid to each; A
list of assets as the first day of each of the months of April,
May, and on June of 2007; A list of assets transferred or sold in
each of the months of April, May, and June of 2007; A list of
assets acquired in each of the months of April, May, and June
of 2007.
b. The request for information concerning the law firms
representing Respondent
Counsel for the General Counsel takes the position that Re-
spondent had a duty to furnish information to the Employer
concerning which firm represents Respondent and whether the
Weinberg firm represents Respondent, pursuant to the UHW
service agreement. Respondent contends that it has no duty to
provide information concerning its attorney-client relationship
with the Weinberg firm and that since it has the right to freely
choose its representatives, there is no obligation to provide
information concerning the basis for its relationship with its
representatives.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

362
The Weinberg firm had represented Respondent for many
years up to June 18, 2007. However, on June 18, 2007, Chis-
holm of the Altshuler Berzon law firm told Arnold that her firm
had been retained to represent trustee Smith and Respondent.
Despite these representations the Weinberg firm took actions
on behalf of Respondent. On August 22, 2007, Vincent Har-
rington of the Weinberg firm on behalf of Respondent wrote to
Quintel demanding that the Employer cease implementing any
new policy concerning work rules.40 On November 1, 2007,
Sokol wrote to Quintel on behalf of Respondent that the Em-
ployer had an obligation to submit dues payments to Respon-
dent.
On August 24, October 5 and 16, 2007, and December 27,
2007, Arnold wrote to Chisholm asking if her law firm repre-
sented Respondent and if the Weinberg law firm represented
UHW under the Local 715-UHW service agreement.41 Chis-
holm refused to reply. On November 9, 2007, Arnold wrote to
trustee Smith and asked if Smith had retained the Weinberg
firm to represent Respondent or whether the Weinberg firm was
providing services for UHW under the Local 715-UHW service
agreement.42
On December 14, 2007,43 Smith advised Quintel that he au-
thorized only the Weinberg law firm to represent Respondent in
all aspects of the arbitration process. However, no representa-
tion was made as to Chisholm’s firm as Respondent’s counsel.
I have found no cases that discuss either an employer or un-
ion’s duty to furnish information concerning which law firm
represents them or whether there is an obligation to provide
information dealing with the underlying agreement providing
for the representation. However, the Board has held that the
parties are free to choose their representatives for the purposes
of collective bargaining and that the parties have an obligation
to meet and bargain with their chosen representatives. General
Electric Co. v. NLRB, 412 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1969).
While General Electric provides that a party is free to
choose its representatives, it also makes clear that there is a
concomitant duty to meet and bargain with those chosen repre-
sentatives. In view of the conflicting evidence as to who repre-
sented Respondent, the information the Employer requested
was relevant and necessary for it to determine with which of
Respondent’s agents it had an obligation to bargain in matters
dealing with contract administration issues such as griev-
ance/arbitration processing. Therefore, Respondent had an
obligation to furnish the Employer with information as to which
law firm or law firms represent Respondent. Advising the Em-
ployer which law firm to deal with in no way infringes upon the
attorney-client relationship between Respondent and the
Weinberg firm. Moreover, Respondent left the responsibilities
of the Altshuler Berzon and the Weinberg firms unclear. While
the Weinberg firm was to handle grievance-arbitration matters,
their role in the remaining areas of contract administration were
not stated.

40 GC Exh. 42.
41 GC Exhs. 43, 44, 47, and 52.
42 GC Exh. 50.
43 GC Exh. 51.
General Electric also provides the parties are free to choose
their representatives. Counsel for the General Counsel takes
the position that since the Employer refused to recognize the
validity of the UHW service agreement and has refused to rec-
ognize UHW representatives acting on Respondent’s behalf, it
has the right to information from Respondent stating the basis
of the Weinberg firm’s representation and whether that is the
UHW service agreement. Respondent contends it can hire any
law firm it chooses.
It seems to me that this issue is a red herring. I am not called
upon here to decide the Employer’s obligation to recognize
UHW, Respondent, Local 521 Respondent’s representatives or
the service agreement. Under a long line of court and Board
cases, Respondent has the right to freely choose its representa-
tives. General Electric Co. v. NLRB, supra; Caribe Steel Co.,
313 NLRB 877 (1994); Kay Provision Co., 203 NLRB 706
(1973). If Respondent chooses an arrangement for the
Weinberg firm to represent it under a service agreement with
UHW, it is free to do so and this is neither necessary nor rele-
vant to the collective-bargaining relationship between Respon-
dent and the Employer.
I will recommend dismissal of this portion of the complaint.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Stanford Hospital and Clinics/Lucile Packard Children’s
Hospital is an employer engaged in commerce within the mean-
ing of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. Service Employees International Union, Local 715 is a
labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the
Act.
3. Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices pro-
scribed by Section 8(b)(3) of the Act since March 29, 2007, by
refusing to provide Stanford Hospital and Clinics/Lucile Pack-
ard Children’s Hospital information necessary and relevant to
its contract administration and enforcement obligations, to de-
termine its bargaining obligations with Respondent, Respon-
dent’s agents or Respondent’s successor.
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor prac-
tices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6)
and (7) of the Act.
5. All other allegations of the complaint are hereby dis-
missed.
REMEDY
Having found that Respondent engaged in and is engaging in
certain unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that it be or-
dered to cease and desist and to take certain affirmative action
designed to effectuate the purposes of the Act.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended44

44 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Section 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mended Order shall, as provided in Section 102.48 of the Rules, be
adopted by the Board and all objections shall be waived for all pur-
poses.
SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION LOCAL 715 (STANFORD HOSPITAL)

363
ORDER
Respondent Service Employees International Union, Local
715, Palo Alto, California, its officers, agents, and representa-
tives, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively with Stanford Hospital
and Clinics/Lucile Packard Children’s Hospital (Employer) by
refusing to provide it with the information it requested regard-
ing the reorganization/merger of Service Employees Interna-
tional Union, Local 715 (Union) and the identity of its legal
representatives.
(b) In any like or related manner engage in conduct in dero-
gation of our duty to bargain in good faith.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Furnish the employer with the information requested in
its letters dated March 29, May 15, June 22, August 1, October
8, and December 27, 2007, specifically the identity of officers,
directors, executives and managerial employees of SEIU Local
715; the identity of officers, directors, executives and manage-
rial employees of SEIU Local 521; the identity of SEIU Local
715’s employees; the identity of all individuals authorized to
act on behalf of SEIU Local 715; the identity of all individuals
who receive paychecks reflecting the name and address of the
legal entity of the employer as SEIU, Local 715, pursuant to
California Labor Code 226(a)(8); the organization chart of
SEIU, Local 521; SEIU Local 715’s current bylaws; SEIU
Local 521’s current bylaws; a description of SEIU, Local 715’s
current assets and; a description of SEIU, Local 521’s current
assets. To the extent that the requested information regarding
SEIU, Local 521 is not available to the Union, we will make a
reasonable, good-faith effort to secure that information or ex-
plain why that information is unavailable.
(b) Furnish the employer the information requested in its let-
ters dated August 24, October 5 and 16, November 9, and De-
cember 27, 2007, specifically we will provide the Employer the
identity of Respondent’s legal representatives and whether the
Alshuter Berzon and/ or the Weinberg, Roger, and Rosenfeld
law firms continue to represent Respondent.
(c) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its of-
fice and meeting halls copies of the attached notice, marked
“Appendix.”45 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the
Regional Director for Region 32, after being signed by the Re-
spondent's authorized representative, shall be posted by the
Respondent immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60
consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places
where notices to employees and members are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to
ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by
any other material.

45 If this Order is enforced by a Judgment of the United States Court
of Appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”

(d) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 21 days
from the date of this Order what steps the Respondent has taken
to comply.
APPENDIX

NOTICE TO MEMBERS
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated
Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this No-
tice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain on your behalf with
your employer
Act together with other employees for your benefit and
protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activi-
ties

WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with Stanford
Hospital and Clinics/Lucile Packard Children’s Hospital (the
Employer) by refusing to provide it with the information it
requested regarding the reorganization/merger of Service Em-
ployees International Union, Local 715 (the Union) and the
identity of its legal representatives.
WE WILL furnish the Employer with the information re-
quested in its letters dated March 29, May 15, June 22, August
1, October 8, and December 27, 2007, specifically the identity
of officers, directors, executives, and managerial employees of
SEIU Local 715; the identity of officers, directors, executives,
and managerial employees of SEIU Local 521; the identity of
SEIU Local 715’s employees; the identity of all individuals
authorized to act on behalf of SEIU Local 715; the identity of
all individuals who receive paychecks reflecting the name and
address of the legal entity of the employer as SEIU, Local 715,
pursuant to California Labor Code 226(a)(8); the organization
chart of SEIU, Local 521; SEIU Local 715’s current bylaws;
SEIU Local 521’s current bylaws; a description of SEIU, Local
715’s current assets and; a description of SEIU, Local 521’s
current assets. To the extent that the requested information
regarding SEIU, Local 521 is not available to the Union, we
will make a reasonable, good-faith effort to secure that infor-
mation or explain why that information is unavailable.
WE WILL furnish the employer the information requested in
its letters dated August 24, October 5 and 16, November 9, and
December 27, 2007, specifically we will provide the Employer
the identity of Respondent’s legal representatives and whether
the Alshuter Berzon and/ or the Weinberg, Roger, and
Rosenfeld law firms continue to represent Respondent.
SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION, LOCAL
715