Service Employees Local 87

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Oct 20, 1997

324 N.L.R.B. 774 (N.L.R.B. 1997)

774
324 NLRB No. 124
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
1 In finding the violation in Case 20–CC–3290, Member Fox relies
solely on the patrolling and picketing of the bank entrance (a re-
served gate entrance) at 711 Van Ness Avenue by one of the union
agents.
2 We shall modify the judge’s recommended Order in accordance
with our decision in Indian Hills Care Center, 321 NLRB 144
(1996).
Service Employees Union, Local 87, Service Em-
ployees International Union, AFL–CIO and
Cresleigh Management, Inc. and GMG Jani-
torial Maintenance, Inc. Cases 20–CC–3284,
20–CC–3287, and 20–CC–3290
October 20, 1997
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN GOULD AND MEMBERS FOX AND
HIGGINS
On May 3, 1996, Administrative Law Judge Clifford
H. Anderson issued the attached decision. The Re-
spondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief, the
Charging Parties each filed an answering brief to the
Respondent’s exceptions, and the General Counsel
filed cross-exceptions and a supporting brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has considered
the decision and the record in light of the exceptions
and briefs and has decided to affirm the judge’s rul-
ings, findings1 and conclusions and to adopt the rec-
ommended Order as modified.2
The judge denied the Respondent’s motion to dis-
miss the instant complaints on the basis of Jefferson
Chemical Co., 200 NLRB 992 (1972), and Peyton
Packing Co., 129 NLRB 1358 (1961), and found that
the issues in the instant cases are sufficiently unrelated
to those in Case 20–CB–9949 so as to withstand the
motion to dismiss. The Respondent has excepted to
this finding. We find no merit in this exception for the
following reasons.
The General Counsel has wide discretion in deter-
mining whether or not to consolidate or sever proceed-
ings. Section 102.33 of the Board’s Rules and Regula-
tions provides that:
(a) Whenever the General Counsel deems it
necessary in order to effectuate the purposes of
the Act or to avoid unnecessary costs or delay, he
. . . may, at any time after a charge has been
filed with a Regional Director . . . order that
such charge and any proceeding which may have
been initiated with respect thereto:
. . . .
(2) Be consolidated with any other proceeding
which may have been instituted in the same Re-
gion; or
(3) Be transferred to and continued in any other
Region for the purpose of investigation or con-
solidation with any proceeding which may have
been instituted in or transferred to such other Re-
gion; or
(4) Be severed from any other proceeding with
which it may have been consolidated pursuant to
this section.
The language of Section 102.33—that the General
Counsel may, if he thinks it necessary to effectuate the
Act’s purposes or to avoid unnecessary costs or delay,
consolidate or sever proceedings—clearly affords the
General Counsel wide discretion in these matters, as
befits a party exercising prosecutorial discretion. This
language is not mandatory; it is not even hortatory. It
says that the General Counsel may do as he thinks
best. Indeed, the Board long ago held that the General
Counsel’s decision whether or not to consolidate is
subject to review only for arbitrary abuse of discretion.
Teamsters (Overnite Transportation Co.), 130 NLRB
1020, 1022 (1961).
The General Counsel’s discretion is not unbounded,
however. In Peyton Packing Co., the Board dismissed
portions of a complaint alleging that the employer had
violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act by withholding a
bonus from employees and that this unlawful act was
the cause of the employees’ subsequent strike. The
General Counsel had previously issued a complaint al-
leging the same conduct, i.e., withholding the bonus,
had violated Section 8(a)(1) and that the same strike
was, for other reasons, an unfair labor practice strike.
The Board stated that
[t]he General Counsel, in short, made an election
. . . as to the path he would take in proving that
the Respondent violated the Act [by withholding
the bonus], and thereby had caused an unfair
labor practice strike. Having failed in his proof,
we cannot condone the General Counsel’s effort
to take a different path to achieve what he failed
to do in the first instance.
Id. at 1361. The Board also stated:
Generally speaking, sound administrative practice,
as well as fairness to respondents, requires the
consolidation of all pending charges into one
complaint. The same considerations dictate that,
wherever practicable, there be but a single hearing
on all outstanding violations of the Act involving
the same respondent. To act otherwise results in
unnecessary harassment of respondents.
Id at 1360.
In Jefferson Chemical, the Board applied these prin-
ciples to preclude the General Counsel from litigating
a complaint alleging that an employer had engaged in
surface bargaining where a prior complaint had pre-
viously been litigated alleging that the employer had
violated Section 8(a)(5) by making unilateral changes
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775SERVICE EMPLOYEES LOCAL 87 (CRESLEIGH MANAGEMENT)
3 Other decisions indicate that issues normally must be consoli-
dated if they are sufficiently closely related. See, e.g., Highland Yarn
Mills, 310 NLRB 644 (1993), vacated as moot 315 NLRB 1169
(1994); Best Lock Corp., 305 NLRB 648 (1991). We think such
statements are inconsistent with the thrust of other decisions and
with the broad discretion afforded the General Counsel in these mat-
ters, and we overrule those decisions insofar as they are at variance
with the discussion above. Naturally, the relatedness of issues is a
factor that may inform the General Counsel’s exercise of discretion
in determining whether consolidation is warranted.
in employment conditions during the same period of
time as the alleged surface bargaining. The original
charge had broadly asserted a refusal to bargain by the
employer, and the General Counsel had specifically
disclaimed at the first hearing any intent to establish
general bad-faith bargaining on the employer’s part.
The Board held that the General Counsel was duty
bound to investigate all 8(a)(5) matters encompassed
by the original charge and to ‘‘proceed appropriately
thereafter.’’ Jefferson Chemical, 200 NLRB at 992 fn.
3. In those circumstances, the General Counsel’s at-
tempt to litigate the surface bargaining issue in the sec-
ond case, after having failed to do so in the first case,
led to ‘‘multiple litigation of issues which should have
been presented in the initial proceeding [that] con-
stitutes a waste of resources and an abuse of our
processes[.]’’ Id.
As the Board has subsequently made clear, however,
the sound principle favoring consolidation of pending
allegations in one proceeding is not absolute. In
Maremont Corp., 249 NLRB 216, 217 (1980), for ex-
ample, the Board rejected the respondent’s claim that
the General Counsel was precluded from litigating al-
legations in the complaint based on their proximity in
time to a prior hearing involving that respondent. The
first hearing involved allegations of threats, promises,
and interrogations of employees. At the start of the
hearing, the General Counsel sought to include an alle-
gation that the respondent had unlawfully threatened
employees with reprisals if they missed work to testify
under subpoena at the Board hearing; however, the ad-
ministrative law judge denied the motion. The Board
distinguished Peyton Packing on the grounds that in
that case, the General Counsel tried to relitigate a mat-
ter which the General Counsel had already brought to
hearing. The Board noted further that to prohibit the
General Counsel from litigating allegations occurring
close in time to a prior hearing involving the same re-
spondent would restrict the General Counsel’s legiti-
mate exercise of discretion in handling complaints.
In Harrison Steel Castings Co., 255 NLRB 1426,
1427 (1981), the Board rejected the respondent’s con-
tention that Peyton Packing required dismissal of a
complaint that was based on a charge filed while a
hearing on a prior complaint was in progress. The
Board stated that
[t]o accept the Respondent’s argument that the
General Counsel be compelled to litigate all un-
fair labor practices occurring during the pendency
of litigation of other unfair labor practice charges
against the same respondent would not only se-
verely restrict the General Counsel’s discretion,
but also allow a respondent to delay indefinitely
the ultimate litigation of any charges by simply
engaging in further unlawful conduct. Such a re-
sult is completely at odds with the purposes and
policies of the Act.
The Board also found that the second complaint, which
involved the termination prior to the first hearing of an
employee who testified in the first hearing concerning
alleged threats by the respondent, was not ‘‘inter-
twined’’ with the first proceeding.3
Thus, Peyton Packing and Jefferson Chemical estab-
lish that the Board generally will not permit the Gen-
eral Counsel to relitigate the lawfulness of specific
conduct in separate proceedings by asserting that the
conduct violates different sections of the Act, and that
a decision on the part of the General Counsel not to
include conduct encompassed by a pending charge in
the complaint may bar a subsequent complaint con-
cerning that conduct. As Maremont and Harrison Steel
Castings make clear, however, the Board does not con-
strue those principles to require that charges filed dur-
ing the pendency of another unfair labor practice pro-
ceeding involving the same respondent must be con-
solidated into that proceeding regardless of the cir-
cumstances. To the contrary, except in the specific cir-
cumstances presented in Peyton Packing and Jefferson
Chemical, where the General Counsel has attempted to
‘‘twice litigate the same act or conduct as a violation
of different sections of the Act,’’ NLRB v. Plaskolite,
Inc., 309 F.2d 788, 790 (6th Cir. 1962) (emphasis in
original), or to relitigate the same charges in different
cases, the Board has recognized that such a blanket
rule in favor of consolidation would improperly inter-
fere with the General Counsel’s discretion and, in
some cases, could unduly delay the disposition of
pending cases. Maremont, 249 NLRB at 217; Harrison
Steel Castings, 255 NLRB at 1427.
In any event, the General Counsel’s decision on
whether to consolidate cases is not necessarily the last
word on the subject. Section 102.35(a)(8) of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations provides that the ad-
ministrative law judge in an unfair labor practice case
has the authority, on motion by a party, to order pro-
ceedings consolidated or severed. The judge has the
discretion to determine when consolidation, or sever-
ance, of any complaint is warranted, considering such
factors as the risk that matters litigated in the first pro-
ceeding will have to be relitigated in the second and
the likelihood of delay if consolidation, or severance,
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776 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
4The dissent argues that if the General Counsel attempts to con-
solidate cases and a party opposes the attempt, the judge may pre-
vent consolidation if he agrees with the opposing party. That propo-
sition is unexceptionable, being fully consistent with the Board’s
rules. What the dissent inexplicably overlooks is that the same rules
also contemplate that the General Counsel may determine that con-
solidation is not appropriate, subject to review if the judge agrees
with a party favoring consolidation. We cannot understand why the
dissent would replace the existing, and perfectly workable, proce-
dural system with one that would force the General Counsel to opt
for consolidation in practically all cases.
5 The hearing in Case 20–CB–9949 closed in August 1995. The
hearing in this proceeding commenced in October 1995. On motion
by the Charging Party, filed in September, the hearing in Case 20–
CB–9949 was reopened in November, 1995. Thus, it is evident that
the Respondent never intended to try to have the CC and CB cases
consolidated in one proceeding. Instead, its apparent intention was
to ‘‘sandbag’’ the General Counsel by ignoring the issue until it was
too late to consolidate the cases, and then arguing that the CC com-
plaints should be dismissed. We take a dim view of such tactics.
6 See Teamsters, 130 NLRB at 1023. Even if the Respondent were
to argue (and it does not) that it was prejudiced by the General
Counsel’s decision to litigate the CC and CB cases separately, we
would view that argument askance given that the Respondent did not
attempt to have the cases consolidated.
is granted. Thus, even if the General Counsel elects
not to consolidate two or more cases involving a party,
any party who feels harassed or prejudiced by the
prospect of separate trials can move for consolidation
and have the issue determined by the judge.
Our dissenting colleague nevertheless would dismiss
the complaint because he finds that the General Coun-
sel improperly failed to consolidate it with the com-
plaint in Case 20–CB–9949. He would, except in a
number of circumstances not present here, follow the
Board’s dictum in Peyton Packing and require that all
outstanding complaints be consolidated in one proceed-
ing.
We reject our colleague’s position, which is not
grounded in the language of the Act and is flatly in-
consistent with the broad discretion afforded the Gen-
eral Counsel in these matters in the Board’s Rules and
Regulations. It is based instead on dictum in cases
which, as we have explained, involved attempts by the
General Counsel either to relitigate issues that had
been litigated in previous proceedings or to litigate, for
the first time, issues that were encompassed by a pre-
vious charge and that could have been litigated in an
earlier proceeding but for the General Counsel’s choice
to proceed on a narrower basis. As subsequent deci-
sions make clear, Peyton Packing and Jefferson Chem-
ical simply do not stand for the broad proposition that
our colleague espouses.
We share our colleague’s concern for efficient
casehandling, conservation of the Board’s resources,
and avoiding harassment of or prejudice to respond-
ents, and we have no doubt that the General Counsel
does, too. We also expect that, in the great majority
of cases, the General Counsel’s desire to achieve those
ends would lead him to consolidate outstanding issues
for trial, rule or no rule. Unlike the dissent, however,
we are unwilling to assume that consolidation will
serve those ends in every case, and we have con-
fidence in the General Counsel’s ability to discern
when it will do so and when it will not. The Board
has historically taken this view. That is why its Rules
and Regulations have long afforded the General Coun-
sel broad discretion, subject to review only for arbi-
trary abuse, in determining whether to consolidate
pending cases. As any other party may appeal the Gen-
eral Counsel’s decision to the administrative law judge,
who can and should ensure that our concerns for expe-
ditious casehandling and fair play are taken into ac-
count, we find no reason to impose a blanket rule re-
quiring consolidation of pending cases in all but the
most unusual circumstances.4
Finally, even if we were to agree with our colleague
that the cases before us should have been consolidated
with Case 20–CB–9949, we still would reject his view
that the complaint should be dismissed. As we have
noted, parties may file motions for consolidation with
the judge presiding at a hearing. That approach was
available to the Respondent. It is undisputed that the
complaint in this proceeding had issued before the
hearing before Judge Wieder commenced in Case 20–
CB–9949. The Respondent could, therefore, have
moved in Case 20–CB–9949 that the proceedings be
consolidated, and Judge Wieder could have ruled on
the motion. According to the unrebutted assertions in
the General Counsel’s brief, however, the Respondent
made no attempt to have the CC and CB cases consoli-
dated. Instead, it waited for the hearing in this case
and moved for dismissal of the complaint.5
An unfair labor practice proceeding, it must be re-
membered, is the only vehicle for adjudicating the
claims of parties and for the Board to enforce the poli-
cies of the Act. Granted, the parties’ rights to proce-
dural fair play are also important, as are our concerns
for efficiency and conservation of the Board’s re-
sources. However, even when the General Counsel
fails to consolidate cases that normally should be con-
solidated, in the absence of a showing of prejudice to
a party we are reluctant to dismiss the complaint and
thereby sacrifice other parties’ substantive rights under
the Act. This is especially true when, as in this case,
the first party only belatedly invokes its procedural in-
terests.6
Applying these principles here, we find that the in-
stant complaint cases involving unlawful picketing in
violation of Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B) is not an at-
tempt by the General Counsel to relitigate the allega-
tions in Case 20–CB–9949 alleging improper union or-
ganizing and card solicitation by a supervisor in viola-
tion of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. Moreover, the
mere common identity of the parties in Case 20–CB–
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777SERVICE EMPLOYEES LOCAL 87 (CRESLEIGH MANAGEMENT)
7 We disavow the judge’s statement that ‘‘as a matter of law,’’ the
General Counsel will never be required to consolidate allegations of
violations of Sec. 8(b)(4) with allegations of violations of other sec-
tions of the Act.
1 There is nothing in the language or logic of the aforementioned
Jefferson Chemical and Peyton Packing principles to suggest that
they are confined to ‘‘related’’ or ‘‘closely related’’ allegations.
Thus, in my view, there is no necessity to resolve whether the ‘‘CP’’
and ‘‘CC’’ allegations herein were ‘‘related’’ or ‘‘closely related.’’
9949 is insufficient to require consolidation here. For
these reasons, we affirm the judge’s decision to deny
the Respondent’s motion to dismiss the complaints.7
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge as
modified below and orders that the Respondent, Serv-
ice Employees Union Local 87, Service Employees
International Union, San Francisco, California, its offi-
cers, agents, and representatives, shall take the action
set forth in the Order as modified.
Substitute the following for paragraphs 2(a) and (b).
‘‘(a) Within 14 days after service by the Region,
post at its business office and meeting halls located in
San Francisco, California, copies of the attached notice
marked ‘‘Appendix.’’8 Copies of the notice, on forms
provided by the Regional Director for Region 20, after
being signed by the Respondent’s authorized represent-
ative, shall be posted by the Respondent and main-
tained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places
including all places where notices to employees are
customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by
the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not al-
tered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
‘‘(b) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file
with the Regional Director a sworn certification of a
responsible official on a form provided by the Region
attesting to the steps that the Respondent has taken to
comply.’’
MEMBER HIGGINS, dissenting.
I would not allow the General Counsel to ‘‘piece-
meal’’ litigate this case, in circumstances where the
case clearly should have been consolidated with a prior
case.
In Peyton Packing Co., 129 NLRB 1358 (1961), the
Board declared:
Generally speaking, sound administrative practice,
as well as fairness to respondents, requires the
consolidation of all pending charges into one
complaint. The same considerations dictate that,
wherever practicable, there be but a single hearing
on all outstanding violations of the Act involving
the same respondent. To act otherwise results in
unnecessary harassment of respondents.
In Jefferson Chemical Co., 200 NLRB 992 (1972),
the Board said:
We believe that such multiple litigation of
issues which should have been presented in the
initial proceeding constitutes a waste of resources
and an abuse of our processes and that we should
not permit it to occur.
I believe that these principles are as sound today as
they were when they were originally pronounced 35
years ago. Indeed, at a time of severe budgetary con-
straint, the policy is even more relevant. Accordingly,
one would hope for a strong reaffirmation of these
principles.
My colleagues have chosen not to reaffirm these
principles. To the contrary, they reverse them, over-
ruling at least two cases in the process. Since the poli-
cies are sound, and are particularly relevant today, I
dissent.
The instant case illustrates the point. In August of
1995, when the hearing in Case 20–CB–9949 opened,
there were two outstanding complaints against Re-
spondent. The complaint in the case going to trial
(Case 20–CB–9949) was issued on June 14, 1995, and
the complaint in Case 20–CC–3284, et al., was issued
on July 18, 1995. Both grew out of Respondent’s pri-
mary dispute with Charging Party GMG. Inexplicably,
the General Counsel chose to litigate the CB case sep-
arately, leaving until later the litigation of the CC case.
The result was two trials before two judges, and two
separate decisional routes. Under established and sound
precedent, there was no warrant for this approach.1
My colleagues rely on Section 102.33 which vests
the General Counsel with discretion in regard to con-
solidation and severance of charges before him. While
I agree that the General Counsel has and should have
considerable discretion with respect to such matters,
the fact that the General Counsel may wish to consoli-
date cases (or not consolidate them) does not, and can-
not, strip the Board of its inherent power to control its
own docket. Indeed, it would be a strange judicial sys-
tem in which the prosecutor could dictate to the court
the timing or order in which cases are to be heard. The
final sentence of Section 102.33 makes clear the
Board’s power: the judge and the Board are the arbi-
ters of these matters.
Where, as here, complaints against a single respond-
ent have issued in two cases prior to the trial of either,
the Board can and should require that they be consoli-
dated for trial. That however, does not end the matter.
First, the charging party or respondent can, of course,
oppose a General Counsel’s motion to consolidate.
And the judge, on a showing of special circumstances,
can agree with them. If so, the General Counsel would
not be precluded from later prosecuting a second case.
Secondly, as to charges filed during the trial of the
first case, there would be no obligation on the part of
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778 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
2 249 NLRB 216.
3 255 NLRB 1426.
1 There were few evidentiary conflicts. Where not otherwise noted,
the findings are based on the admitted pleadings, the stipulations or
admissions of counsel and uncontested, credible testimonial, or docu-
mentary evidence.
the General Counsel to add complaints based on these
charges. Any party may seek to do so, and the judge
would then rule on the motion. Third, the policy re-
quires only the consolidation of all outstanding com-
plaints. Thus, if the General Counsel is faced with a
continuing series of charges against a respondent, he
need not postpone litigation until the flood has sub-
sided or until a prosecutorial decision is made on all
charges. Rather, at a point in time, the General Coun-
sel can gather together all complaint-worthy cases,
issue complaints, and proceed to trial, leaving until a
later trial other pending charges that may turn out to
be complaint-worthy. Finally, even where complaints
have issued in a mammoth series of cases, the General
Counsel may choose not to litigate all of them in one
proceeding. In this regard, I do not read the Jefferson
Chemical and Peyton Packing principles as being so
rigid as to preclude an exception for unusual cir-
cumstances. To the contrary, they are common sense
principles for ensuring efficiency of casehandling for
all parties involved. If the application of these prin-
ciples in a particular case would result in undue delay
in casehandling, they must give way in the unusual or
special circumstances of that case.
My colleagues argue that, under Maremont2 and
Harrison,3 ‘‘charges filed during the pendency of an-
other unfair labor practice proceeding involving the
same respondent’’ need not be consolidated with that
proceeding. I certainly agree with that policy but that
policy is not applicable here. Rather, where, as here,
a charge and complaint are filed prior to the proceed-
ing, there is a clear warrant for consolidation, and
there is no basis for separate trials.
Finally, my colleagues make much of the fact that
Respondent did not move to consolidate the second
case with the first case. However, the whole point of
Peyton and Jefferson is that the Board has its own in-
terest in judicial efficiency and economy. Thus, quite
apart from the interests of a private party, the Board
has a personal interest in conservation of scarce re-
sources. As noted above, at a time of severe budgetary
constraint, we should not be abandoning these prin-
ciples, and this is true without reference to the whims
of individual litigants.
For the reasons set forth above, the two complaints
in this case, pending at the opening of the hearing in
the first case, should have been litigated in case no. 1.
Under well-established and sound principles, I would
not permit ‘‘piece-meal’’ litigation of the second case.
Boren Chertkov, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Paul D. Supton, Esq. (Van Bourg, Weinberg, Roger &
Rosenfeld), of Oakland, California, for the Respondent,
Service Employees Union Local 87.
Stephen R. Lueke, Esq. (Ballard, Rosenberg & Golper), of
Universal City, California, for the Charging Party,
Cresleigh Management, Inc.
David F. Byrnes and Alan M. Pittler, Esqs. (Littler,
Mendelson, Fastiff & Tichy), of San Francisco, California,
for the Charging Party, GMG Janitorial Maintenance, Inc.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
CLIFFORD H. ANDERSON, Administrative Law Judge. I
heard the above-captioned case in trial in October and No-
vember 1995, in San Francisco, California. Briefs were sub-
mitted in February 1995. The matter arose as follows.
On March 8, 1995, Cresleigh Management, Inc. (the
Charging Party Cresleigh or Cresleigh) filed a charge, dock-
eted as Case 20–CC–3284, against Service Employees
Union, Local 87, Service Employees International Union,
AFL–CIO (the Respondent or the Union). On April 7, 1995,
the Regional Director for Region 20 of the National Labor
Relations Board issued a complaint and notice of hearing re-
specting the charge. On April 6, 1995, GMG Janitorial, Inc.
(the Charging Party GMG or GMG) filed a charge against
the Union, docketed as Case 20–CC–3287, and amended the
charge on May 17, 1995. On April 26, 1995, the Regional
Director issued a complaint and notice of hearing respecting
the charge. GMG filed a second charge on June 13, 1995,
docketed as Case 20–CC–3290, against the Union and
amended the charge on June 20 and 29, 1995. On July 18,
1995, the Regional Director issued a complaint and notice of
hearing respecting the charge and an order consolidating the
three cases for a common hearing.
The complaints as amended at the hearing allege that the
Respondent violated the provisions of Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)
of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act) by engaging
in unlawful secondary activity at various locations within the
City and County of San Francisco essentially in the spring
of 1995. The Respondent in its amended answer denies that
it has violated the Act.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Upon the entire record, including posthearing briefs from
the General Counsel, the Charging Party GMG, the Respond-
ent, and my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor,
I make the following findings of fact1
I. JURISDICTION
At all material times, the Charging Party Cresleigh has
been a California corporation with an office and place of
business in San Francisco, California. Cresleigh is engaged
in the management of office and commercial buildings.
Based upon projected operations Cresleigh annually enjoys
revenues from tenants, each of whom satisfies the Board’s
direct standard for purposes of asserting jurisdiction, of an
amount in excess of $100,000. I find that Cresleigh at all
times material has been a person and an employer engaged
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779SERVICE EMPLOYEES LOCAL 87 (CRESLEIGH MANAGEMENT)
in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7)
of the Act.
At all material times, the Charging Party GMG has been
a California corporation with an office and places of business
in San Francisco, California. GMG is engaged in the busi-
ness of providing janitorial and maintenance services to of-
fices and commercial buildings. GMG enjoys annual reve-
nues from clients, each of whom satisfies the Board’s direct
standard for purposes of asserting jurisdiction, of an amount
in excess of $50,000 and has a gross volume of business in
excess of $500,000. I find that GMG at all times material has
been an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning
of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
The Ritz-Carlton and the property managers attending the
meeting discussed below, the United Savings Bank and its
tenants, and Frank Boides and Associates are persons en-
gaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(1), (6), and (7) and Section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act.
II. LABOR ORGANIZATION
Based on the admissions in the pleadings, I find the Union
is, and at all material times has been, a labor organization
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Threshold Defense Motion to Dismiss
On April 17, 1995, the Charging Party GMG filed a
charge, docketed as Case 20–CB–9949, against the Respond-
ent alleging improper union organizing and card solicitation
by a supervisor of GMG at certain San Francisco locations
in violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. A complaint
was issued by the Regional Director on June 14, 1995, with
the matter being set for hearing initially on June 29, 1995.
Following postponements the case was heard in August 1995
by Administrative Law Judge Joan Wieder, closed by her
and thereafter on motion reopened in November 1995 and
closed thereafter. That matter is now before her pending
issuance of her decision.
Based on an asserted temporal and subject matter overlap
of Case 20–CB–9949 and the instant cases, the Respondent
moves that I dismiss the instant cases under the Board’s
holdings in Jefferson Chemical Co., 200 NLRB 992 (1972),
and Peyton Packing Co., 129 NLRB 1358 (1961). The
Charging Party GMG and the General Counsel argue that the
CC and CB allegations deal with differing factual contexts
with only slight geographical overlap. They argue, in es-
sence, that as a matter of law there is not a sufficient legal
nexus between allegations of violations of Section 8(b)(1)(A)
and 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act to invoke the mandatory con-
solidation provisions of Peyton and Jefferson. GMG also ar-
gues that the Respondent raised the defense untimely.
The Board in Peyton Packing, addressed a situation where
the General Counsel had separately litigated two complaints:
the earlier complaint contending that an employer bonus to
employees was a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act and
that the strike involved was an unfair labor practice strike
and the later complaint contending that the bonus was a vio-
lation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act and, as amended at the
hearing, that the strike was an unfair labor practice strike.
The Board ruling on the latter complaint found the relitiga-
tion of the bonus and the unfair labor practice strike to be
improper. The Board held at 1360:
Generally speaking, sound administrative practice, as
well as fairness to respondents, requires that consolida-
tion of all pending charges into one complaint. The
same considerations dictate that, wherever practicable,
there be but one single hearing on all outstanding viola-
tions of the Act involving the same respondent. To act
otherwise results in the unnecessary harassment of re-
spondents. [Footnote omitted.]
The Board found such multiple litigation to be an abuse
of process and held it would not be permitted to occur in Jef-
ferson Chemical Co., supra, now the lead case in the area.
In Jefferson two complaints had been issued alleging bar-
gaining violations of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. The Board
held at 992 fn. 3:
We believe that such multiple litigation of issues that
should have presented in the initial preceding con-
stitutes a waste of resources and an abuse of our proc-
ess and that we should not permit it to occur.
In Highland Yarn Mills, 310 NLRB 644, 644–645 (1993),
the Board restated the ‘‘closely related’’ portion of its mul-
tiple litigation prohibition standard:
[O]nce a respondent has made a prima facie showing
under Jefferson Chemical, we believe the burden shifts
to the General Counsel to rebut that showing. More
particularly, if a respondent shows that the allegations
of a ‘‘new’’ complaint pertain to events that occurred
prior to the hearing in an earlier case and that these
new allegations are closely related to the allegations of
the earlier case, the burden shifts to the General Coun-
sel to show . . . that the allegations of the new com-
plaint are not closely related to the allegations of the
earlier case.
The General Counsel cites the Board’s decision in Team-
sters after Peyton and held, reversing the administrative law
judge, that two different complaints litigating violations of
Section 8(a)(4) were not so related that the latter case should
be dismissed for failure to consolidate it with the former.
The majority held that Peyton required a common act at
issue in each of the multiple complaints to trigger dismissal
of a second complaint whereas in Overnight there were mul-
tiple, separate acts, no one of which was the common subject
of the two proceedings. The General Counsel also cites
Maremont Corp., 249 NLRB 216 (1981), and Harrison Steel
Castings Co., 255 NLRB 1426 (1981), for the proposition
that the General Counsel has discretion to consolidate or not
wherever there are differing factual and legal settings to
charges and complaints.
Rejecting the argument of GMG, I find that counsel for
the Respondent timely raised the issue discussed here. I do
not, however, find the allegations of the instant complaints
so related to the matters at issue in Case 20–CB–9949, now
before Judge Wieder, as to trigger the prohibitions of Peyton
and Jefferson Chemical. Rather, I find as a matter of law,
independent of the factual allegations at issue in each of the
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780 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
2 The dates refer to 1995 unless otherwise indicated.
3 Documentary evidence established the facsimile transmission oc-
curred at 5:17 p.m.
4 There was no real dispute and on this record I find that the dem-
onstrators were union agents and that the Union was responsible for
their conduct in the events involved.
5 The slogans included: ‘‘no contract, no peace,’’ ‘‘tear it down,
tear it down, San Francisco, union town,’’ etc.
two matters, that the provisions of Section 8(b)(4), with its
significantly different legal approach and legislative history
as well as its differing standards respecting ‘‘persons’’ and
special status under Sections 10(1) and 10(m) of the Act,
render allegations of violations of Section 8(b)(4) of the Act
immune from being dismissed as abusive multiple litigation
when they are not consolidated by the General Counsel with
non-8(b)(4) cases. Thus, I find that any and all 8(b)(4) cases
will always be, by the nature of the statute, sufficiently unre-
lated to any and all non-8(b)(4) cases so as to withstand a
motion to dismiss under Peyton and Jefferson Chemical irre-
spective of the underlying facts in the complaints as they
apply to such legally different contentions.
Given my findings that as a matter of law allegation of
violations of Section 8(b)(4) need not be consolidated with
allegations of violations of other sections of the Act, I shall
not dismiss or otherwise fetter the General Counsel’s litiga-
tion of the instant consolidated case. The Respondent’s mo-
tion to dismiss is denied.
B. Facts2
1. Background
On September 20, 1993, the Board in Service Employees
Local 87 (Trinity Maintenance), 312 NLRB 715 (1993), a
lengthy multicomplaint case, found that the Respondent had
violated Section 8(b)(4) in various ways during a 15-month
period running from June 1990 through August 1991. The
background and the existence of a campaign in the City of
San Francisco by the Union at relevant times are not in dis-
pute nor are the occurrence of the events in question on the
dates in question. It is appropriate to turn to the individual
allegations alleged in the complaint.
2. Case 20–CC–3284
In mid-January Cresleigh took over the management of the
433 California building—a San Francisco commercial build-
ing, did not assume prior management’s contracts with jani-
torial concerns for the provision of janitorial services, and
put its own janitorial employees in place. The former jani-
torial service provider’s janitorial employees, who worked at
the site and who were let go as a result of Cresleigh’s ac-
tions, were represented by the Union. In January and Feb-
ruary the Union sought first reinstatement of the former jani-
tors and thereafter that Cresleigh sign a collective-bargaining
agreement respecting its janitorial employees. Picketing of
the premises by the Union occurred during this period which
is not under challenge.
On Friday, March 3 Cresleigh contracted with GMG to
perform janitorial services at 433 California commencing on
March 6. Cresleigh’s agreement specified that GMG employ-
ees would not be present at the site from 8 a.m. to 7 p.m.
This schedule was intended to reduce the possibility of ‘‘dis-
ruption’’ by picketing during the business day.
After the close of business on Friday, March 3,3 Cresleigh
sent to the Union by facsimile transmission a copy of a letter
which stated in part:
Effective 8 a.m. March 4,1995, Cresleigh will no longer
employ any of its own employees to perform janitorial
services at 433 California. GMG janitorial staff will be
working at the 433 California location between the
hours of 5 a.m. - 8 a.m. and from 7 p.m. - 3 a.m., Mon-
day through Friday commencing on March 6,1995. . . .
No GMG managers, supervisors, agents or employees
will be at the premises located at 433 California Street
at any time(s) other than those noted above. Please con-
fine picketing by your Union, if any, to appropriate
times and locations.
The Respondent picketed the 433 California Building on
March 6 from about 11 a.m. through 6 p.m. with picket signs
asserting, inter alia:
CRESLEIGH/ROCKLAND DEVELOPMENT
STRIKE LOCAL 87
NO DISPUTE WITH ANY OTHER PERSON
and
SAN FRANCISCO CONTRACTORS ASSOCIATION
STRIKE LOCAL 87
NO DISPUTE WITH ANY OTHER PERSON, SEIU
and
UNFAIR
On March 8, 1995, the Union again picketed the 433 Cali-
fornia building commencing in the late morning. The picket
signs bore, inter alia, the following legends:
UNFAIR, UNFAIR
LOCAL 87 Service Employees International Union,
AFL–CIO
and
GMG JANITORIAL UNFAIR
SERVICE EMPLOYEES INT. UNION, AFL–CIO
and
WEST BAY BID. MAIN., STRIKE, LOCAL 87
SERVICE EMPLOYEES INT. UNION, AFL–CIO
and
CRESLEIGH/ROCKLAND
A crowd of demonstrators4 entered the building lobby en
masse shouting and using bullhorns and noisemakers. The
lobby was filled with the demonstrators whose numbers
pressed the lobby occupants to the rear. The demonstrators
chanted various protests5, handed out and littered the area
with literature, and after a time departed.
The Union argues that GMG maintained a daytime janitor
at 433 California at relevant times. The Respondent’s basis
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781SERVICE EMPLOYEES LOCAL 87 (CRESLEIGH MANAGEMENT)
6 The demonstrators were led by agents of the Union and on this
record there is no doubt and I find the Union is responsible for the
actions of the demonstrators in the context of the charges.
for this argument is General Counsel’s Exhibit 19. This doc-
ument is a memorandum from GMG to Cresleigh dated
March 10 reporting about events on the evening of March 8.
The memorandum continues to describe an undated event in
which a Daytime had been confronted by ‘‘one of the union
people.’’ I find the memo is not sufficient evidence of the
presence of a GMG employee at 433 California at relevant
times to overcome the testimony of the General Counsel’s
and the Charging Parties’ witnesses that no such employees
were either authorized nor known to have been on the prem-
ises during business day hours. Rather, l find that during the
period of March 6 through there were no GMG employees
at 433 California during the 8 a.m.–7 p.m. period.
3. Case 20–CC–3287
The Ritz-Carlton Hotel is located on the corner of Stock-
ton and California Streets in San Francisco. On April 6, West
Bay Building Maintenance, Inc., a janitorial contractor which
has been involved in a labor dispute with the Union, held a
luncheon at the hotel for about representatives of property
management firms. GMG was not involved in the gathering
although it retains the same law firm as West Bay and cer-
tain of that law firm’s staff were present.
In the late morning a crowd of 200 to 300 union6 dem-
onstrators approached the hotel and commenced picketing
and demonstrating by marching in an elongated loop in the
front area of the hotel. Picket signs, sandwich boards and
placards read, inter alia:
GMG BUILDING MAINTENANCE, UNFAIR, STRIKE,
LOCAL 87
and
WEST BAY BUILDING MAINTENANCE, LOCAL 87, ON
STRIKE
and
SAN FRANCISCO CONTRACTORS ASSOCIATION, ON
STRIKE, LOCAL 87
The demonstrators shouted, chanted, and utilized noise mak-
ers. Slogans included ‘‘West Bay got to go’’ and associated
admonitions. The union demonstration lasted for the better
portion of an hour. Thereafter the demonstrators marched on
to a separate area.
4. Case 20–CC–3490
The 711 Van Ness Avenue building is a five story office
building located at the corner of Van Ness and Turk in San
Francisco housing the headquarters of the United Savings
Bank (the bank) and other commercial tenants. Located at
the street corner is the bank’s main entrance. About 100 feet
west on Turk street is the structure’s garage entrance. Some
40 feet north on Van Ness is a separate entrance for other
building tenants.
Since April 1995, the building has been managed by Frank
Boides & Associates (Boides). Prior to April GMG, held a
contract for the provision of janitorial services at the build-
ing. In early April, the bank and, through the bank, Boides
received a letter from the Union urging it not to contract
with GMG or other nonunion janitorial services and noting
that the Union had an ongoing dispute with GMG and might
picket. In any event Boides negotiated an extension of the
GMG agreement to provide janitorial services at 711 Van
Ness and such services were thereafter provided.
In mid-April the Union began picketing and handbilling
the 711 Van Ness Avenue building with signs identifying
GMG as the party with whom it had a dispute. Agents of
the bank and Boides met with union officials, but no resolu-
tion occurred and the picketing and handbilling continued.
This conduct is not under challenge.
In late April, Boides established a reserved gate system at
711 Van Ness. The Turk Street garage entrance was posted
with a sign stating:
Employees, agents, representatives and suppliers of
GMG Janitorial may use ONLY this entrance to this
building. Employees, agents, representatives and suppli-
ers of GMG Janitorial may NOT use the 711 Van Ness
Entrance to this building or any other entrance. [Em-
phasis in original.]
The bank’s main entrance and the separate entrance on
Van Ness were posted with signs asserting:
Employees, agents, representatives and suppliers of
GMG Janitorial may not use this entrance to this build-
ing for any purpose. This entrance is reserved for all
other individuals and companies doing business with
tenants of 711 Van Ness Avenue. Employees, agents,
representative and suppliers of GMG Janitorial must use
the rear entrance to this building, located through the
garage entrance on Turk Street. [Emphasis in original.]
Boides communicated the creation, implementation, and
intended enforcement of the reserve system to its security
staff, the Union, and GMG at the end of April. The signs
remained posted and the reserve gate system enforced there-
after at all relevant times. There is no evidence that the en-
trances were used in a manner inconsistent with the instruc-
tions posted.
On June 13, two union agents established a table near the
bank entrance bedecked with placards asserting, inter alia:
‘‘Justice for Janitors’’ and ‘‘Hey, hey, ho, ho, Union busters
got to go—GMG.’’ The person at the table distributed union
literature. The other agent patrolled at the bank entrance with
a sign that asserted: ‘‘GMG Janitorial—Unfair-Local 87.’’
On another occasion the same or a similar sign was propped
up at the corner light post. When an agent of Boides pro-
tested the picketing of the bank entrance, one of the two
union agents asserted they had been told to picket the bank
entrance and would remain there. Similar conduct occurred
on June 28 and 29.
C. Analysis and Conclusions
The General Counsel and the Charging Parties argue that
the instant complaint allegations addressing conduct starting
in March 1995 are but a continuation of an earlier ongoing
campaign of wrongful secondary conduct by the Union
which is presented in detail in Service Employees Local 87
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782 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
(Trinity Maintenance), 312 NLRB 715 (1993). The Union ar-
gues rather that the Union’s earlier actions are long past and
irrelevant to these proceedings. More specifically, counsel for
the Union argues that it ‘‘sought to, and succeeded in, engag-
ing in lawful conduct for many months (from March through
July, 1995)’’ and that the instant case involves at most some
‘‘technical violations induced by the sharp practices of [the
Union’s opponents].
The record evidence is largely undisputed respecting what
occurred during the events in question. Learned briefs replete
with detailed analysis of the facts and applicable law were
submitted. It is unnecessary to set forth the legal analysis in
detail respecting the individual allegations of the complaint
because essentially identical legal and factual arguments have
been made by the parties, analyzed at length by Administra-
tive Law Judge Burton Litvack and definitively resolved by
the Board in Service Employees Local 87 (Trinity Mainte-
nance), supra. Relying on this body of scholarly guidance,
where not otherwise indicated, I shall address the complaints
separately below.
1. Complaint in Case 20–CC–3284
The complaint in Case 20–CC–3284 alleges that the Re-
spondent’s picketing and demonstration on March 6 and 8 at
the 433 California building occurred at a time when no GMG
employees were present and that the Respondent well knew
that fact was true at the time it engaged in the conduct. The
General Counsel’s complaint further alleges that the conduct
blocked ingress and egress to the building and forced the se-
curity staff to the back of the lobby as a result of the ‘‘surge,
en masse, into the lobby’’ on March 8.
The General Counsel alleges that this conduct had as an
object, to force or require Cresleigh to cease doing business
with GMG and/or to force the tenants of 433 California to
cease doing business with Cresleigh in order to force or re-
quire Cresleigh to cease doing business with GMG. This
conduct is alleged to violate Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B) of
the Act.
The Respondent argues that, in fact, GMG employees
were present at all relevant times. I have rejected this factual
argument, above. The Respondent argues further it should
not in the circumstances presented be held to have knowl-
edge that GMG employees were not present because the no-
tice it received was untimely. I also reject this argument on
the facts. The Union had in all events received the Friday
facsimile transmission from Cresleigh at the time it opened
for business on Monday, March 6. Sufficient time passed
thereafter for the Union to be charged with knowledge of the
letter’s contents at the time it picketed 433 California in the
late afternoon that day. The events of March 8, 2 days’ later,
were even more clearly undertaken with actual or construc-
tive knowledge of the communication.
Given all the above, I find the conduct of the Respondent
on March 6 and 8, 1995, at the 433 California building vio-
lates the Act as alleged in the complaint in Case 20–CC–
3284. Service Employees Local 87 (Trinity Maintenance),
supra.
2. Complaint in Case 20–CC–3287
The complaint in Case 20–CC–3287 alleges that on April
6, 1995, the Union picketed The Ritz-Carlton at a time when
GMG had no presence at the facility. The complaint further
alleges that an object of the conduct was to force or require
GMG to recognize and bargain with the Union as the rep-
resentative of its employees even though it had not been cer-
tified as such a representative. The complaint further alleges
this conduct violates Section 8(b)(4)(i)(ii)(B) of the Act.
Counsel for the Respondent makes two arguments. First,
he argues that there is insufficient evidence of patrolling,
picketing or inducing persons not to leave or enter. I have
carefully examined the videotape of the events entered into
evidence and find the conduct of the demonstrators easily
meets the Board’s standards in this regard. Second, counsel
for the Respondent on brief at argues that the individuals
present at The Ritz-Carlton meeting were the opponents of
the Union and were the determinants of GMG and others’
policies of ‘‘getting rid of union janitors throughout the City
of San Francisco.’’ The Respondent argues that since they
‘‘were also labor representatives for GMG . . . the carrying
of signs that said GMG was entirely appropriate.’’ Counsel
for the Respondent’s latter argument finds no support in the
law.
Given all the above, I find the conduct of the Respondent
on April 6, 1995, at The Ritz-Carlton Hotel violates the Act
as alleged in the complaint in Case 20–CC–3287. Service
Employees Local 87 (Trinity Maintenance), at 715.
3. Complaint in Case 20–CC–3290
The complaint in Case 20–CC–3290 alleges that on June
13, 28, and 29, 1995, the Respondent picketed at the 711
Van Ness building at reserved gates restricted to other GMG
employees and related individuals. The General Counsel al-
leges that this conduct had as an object, to force or require
the bank and Boides to cease doing business with GMG
and/or to force the tenants of 711 Van Ness to cease doing
business with the bank and Boides in order to force or re-
quire the bank and Boides to cease doing business with
GMG. This conduct is alleged to violate Section 8(b)(4)(i)
and (ii)(B) of the Act.
The Respondent on brief argues first that the evidence will
not support a finding of unlawful picketing. Second, the Re-
spondent argues that, even when viewed most favorably from
the General Counsel’s perspective, during a lawful 4-month
campaign at the 711 Van Ness building, the General Counsel
has established, but a few ‘‘inadvertent incidents’’ of non-
compliance with ‘‘the arbitrary strictures of Moore Dry-
dock.’’ (R. Br. at 6.)
Considering the essentially unchallenged testimony of
events as well as the cases cited by the moving parties, I find
that the General Counsel has met his burden of showing the
Respondent did in fact undertake the conduct alleged in the
complaint and that it violates the Act as alleged. Service Em-
ployees Local 87 (Trinity Maintenance), supra.
THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has violated the Act, I
shall direct it to cease and desist therefrom and to take cer-
tain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of
the Act. More particularly, l shall follow the relevant reme-
dial provisions of Service Employees Local 87 (Trinity Main-
tenance), supra at 715.
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783SERVICE EMPLOYEES LOCAL 87 (CRESLEIGH MANAGEMENT)
7 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and rec-
ommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be
adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
8 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court
of appeals, the words in the notice reading ‘‘Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board’’ shall read ‘‘Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order
of the National Labor Relations Board.’’
The General Counsel and the Charging Parties urged and
the Respondent opposed inclusion of a broad cease-and-de-
sist order in any directed remedy. This issue is a reprise of
the arguments definitively treated in Trinity. Judge Litvack’s
analysis, specifically adopted by the Board, addresses the
issue in some detail and will not be repeated here. Simply
put, Judge Litvak found a broad order was appropriate in
Trinity because the Board had found earlier conduct of the
Union improper. That earlier conduct had been found im-
proper less than 2 years before the occurrence of the conduct
at issue before him. The conduct found violative in the in-
stant case occurred less than 2 years after the Board’s deci-
sion in Service Employees Local 87 (Trinity Maintenance),
supra. The timing in this respect is no different. Accordingly,
a broad order will be included.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
On the basis of the above findings of fact and the record
as a whole, I make the following conclusions of law.
1. The Charging Party Cresleigh Management, Inc. at all
times material has been a person and an employer engaged
in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7)
of the Act.
2. The Charging Party GMG at all times material has been
a person and an employer engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
3. The Ritz-Carlton and the property managers attending
the meeting at The Ritz Carlton as discussed above, the ten-
ants of the 433 California building, the United Savings Bank,
the tenants of the 711 Van Ness building, and Frank Boides
and Associates are persons engaged in commerce or in an in-
dustry affecting commerce within the meaning of Section
2(1), (6), and (7) and Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act.
4. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning
of Section 2(5) of the Act.
5. The Union violated Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B) of the
Act by the following acts and conduct:
(a) By picketing The Ritz-Carlton Hotel in furtherance of
its dispute with GMG notwithstanding that at the time it en-
gaged in its conduct, GMG was not present at the Hotel.
(b) By picketing and entering en mass the 433 California
Building in furtherance of its dispute with GMG notwith-
standing that at the time it engaged in its conduct. GMG was
not present at the location.
(c) By picketing reserved entrances of the 711 Van Ness
Building in furtherance of its dispute with GMG notwith-
standing that at the time it engaged in its conduct, GMG was
not using nor authorized to use said entrances.
6. The unfair labor practices described above are unfair
labor practices within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7)
of the Act.
ORDER
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on
the entire record, I issue the following recommended7
The Respondent, Service Employees Local 87, Service
Employees International Union, AFL–CIO, San Francisco,
California, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from picketing or any similar or relat-
ed conduct or in any other manner inducing or encouraging
any individual employed by The Ritz-Carlton Hotel or its
luncheon customers and clients, Cresleigh Management, Inc.,
the tenants of the 433 California building, the tenants of the
711 Van Ness building, Frank Boides & Associates, the
United Savings Bank, or any other person engaged in com-
merce or in an industry affecting commerce, to engage in a
strike or a refusal in the course of his or her employment
to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle
or work on any goods, articles, materials or commodities, or
to perform any services where objects thereof are to force or
require Cresleigh Management, Inc., Frank Boides & Associ-
ates, the United Savings Bank, or any other person to cease
doing business with GMG Janitorial Maintenance; or to force
or require any person or persons to pressure or to cease
doing business with The Ritz-Carlton Hotel or its luncheon
customers and clients, Cresleigh Management, Inc., the ten-
ants of the 433 California building, the tenants of the 711
Van Ness building, Frank Boides & Associates, the United
Savings Bank, or any other person engaged in commerce or
in an industry affecting commerce in order to force or re-
quire the latter persons, in turn, to cease doing business with
GMG Janitorial Maintenance, or any other person.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to ef-
fectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Post at its business office and all meeting halls located
in San Francisco, California, copies of the attached Notice
marked ‘‘Appendix.’’8 Copies of the notice, on forms pro-
vided by the Regional Director, in English and such other
languages as the Regional Director determines are necessary
to fully communicate with employees and union members,
after being signed by the Respondent’s authorized representa-
tive, shall be posted for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous
places, including all places where notices to employees are
customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the
Respondent to ensure the notices are not altered. defaced or
covered by other material.
(b) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20 days
from the date of this Order what steps the Respondent has
taken to comply.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us
to post and abide by this notice.
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784 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
WE WILL NOT by picketing or any similar or related con-
duct or in any other manner, induce or encourage any indi-
vidual employed by The Ritz-Carlton Hotel or its luncheon
customers and clients, Cresleigh Management, Inc., the ten-
ants of the 433 Califomia Building, the tenants of the 711
Van Ness Building, Frank Boides & Associates, the United
Savings Bank, or any other person engaged in commerce or
in an industry affecting commerce, to engage in a strike or
a refusal in the course of his or her employment to use, man-
ufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on
any goods, articles, materials or commodities, or to perform
any services where objects thereof are to force or require
Cresleigh Management, Inc., Frank Boides & Associates, the
United Savings Bank or any other person to cease doing
business with GMG Janitorial Maintenance; or to force or re-
quire any person or persons to pressure or to cease doing
business with The Ritz-Carlton Hotel or its luncheon cus-
tomers and clients, Cresleigh Management, Inc., the tenants
of the 433 California Building, the tenants of the 711 Van
Ness Building, Frank Boides & Associates, the United Sav-
ings Bank, or any other person engaged in commerce or in
an industry affecting commerce in order to force or require
said latter persons, in tum, to cease doing business with
GMG Janitorial Maintenance, or any other person.
SERVICE EMPLOYEES LOCAL 87, SERVICE EM-
PLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION, AFL–CIO
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