SecureWave Storage Solutions, Inc.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Oct 7, 2020

IPR2020-00139 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 7, 2020)

Trials@uspto.gov Paper 13
571-272-7822 Entered: October 7, 2020

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

MICRON TECHNOLOGY INC.,
Petitioner,
v.
SECUREWAVE STORAGE SOLUTIONS, INC.,
Patent Owner.
____________

IPR2019-00932
Patent 7,036,020 B2
____________

Before JONI Y. CHANG, GARTH D. BAER, and KAMRAN JIVANI,
Administrative Patent Judges.

CHANG, Administrative Patent Judge.

JUDGMENT
Final Written Decision
Determining All Challenged Claims Unpatentable
35 U.S.C. § 318(a)

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I. INTRODUCTION
Micron Technology Inc. (“Petitioner” or “Micron”) filed a Petition
requesting an inter partes review of claims 1−14 (“the challenged claims”)
of U.S. Patent No. 7,036,020 B2 (Ex. 1001, “the ’020 patent”). Paper 1
(“Pet.”). SecureWave Storage Solutions, Inc. (“Patent Owner”) filed a
Preliminary Response. Paper 8 (“Prelim. Resp.”). Upon consideration of
the Petition and Preliminary Response, we instituted the instant inter partes
review of all of the challenged claims and on all of the grounds presented in
the Petition. Paper 10 (“Dec.”).
After institution, we granted a Motion for Joinder filed timely by
Kingston Technology Company, Inc. (“Kingston”), joining IPR2020-00139
with the instant proceeding (Paper 22). Subsequently, Kingston and Patent
Owner filed a Joint Motion to Terminate this proceeding with respect to
Kingston in light of their settlement of their dispute regarding the ’020
patent. Paper 45. Upon consideration, we granted the Joint Motion and
terminated the proceeding with respect to Kingston only. Paper 47. The
proceeding continued with Patent Owner and Micron. Id. at 3.
During this trial, Patent Owner filed a Response (Paper 15, “PO
Resp.”) and a Sur-reply (Paper 23, “Sur-reply”); Petitioner filed a Reply
(Paper 20, “Reply”). An oral hearing was held on May 12, 2020, and a
transcript is included in the record as Paper 44 (“Tr.”).
This Final Written Decision is entered pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 318(a).
For the reasons set forth below, we determine that Petitioner has
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demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1−14 of the
’020 patent are unpatentable.
A. Related Matters
The parties indicate that the ’020 patent is involved in SecureWave
Storage Solutions, Inc. v. Micron Tech., Inc., No. 1-18-cv-1398-MN
(D. Del.) and SecureWave Storage Solutions, Inc. v. Kingston Tech. Co.,
Inc., No. 8:18-cv-01425 (C.D. Cal.). Pet. 3; Paper 4, 3. The ’020 patent also
is involved in Kingston Tech. Co. v. SecureWave Storage Solutions, Inc.,
IPR2019-00494, Paper 8 (PTAB July 11, 2019) (Denied Institution) and
Unified Patents, Inc. v. SecureWave Storage Solutions, Inc., IPR2019-
00501, Paper 31 (PTAB July 7, 2020) (Final Written Decision holding
claims 1−5 of the ’020 patent unpatentable).
B. The ’020 Patent
The ’020 patent relates to methods and systems for promoting security
in a computer system. Ex. 1001, code (57). In particular, the ’020 patent
discloses a simple file system that is concealed in the computer system and
is managed with a processor and simple non-writeable code operating on a
storage device. Id. at 3:26−30. In one embodiment, a computer system is
provided with an operating system associated with a storage device that
includes firmware and a processor for processing data stored on the storage
device. Id. at 3:33−37. The embodiment includes creating a secured
partition in, and restricting access to, a portion of the storage device by the
operating system. Id. at 3:37−39. The embodiment also includes providing
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at least one authority record and data associated with the authority record in
the storage device. Id. at 3:41−43.
C. Illustrative Claim
Of the challenged claims, claims 1, 7, and 12 are independent.
Claims 2−6 and 11 depend from claim 1; claims 8 and 9 depend from
claim 7; and claims 13 and 14 depend from claim 12.
Claim 1 is illustrative:
1. A storage device for promoting security in a computer system,
the storage device comprising:
a storage medium for storing data;
firmware for reading data from and writing data to the storage
medium; and
a partition defined on the storage medium for dividing the storage
medium into a data partition and a secure data partition, the
secure data partition for storing secure data and one or more
authority records, wherein the one or more authority records
define access permissions relating to the secure data partition and
the secure data;
wherein the secure data partition contains a master authority
record, wherein the one or more authority records can be created
and deleted as required by a user having access permissions
according to the master authority record; and
wherein only the firmware is permitted to access the secure data
and the one or more authority records.
Ex. 1001, 12:52–13:2.
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D. Prior Art Relied Upon
Petitioner relies upon the references listed below. Pet. 5−6.
Reference Date Exhibit No.
Hamlin1, US 7,003,674 B1 Feb. 21, 2006 10042
Fisherman, US 5,586,301 Dec. 17, 1996 1005
Silvester, US 7,155,615 B1 Dec. 26, 2006 1006
Carter , US 6,738,907 B1 May 18, 2004 1007
Mirov , US 6,138,236 Oct. 24, 2000 1008

E. Asserted Grounds of Unpatentability
Petitioner asserts the following grounds of unpatentability (Pet. 6) 3:
Claim(s) Challenged 35 U.S.C. § References
1 1−3, 5, 12−14 103(a)
Hamlin, Fisherman, the knowledge of an
ordinarily skilled artisan

1 In this Decision, we refer to this asserted reference as “Hamlin”
(Ex. 1004), U.S. Patent No. 7,215,771 B1 as “Hamlin II” (Ex. 1009), and
U.S. Patent No. 7,155,616 as “Hamlin III” (Ex. 1010).
2 Hamlin incorporates by reference Tygar, J. D. and Yee, B. S., “Secure
Coprocessors in Electronic Commerce Applications,” Proceedings 1995
USENIX Electronic Commerce Workshop (1995) (Ex. 1017, “Tygar”).
3 For purposes of this Decision, we assume the claims at issue have an
effective filing date prior to March 16, 2013, the effective date of the
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Claim(s) Challenged 35 U.S.C. § References
2 3, 11 103(a) Hamlin, Fisherman, Silvester, the knowledge of an ordinarily skilled artisan
3 4 103(a) Hamlin, Fisherman, Carter, the knowledge of an ordinarily skilled artisan
4 6−10 103(a) Hamlin, Fisherman, Mirov, the knowledge of an ordinarily skilled artisan
5 7−10 103(a) Hamlin, Fisherman, Mirov, Silvester, the knowledge of an ordinarily skilled artisan
II. ANALYSIS
A. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art
In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors
may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art;
prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are
made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active
workers in the field.” In re GPAC, Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(quotation marks and citation omitted). Petitioner’s declarant, John Levy,
Ph.D., testifies that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had “at least a
bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer
science, or a closely related field, with two or more years of experience in

Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011)
(“AIA”), and we apply the pre-AIA version of 35 U.S.C. § 103.
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the development, design, or implementation of digital storage devices or the
equivalent.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 23. Dr. Levy explains that “[a]dditional graduate
education could substitute for professional experience, or significant
experience in the field could substitute for formal education.” Id.
Patent Owner asserts that such an artisan would have had “at least a
bachelor’s degree in a discipline such as computer science, electrical
engineering, computer engineering, or related disciplines or experience, and
at least two years of experience in computer storage systems.” PO Resp. 21.
Patent Owner further explains that under either assessment, “the disclosures
of the references are the same and cannot be altered by expert opinion or
argument.” Id.
Based on the evidence in this entire trial record, we adopt the level of
ordinary skill as articulated by Petitioner because its assessment appears to
be consistent with the ’020 patent, the asserted prior art, and is supported by
the testimony of Dr. Levy. We note, however, our claim construction and
patentability analyses would reach the same findings and determinations if
we were to adopt the level of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Petitioner
or Patent Owner.
B. Claim Construction
In an inter partes review proceeding, a patent claim shall be construed
using the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe
the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b). 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b)
(2019). This standard is the same as that applied in Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
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415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) and its progeny. Under this
standard, the words of a claim are generally given their “ordinary and
customary meaning,” which is the meaning the term would have to a person
of ordinary skill at the time of the invention, in the context of the entire
patent including the specification. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–13.
In light of the parties’ arguments and evidence, we find that it is
necessary to expressly construe the terms identified below. See Nidec Motor
Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed.
Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d
795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that
are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the
controversy’”).
1. “firmware”
Claim 1 recites “firmware for reading data from and writing data to
the storage medium.” Ex. 1001, 12:55−56. Claim 12 recites “firmware
disposed within the storage device adapted to limit access to the security
partition by an operating system of a computer system.” Id. at 14:23−26.
Dr. Levy testifies that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have
understood the plain and ordinary meaning of the term “firmware,” as used
in the ’020 patent, to mean “software that has been copied on (and therefore
stored in) an integrated circuit, which usually may be a [read only memory
(‘ROM’)] or other non-writable and non-volatile memory.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 111.
Dr. Levy explains that this construction is consistent with several dictionary
definitions. For example, the Webster’s New World Dictionary of
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Computer Terms defines “firmware” as “[s]oftware that has been copied on
integrated circuits, usually ROMs . . . which cannot be altered.” Ex. 1013,
232. The IEEE Standard Dictionary of Electrical and Electronics Terms also
provides a similar definition of the term firmware. Ex. 1012, 411−412.
Dr. Levy’s construction also is consistent with the Specification.
Figures 1 and 2 of the ’020 patent are reproduced below.

Figure 1 of the ’020 patent above (on the left) shows network 2
connected to computer system 6. Id. at 4:37−44. Figure 2 above (on the
right) shows storage device 12, which contains central processing unit
(“CPU”) 18, data storage 16, and firmware 14 to read and write data from
data storage 16. Id. at 4:45−65. Operating system 10 of computer system 6
relies on software and data obtained from storage device 12. Id. A portion
of firmware 14 is “writeable firmware” that can be re-written by software
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executed in the operation system. Id. A portion of firmware 14 is
“non-writeable firmware” that “is written by using one or more of a plurality
of conventional hardware methods that resist this firmware from being
written by the operating system 10.” Id.
In view of the claim language, Specification, and evidence of record,
we agree with Dr. Levy and interpret “firmware” as “software that has been
copied on (and therefore stored in) an integrated circuit, which usually may
be a ROM or other non-writable and non-volatile memory.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 111.
2. “firmware for reading data from and writing data to the
storage medium”
Patent Owner argues that the claim language “firmware for reading
data from and writing data to the storage medium” requires that “the
firmware performs the read/write operations itself,” not “facilitating the
reading and writing as performed by other software, as indicated by the
ordinary and customary meaning of the words of the phrase.”
Sur-reply 6−8.
Patent Owner’s construction improperly imports a negative limitation
into the claims. Nothing in the claim’s plain language requires that read and
write commands must originate from the firmware, or that no other
component outside the firmware may play a role in reading data from and
writing data to the storage medium. Similarly, the Specification does not
necessitate that the firmware alone must perform all aspects of reading from
and writing data to the storage medium.
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For example, claim 1 recites a limitation “wherein the one or more
authority records can be created and deleted as required by a user.”
Ex. 1001, 12:64−65 (emphasis added). Dr. Levy testifies that “to allow an
authority record to be created and deleted, access must be made to the
authority records at the behest of a user” and “that user is allowed to
reference this data via the firmware.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 138. The Specification
also discloses “a user application external to the storage device can employ
the storage device as a reliable place to conceal information and to perform
cryptographic operations.” Ex. 1001, 8:30−34. In short, the ’020 patent
makes clear that a user or an entity external to the disk drive is allowed to
access, read, and write secure data or authority records via the firmware.
Therefore, neither the plain and ordinary meaning of the claim terms,
nor the Specification, requires the firmware by itself performs the read/write
operations. As such, we decline to adopt Patent Owner’s construction that
improperly imports a negative limitation into the claims. E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 849 F.2d 1430, 1433 (Fed. Cir.
1988) (holding that reading an “extraneous limitation” into a claim is
improper).
3. “only the firmware is permitted to access the secure data and the one or
more authority records”
Petitioner asserts that “this limitation requires that all interactions with
the secure data and authority records are performed through and brokered by
the firmware.” Pet. 32. Dr. Levy testifies that “for the ’020 Patent to be
operable per its written description, and for other claim limitations to be
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practicable, this limitation must mean simply that all access to the secure
data and the authority records is performed via and brokered by the
firmware.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 138 (emphasis added).
Patent Owner suggests that no other component or external entity is
permitted to request access to the secure data via the firmware. Sur-reply
10−17. Patent Owner argues that during prosecution, the applicant
distinguished the Diamant and Aucsmith references from the claims that
later issued in the ’020 patent because those references allow access by a
host. Id. at 12−13 (citing Ex. 1002, 328−329, 385).
We agree with Dr. Levy. Patent Owner’s implicit construction is
inconsistent with the claim language and Specification and is not supported
by the prosecution history. As discussed above, claim 1 recites a limitation
“wherein the one or more authority records can be created and deleted as
required by a user.” Ex. 1001, 12:64−65 (emphasis added). Dr. Levy
testifies that “to allow an authority record to be created and deleted, access
must be made to the authority records at the behest of a user” and “that user
is allowed to reference this data via the firmware.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 138. The
Specification also discloses “a user application external to the storage device
can employ the storage device as a reliable place to conceal information and
to perform cryptographic operations.” Ex. 1001, 8:30−34. In short, the ’020
patent makes clear that a user or an entity external to the disk drive is
allowed to access, read, and write secure data or authority records via the
firmware.
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We are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument that during
prosecution, the applicant distinguished Diamant and Aucsmith from the
claims that later issued in the ’020 patent because they allow access by a
host. The prosecution history clearly shows that these references were
distinguished because they “teach a controller external to the storage device
for controlling access to the storage device.” Ex. 1002, 328−29, 384−85.
Therefore, the prosecution history does not support Patent Owner’s implicit
construction.
In light of the claim language, Specification, and prosecution history,
we decline to adopt Patent Owner’s construction. Rather, we construe “only
the firmware is permitted to access the secure data and the one or more
authority records” to mean that “all access to the secure data and the
authority records is performed via and brokered by the firmware.”
See Ex. 1001, 8:30−34, 12:64−65; Ex. 1002, 328−29, 384−85; Ex. 1003
¶ 138.
4. “authority records”
Claim 1 recites “wherein the one or more authority records define
access permissions relating to the secure data partition and the secure data.”
Ex. 1001, 12:60−62. Claim 12 recites “a security partition containing one or
more authority records.” Id. at 14:15−16. Claim 14 depends from claim 12
and further recites “wherein each of the one or more authority records
comprises a plurality of fields.” Id. at 14:31−34.
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Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have
understood the term “authority record(s)” to mean “data defining an entity’s
access permissions.” Pet. 9; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 58−66.
In our Institution Decision, based on the record at that time, we
preliminarily adopted Petitioner’s construction. Dec. 10. For this Final
Decision, we review the evidence and arguments presented by the parties
during the entire trial.
Patent Owner maintains that the term “authority record” should be
given its plain and ordinary meaning. PO Resp. 23; Prelim. Resp. 24;
Ex. 2008 ¶ 24. Nevertheless, through its prior art arguments, Patent Owner
implicitly imports limitations into the claims. PO Resp. 32−36; Sur-reply
24−27.
We agree with Patent Owner that the term “authority records” should
be given its plain and ordinary meaning consistent with the claim language
and Specification, and the term “access permissions” is “relat[ed] to the
secure data partition and the secure data.” However, because the term
“access permissions” appears without a modifier, we decline to introduce a
modifier (“entity’s”) into the claims as Petitioner proposes. See Source
Vagabond Sys. Ltd. v. Hydrapak, Inc., 753 F.3d 1291, 1299−1300 (Fed. Cir.
2014) (“[A]n analysis that adds words to the claim language . . . does not
follow standard cannons of claim construction.”). Furthermore, we decline
to adopt Patent Owner’s implicit claim construction that improperly imports
limitations into the claims.
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First, through its prior art arguments, Patent Owner suggests that
authentication and authorization cannot be performed using the same
information. PO Resp. 32−34; Sur-reply 23−24. Patent Owner argues that
authorization and authentication perform different functions—namely,
“[a]uthorization deals with granting and verifying a user’s (or a device’s)
access permissions, whereas authentication deals with confirming the user’s
(or device’s) identity.” Id.; Ex. 2008 ¶¶ 84−85 (relying on portions of the
Horak book (Ex. 20034)); Sur-reply 23−24.
However, Patent Owner improperly imports a negative limitation into
the claims by excluding information that is used for both authentication and
authorization. Nothing in the claim language excludes such information.
Mr. Jay Jawadi, Patent Owner’s declarant, admits that “[a]uthorization and
authentication both deal with computer security.” Ex. 2008 ¶ 84. Dr. Levy
testifies that “authentication and authorization are interrelated concepts.”
Ex. 1021 ¶ 65.
Our reviewing court “has repeatedly cautioned against limiting the
claimed invention to preferred embodiments or specific examples in the
specification.” Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1346−47
(Fed. Cir. 2015). “[I]t is the claims, not the written description, which
define the scope of the patent right.” Id. at 1346 (emphasis in the original).

4 Exhibit 2003 contains portions of pages 222 and 540 from Ray Horak,
Communications Systems and Networks, 2nd ed., M&T Books (1999) (“the
Horak book”). Petitioner filed an actual copy of pages 222, 223, 540, 541 of
the Horak book in Exhibit 1038.
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The Specification also does not support Patent Owner’s construction.
Indeed, the Specification uses the term “authority record” broadly. For
example, the Specification provides that “authority record 52 can include
data, computer programs, and other like information and functionality in
association with the SP [security partition] data 54.” Ex. 1001, 5:53−56
(emphasis added). Nothing in the Specification defines the term “authority
records” to exclude information that is used for both authentication and
authorization.
Furthermore, Patent Owner’s construction is not consistent with the
understanding of an ordinarily skilled artisan. “The words of a claim are
generally given their ordinary and customary meaning as understood by a
person of ordinary skill in the art when read in the context of the
specification and prosecution history.” Thorner v. Sony Comput. Entm’t Am.
LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (emphasis added). Here,
Dr. Levy testifies that “authorization and authentication are closely related
and interconnected activities that are often performed by the same process
using the same data.” Ex. 1021 ¶ 64. As Dr. Levy points out, under the
“authorization” section in the Horak Book, the author provides that
“Kerberos, the best-known authorization software, makes use of private-key
authentication and a UNIX-based distributed databases.” Ex. 1021 ¶ 65;
Ex. 1038, 3 (emphases added). We credit Dr. Levy’s testimony as it is
consistent with the prior art of record (Ex. 2003; Ex. 1038).
In short, we decline to adopt Patent Owner’s construction that would
improperly import a negative limitation into the claims. Instead, we
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determine that the claim term “authority records” does not exclude
information that is used for both authentication and authorization.
Second, Patent Owner argues that “the construction of ‘authority
records’ adopted by the Board requires multiple access permissions
(plural),” in that “a single authority record defines access permissions
(plural), such as R/W Access Rights, WriteOnce, Write Over, WriteAny,
ReadCur, ReadAny, and Hidden Read.” PO Resp. 25; Sur-reply 24−27;
Ex. 2008 ¶¶ 121−125; Ex. 1022, 44:8−45:3.
At the outset, our claim construction set forth in the Institution
Decision does not require multiple access permissions in each authority
record. To be clear, our claim construction in this Final Decision also does
not require multiple permissions in each record for the reasons discussed
below.
Again, Patent Owner’s construction improperly imports a limitation
into the claims. Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1346−47. As Petitioner points out,
Patent Owner’s construction improperly injects “each of” into the claim:
“where [each of] the one or more authority records define access
permissions.” Reply 13. Dr. Levy testifies that “[he has] reviewed the ’020
patent and its file history, and [he has] not identified any language
suggesting that invention of the ’020 patent is limited to requiring multiple
permissions for each authority record.” Ex. 1021 ¶ 69.
Moreover, Patent Owner concedes that “[b]y the plain and customary
reading of the phrase ‘wherein the one or more authority records defines
access permissions,’ it is clear that one authority record can define multiple
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access permissions, or alternatively, multiple authority records can define
multiple access permissions.” Sur-reply 25. Dr. Levy testifies that “the
claims cover the situation when there are 10 authority records (‘one or more’
authority records) that each include one permission (because together, the 10
records include 10 permissions and thus ‘define access permissions [10]
relating to the secure data partition and the secure data’).” Ex. 1021 ¶ 69.
Therefore, we find that the plain and ordinary meaning of the claim
language “one or more authority records define access permissions relating
to the secure data partition and the secure data” encompasses both:
(1) a single authority record that includes multiple access permissions, and
(2) multiple authority records that include multiple access permissions (each
record includes at least one permission). We decline to adopt Patent
Owner’s implicit claim construction that improperly imports a limitation into
the claims by requiring multiple permissions for each authority record.
Lastly, Patent Owner suggests that each authority record requires
multiple fields. PO Resp. 34−36; Ex. 2008 ¶¶ 126−136.
Again, Patent Owner improperly imports a limitation into the claims.
Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1346−47. Nothing in the Specification or the claim
language of independent claims 1 and 12, states or implies that each
authority record requires multiple fields. This is confirmed by dependent
claim 14, which further recites “wherein each of the one or more authority
records comprises a plurality of fields.” Ex. 1001, 14:31−34. The fact that
claim 14 further adds this limitation indicates that this limitation was not a
necessary element of independent claims 1 and 12. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at
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1315 (“[T]he presence of a dependent claim that adds a particular limitation
gives rise to a presumption that the limitation in question is not present in
the independent claim.”). The intrinsic evidence does not support Patent
Owner’s implicit construction that requires multiple fields in each authority
record. Therefore, we decline to adopt that construction.
In sum, we determine that the claim term “authority records” should
be given its plain and ordinary meaning, and the claim term “access
permissions” is “related to the secure data partition and the secure data.”
However, we do not adopt Patent Owner’s implicit claim construction
that imports limitations into the claims. Rather, we determine that “authority
records” does not exclude information that is used for both authentication
and authorization. And the claim language “one or more authority records
define access permissions relating to the secure data partition and the secure
data” encompasses both: (1) a single authority record that includes multiple
access permissions, and (2) multiple authority records that include multiple
access permissions (each record includes at least one permission). And the
term “authority records” does not require multiple fields in each authority
record.
5. “master authority record”
Claim 1 recites “wherein the one or more authority records can be
created and deleted as required by a user having access permissions
according to the master authority record.” Ex. 1001, 12:64−67. Claim 13,
which depends from claim 12, recites that “the one or more authority records
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comprises a master authority record including instructions for governing the
one or more authority records in said storage device.” Id. at 14:27−30.
Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have
understood the term “master authority record” to mean “data defining the
access permissions of an entity that can govern (e.g., create and delete) other
authority records.” Pet. 9; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 58−66. In our Institution Decision,
we adopted Petitioner’s construction as it is consistent with the Specification
(Ex. 1001, 3:25−43, 5:25−6:16, 6:20−31, 7:11−8:34, 8:51−9:21, 9:22−44,
12:60−62, Fig. 4−7). Dec. 9−10. Patent Owner does not dispute this
construction. PO Resp. 22−23. Upon review of the entire trial record, we
do not discern any reason or evidence that compels any deviation from our
earlier construction of “master authority record.” Therefore, we adopt the
previous analysis and construe “master authority record” as “data defining
the access permissions of an entity that can govern (e.g., create and delete)
other authority records.”
6. “root assurance”
Claim 6 depends from claim 1 indirectly and recites “wherein
cryptographic code is authenticated with a root assurance in the firmware of
the device, wherein the firmware is non-writable.” Ex. 1001, 13:17−19.
Apart from the claims, the Specification discusses the term “root assurance”
once. In particular, the Specification discloses that the cryptographic code is
authenticated with a root assurance in the non-writeable firmware of the
device. Id. at 7:31−33.
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Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have
understood “root assurance” to mean “code used to authenticate other code.”
Pet. 12−13. Dr. Levy testifies that, with the understanding that “code” may
be referred to as “software, executable computer code, computer
instructions, or instructions,” this construction is appropriate in view of the
claims and Specification. Ex. 1003 ¶ 72.
In our Institution Decision, we adopted Petitioner’s construction as it
is consistent with the Specification (Ex. 1001, 7:31−33). Dec. 10. Patent
Owner does not present any argument or evidence regarding this
construction in its Response. PO Resp. 22−23.
Upon review of the entire trial record, we do not discern any reason or
evidence that compels any deviation from our earlier construction of “root
assurance.” Therefore, we adopt the previous analysis and construe “root
assurance” as “code used to authenticate other code.”
C. Principles of Law
A patent claim is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) if the
differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art are such that
the subject matter, as a whole, would have been obvious at the time the
invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said
subject matter pertains. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406
(2007). The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying
factual determinations including: (1) the scope and content of the prior art;
(2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art;
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(3) the level of ordinary skill in the art; and (4) when in evidence, objective
evidence of nonobviousness.5 See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1,
17–18 (1966).
D. Overview of Prior Art References
1. Hamlin (Ex. 1004)
Hamlin discloses a disk drive comprising a disk that is divided into a
public area partition for storing plaintext data and a secure partition that is a
“pristine area for storing encrypted data.” Ex. 1004, code (57), 2:49−52.
Figure 1 of Hamlin is reproduced below.

Figure 1 of Hamlin above shows disk drive 2 comprising disk 4 for
storing data. Ex. 1004, 4:13−14. Disk 4 includes public area 6 for storing

5 Neither party presents evidence or arguments regarding objective evidence
of nonobviousness in the instant proceeding. Pet. 77; see generally PO
Resp.; Sur-reply.
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plaintext data and pristine area 8 for storing encrypted data. Id. at 4:15−16.
The data stored in pristine area 8 includes “sensitive information (e.g., a
password, credit card number, etc.),” as well as “user/device authentication
information (e.g., a password).” Id. at 4:65−5:1, 5:50−63.
Disk drive 2 also comprises head 10 for reading the encrypted data,
and control system 12 for controlling access to pristine area 8. Id. at
4:18−27. Authentication circuitry 14 is for authenticating a request received
from an external entity to access pristine area 8 and for enabling control
system 12 if the request is authenticated. Id. Disk drive 2 further comprises
secret drive key 16 and decryption circuity 18 for decrypting the encrypted
data stored in pristine area 8. Id.
2. Fisherman (Ex. 1005)
Fisherman discloses a hard disk protection system (“HDPS”) for
protecting data stored on computer hard disks while permitting multiple user
operation. Ex. 1005, code (57). Figure 1 is reproduced below.

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Figure 1 above shows a block diagram of HDPS 20 installed in a
computer. Id. at 2:55−56. HDPS 20 comprises protection-program support
module (“PPSM”) and protection software 24. Id. at 3:31−50.
In addition, Fisherman discloses flexible access rights and supervisor
user features. Fisherman’s ACCESS_FIELD has two subfields, each of
which can have a value of 0 or 1, representing read and write rights. Id. at
8:46−60. For example, ACCESS_FIELD = (1, 1) means that the cluster is
accessible for both reading and writing, and ACCESS_FIELD = (1, 0)
means that the cluster is accessible for reading, but not writing. Id. at
8:46−60, 22:46−47. Fisherman also discloses a supervisor user who
performs privileged operations. Id. 1:60−61 (“file-access criteria [are]
established by the supervisor”), 10:19−20 (“system 20 should be installed by
the supervisor”)). The supervisor user can create and delete user’s
associated data, executing a command that “pertains to the registration of a
new user, the deletion of a user, or a change in file status.” Id. 14:37−57
(“the new user registration command”), 14:66−15:11 (“a delete user
command”), 15:20−24.
3. Silvester (Ex. 1006)
Silvester discloses a secure-private partition on a storage device of a
computer system. Ex. 1006, code (57). The secure-private partition is
normally invisible to an operating system unless the partition is unlocked.
Id.
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Figure 4 is reproduced below.

Figure 4 of Silvester above shows security/privacy system 400,
Integrated Device Electronics (“IDE”) controller 410, hard disk drive 416,
and requesting software 414. Id. at 2:54−3:49. Security/privacy system 400
includes privacy gatekeeper 402 and security/privacy software task 404. Id.
Hard disk drive 416 includes disk controller 418 and is partitioned into
standard partition 422 and secure-private partition 420. Id.
4. Carter (Ex. 1007)
Carter discloses maintaining a soft-token private key store in a
distributed environment. Ex. 1007, code (57). Figures 5 and 6 are
reproduced below.
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Figures 5 and 6 above illustrate the structure and content of soft-token
store 120, which includes administrative user records 500, regular user
records 502, and directory/database structures 504. Id. at 8:45−55.
Administrative user records 500 contain soft-token information associated
with network or other computer system administrators who have
responsibility for, and authority over administrative aspects of, both their
own accounts and the accounts of non-administrative users. Id. Regular
user records 502 contain soft-token information associated with
non-administrative users, who have responsibility and authority for only
their individual accounts. Id. User record 500/502 includes user
information 600, old certificate set 602, certificate with public key 604,
digital signature 606, and private key set 608. Id. at 9:9−13.
5. Mirov (Ex. 1008)
Mirov discloses a method and an apparatus for firmware
authentication. Ex. 1008, code (57). Figure 2 is reproduced below.
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Figure 2 above shows flash programmable read-only memory
(“PROM”) 18 of a computer system. Id. at 3:56−4:55. Flash PROM 18 is
divided into two main sections: authentication section 45 and programmable
section 55. Id. Authentication section 45 authenticates programmable
section 55 to verify that the micro-code instructions that boot the computer
system are trusted. Id. Authentication section 45 includes secure
micro-code 51, comparator 52, hash generator 53, decryptor 54, and public
key 56. Id. Unsecured section 55 includes digital signature 57 and
unsecured micro-code 58. Id. Micro-code is referred to as firmware. Id. at
1:15−16.
E. Ground 1: Obviousness over Hamlin, Fisherman, and
the knowledge of an ordinarily skilled artisan
Petitioner asserts that claims 1−3, 5, and 12−14 are unpatentable
under § 103(a) as obvious over Hamlin in combination with Fisherman and
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the knowledge of an ordinarily skilled artisan, citing to Dr. Levy’s
Declaration for support. Pet. 20–47 (citing Ex. 1003). Petitioner relies on
Hamlin to teach a storage device (disk drive) and a storage medium (disk)
that has a secure data partition (pristine area) for storing an authority record
(authentication information). Id. Petitioner also relies on Hamlin, in
combination of Fisherman and the knowledge of an ordinarily skilled
artisan, to teach a master authority record (supervisor’s record) stored in the
secure data partition. Id. at 28−31. Petitioner further relies on Hamlin, in
view of the knowledge of an ordinarily skilled artisan, to teach or suggest
the claimed “firmware,” citing Dr. Levy’s Declaration (Ex. 1003
¶¶ 111−123), Hamlin II (Ex. 1009), Hamlin III (Ex. 1010), and U.S. Patent
No. 6,631,453 B1 to Friday (Ex. 1011), for support. Id. at 22−26, 39−40.
Patent Owner argues that the asserted prior art combination fails to
disclose a firmware, an authority record, and a master authority record, as
required by the claims, and that a person of ordinary skill in the art would
not have been motivated to combine Hamlin with Fisherman. PO Resp.
23−61; Sur-reply 1−27.
For the reasons discussed below, we determine that Petitioner has
demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1−3, 5, and
12−14 are unpatentable.
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1. Claims 1, 12, and 13
a. “firmware for reading data from and writing data to the storage
medium” (claim 1)
Claim 1 recites “firmware for reading data from and writing data to
the storage medium.” Ex. 1001, 12:55−56. As discussed above in our claim
construction Section II.B.1−2, we construe “firmware” as “software that has
been copied on (and therefore stored in) an integrated circuit, which usually
may be a ROM or other non-writable and non-volatile memory.” Ex. 1003
¶ 111. We decline to adopt Patent Owner’s claim construction that
construes “firmware for reading data from and writing data to the storage
medium” to require the firmware by itself performs the read/write
operations. Sur-reply 6−8.
In its Petition, Petitioner asserts that the combination of Hamlin,
Fisherman, and the knowledge of an ordinarily skilled artisan teaches the
aforementioned “firmware” limitation. Pet. 22−26. Petitioner explains that
Hamlin teaches “a control system for interfacing with a host computer to
facilitate read and write commands to write data to and read data from the
pristine area of the disk.” Id. (citing Ex. 1004, code (57), 2:52−55, 3:12−16,
4:28−44, 8:64−67, 9:55−67, 10:55−11:4, 11:17−12:3) (emphasis added).
Petitioner argues that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have
understood that “Hamlin discloses using firmware (e.g., software that
implements, inter alia, the ‘control system 12’) for reading data from and
writing data to the storage medium and, at a minimum, it would have been
obvious.” Id. According to Petitioner, such an artisan would have known
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that “storage devices such as the Hamlin disk drive would have used a
processor running firmware (instructions).” Id. Dr. Levy testifies that, at
the time of the invention, “it was well known to implement functional
elements inside a storage device such as Hamlin’s ‘disk drive 2’ using a
processor running firmware.” Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 112−123.
Upon consideration of the evidence in this entire trial record, we agree
with Petitioner that the combination of Hamlin, Fisherman, and the
knowledge of an ordinarily skilled artisan teaches the aforementioned
“firmware” limitation recited in claim 1.
Patent Owner opposes and advances several arguments. First, Patent
Owner argues that Hamlin does not teach “firmware,” citing to Mr. Jawadi’s
testimony for support. PO Resp. 23−26; Ex. 2008 ¶¶ 38−67;
Sur-reply 9−10.
To the extent that Patent Owner requires the prior art to use the exact
terminology as the claims, an obviousness determination is not an ipsissimis
verbis test. Cf. In re Gleave, 560 F.3d 1331, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(addressing similar concept in the context of anticipation). Instead, the test
for obviousness is whether the references, taken as a whole, would have
suggested the claimed subject matter to a person of having ordinary skill in
the art at the time the invention was made. See In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d
1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
Significantly, Patent Owner and Mr. Jawadi fail to consider Hamlin as
a whole. In particular, they ignore that Hamlin expressly incorporates by
reference Tygar, which discloses secure coprocessors having firmware.
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Ex. 1004, 6:14−22; Ex. 1017, 1−3, 12−13. In its Sur-reply, Patent Owner
concedes that Hamlin’s control system and authentication circuitry may be
implemented using Tygar’s secure coprocessors. Sur-reply 11.
“When a document is ‘incorporated by reference’ into a host
document, such as a patent, the referenced document becomes effectively
part of the host document as if it were explicitly contained therein.”
Telemac Cellular Corp. v. Topp Telecom, Inc., 247 F.3d 1316, 1329 (Fed.
Cir. 2001). There is no dispute that Hamlin incorporates Tygar by reference
in its entirety. Pet. 25; see generally PO Resp.; Sur-reply. As a host
document, Hamlin cites to Tygar in a manner that makes clear that Tygar’s
disclosure regarding secure coprocessors is effectively part of Hamlin’s
disclosure as if it were explicitly contained therein. Advanced Display Sys.,
Inc. v. Ken State Univ., 212 F.3d 1272, 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
As Petitioner explains, Hamlin discloses that “control system 12 . . .
may be implemented using tamper resistant circuitry to protect the decrypted
authentication data.” Pet. 25; Reply 1−2; Ex. 1004, 6:14−22. Hamlin also
refers to Tygar’s secure coprocessors as an example of the tamper resistant
circuitry. Ex. 1004, 6:14−22; Ex. 1017. Indeed, Hamlin states:
In addition, all or part of the control system 12 and/or the
authentication circuitry 14 may be implemented using tamper
resistant circuitry to protect the decrypted authentication data.
An example discussion of tamper-resistant circuitry is provided
in Tygar, J. D. and Yee, B. S., “Secure Coprocessors in
Electronic Commerce Applications,” Proceedings 1995
USENIX Electronic Commerce Workshop, 1995, New York,
which is incorporated herein by reference.
Ex. 1004, 6:14−22 (emphases added).
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Tygar discloses secure coprocessors executing instructions that
include those stored on a ROM (firmware). Ex. 1017, 1−3 (“A secure
coprocessor is a hardware module containing (1) a CPU, (2) boostrap ROM,
and (3) secure non-volatile memory.”), 12, 13. In short, Tygar’s secure
coprocessors provide examples of Hamlin’s tamper-resistant circuitry for
control system 12 and authentication circuitry 14. Ex. 1017, 1−3, 12−13;
Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 118−119; Ex. 1021 ¶¶ 26−29. Hence, Hamlin, which
incorporates Tygar by reference, discloses using firmware in a disk drive to
protect the decrypted data. Ex. 1004, 6:14−12; Ex. 1017, 1−3, 12, 13.
Moreover, Dr. Levy testifies that one of ordinary skill in the art would have
recognized that the behavior of Hamlin’s control system (e.g., memory
mapping) suggests firmware. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 117 (citing Ex. 1004, 4:44−50;
7:63−66, 3:21−25; Ex. 1012, 823, 224, 411−412).
Therefore, Patent Owner’s argument that Hamlin does not teach
firmware is unavailing.
Second, Patent Owner argues that Hamlin II and Hamlin III should
not be considered because Petitioner does not identify these references in its
statements of the asserted grounds. PO Resp. 26 n.4. Patent Owner also
contends that Hamlin, Hamlin II, and Hamlin III disclose different
inventions, solve different problems, and have different implementations.
Id. at 26−32. Patent Owner further avers that Petitioner failed to describe
how and why Hamlin, Hamlin II, Hamlin III, and Fisherman are combined.
Patent Owner’s arguments are misplaced. When considering whether
a claimed invention would have been obvious, “the knowledge of such an
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artisan is part of the store of public knowledge that must be consulted.”
Randall Mfg. v. Rea, 733 F.3d 1355, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Ariosa
Diagnostics v. Verinata Health, Inc., 805 F.3d 1359, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
Here, Dr. Levy testifies that using a processor and firmware in a disk
drive to perform disk drive operations was known in the art at the time of the
invention and that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized
that using firmware (running on a processor) was a well-known
implementation in storage devices. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 112−123. We credit
Dr. Levy’s testimony (id.) as it is supported by Hamlin II, Hamlin III, and
Friday. See, e.g., Ex. 1009, 7:38−40 (“The components in the secured disk
drive 20 shown in FIG. 2 may be implemented in integrated circuitry or in
firmware executed by a microprocessor.”); Ex. 1010, 5:18−22 (“The disk
drive 22 is less susceptible to virus attacks because the firmware
implemented by the disk controller 34 is essentially static, as determined by
the manufacturing process, and facilities can be employed to monitor the
firmware for tampering.”); Ex. 1011, 5:35−38 (“The drive electronics unit
88 has a CPU 90, a memory 92 and a firmware module 94 which operate the
disk drive unit 84 in the normal manner known to those skilled in the art.”).
Based on the evidence in this entire trial, we are persuaded that
Petitioner has shown sufficiently that the combination of Hamlin,
Fisherman, and the knowledge of an ordinarily skilled artisan, teaches the
claimed “firmware.” Patent Owner’s arguments regarding Hamlin II and
Hamlin III do not undermine Petitioner’s showing.
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Third, Patent Owner argues that Hamlin does not disclose “firmware
for reading data from and writing data to the storage medium” because the
claim language requires the firmware by itself performs the read/write
operations. PO Resp. 24−25; Sur-Reply 6−8, 14−15. According to Patent
Owner and Mr. Jawadi, “Hamlin’s facilitation of reading and writing is not
the same thing as actually performing the reading and writing required by
Claim 1.” PO Resp. 24−25; Ex. 2008 ¶¶ 27−29, 31.
However, both Patent Owner and Mr. Jawadi rely on Patent Owner’s
improper claim construction that requires the firmware by itself performs the
read/write operation. As discussed in our claim construction Section II.B.2,
we decline to adopt Patent Owner’s construction that improperly imports an
extraneous limitation into the claims. Nothing in the claim’s plain language
requires that read and write commands must originate from the firmware or
that no other component outside the firmware may play a role in reading
data from and writing data to the storage medium.
In addition, Patent Owner and Mr. Jawadi fail to consider Hamlin as a
whole and read Hamlin overly narrow. Hamlin is not limited to merely
“facilitation of reading and writing,” as Patent Owner and Mr. Jawadi
suggest. PO Resp. 24−25; Ex. 2008 ¶¶ 27−29, 31. Indeed, Hamlin
expressly discloses that the disk drive includes “control system 12 for
controlling access to the pristine area of the disk 4” that stores encrypted
data, “allow[ing] a write or read operation only if certain predetermined
conditions are satisfied.” Ex. 1004, code (57), 2:52−55, 3:12−21, 4:18−19,
4:58−60. Hamlin also discloses “a control system for interfacing with a host
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computer to facilitate read and write commands to write data to and read
data from the pristine areas of the disk.” Id. at 8:64−66 (emphasis added).
Moreover, Hamlin discloses “using the control system internal to the disk
drive to read the encrypted data stored in the pristine area,” and “to enable
servoing the pristine area . . . wherein[] the servo bursts are written to the
disk in encrypted form.” Id. at 9:66−67, 10:7−12 (emphases added).
In light of Hamlin’s disclosure, we agree with Dr. Levy’s testimony
that Hamlin’s “control system is used to read data from and write data to the
disk drive 2 and therefore the reading from and writing to the storage
medium of Hamlin is carried out by Hamlin’s firmware.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 121.
We credit the testimony of Dr. Levy (Ex. 1003 ¶ 121) over that of
Mr. Jawadi (Ex. 2008 ¶¶ 27−29, 31). We find Dr. Levy’s testimony is
supported by Hamlin’s disclosure. See, e.g., Ex. 1004, code (57), 2:52−55,
3:12−16, 4:18−19, 4:58−60, 8:64−66, 9:66−67.
Based on the evidence in this entire trial record, we determine that
Petitioner has shown sufficiently that Hamlin teaches the aforementioned
“firmware” limitation recited in claim 1. Patent Owner’s argument that
Hamlin does not disclose “firmware for reading data from and writing data
to the storage medium” because the claim language requires the firmware by
itself performs the read/write operations (PO Resp. 24−25; Sur-Reply 6−8,
14−15) is unavailing.
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b. “only the firmware is permitted to access the secure data and the one
or more authority records” (claim 1) and “firmware . . . adapted to
limit access to the security partition by an operating system of a
computer system” (claim 12)
Claim 1 recites “wherein only the firmware is permitted to access the
secure data and the one or more authority records.” Ex. 1001, 13:1−2.
Claim 12 recites “firmware disposed within the storage device adapted to
limit access to the security partition by an operating system of a computer
system.” Id. at 14:23−26.
Petitioner asserts that “Hamlin’s control system and authentication
circuitry would be understood to be implemented in firmware executed by a
processor,” and that “Hamlin’s figures show that only the control system
(firmware) is directly connected (through the preamplifier or not) to the
storage medium.” Pet. 32−33, 39−40 (citing Ex. 1004, 4:65−5:7, 5:58−63,
6:4−8, Figs 1−3, Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 137−139, 141). According to Petitioner, “the
firmware must be the internal component through which access is
performed, e.g., the ‘host or network’ accesses the data through only the
control system firmware,” and “all data stored on the storage medium is only
accessible via the firmware.” Id. Petitioner explains that Hamlin’s disk
drive includes an authentication circuitry that uses the user/device
authentication information to broker access to the pristine area, and it allows
access to those users and devices found in the user/device authentication
information set of data when properly verified using their corresponding
authentication information (e.g., a password). Id. at 38−40; Ex. 1003
¶¶ 204, 208−209; Ex. 1004, 5:50−6:3. Petitioner also explains that Hamlin’s
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authentication information is used by authentication circuitry 14 to grant or
deny access to pristine area 8. Id. at 39−40.
Based on the evidence of record, we are persuaded that Petitioner has
demonstrated sufficiently that Hamlin, in view of the knowledge of an
ordinarily skilled artisan, discloses the aforementioned limitations recited in
claims 1 and 12.
Patent Owner counters that the combination does not teach “only the
firmware is permitted to access the secure data and the one or more authority
records” because Hamlin does not disclose firmware. PO Resp. 31−32.
Patent Owner’s argument is unavailing. As discussed above, Hamlin,
which incorporates by reference Tygar, teaches implementing the control
system and authentication circuitry using secure coprocessors that include
firmware. Ex. 1004, 6:14−12; Ex. 1017, 1−3, 12, 13. Patent Owner also
concedes that Hamlin’s control system and authentication circuitry may be
implemented using Tygar’s secure coprocessors that include firmware.
Sur-reply 11.
In its Sur-reply, Patent Owner further argues that Hamlin does not
teach or suggest “only the firmware is permitted to access the secure data
and the one or more authority records” because Hamlin’s decryption
circuitry and the operating system of a host computer also have access to the
secure data. Sur-reply 10−17 (Ex. 1004, 4:61−5:1).
Patent Owner’s argument improperly rests on its implicit claim
construction that imports a negative limitation into the claims—no other
component or external entity is permitted to request access via the firmware.
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Sur-reply 10−17. As discussed above in our claim construction Section
II.B.3, we decline to adopt Patent Owner’s construction. Instead, we
construe “only the firmware is permitted to access the secure data and the
one or more authority records” to mean simply that “all access to the secure
data and the authority records is performed via and brokered by the
firmware.” See Ex. 1001, 8:30−34, 12:64−65; Ex. 1002, 328−29, 384−85;
Ex. 1003 ¶ 138.
In addition, Patent Owner’s argument narrowly focuses on one portion
of Hamlin and fails to consider Hamlin as a whole. Sur-reply 12, 15−16
(citing Ex. 1004, 4:61−5:1). Hamlin makes clear that the host and
decryption circuitry themselves do not access the pristine area, rather they
must seek access through control system 12, which includes firmware.
Ex. 1004, 4:58−60 (“The control system 12 will access the pristine area 8
and allow a write or read operation only if certain predetermined conditions
are satisfied.” (emphasis added)), 5:45−49 (“The encrypted data is read from
the disk 4 by the control system 12, decrypted by the decryption
circuitry 18.” (emphasis added)). As Dr. Levy testifies, “the firmware
(control system) is permitted to access the secure data and the authentication
information, and all entities other than the firmware that attempt to access
the data on Hamlin’s storage medium must do so via the firmware.”
Ex. 1003 ¶ 139. We credit Dr. Levy’s testimony because it is supported by
Hamlin. Figure 1 of Hamlin is reproduced below.
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Figure 1 of Hamlin illustrates disk drive 2 comprising disk 4 having
public area 6 for storing plain text data and pristine area 8 for storing
encrypted data. Ex. 1004, 3:52−59, 4:3−27. As shown, only control system
12 is directly connected (whether through the preamplifier or not) to disk 4.
Hamlin expressly discloses “control system 12 for controlling access
to the pristine area 8 of the disk 4.” Id. at 4:18−19 (emphasis added).
Decryption circuitry 18 and the external entities (e.g., the host or network)
must access the secure data or authority records stored in pristine area 8 via
control system 12. Id. at 5:45−49 (“The encrypted data is read from the disk
4 by the control system 12, decrypted by the decryption circuitry 18.”
(emphasis added)), 5:8−10 (“the control system 12 receives via line 38 a
request from an external entity to access the pristine area 8 (read or write)”
(emphasis added)). Hamlin makes clear that control system 12 (not the host,
network, or decryption circuitry) performs the actual access (read or write).
Id. at 3:19−21 (“The disk comprises a plurality of physical blocks accessed
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by the control system through physical block addresses.” (emphasis added)),
4:28−34 (“[D]uring a write operation . . . preamplifier 20 receives digital
write data 24 from the control system 12 which is to be written to the disk
4.” (emphasis added)), 4:38−44 (“During a read operation . . . preamplified
analog read signal 26 is supplied to the control system 12 where it is
demodulated into an estimated data sequence representing the originally
recorded data.” (emphasis added)), 4:47−50 (“The control system 12 sends
control sequences to the preamplifier 20 over line 28 in order to configure it
for write or read operations.” (emphasis added)).
Therefore, we are not convinced by Patent Owner’s argument that
Hamlin does not teach “only the firmware is permitted to access the secure
data and the one or more authority records” because Hamlin’s decryption
circuitry and the operating system of a host computer also have access to the
secure data. Sur-reply 10−17.
For the foregoing reasons, we determine that Petitioner has shown
sufficiently that Hamlin, in view of Fisherman and the knowledge of an
ordinarily skilled artisan, teaches “wherein only the firmware is permitted to
access the secure data and the one or more authority records,” as recited in
claim 1, and “firmware disposed within the storage device adapted to limit
access to the security partition by an operating system of a computer
system,” as recited in claim 12.
c. “one or more authority records”
Claim 1 recites “the secure data partition for storing secure data and
one or more authority records, wherein the one or more authority records
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define access permissions relating to the secure data partition and the secure
data.” Ex. 1001, 12:59−62. Claim 12 recites “a security partition containing
one or more authority records and at least one data set associated with each
of the one or more authority records” and “a mechanism within the storage
device adapted to limit access to the security partition based on the one or
more authority records.” Id. at 14:15−20.
As discussed above in our claim construction Section II.B.4, we
determine that “authority records” should be given its plain and ordinary
meaning, and “access permissions” is “related to the secure data partition
and the secure data.” However, we decline to adopt Patent Owner’s implicit
claim construction. We clarify that “authority records” does not exclude
information that is used for both authentication and authorization. And, the
claim language “one or more authority records define access permissions
relating to the secure data partition and the secure data” encompasses both:
(1) a single authority record that includes multiple access permissions, and
(2) multiple authority records that include multiple access permissions—
e.g., each record includes at least one permission.
Petitioner asserts that Hamlin alone, or in view of Fisherman,
discloses the aforementioned “authority records” limitations. Pet. 27−30,
37−40. Upon consideration of the entire trial record, we determine that
Petitioner has shown sufficiently that Hamlin alone teaches the “authority
records” limitations under the proper claim construction. Although we
decline to adopt Patent Owner’s claim construction, we determine that
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Petitioner has shown sufficiently that Hamlin in view of Fisherman teaches
the “authority records” limitations, even under Patent Owner’s construction.
In its Petition, Petitioner asserts that Hamlin’s pristine area (the secure
data partition) stores sensitive information (secure data), such as “a
password, credit card number, etc.,” as well as user/device authentication
information (authority records). Pet. 27 (citing Ex. 1004, 4:65−5:1,
5:50−63, 6:4−8, 7:55−60, 8:12−15). Petitioner explains that Hamlin’s
authentication information discloses “one or more authority records”
because the authentication information defines an entity’s access
permissions to the pristine area and Hamlin’s authentication circuitry uses it
to authorize or deny access to the data or information stored in the pristine
area. Id. at 28 (citing Ex. 1004, 4:61−5:7, 5:58−6:12, 7:38−43, 7:50−59).
Dr. Levy testifies that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have
understood that Hamlin’s authentication information (the authority records)
includes the entity ID, “password, finger print, voice print, spectral
signature, etc.” and information sufficient to identify the data set for which
access is protected and the associated area in the pristine area storing the
sensitive information (e.g., a credit card number). Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 125, 126
(citing Ex. 1004, 4:61−5:7, 5:50−63, 7:38−43, 7:50−59). Dr. Levy also
testifies that the authentication information is an “authority record” because
“the authentication information is used to control access to the pristine
area 8 and to the data within that partition.” Id. ¶ 126.
Alternatively, Petitioner asserts that “[t]o the extent authority records
are required to define flexible access rights or be associated with a specific
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data set, Fisherman discloses this.” Pet. 28−29; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 128. Petitioner
avers that Fisherman discloses “one or more authority records” because
Fisherman’s ACCESS_FIELD has two subfields, each of which can have a
value of 0 or 1, representing read and write rights. Ex. 1005, 8:46−60. For
example, ACCESS_FIELD = (1, 1) means that the cluster is accessible for
both reading and writing; and ACCESS_FIELD = (1, 0) means that the
cluster is accessible for reading, but not writing. Id. at 8:46−60, 22:46−47.
Petitioner argues that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been
motivated to include Fisherman’s flexible access rights in Hamlin’s
authentication information and store such records in Hamlin’s pristine area
so that the entities in Hamlin can have different types of rights to access the
data in the pristine area. Pet. 45−47. Petitioner explains that “an additional
field may be added to Hamlin’s ‘user/device authentication information’ to
denote what kind of access right the user has, as Fisherman teaches.” Id.
Dr. Levy testifies that Fisherman “discloses more detailed user access
permissions, which would also improve the security and utility of the
Hamlin invention” because “such protection methods are known to ‘prevent
mischievous, intentional violation of an access restriction by a user.’”
Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 223, 226 (quoting Ex. 1016 (Abraham Silberschatz & Peter
Baer Galvin, Operating System Concepts, 598 (Lynne Doran Cote ed., 5th
ed. 1998))). Dr. Levy also testifies that “Fisherman’s flexible access rights
would allow the Hamlin invention to establish tiers of trust and enforce
different access policies depending on the user’s trust tier.” Id. ¶ 227.
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Based on the evidence in the entire trial record, we determine that
Petitioner has demonstrated sufficiently, either relying on Hamlin alone or
alternatively Hamlin in view of Fisherman, that the combination of Hamlin,
Fisherman, and the knowledge of an ordinary skilled artisan teaches the
aforementioned “authority records” limitations recited in claims 1 and 12.
Patent Owner opposes, advancing several arguments.
First, Patent Owner argues that Petitioner conflates authentication
with authorization and that Hamlin discloses authentication but not
authorization, suggesting that authentication and authorization cannot be
performed using the same information. PO Resp. 32−36 (citing Ex. 2008
¶¶ 112−120); Sur-reply 23−24.
As discussed above in our claim construction Section II.B.4, however,
we decline to adopt Patent Owner’s implicit claim construction that
improperly imports a negative limitation into the claims. Rather, we
determine that the term “authority records” does not exclude information
that is used for both authentication and authorization.
As Dr. Levy testifies, Hamlin’s authentication information “is used to
both authenticate the external entity, i.e., confirm the identity of the external
entity, and authorize the external entity, i.e., grant the external entity access
to the user’s area in the pristine area.” Ex. 1021 ¶ 66 (emphases added). In
particular, Hamlin’s authentication information defines access permissions
(e.g., read or write) to the pristine area and the secure data stored in the
pristine area. Ex. 1004, 4:61−5:7, 5:50−6:12, 7:38−43, 7:50−60, 8:12−15.
For example, Hamlin discloses that “[w]hen an external entity sends a
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request to access to the pristine area 8, . . . [t]he authentication circuitry 14
uses the entity ID to read the associated password from the pristine area 8,
and the request is authenticated if it matches the entity password received in
the request,” and that “[o]therwise, the request is not authenticated and
access is denied.” Id. at 4:61−5:7 (emphases added). Hence, Hamlin’s
authentication information is used for both authentication and authorization
to authorize or deny access to the secure data stored in the pristine area.
Ex. 1003 ¶ 126.
Applying the proper claim construction, we determine that Petitioner
has established sufficiently that Hamlin teaches the aforementioned
“authority records” limitations recited in claims 1 and 12. Patent Owner’s
argument that Petitioner conflates authentication with authorization and that
Hamlin discloses authentication but not authorization is unavailing.
Second, Patent Owner argues that the construction of “authority
records” requires multiple access permissions in that “a single authority
record defines access permissions (plural), such as R/W Access Rights,
WriteOnce, Write Over, WriteAny, ReadCur, ReadAny, and Hidden Read.”
PO Resp. 25; Sur-reply 24−27; Ex. 2008 ¶¶ 121−136.
To the extent that Patent Owner argues that Hamlin does not disclose
each authority record includes multiple access permissions, that argument is
unavailing. As discussed above in our claim construction Section II.B.4, the
claim language encompasses both: (1) a single authority record that includes
multiple access permissions, and (2) multiple authority records that include
multiple access permissions (e.g., each record includes at least one
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permission). Moreover, Patent Owner concedes that “[b]y the plain and
customary reading of the phrase ‘wherein the one or more authority records
defines access permissions,’ it is clear that one authority record can define
multiple access permissions, or alternatively, multiple authority records can
define multiple access permissions.” Sur-reply 25 (emphasis added).
Applying the proper claim construction, we find that Petitioner has
established sufficiently that Hamlin teaches the aforementioned “authority
records” limitations because Hamlin teaches multiple authority records that
collectively include multiple access permissions. As Petitioner points out
(Pet. 27−28; Reply 13; 1003 ¶¶ 125−127), Hamlin discloses that multiple
external entities can request access to the pristine area, and each entity has
an entity ID, password, and associated area to access in the pristine area.
Ex. 1004, 4:61−5:7 (“disk drive 2 receives requests from external entities
(e.g., a host or client computer) to access the pristine area”), 5:50−6:12,
7:38−43, 7:50−60, 8:12−15. For example, an external entity may send a
request to disk drive 2 to store a credit card number in the pristine area in
encrypted form, and a subsequent request may be sent to disk drive 2 to read
the encrypted message stored in the pristine area. Id. at 7:38−49. Therefore,
Hamlin discloses multiple authority records that collectively include
multiple permissions—each record having at least one access permission
(read or write) to the pristine area. Ex. 1021 ¶¶ 69−72. Accordingly, Patent
Owner’s argument that Hamlin does not discloses each authority record
includes multiple access permissions is unavailing.
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In addition, even if we were to apply Patent Owner’s implicit claim
construction that requires each authority record to include multiple access
permissions, we find that Petitioner has shown sufficiently that Hamlin, in
combination with Fisherman and the knowledge of an ordinarily skilled
artisan, teaches such authority records. Pet. 15−17, 27−30, 44−47; Ex. 1003
¶¶ 128−129.
As discussed above, Petitioner alternatively relies upon Hamlin in
view of Fisherman to disclose “one or more authority records” because
Fisherman discloses an authority record that includes flexible access
permissions by having an access field that includes two subfields, each of
which can have a value of 0 or 1, representing read and write rights.
Pet. 28−29, 45−47; Ex. 1003 ¶ 128; Ex. 1005, 8:46−60; Reply 15−16;
Ex. 1021 ¶¶ 74−83. Petitioner explains that “an additional field may be
added to Hamlin’s ‘user/device authentication information’ to denote what
kind of access right the user has, as Fisherman teaches.” Pet. 46−47;
Ex. 1003 ¶ 230. Petitioner avers that a person of ordinary skill in the art
would have been motivated to include the additional field in Hamlin’s
authentication information and store the records in Hamlin’s pristine area so
that the external entities in Hamlin can have different types of rights to
access the data in the pristine area. Pet. 45−47; Reply 15−16; Ex. 1003
¶¶ 223−232; Ex. 1021 ¶¶ 74−75. Dr. Levy testifies that Fisherman
“discloses more detailed user access permissions, which would also improve
the security and utility of the Hamlin invention” because “such protection
methods are known to ‘prevent mischievous, intentional violation of an
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access restriction by a user.’” Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 223, 226 (quoting Ex. 1016).
Dr. Levy also testifies that “Fisherman’s flexible access rights would allow
the Hamlin invention to establish tiers of trust and enforce different access
policies depending on the user’s trust tier.” Id. ¶ 227.
Based on the evidence in this entire trial record, we determine that
Petitioner has established adequately that Hamlin, in view of Fisherman and
the knowledge of an ordinarily skilled artisan, teaches the aforementioned
“authority records” limitations even under Patent Owner’s implicit
construction that requires multiple permissions in each record.
Third, Patent Owner argues that Fisherman does not disclose
device-based authority records, a disk-level partition, and a security
partition, and that Fisherman’s implementation involves reducing available
disk space which is contrary to the teachings of the ’020 patent. PO Resp.
36−42.
However, attacking Fisherman individually does not undermine
Petitioner’s obviousness showing that is based on a combination of Hamlin,
Fisherman, and the knowledge of an ordinarily skilled artisan. See In re
Keller 642 F.2d 413, 426 (CCPA 1981) (nonobviousness cannot be
established by attacking prior art teachings individually where the ground of
unpatentability is based upon a combination of the prior art teachings). The
relevant issue here is whether the prior art combination, taken as a whole,
would have suggested the patentees’ claimed invention to a person having
ordinary skill in the art. See Merck, 800 F.2d at 1097.
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Significantly, as discussed above, Hamlin teaches using authentication
information (an authority record) stored in the pristine area (security
partition) of a storage device for granting or denying access to the pristine
area. The combination of Hamlin, Fisherman, and the knowledge of an
ordinarily skilled artisan would have taught an authority record having
multiple access permissions stored in the pristine area of a storage device.
In addition, Patent Owner narrowly focuses on the physical
differences between the systems disclosed in the references and requires
bodily incorporating Fisherman’s system into Hamlin’s disk drive. “It is
well-established that a determination of obviousness based on teachings
from multiple references does not require an actual, physical substitution of
elements.” In re Mouttet, 686 F.3d 1322, 1332 (Fed. Cir. June 26, 2012); In
re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 859 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc); Keller 642 F.2d at
425 (Obviousness does not require that all of the features of the secondary
reference be bodily incorporated into the primary reference.).
Accordingly, Patent Owner’s argument that Fisherman does not
disclose a device-based authority records, disk-level partition, and security
partition, and that Fisherman’s implementation involves reducing available
disk space which is contrary to the teachings of the ’020 patent, is
unavailing. PO Resp. 36−42. To the extent that Patent Owner argues that
there is no motivation to combine Hamlin with Fisherman, we address those
arguments below in Section II.E.1.e (the discussion on the reasons to
combine Hamlin with Fisherman).
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Fourth, Patent Owner argues that “Hamlin discloses storing passwords
but not records” because Hamlin discloses only a single field (a password) is
read from the pristine area, citing a portion of Hamlin for support. PO
Resp. 34−36 (citing Ex. 1004, 5:51−64, 6:4−5); Ex. 2008 ¶¶ 126−136.
However, Patent Owner implicitly construes “authority records” to
require multiple fields in each authority record. As discussed in our claim
construction Section II.B.4, we decline to adopt this construction because it
improperly imports a limitation into the claims. Even if we apply Patent
Owner’s implicit construction, we find that Petitioner has shown sufficiently
that the asserted combination teaches the aforementioned “authority records”
limitations recited in claims 1 and 12 for the reasons discussed below.
Notably, Patent Owner narrowly focuses on a portion of Hamlin and
fails to consider Hamlin as a whole. The two sentences immediately before
the portion of Hamlin relied upon by Patent Owner, in the very same
paragraph, state:
User/device authentication may be implemented, for example, by
associating selected information (e.g., a password, finger print,
voice print, spectral signature, etc.) with a trusted entity. In one
embodiment, user/device authentication information (e.g., a
password) is stored in the pristine area 8 of the disk 4.
Ex. 1004, 5:58−63. These two sentences make clear that Hamlin’s
authentication information includes “a password, finger print, voice print,
spectral signature, etc.,” which is more than a single field for a password.
Id. The sentences also make clear that the authentication information is
stored in the pristine area. Id. Patent Owner’s reading of Hamlin is unduly
narrow, limiting the authentication information to only a single field.
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In addition, the portion of Hamlin relied upon by Patent Owner does
not support Patent Owner’s argument that “Hamlin discloses storing only
passwords but not records.” PO Resp. 35−36. That portion of Hamlin
makes clear that “authentication circuitry 14 uses the entity ID to read the
associated password from the pristine area 8.” Ex. 1004, 5:65−67 (emphasis
added). Both Patent Owner and Mr. Jawadi ignore that the password is
associated with the entity ID. PO Resp. 34−36; Ex. 2008 ¶¶ 126−136. The
prior sentences (reproduced above) also make clear that the authentication
information is associated with a trusted entity. Ex. 1004, 5:58−63.
As Dr. Levy testifies, one of ordinarily skill in the art would have
understood that Hamlin’s authentication information includes at least:
(1) one field for identifying the user (“entity ID”), and (2) another field for
containing the authentication information itself that is associated with the
entity ID. Ex. 1003 ¶ 126. Dr. Levy also testifies that “the authority record
would include the entity ID, entity password, and information sufficient to
identify the area of the pristine area to which the external entity has the right
to access.” Ex. 1021 ¶ 67. Dr. Levy explains that “in order to allow the
access, the authentication circuitry must first authenticate the external entity
by determining whether the entity ID and password match the authentication
information stored in the pristine area.” Id. We credit Dr. Levy’s testimony
(Ex. 1003 ¶ 126; Ex. 1021 ¶ 67), as it is consistent with the teachings of
Hamlin (Ex. 1004, 5:50−6:3) that the authentication information (authority
records) for each entity includes more than one field.
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Accordingly, Patent Owner’s argument that “Hamlin discloses storing
passwords but not records” is unavailing. Moreover, Patent Owner does not
dispute that Hamlin in view of Fisherman discloses an authority record with
multiple fields, including an access field that provides flexible access
permissions (Ex. 1005, 8:46−60). See generally PO Resp.; Sur-reply.
Finally, Patent Owner argues that Hamlin’s authentication information
is not organized, structured, or stored as records, as required by the claims.
PO Resp. 35. However, the claims do not recite any specific organization or
structure. It is well established that limitations not appearing in the claims
cannot be relied upon for patentability. In re Self, 671 f.2d 1344, 1348
(CCPA 1982).
For the foregoing reasons, we determine that Petitioner has shown
sufficiently that Hamlin, in view of Fisherman and the knowledge of an
ordinarily skilled artisan, teaches the aforementioned “authority records”
limitations.
d. “a master authority record”
Claim 1 recites “the secure data partition contains a master authority
record,” and “wherein the one or more authority records can be created and
deleted as required by a user having access permissions according to the
master authority record.” Ex. 1001, 12:63−67 (emphasis added). Claim 13
depends from claim 12 and further recites that “the one or more authority
records comprises a master authority record including instructions for
governing the one or more authority records in said storage device.” Id. at
14:27−30 (emphasis added).
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Petitioner asserts that Hamlin, in combination with Fisherman and the
knowledge of an ordinarily skilled artisan, teaches the aforementioned
“master authority record” limitations. Pet. 30−31, 40−41, 44−47. Petitioner
explains that Fisherman discloses a “supervisor” user who performs
privileged operations. Id. at 30 (citing Ex. 1005, 1:60−61 (“file-access
criteria [are] established by the supervisor”), 10:19−20 (“system 20 should
be installed by the supervisor”)). Petitioner contends that the supervisor’s
name and password discloses a “master authority record.” Id. According to
Petitioner, Fisherman’s supervisor can create and delete user’s associated
data (authority records), executing a command that “pertains to the
registration of a new user, the deletion of a user, or a change in file status.”
Id. at 31, 41 (citing Ex. 1005, 14:37−57 (“the new user registration
command”), 14:66−15:11 (“a delete user command”), 15:20−24).
Petitioner asserts that it would have been obvious to include
Fisherman’s supervisor features in Hamlin by including a master authority
record in Hamlin’s pristine area to create and delete authority records. Id. at
27−31, 45−47. Dr. Levy testifies that one of ordinary skill in the art would
have understood that a master authority record, when implemented in
Hamlin, would have been implemented in the pristine area (the secure data
partition) because the authentication information (authority record) is
already disclosed in Hamlin as being stored in the pristine area. Ex. 1003
¶¶ 132−133 (citing Ex. 1004, 5:61−62). Dr. Levy also testifies that such an
artisan would have been motivated to store the master authority record in the
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pristine area because the purpose of the pristine area is to keep the data
secure. Id. (citing Ex. 1004, 1:27−30).
Dr. Levy also testifies that adding a master authority record for a
system administrator/supervisor in Hamlin’s pristine area “would provide
the benefits of allowing easy configuration and customization of the drive—
enabling the administrator (supervisor) of the computer system to ensure that
information about users and devices authorized to access Hamlin’s pristine
area are up-to-date.” Id. ¶ 225. The combination would allow “only
authorized employees or members [to] have access to critical or sensitive
information,” and as “employees and members join, leave, or become more
or less trusted, the administrator must update the list of users and their
credentials accordingly.” Id.
Based on the evidence in the entire trial record, we determine that
Petitioner has demonstrated sufficiently that the combination of Hamlin,
Fisherman, and the knowledge of an ordinary skilled artisan teaches the
aforementioned “master authority record” limitations.
Patent Owner opposes, advancing several arguments. PO Resp.
42−45. First, Patent Owner argues Hamlin does not disclose a master
authority record because Hamlin does not disclose authority records or
creating and deleting authority records, relying on the same arguments for
the “authority records” limitations. Id. at 42−43; Sur-reply 23−27.
However, as discussed above, Hamlin alone, or in view of Fisherman,
discloses the “authority records” limitations. We have addressed those
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arguments in our analysis and find them unavailing here for the reasons
stated above.
In addition, attacking Hamlin individually does not undermine
Petitioner’s obviousness showing that is based on Hamlin, Fisherman, and
the knowledge of an ordinarily skilled artisan. See Keller, 642 F.2d at 426.
As discussed above, Fisherman discloses a master authority record (the
supervisor’s name and password), and the supervisor governs (e.g., adds and
deletes) other user records. Ex. 1005, 14:37−57, 14:66−15:11, 15:20−24.
Therefore, Patent Owner’s argument that Hamlin does not disclose a master
authority record is misplaced.
Second, Patent Owner argues that Petitioner improperly mixes the
prior art invention described in Fisherman’s background section, with
Fisherman’s invention, and that Fisherman “criticizes the prior art.” PO
Resp. 43−45 (citing Ex. 1005, 2:5−15).
We disagree, however. Petitioner merely shows that the features of a
system administrator (supervisor) in a multi-user environment were known
in the art at the time of the invention, as evidenced by Fisherman’s
background section and Fisherman’s invention. See Pet. 30, 45; Reply 17;
Ex. 1003 ¶ 86. Patent Owner does not dispute that such features of a system
administrator (supervisor) were known in the art at the time of the invention.
See generally PO Resp.; Sur-reply. “A reference must be considered for
everything that it teaches, not simply the described invention or a preferred
embodiment.” In re Applied Materials, Inc., 692 F.3d 1289, 1298 (Fed. Cir.
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2012) (citing EWP Corp. v. Reliance Universal Inc., 755 F.2d 898, 907 (Fed.
Cir. 1985)).
We understand Patent Owner’s “criticizes the prior art” argument to
be a teaching away argument. Fisherman’s invention does not teach away
from these system administrator/supervisor features. See generally
Ex. 1005. The portion of Fisherman cited by Patent Owner is not directly
related to the supervisor, but instead addresses the prior art “subsystem” that
Fisherman’s invention sought to improve. Ex. 1005, 2:4−15 (“An obvious
disadvantage of the above-described subsystem is . . . .” (emphasis added)).
Additionally, the existence of better alternatives “does not mean that an
inferior combination is inapt for obviousness purposes.” Mouttet, 686 F.3d
at 1334 (citing In re Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). Therefore,
Patent Owner’s argument that Petitioner improperly mixes different
inventions and that Fisherman “criticizes the prior art” is misplaced.
Third, Patent Owner argues that Fisherman is a host-based system, not
a storage device-based system. PO Resp. 43. However, Patent Owner fails
to consider the combination as a whole, attacking Fisherman individually.
See Merck, 800 F.2d at 1097; Keller, 642 F.2d at 426. Significantly, Hamlin
is a device-based system, and the combination of adding Fisherman’s
supervisor features to Hamlin would be a device-based system. Pet. 44−47;
Ex. 1003 ¶ 93; Reply 17. Thus, Patent Owner’s argument that Fisherman is
a host-based system is inapposite.
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Fourth, Patent Owner argues that Fisherman does not disclose storing
master authority records in a secure partition and creating and deleting
authority records. PO Resp. 43−44.
Again, Patent Owner fails to consider the combination as a whole,
attacking Fisherman’s teachings individually. See Merck, 800 F.2d at 1097;
Keller, 642 F.2d at 426. As Dr. Levy testifies, the supervisor’s name and
password in Fisherman discloses a master authority record because “[t]he
supervisor name and password are placed in the first element of the
USER_LIST,” and the supervisor governs other user records by adding and
deleting users or by altering file parameters related to a user’s access
permissions. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 88, 132−136 (citing Ex. 1005, 10:19−24,
14:37−57).
Dr. Levy also testifies that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have
understood that a master authority record, when implemented in Hamlin,
would be implemented in the secure data partition” because Hamlin’s
user/device authentication information (authority records) is already stored
in the pristine area (the secure data partition) of the disk. Id. ¶ 133 (citing
Ex. 1004, 5:61−62). Dr. Levy further testifies that such an artisan would
have been motivated to put the master authority record in the pristine area
for keeping the data secure. Id. (citing Ex. 1004, 1:27−30). According to
Dr. Levy, “[i]t is even more important to keep the master authority record
secure because it may authorize the creating and deleting of other authority
records.” Id. Dr. Levy explains that “when implementing a Fisherman-style
supervisor user name and password record in Hamlin, the supervisor
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authority record would be implemented in Hamlin’s existing dataset of
authentication information, which resides in Hamlin’s pristine area (the
secure partition).” Id. ¶¶ 125−127, 133.
Based on the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has
shown sufficiently that Hamlin in view of Fisherman teaches the
aforementioned “master authority record” limitations. Patent Owner’s
argument that Fisherman does not disclose storing master authority records
in a security partition, and creating and deleting authority records, is
unavailing.
Finally, Patent Owner argues that the Board has held that Hamlin III
does not disclose storing the master authority record in a security partition in
IPR2019-00494. PO Resp. 44 (citing IPR2019-00494, Paper 8, 9 (Decision
Denying Institution)).
Patent Owner’s argument is inapposite. The asserted grounds and
evidentiary record in the instant proceeding are different than those in
IPR2019-00494. Notably, in the instant proceeding, Petitioner relies upon
Hamlin and Fisherman, not Hamlin III, to teach the “master authority
record” limitations. Pet. 30−31, 40−41, 44−47. Neither Hamlin nor
Fisherman was asserted in IPR2019-00494. IPR2019-00494, Paper 8 at 3.
More importantly, as discussed above, we determine that Petitioner has
shown sufficiently that Hamlin in view of Fisherman teaches the “master
authority record” limitations. Therefore, Patent Owner’s argument that the
Board has held that Hamlin III does not disclose storing the mater authority
record in a security partition in IPR2019-00494 is inapposite.
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For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Petitioner has shown
sufficiently that Hamlin in view of Fisherman teaches the aforementioned
“master authority record” limitations recited in claims 1 and 13.
e. Reasons to combine Hamlin with Fisherman
Petitioner’s arguments
Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have
been motivated to implement Fisherman’s flexible access permissions and
supervisor features in Hamlin’s pristine area because the combination would
have achieved known benefits, such as increased security and more flexible
security policies in Hamlin’s multi-user environment. Pet. 45−47. In
addition, Petitioner avers that such an artisan would have had a reasonable
expectation of success to implement those features in Hamlin’s disk drive
because the combination merely involves adding an access field and a
master authority record in Hamlin’s preexisting data structure with routine
modification to Hamlin’s firmware. Id.; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 223−232.
In support of Petitioner’s arguments, Dr. Levy testifies that adding an
access field in Hamlin’s authentication information (authority records)
“allow[s] the Hamlin invention to establish tiers of trust and enforce
different access policies depending on the user’s trust tier.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 227.
As Dr. Levy explains, “highly trusted users may be allowed to read and
write to the pristine area, whereas a less-trusted user may be given only read
access to ensure no data is tampered with, and entirely untrusted users could
be barred access.” Id. Dr. Levy also testifies that adding a master authority
record for a system administrator/supervisor in Hamlin’s pristine area
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“would provide the benefits of allowing easy configuration and
customization of the drive—enabling the administrator (supervisor) of the
computer system to ensure that information about users and devices
authorized to access Hamlin’s pristine area are up-to-date.” Id. ¶ 225. The
combination would allow “only authorized employees or members have
access to critical or sensitive information,” and as “employees and members
join, leave, or become more or less trusted, the administrator must update the
list of users and their credentials accordingly.” Id.
Dr. Levy also testifies that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have
understood that a master authority record, when implemented in Hamlin,
would be implemented in the secure data partition” because Hamlin’s
user/device authentication information (authority records) is already stored
in the pristine area (the secure data partition) of the disk. Id. ¶ 133 (citing
Ex. 1004, 5:61−62). Dr. Levy further testifies that such an artisan would
have been motivated to put the master authority record in the pristine area
for keeping the data secure. Id. (citing Ex. 1004, 1:27−30). According to
Dr. Levy, “[i]t is even more important to keep the master authority record
secure because it may authorize the creating and deleting of other authority
records.” Id. Dr. Levy explains that “when implementing a Fisherman-style
supervisor user name and password record in Hamlin, the supervisor
authority record would be implemented in Hamlin’s existing dataset of
authentication information, which resides in Hamlin’s pristine area (the
secure partition).” Id. ¶¶ 125−127, 133.
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Based on the evidence in the entire trial record, we determine that
Petitioner has articulated sufficient reasons to combine Fisherman’s flexible
access permissions and supervisory features in Hamlin’s disk drive.
Patent Owner’s incompatibility arguments
Patent Owner opposes, advancing several arguments. We address
below each of Patent Owner’s arguments in turn.
First, Patent Owner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art
would not have been motivated to combine Hamlin with Fisherman because
Fisherman’s host-based implementation is incompatible with Hamlin’s
device-based implementation and “Fisherman’s operating system and file
system dependent software is different from and incompatible with Hamlin’s
operating system independence and file system independence,” citing
Mr. Jawadi’s testimony for support. PO Resp. 37−40, 47−61; Sur-reply
21−23; Ex. 2008 ¶¶ 185−187.
However, Patent Owner’s argument and Mr. Jawadi’s testimony
incorrectly rest on the premise that the combination “would have required
porting host-based hardware and host-based software to the disk drive.” PO
Resp. 48; Ex. 2008 ¶ 186. Again, Patent Owner and Mr. Jawadi narrowly
focus on the physical differences between the storage systems disclosed in
the references and require bodily incorporating Fisherman’s system into
Hamlin’s disk drive. “It is well-established that a determination of
obviousness based on teachings from multiple references does not require an
actual, physical substitution of elements.” Mouttet, 686 F.3d at 1332.
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Notably, the combination does not rely on incorporating Fisherman’s
hardware or software into Hamlin’s disk drive. Rather, the combination
merely implements an access field in Hamlin’s authentication information
(authority record) and adds a master authority record for a supervisor user.
Pet. 45−47; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 223−232; Ex. 1021 ¶¶ 92−96.
Petitioner makes clear that the combination maintains Hamlin’s
pre-existing data structures and firmware. Pet. 45−47; Ex. 1003 ¶ 232;
Reply 21; Ex. 1021 ¶ 94. Dr. Levy testifies that “[i]n implementing the
supervisor user and the flexible access permissions, no alternations to
Hamlin’s structure or general organization would be required by these
changes” because “the organization of the ‘user/device authentication
information’ already present in Hamlin.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 232. Indeed, Hamlin’s
authentication information (authority records) is already stored in the
pristine area (the secure data partition) of the disk. Ex. 1004, 5:61−62.
In addition, Dr. Levy testifies that “the ACCESS_FIELD and
supervisor features in Fisherman are not specific to a host-based system, nor
are they operating system dependent.” Ex. 1021 ¶¶ 92−95; see also
Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 224−230. Dr. Levy also testifies that “[a]dding an
ACCESS_FIELD element (binary numbers) to the user/device
authentication information in Hamlin does not transform Hamlin into a
host-based system, and does not require Hamlin to be operating system
dependent.” Ex. 1021 ¶¶ 92−94.
More significantly, “if a technique has been used to improve one
device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would
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improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious
unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill.” KSR, 550 U.S. at
417. Here, as evidenced by Fisherman, the flexible access permissions and
supervisor features were known in the art at the time of the invention
(Ex. 1005, 1:7−11, 8:46−60, 10:19−24, 14:37−57, 14:66−15:11), and Patent
Owner does not dispute that. See generally PO Resp.; Sur-reply. The
evidence of record also shows that adding an access field and a master
authority record for a supervisor in the pristine area of Hamlin’s storage
device is not beyond the skill of a pertinent artisan.
Notably, Dr. Levy testifies that Fisherman’s access field “feature
would have been easily implemented in Hamlin because a POSITA merely
needed to add an additional field, which is two bits in size, to the user/device
authentication information in Hamlin.” Ex. 1021 ¶ 74; Ex. 1003 ¶ 230.
Indeed, Mr. Jawadi admits that Fisherman’s access field is two binary
numbers and that “a bit in a device-based system could be used to determine
whether a block is readable or not” and “that’s a very basic construct in
computing in general.” Ex. 1022, 64:16−18, 79:10−14, 80:7−10 (emphases
added). As Dr. Levy also explains, “read/write access rights, such as
implemented in ACCESS_FIELD, had already been used in storage-device
based systems” before the filing date of the ’020 patent. Ex. 1021 ¶ 94. For
example, Moran (U.S. Patent No. 6,324,537 B1, filed on September 30,
1999) discloses access control features that are “integrated with the
hardware of the storage device,” incorporating multiple read/write access
rights. Id. (citing Ex. 1039, 2:1−16, 6:12−15, 6:55−59).
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In addition, Dr. Levy testifies that implementing the supervisor
features “would be straightforward because a POSITA would only need to
designate the user that has the lowest ‘entity ID’ value as the supervisor and
give the supervisor permission to add and delete other entities.” Ex. 1003
¶¶ 224−225, 229; Ex. 1021 ¶ 93. Dr. Levy explains that “adding a
supervisor user in Hamlin’s device does not change Hamlin’s storage system
structure (it only adds another Hamlin authority record for the supervisor
user who has permission to create and delete other authority records), and
does not transform Hamlin into a host-based system.” Ex. 1021 ¶¶ 93−95.
We credit Dr. Levy’s testimony (e.g., Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 223−232; Ex. 1021
¶¶ 92−96) because it is consistent with the prior art disclosures and other
evidence of record (e.g., Exs. 1004, 1005, 1039).
Furthermore, as Petitioner explains, implementing an access field and
a master authority record for a supervisor would achieve known benefits,
such as increased security and more flexible security policies in Hamlin’s
multi-user environment in that it would allow multi-tiers of trust to enforce
difference access policies and allow a system administrator to maintain an
up-to-date list of authorized users and access permissions. Pet. 45−47.
Dr. Levy testifies that adding an access field in Hamlin’s authentication
information (authority records) “allow[s] the Hamlin invention to establish
tiers of trust and enforce different access policies depending on the user’s
trust tier.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 227. For example, as Dr. Levy explains, “highly
trusted users may be allowed to read and write to the pristine area, whereas a
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less-trusted user may be given only read access to ensure no data is tampered
with, and entirely untrusted users could be barred access.” Id.
Dr. Levy also testifies that adding a master authority record for the
administrator/supervisor in Hamlin’s pristine area “would provide the
benefits of allowing easy configuration and customization of the drive—
enabling the administrator (supervisor) of the computer system to ensure that
information about users and devices authorized to access Hamlin’s pristine
area are up-to-date.” Id. ¶ 225. The combination would allow “only
authorized employees or members have access to critical or sensitive
information,” as “employees and members join, leave, or become more or
less trusted, the administrator must update the list of users and their
credentials accordingly.” Id.
As the Supreme Court has held, “when a patent ‘simply arranges old
elements with each performing the same function it had been known to
perform’ and yields no more than one would expect from such an
arrangement, the combination is obvious.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418 (quoting
Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 282 (1976)).
For the foregoing reasons, we determine that Petitioner has articulated
sufficient reasons to combine Hamlin with Fisherman. We are not
convinced by Patent Owner’s arguments and Mr. Jawadi’s testimony that
Fisherman’s host-based implementation is incompatible with Hamlin’s
device-based implementation and “Fisherman’s operating system and file
system dependent software is different from and incompatible with Hamlin’s
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operating system independence and file system independence.” PO Resp.
37−40, 47−61; Sur-reply 21−23; Ex. 2008 ¶¶ 185−187.
To the extent that Patent Owner is arguing that one of ordinary skill in
the art would not have considered combining Hamlin with Fisherman
because Fisherman and Hamlin are not analogous art, we do not agree.
Prior art is analogous and can be applied in an obviousness
combination if it either (1) “is from the same field of endeavor, regardless of
the problem addressed” or (2) “is reasonably pertinent to the particular
problem with which the inventor is involved.” In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656,
658−59 (Fed. Cir. 1992). A reference is analogous if either of these two
tests is met. Scientific Plastic Prods., Inc. v. Biotage AB, 766 F.3d 1355,
1359 (Fed. Cir. 2014). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
has indicated that the scope of analogous art should be construed broadly.
Wyers v. Master Lock Co., 616 F.3d 1231, 1238 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“The
Supreme Court’s decision in KSR . . . directs us to construe the scope of
analogous art broadly . . . .”).
Here, the ’020 patent broadly defines its “Field of the Invention,”
stating that “[t]he present invention generally relates to methods and systems
for securing computer systems” and “more particularly relates to methods
and devices for securing information in a computer system wherein the
computer system may be connected to a networked environment.” Ex. 1001,
1:7−14 (emphases added). The field of endeavor of the ’020 patent is not
limited to device-based implementation or file system independence, as
Patent Owner suggests. PO Resp. 36−42, 47−61; Ex. 2008 ¶¶ 185−229;
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Sur-reply 17−23. As our reviewing court has held, “[t]he field of endeavor
of a patent is not limited to the specific point of novelty, the narrowest
possible conception of the field, or the particular focus within a given field.”
Unwired Planet, LLC v. Google Inc., 841 F.3d 995, 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
Hence, the field of endeavor of the ’020 patent encompasses “methods and
devices for securing information in a computer system.” Ex. 1001, 1:7−14.
Significantly, both Hamlin and Fisherman disclose methods and
systems for securing information in a computer system. Ex. 1004, code 54,
1:26−30 (disclosing a “[d]isk drive employing a disk with a pristine area for
storing encrypted data accessible only by trusted devices”) 2:49−3:49;
Ex. 1005, code 57, 1:7−11, 2:30−44 (disclosing that the “objects of the
instant invention are achieved by providing a hard disk protection system for
protecting data stored on a hard disk of a personal computer”); Ex. 1003
¶¶ 220−222. As such, Hamlin, Fisherman, and the ’020 patent are within the
same field of endeavor that encompasses “methods and devices for securing
information in a computer system.” Ex. 1001, 1:7−14. Accordingly,
Hamlin and Fisherman are analogous prior art to the ’020 patent.
Patent Owner’s argument regarding Petitioner’s reliance on host based and
file system dependent features
Second, Patent Owner argues that Petitioner relies on features in
Fisherman that are “host based and file system dependent.” PO Resp. 60−61
(citing Ex. 2008 ¶¶ 225−229; Ex. 1005, 5:63−64, 5:64−6:9, 8:20−9:22).
According to Patent Owner, Fisherman’s service data are in the host
computer and are dependent on the operating file, and Fisherman’s
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description of the service area shows that the fields are specific to the file
system, files, directories, and clusters. Id.
However, as discussed above, Petitioner makes clear that the
combination would store the authority records, including the access field and
the master authority record, in the pristine area of Hamlin’s disk (not in a
host system), and use the authority records to apply permissions to the
blocks in Hamlin’s disk, not clusters. Pet. 46−47; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 125−129,
133, 232; Reply 21−22; Ex. 1021 ¶¶ 78−79. Petitioner explains that
“Fisherman simply implements these features within its architecture, and
these features are equally applicable and useful in Hamlin’s device.” Reply
22; Ex. 1021 ¶ 94.
Indeed, Dr. Levy testifies that “[i]n implementing the supervisor user
and the flexible access permissions, no alternations to Hamlin’s structure or
general organization would be required by these changes,” and Fisherman’s
access field and supervisor features are equally applicable and useful in
device-based systems. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 133, 232; Ex. 1021 ¶ 94. Dr. Levy also
testifies that an ordinarily skilled artisan “merely needed to add an additional
field, which is two bits in size, to the user/device authentication information
in Hamlin.” Ex. 1021 ¶ 74; Ex. 1003 ¶ 230. Moreover, Mr. Jawadi admits
that Fisherman’s access field is two binary numbers and that “a bit in a
device-based system could be used to determine whether a block is readable
or not” and “that’s a very basic construct in computing in general.”
Ex. 1022, 64:16−18, 79:10−14, 80:7−10 (emphases added).
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Dr. Levy further testifies that “adding a supervisor user in Hamlin’s
device does not change Hamlin’s storage system structure (it only adds
another Hamlin authority record for the supervisor user who has permission
to create and delete other authority records), and does not transform Hamlin
into a host-based system.” Ex. 1021 ¶¶ 93−95.
Based on the evidence in this entire trial record, we are not convinced
by Patent Owner’s argument that Petitioner relies on features that are “host
based and file system dependent.” PO Resp. 60−61.
Patent Owner’s teaching away arguments
Third, Patent Owner argues that “a POSITA would not be motivated
to combine Hamlin and Fisherman to arrive at the ’020 Patent because all
three teach away from such combination.” Sur-reply 21−23; see also PO
Resp. 47−54. To support its argument, Patent Owner avers that Hamlin and
the ’020 patent teach away from Fisherman and from any potential
combination of a host-based system with a device-based system. Sur-reply
22 (citing Ex. 1004, 1:42−52, 2:16−21; Ex. 1001, 1:35−54, 10:67−11:3).
“A reference may be said to teach away when a person of ordinary
skill, upon reading the reference, would be discouraged from following the
path set out in the reference, or would be led in a direction divergent from
the path that was taken by the applicant.” Gurley, 27 F.3d at 553. Thus, the
“mere disclosure of alternative designs does not teach away.” In re Fulton,
391 F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Furthermore, just because better
alternatives exist in the prior art does not mean that an inferior combination
is inapt for obviousness purposes. Gurley, 27 F.3d at 553.
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Patent Owner’s theory of teaching away is misplaced. Again, Patent
Owner’s arguments and Mr. Jawadi’s testimony incorrectly rest on the
premise that the combination “would have required porting host-based
hardware and host-based software to the disk drive.” PO Resp. 48; Ex. 2008
¶ 186. As discussed above, Petitioner makes clear that the combination
maintains Hamlin’s pre-existing data structures and firmware. Pet. 45−47;
Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 125−129, 133, 232; Reply 21; Ex. 1021 ¶ 94.
For data security, Hamlin stores the authentication information
(authority records) in the pristine area (the secure data partition) of a disk.
Ex. 1004, 1:26−30, 4:65−5:1, 5:50−63, 6:4−8, 7:55−60, 8:12−15. Hamlin’s
authentication circuitry uses the authentication information to authorize or
deny access (read/write permissions) to the secure data or information stored
in the pristine area. Id. at 4:61−5:12, 5:58−6:12, 7:38−43, 7:50−59.
To prevent unauthorized access to data stored on a disk, Fisherman
discloses a way to implement: (1) flexible access permissions by adding an
access field, and (2) features for a supervisor user to have access permissions
to create and delete authority records. Ex. 1005, 1:7−11, 8:46−60,
10:19−24, 14:37−57, 14:66−15:11. As Dr. Levy testifies, “the
ACCESS_FIELD and supervisor features in Fisherman are not specific to a
host-based system, nor are they operating system dependent.” Ex. 1021
¶¶ 92−95; see also Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 224−230. Dr. Levy also testifies that
“[a]dding an ACCESS_FIELD element (binary numbers) to the user/device
authentication information in Hamlin does not transform Hamlin into a
host-based system, and does not require Hamlin to be operating system
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dependent.” Ex. 1021 ¶¶ 92−94. Neither Hamlin nor the ’020 patent
discourages an ordinarily skilled artisan from implementing flexible access
permissions or supervisor features in a device-based system, or to lead such
an artisan in a direction divergent from the path taken by Applicant.
Ex. 1001; Ex. 1004.
In short, Patent Owner’s argument that Hamlin, Fisherman, and the
’020 patent teach away from the combination of Hamlin, Fisherman, and the
knowledge of an ordinarily skilled artisan is unavailing.
Patent Owner’s arguments regarding Dr. Levy’s Testimony
Lastly, Patent Owner argues that “Dr. Levy’s discussion completely
omits any reference to the time of the invention and utterly fails to explain
why a POSITA at that particular point in time would have been motivated to
make such a combination.” PO Resp. 46−47; Sur-reply 17−19. Patent
Owner also argues that Dr. Levy “does not discuss any consumer demand
for such an invention at the time of the invention,” “the state of the industry
or the state of that particular market at the time of the invention,” or “why a
POSITA with knowledge of Hamlin would have been motivated to combine
Fisherman at the time of the invention.” PO Resp. 46.
Patent Owner’s arguments are misplaced. There is no requirement
that an expert has to repeat the phrase “at the time of the invention” in each
sentence. Dr. Levy’s Declarations, as a whole, show that his opinions and
analysis are from the perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the art at the
time of the invention.
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Significantly, Dr. Levy states repeatedly that his analysis was done
from the perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the
invention. See, e.g., Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 21, 22, 24, 28, 51, 116, 112. Indeed,
Dr. Levy expressly testifies that his “opinions and analysis set forth in [his]
Opening Declaration are from the perspective of a POSITA at the time of the
alleged invention, which [he] understood to be no earlier than July 25, 2001,
including [his] analysis of the patent claims, prior art references, motivations
to combine the prior art references, and reasonable expectation of success in
combining the references.” Ex. 1021 ¶ 5 (emphasis). Dr. Levy also testifies
in his Opening Declaration that “[his] opinions are given from the
perspective of a POSITA at the time of the July 25, 2001, filing of the
application that became the ’020 Patent,” and that “[his] analysis and
conclusions herein are from the perspective of a POSITA as of July 25,
2001.” Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 22, 24 (emphases added).
Dr. Levy further testifies that “[i]n providing [his] opinions in this
declaration, [he] was asked to consider the patent claims and the prior art
standing in the shoes of a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) at
the time of the alleged invention” and that “[he] understand[s] that common
factors considered in determining the ordinary level of skill in a field of art
include the level of education and experience of persons working in the
field, the types of problems encountered in the field, and the sophistication
of the technology at the time of the invention.” Id. ¶ 21 (emphases added).
More importantly, Dr. Levy also cites to supporting evidence that is
contemporaneous with, or predates, the ’020 patent. Notably, Dr. Levy
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testifies that “[i]n forming [his] opinions and reaching the conclusion given
in this declaration, [he] relied on the documents and materials cited in this
declaration as well as those identified in Appendix A” of his Declaration.
Id. ¶ 19. Apart from Exhibit 1001 that contains a copy of the ’020 patent,
the documents and materials cited in Dr. Levy’s Declarations and those
identified in Appendix A predate the filing of the ’020 patent. See generally
Ex. 1003; Ex. 1021; Ex. 1003 at 168−169 (Appendix A).
Moreover, as discussed in our analysis above, we credit Dr. Levy’s
testimony because it is supported by the Specification, prior art, and other
evidence of record (e.g., Exs. 1001, 1004−1013, 1016, 1017, 1038, 1039).
It is within the Board’s discretion to assign appropriate weight to evidence.
See e.g., In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1368 (Fed. Cir.
2004); Velander v. Garner, 348 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“It is
within the discretion of the trier of fact to give each item of evidence such
weight as it feels appropriate.”).
Upon consideration of the evidence of record, we are not convinced
by Patent Owner’s argument that Dr. Levy’s discussion fails to offer a
perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention
and fails to explain why such an artisan at that particular point in time would
have been motivated to make such a combination.
f. Conclusion on claims 1, 12, and 13
In sum, Petitioner has demonstrated adequately that the
combination of Hamlin, Fisherman, and the knowledge of an
ordinarily skill artisan teaches all of the limitations recited in claims 1,
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12, and 13, and has articulated sufficient reasons to combine the prior
art teachings. We determine that Petitioner has established by a
preponderance of the evidence that claims 1, 12, and 13 are
unpatentable under § 103(a) as obvious over Hamlin, in combination
with Fisherman and the knowledge of an ordinarily skill artisan.
2. Claims 2, 3, 5, and 14
Claims 2, 3, and 5 depend from claim 1, and claim 14 depends from
claim 12. Petitioner has accounted for the limitations recited in each of
these dependent claims. Pet. 33−36, 42−47. For these claims, Patent Owner
relies upon the same arguments presented for claim 1, and does not make
any additional arguments. PO Resp. 23−61. We already addressed those
arguments in our analysis above, and we find those arguments unavailing
here for the reasons stated above.
Upon consideration of the evidence in this entire record, we determine
that Petitioner has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that
claims 2, 3, 5, and 14 are unpatentable under § 103(a) as obvious over
Hamlin, in combination with Fisherman and the knowledge of an ordinarily
skill artisan.
For example, as to claim 2, which recites “wherein the storage device
is in communication with a computer system having an operating system,”
Petitioner asserts that Hamlin discloses that its invention is to “improve
security . . . with respect to probing attacks and virus attacks on computer
operating systems.” Pet. 33−34 (citing Ex. 1004, 2:43−45, 7:39−42,
Figs. 1−3). Petitioner points out that Hamlin’s disk drive is in
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communication with and “receives requests from . . . a host or client
computer,” which would run such an operating system. Id. (citing Ex. 1004,
4:61−63, 7:39−42, Figs. 1−3). Petitioner further contends that Hamlin
claims a “disk drive comprising: . . . a control system for interfacing with a
host computer.” Id. (citing Ex. 1004, 8:56−64, 9:1−3, 9:55−61, 10:55−63,
11:1−4, 12:1−6). Based on the evidence before us, we determine that
Petitioner has shown sufficiently that claim 2 is obvious over Hamlin in
view of Fisherman and the knowledge of an ordinarily skill artisan.
For claim 3, which recites “wherein secure data stored in the secure
data partition is invisible to the operating system,” Petitioner asserts that
Hamlin’s “pristine area 8 comprises at least one physical block” that is “not
externally accessible through a logical block address during normal
operation of the disk drive 2,” and such blocks are “not mapped from logical
block addresses.” Pet. 34−35 (citing Ex. 1004, 7:67−8:4, 8:19−25).
Dr. Levy testifies that this disclosure indicates that at least one block of the
pristine area is invisible to the operating system. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 143−144.
Alternatively, Petitioner asserts that Fisherman discloses that each of
its logical drives is broken into several zones, including a HiddenZone
where “the disk space occupied by this zone is excluded from the disk space
accessible to the operating system.” Pet. 34−35 (citing Ex. 1005, 5:7−11,
5:38−45). Dr. Levy testifies that making the HiddenZone inaccessible to the
operating system renders it invisible. Ex. 1003 ¶ 145.
Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have
been motivated to implement Fisherman’s invisible partition teaching in
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Hamlin’s pristine area of the disk because “Fisherman’s teaching of a
partition that is invisible to the operating system would further improve the
security of Hamlin’s invention” as “it is much harder for a compromised
operating system to access it.” Pet. 47; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 233−237. Dr. Levy
testifies that such an artisan “would have had a reasonable expectation of
success in making this combination” because “implementation of this feature
in Hamlin requires no large changes to Hamlin, and indeed only requires
updates to Hamlin’s firmware that would have been well understood by a
POSITA.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 237. Dr. Levy also testifies that “the implementation
would have provided the predictable result of rendering the pristine area of
Hamlin invisible to the operating system.” Id.
Based on the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has
shown sufficiently that claim 3 is obvious over Hamlin in view of Fisherman
and the knowledge of an ordinarily skill artisan.
As to claim 5, which recites “wherein the storage device further
comprises: cryptographic operations embedded in the firmware of the
storage device,” Petitioner asserts that Hamlin discloses that information
“may be encrypted by the disk drive 2 before it is written to the pristine area
8” and authentication circuitry 14 performs cryptographic operations, such
as generating a message authentication code using a hashing function.
Pet. 35−36 (citing Ex. 1004, 7:10−27, 7:42−44; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 152−154).
Petitioner contends that Hamlin discloses using firmware on a processor to
implement the control system and authentication circuitry of the disk drive
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(as discussed above in its analysis for claim 1), and therefore firmware
includes these cryptographic operations. Id.; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 152−154.
Based on the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has
shown sufficiently that claim 5 is obvious over Hamlin in view of Fisherman
and the knowledge of an ordinarily skill artisan.
Claim 14 requires each authority records to include a plurality of
fields and “a first field of the plurality of fields contains access rights
governing access to the at least one data set.” As discussed above, Petitioner
has shown sufficiently that Hamlin in view of Fisherman teaches a plurality
of fields in each authority record, including Fisherman’s access field that has
two subfields to represent read and write rights. Ex. 1005, 8:46−60.
Dr. Levy testifies that it is clear from Fisherman’s disclosure that the access
field is a first field of the plurality of fields and it contains access rights.
Ex. 1003 ¶ 217 (citing Ex. 1005, 8:20−26, 8:46−60, 9:7−17).
Based on the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has
shown sufficiently that claim 14 is obvious over Hamlin in view of
Fisherman and the knowledge of an ordinarily skill artisan.
For the foregoing reasons, we determine that Petitioner has
established by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 2, 3, 5, and
14 are unpatentable under § 103(a) as obvious over Hamlin, in
combination with Fisherman and the knowledge of an ordinarily skill
artisan.
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3. Conclusion on Ground 1
In short, we determine that Petitioner has established by a
preponderance of the evidence that claims 1−3, 5, and 12−14 are
unpatentable under § 103(a) as obvious over Hamlin, in combination
with Fisherman and the knowledge of an ordinarily skill artisan.
F. Ground 2: Hamlin, Fisherman, Silvester, and the knowledge of an
ordinarily skilled artisan
Petitioner asserts that claims 3 and 11 are unpatentable under § 103(a)
as obvious over Hamlin, in combination with Fisherman, Silvester, and the
knowledge of an ordinarily skilled artisan, citing Dr. Levy’s Declaration for
support. Pet. 48–54; Ex. 1003.
Patent Owner relies upon its arguments in connection with claim 1.
PO Resp. 45−46. We already addressed those arguments in our analysis
above, and find those arguments unavailing here for the same reasons stated
above. In addition, as discussed above, we also determine that Petitioner has
shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 3 is unpatentable under
§ 103(a) as obvious over Hamlin in view of Fisherman and the knowledge of
an ordinarily skill artisan.
As to dependent claim 11, which depends on claim 1 and further
recites “wherein the secure data is accessed by the firmware using a security
partition open call internal to the storage device and hidden from a user,”
Petitioner asserts that Silvester discloses that “operations . . . relating to
opening, accessing and closing of the [secure-private partition] 420 are
carried out in part by the IDE controller 410 which works in harmony with
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the disk controller 418 on the hard drive 416.” Pet. 49 (citing Ex. 1006,
3:3−7, 4:44−46, Fig. 4). Petitioner explains that “[t]he open operation
would be carried out internal to the storage device because the disk
controller (in harmony with the IDE controller) is internal to the hard disk
drive.” Id. at 50 (citing Ex. 1006, 2:61−64, 3:3−7, Fig. 4).
Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art
“integrating the open call from Silvester into Hamlin would have necessarily
implemented it internal to Hamlin’s drive.” Pet. 51, 53−54. Petitioner
articulates that such an artisan “would have been further motivated to
combine Silvester with Hamlin and Fisherman because integrating
Silvester’s disclosures of opening (unlocking) and closing (locking) a
partition into Hamlin would have increased the efficiency and security of
Hamlin.” Id.; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 251−555.
Based on the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has
shown sufficiently that Hamlin, in combination with Fisherman, Silvester,
and the knowledge of an ordinarily skilled artisan, teaches the limitation
recited in claim 11, and Petitioner has articulated an adequate reason to
combine the prior art teachings.
For the reasons stated above, we determine that Petitioner has
demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 3 and 11
are unpatentable under § 103(a) as obvious over Hamlin, in
combination with Fisherman, Silvester, and the knowledge of an
ordinarily skill artisan.
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G. Ground 3: Hamlin, Fisherman, Carter, and the knowledge of an
ordinarily skilled artisan
Petitioner asserts that claim 4 is unpatentable under § 103(a) as
obvious over Hamlin, in combination with Fisherman, Carter, and the
knowledge of an ordinarily skilled artisan, citing Dr. Levy’s Declaration for
support. Pet. 55–60; Ex. 1003.
Patent Owner relies upon its arguments in connection with claim 1.
PO Resp. 23. We already addressed those arguments in our analysis above,
and find those arguments unavailing here for the same reasons stated above.
Claim 4 recites “wherein each of the one or more authority records
contains one public-private key pair for authenticating data that originates
from the security partition.” Ex. 1001, 13:9−12. For this limitation,
Petitioner asserts that each of Carter’s user records in a soft-token store
contains a certificate with a public key, a private key(s), and a digital
signature created with the private key. Pet. 55 (citing Ex. 1007, 9:9−13,
9:59−62, Figs. 5−6 (reproduced above) (showing that the user record
contains old certificate set 602, certificate with public key 604, digital
signature 606, and private key set 608)).
Dr. Levy testifies that Carter discloses that the public-private key pair
in the user record is used to authenticate data within the soft-token store
because Carter provides a way to securely perform a transaction (updating
confidential user data in the soft-token store) by authenticating the
transaction with the public key in the certificate and the corresponding
private key in the digital signature. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 150, 259−264 (citing
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Ex. 1007, 2:6−9, 19−23, 5:60−65, 6:16−35, 7:12−17, 9:9−67, 10:15−26,
13:9−13, 13:22−24). Dr. Levy further testifies that an ordinarily skilled
artisan would have been motivated to combine Carter with Hamlin and
Fisherman because Carter’s teaching regarding key pairs would have
provided a further layer of security to authenticate data in the pristine area in
Hamlin. Id. ¶¶ 259−264.
Based on the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has
shown sufficiently that Hamlin, in combination with Fisherman, Carter, and
the knowledge of an ordinarily skilled artisan, teaches the limitation recited
in claim 4, and articulated reasons to combine the prior art teachings.
For the reasons stated above, we determine that Petitioner has
demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 4 is
unpatentable under § 103(a) as obvious over Hamlin, in combination with
Fisherman, Carter, and the knowledge of an ordinarily skill artisan.
H. Ground 4: Hamlin, Fisherman, Mirov, and the knowledge of an
ordinarily skilled artisan
Petitioner asserts that claims 6−10 are obvious over Hamlin, in
combination with Fisherman, Mirov, and the knowledge of an ordinarily
skilled artisan, citing Dr. Levy’s Declaration for support. Pet. 60–75;
Ex. 1003. Claim 6 depends from claim 5, which depends from claim 1.
Claims 8−10 depend from claim 7.
For this ground, Patent Owner relies upon its arguments in connection
with claim 1. PO Resp. 23. We already addressed those arguments in our
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analysis above, and find those arguments unavailing here for the same
reasons stated above.
In addition, Petitioner has accounted for the limitations recited in
claims 6−10. Pet. 60−75. In its analysis regarding claims 6 and 7, Petitioner
explains Hamlin’s secure data is encrypted. Id. at 65 (citing Ex. 1004,
4:13−19). Petitioner also notes that Mirov’s authentication of firmware is
based on cryptography, and Mirov’s authentication section 45 includes
secured micro-code 51 (firmware), comparator 52, hash generator 53,
decryptor 54, and public key 56. Id. at 60−61 (citing Ex. 1008, 2:4−20,
3:56−4:7). Petitioner further points out that secured micro-code 51 of
authentication section 45 in Mirov performs cryptographic operations as part
of authenticating programmable section 55. Id. (citing Ex. 1008, 4:8−25).
Significantly, Petitioner explains that, once unsecured micro-code 58 in
programmable section 55 is verified and raised to a level of trusted, other
boot data can be similarly authenticated using trusted micro-code 58. Id. at
61 (citing Ex. 1008, 5:24−30). Petitioner further explains that Mirov’s
cryptographic code in micro-code 58 (firmware) is authenticated by the root
assurance (secure micro-code 51) which forms a part of Mirov’s firmware.
Pet. 61; Ex. 1003 ¶ 158.
Dr. Levy testifies that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have
been motivated to combine Mirov with Hamlin, Fisherman, and the
knowledge of an ordinarily skilled artisan, because Mirov’s mechanism to
authenticate cryptographic code with a root authority would keep the critical
firmware in Hamlin safe from corruption or malicious users and thus would
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have improved the security of Hamlin. Ex. 1003 ¶ 268. Therefore,
Hamlin’s control system and authentication circuitry in the disk drive, as
modified in view of Fisherman, Mirov, and the knowledge of an ordinarily
skilled artisan, would include the features for authenticating cryptographic
code with a root assurance.
Based on the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has
shown sufficiently that Hamlin, in combination with Fisherman, Mirov, and
the knowledge of an ordinarily skilled artisan, teaches the limitations recited
in claims 6 and 7, and Petitioner has articulated an adequate reason to
combine the prior art teachings.
As to claim 8, which recites “prohibiting access to the secure data
partition by the operating system of the computer system,” Petitioner asserts
that, as explained in its analysis for claim 3, Hamlin discloses that at least
one physical block of data in pristine area 8 is not externally accessible, and
therefore, access by a computer operating system (external) to this data in
pristine area 8 is prohibited. Pet. 66. Alternatively, Petitioner also asserts
that Fisherman’s invisible partition implemented in Hamlin’s pristine area,
as discussed in its analysis for claim 3, is inaccessible to the operating
system. Id. at 66−67. Based on the evidence of record, we determine that
Petitioner has shown sufficiently that claim 8 is obvious over Hamlin, in
combination with Fisherman, Mirov, and the knowledge of an ordinarily
skilled artisan.
With respect to claim 9, which recites “a portion of the firmware is
non-writable,” Petitioner asserts that, as evidence by Mirov, it was
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well-known at the time of the invention that firmware can be non-writable.
Pet. 67 (citing Ex. 1008, 3:55−4:7, Fig. 2). Petitioner argues that a person of
ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine Mirov’s
read-only firmware with Hamlin’s pristine area to improve Hamlin’s
security by ensuring Hamlin’s firmware safety. Id. at 74. Dr. Levy testifies
that a disk drive may be “less susceptible to virus attacks” when the
“firmware implemented by the disk controller” is “essentially static.”
Ex. 1003 ¶ 273 (citing Ex. 1010, 5:18−21). Based on the evidence of record,
we determine that Petitioner has shown sufficiently that claim 9 is obvious
over Hamlin, in combination with Fisherman, Mirov, and the knowledge of
an ordinarily skilled artisan.
As to claim 10, which recites “writing data to the secure data partition
by executing of a portion of the firmware of the storage device,” Petitioner
asserts that, as discussed in its analysis for claim 1, Hamlin’s control system
is implemented in firmware on a processor and the firmware writes data to
the secure data partition. Pet. 68. Petitioner points out that Hamlin discloses
that “during a write operation . . . preamplifier 20 receives digital write data
24 from the control system 12 which is to be written to the disk 4” and that
“control system 12 ‘will access the pristine area’” for “a write or read
operation.” Id. (citing Ex. 1004, 4:28−38, 4:58−60; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 186−188).
Based on the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has
shown sufficiently that claim 10 is obvious over Hamlin, in combination
with Fisherman, Mirov, and the knowledge of an ordinarily skilled artisan.
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For the foregoing reasons, we determine that Petitioner has
demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 6−10 are
unpatentable under § 103(a) as obvious over Hamlin, in combination
with Fisherman, Mirov and the knowledge of an ordinarily skill
artisan.
I. Ground 5: Hamlin, Fisherman, Mirov, Silvester, and the knowledge of
an ordinarily skilled artisan
Petitioner asserts that claims 7−10 are obvious over Hamlin, in
combination with Fisherman, Mirov, Silvester, and the knowledge of an
ordinarily skilled artisan, citing Dr. Levy’s Declaration for support. Pet. 75–
77; Ex. 1003.
For this ground, Patent Owner relies upon its arguments in connection
with claim 1. PO Resp. 23. We already addressed those arguments in our
analysis above, and find those arguments unavailing here for the same
reasons stated above. In addition, as discussed above, we also determine
that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims
7−10 are unpatentable under § 103(a) as obvious over Hamlin in view of
Fisherman, Mirov, and the knowledge of an ordinarily skill artisan.
Upon consideration of Petitioner’s contentions and supporting
evidence, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated by a
preponderance of the evidence that claims 7−10 are unpatentable
under § 103(a) as obvious over Hamlin, in combination with
Fisherman, Mirov, Silvester, and the knowledge of an ordinarily skill
artisan.
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III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Petitioner has established
by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1−14 of the ’020 patent are
unpatentable.
IV. ORDER6
For the foregoing reasons, it is
ORDERED that claims 1−14 of the ’020 patent have been shown to
be unpatentable; and
FURTHER ORDERED that, because this is a Final Written Decision,
parties to the proceeding seeking judicial review of the decision must
comply with the notice and service requirements of 37 C.F.R. § 90.2.
In summary:

6 Should Patent Owner wish to pursue amendment of the challenged claims
in a reissue or reexamination proceeding subsequent to the issuance of this
decision, we draw Patent Owner’s attention to the April 2019 Notice
Regarding Options for Amendments by Patent Owner Through Reissue or
Reexamination During a Pending AIA Trial Proceeding. See 84 Fed. Reg.
16,654 (Apr. 22, 2019). If Patent Owner chooses to file a reissue application
or a request for reexamination of the challenged patent, we remind Patent
Owner of its continuing obligation to notify the Board of any such related
matters in updated mandatory notices. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.8(a)(3), (b)(2).
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Claim(s)
35
U.S.C.
§
References
Claims
Shown
Unpatentable
Claims Not
Shown
Unpatentable
1−3, 5,
12−14 103(a)
Hamlin, Fisherman,
and the knowledge
of an ordinarily
skilled artisan
1−3, 5, 12−14
3, 11 103(a)
Hamlin, Fisherman,
Silvester, and the
knowledge of an
ordinarily skilled
artisan
3, 11
4 103(a)
Hamlin, Fisherman,
Carter, and the
knowledge of an
ordinarily skilled
artisan
4
6−10 103(a)
Hamlin, Fisherman,
Mirov, and the
knowledge of an
ordinarily skilled
artisan
6−10
7−10 103(a)
Hamlin, Fisherman,
Mirov, Silvester, and
the knowledge of an
ordinarily skilled
artisan
7−10
Overall
Outcome 1−14

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For PETITIONER:
Jeremy Jason Lang
ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP
ptabdocketjjl2@orrick.com

Robert Perez
robert.perez@pillsburylaw.com

For PATENT OWNER:
Cabrach Connor
CONNOR KUDLAC LEE PLLC
cab@connorkudlaclee.com

Enrique Sanchez, Jr.,
WHITAKER CHALK SWINDLE & SCHWARTZ PLLC
rsanchez@whitakerchalk.com