Scott Alan. Brozek et al.Download PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardJul 22, 201914040269 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jul. 22, 2019) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/040,269 09/27/2013 Scott Alan Brozek 21652-00313 4670 75564 7590 07/22/2019 DANIEL M. FITZGERALD (21652) ARMSTRONG TEASDALE LLP 7700 Forsyth Boulevard Suite 1800 St. Louis, MO 63105 EXAMINER KAZIMI, HANI M ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3691 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 07/22/2019 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): USpatents@armstrongteasdale.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________________ Ex parte SCOTT ALAN BROZEK, TROCI M. TOMSON, PHILIP ROWE, and CRISTIAN CATANESCU ____________________ Appeal 2018-005061 Application 14/040,269 Technology Center 3600 ____________________ Before JUSTIN BUSCH, JENNIFER L. McKEOWN, and JASON J. CHUNG, Administrative Patent Judges. BUSCH, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellants appeal from the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–21, which constitute all the claims pending in this application. We have jurisdiction over the pending claims under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER Appellants’ disclosure generally relates to methods and devices for “denying a payment authorization request due to fraud, and more specifically to denying a payment authorization request at a payment network based on a previous indication by an issuer processor that a Appeal 2018-005061 Application 14/040,269 2 particular payment card associated with the payment authorization request is associated with fraud.” Spec. ¶ 1. Claims 1, 10, and 19 are independent claims, and claim 1 is reproduced below: 1. A computer-implemented method for denying a payment authorization request associated with fraud, said method implemented using a payment network computing device coupled to a database, said method comprising: receiving, by the payment network computing device, a first payment authorization response from an issuer processor that includes a first payment card identifier, wherein the first payment authorization response is a response to a first payment authorization request, wherein the payment network computing device is associated with a payment network; determining, by the payment network computing device, that the first payment authorization response indicates that the first payment card identifier is associated with fraud by electronically detecting a fraud-indicating response code included within the first payment authorization response by the issuer processor; storing, by the payment network computing device, an indication in the database that the first payment card identifier is associated with fraud, in response to electronically detecting the fraud-indicating response code included within the first payment authorization response; receiving, by the payment network computing device, a second payment authorization request, directly or indirectly, from a merchant; identifying, by the payment network computing device, a second payment card identifier included in the second payment authorization request by electronically detecting the second payment card identifier included within the second payment authorization request; electronically matching the second payment card identifier to the first payment card identifier stored within the database; determining, by the payment network computing device, that the second payment authorization request that includes the second payment card identifier is associated with fraud based at Appeal 2018-005061 Application 14/040,269 3 least in part on the stored indication and the matching of the second payment card identifier to the first payment card identifier; and transmitting, by the payment network computing device, a second payment authorization response to the merchant, without transmitting the second payment authorization request to the issuer processor, wherein the second payment authorization response includes a denial of the second payment authorization request. REJECTIONS Claims 1–21 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 2–5. ANALYSIS The Examiner concludes claims 1–21 are directed to judicially excepted subject matter. Final Act. 2–5; Ans. 3–11. Appellants argue the § 101 rejection of all claims as a group. See Appeal Br. 13–14; Reply Br. 4. The Supreme Court’s two-step framework guides our analysis of patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 217 (2014). In addition, the United States Patent & Trademark Office recently published revised guidance for evaluating subject matter eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101, specifically with respect to applying the Alice framework. USPTO, 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Guidance”). If a claim falls within one of the statutory categories of patent eligibility (i.e., a process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter), we determine whether the claim is directed to one of the judicially recognized exceptions (i.e., a law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea). Alice, 573 U.S. at 217. As part of our inquiry, we “look at the ‘focus of the claimed advance over the prior art’ to determine if the Appeal 2018-005061 Application 14/040,269 4 claim’s ‘character as a whole’ is directed to excluded subject matter.” Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2016). The Guidance directs us to address this inquiry using the following two prongs of analysis: (i) does the claim recite a judicial exception (e.g., an abstract idea), and (ii) if so, is the judicial exception integrated into a practical application. 84 Fed. Reg. at 54. Under the Guidance, if the judicial exception is integrated into a practical application, the claim is patent eligible under § 101. 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55. If the claim is directed to a judicial exception (i.e., the claim both recites a judicial exception and fails to integrate the exception into a practical application), we next determine whether the claim provides an inventive concept, which includes determining whether any element, or combination of elements, amounts to significantly more than the judicial exception. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217; 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. Here, we conclude Appellants’ claims recite an abstract idea because they recite mental processes. If a claim, under its broadest reasonable interpretation, covers performance in the mind but for the recitation of generic computer components, then it is still in the mental processes category unless the claim cannot be performed in the mind practically. See Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[W]ith the exception of generic computer-implemented steps, there is nothing in the claims themselves that foreclose them from being performed by a human, mentally or with pen and paper.”). More specifically, Appellants’ claims generally are directed to processing payment authorization data to generate a list of card identifiers associated with fraud and determining payment authorization requests are associated with fraud if Appeal 2018-005061 Application 14/040,269 5 they include card identifiers matching one of the card identifiers associated with fraud. This is consistent with how Appellants describe the claimed invention. See, e.g., Spec. ¶¶ 1 (“denying a payment authorization request at a payment network based on a previous indication by an issuer processor that a particular payment card associated with the payment authorization request is associated with fraud”), 2 (“Accordingly, a system for enabling a payment processing network to decline payment authorization requests on behalf of an issuer without requiring the issuer processor to continuously update a set of negative listings would be beneficial.”), Fig. 8, Abstract. Consistent with our Guidance and case law, we conclude that receiving and processing payment authorization data to generate a list of card identifiers associated with fraud and transmitting denial responses in response to payment authorization requests that include card identifiers matching one of the card identifiers associated with fraud is a mental process and, therefore, an abstract idea. See 84 Fed. Reg. at 52; CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (determining claims verifying the validity of a credit card transaction by obtaining information about other transactions, creating a map of credit card numbers to transactions, and using the map to determine whether the transaction is valid were directed to an abstract idea because all of the claimed steps could “be performed in the human mind, or by a human using a pen and paper”); see also FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1093 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (agreeing with district court’s characterization of claims relating to analyzing data including user identifier data to detect fraud in a computer environment as being “drawn to the concept of analyzing records Appeal 2018-005061 Application 14/040,269 6 of human activity to detect suspicious behavior” (quoting FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., No. 8:14–CV–2685, 2015 WL 3883958, at *2 (M.D. Fla. June 24, 2015)). In addition to consisting predominantly of mental processes, Appellants’ claims may also be characterized as being directed to receiving and processing payment authorization data to generate a list of card identifiers associated with fraud and transmitting denial responses in response to payment authorization requests that include card identifiers matching one of the card identifiers associated with fraud, which is a commercial and legal interaction (i.e., sales activities) and, therefore, falls within the certain method of organizing human activity category in our Guidance. See 84 Fed. Reg. at 52; see also Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (explaining that intermediated settlement was abstract because it was a longstanding fundamental economic practice similar to hedging, which was found ineligible in Bilski); Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 721 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (holding that claims reciting showing an advertisement before delivering content were directed to an abstract idea, stating a “rule holding that claims are impermissibly abstract if they are directed to an entrepreneurial objective, such as methods for increasing revenue, minimizing economic risk, or structuring commercial transactions, rather than a technological one, would comport with the guidance provided in both Alice and Bilski”). Each of the steps recited in claim 1, except for the two receiving steps and the transmitting step, recite mental processes that are part of the abstract idea of processing payment authorization data to generate a list of card identifiers associated with fraud and determining payment authorization Appeal 2018-005061 Application 14/040,269 7 requests are associated with fraud if they include card identifiers matching one of the card identifiers associated with fraud and the “payment network computing device” performing each of the other recited steps. With respect to the characterization of Appellants claims as being directed to receiving and processing payment authorization data to generate a list of card identifiers associated with fraud and transmitting denial responses in response to payment authorization requests that include card identifiers matching one of the card identifiers associated with fraud, each step recited in claim 1 recite elements of the abstract idea. Although the receiving and transmitting steps arguably could be considered mental processes and are part of the commercial interaction, we treat the two receiving steps, the transmitting step, and the “payment network computing device” as additional elements that we analyze to determine whether they integrate the abstract idea into a practical application or provide an inventive concept. See 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–56. Because the claim recites a judicial exception, we next determine whether the claim integrates the judicial exception into a practical application. 84 Fed. Reg. at 54. To determine whether the judicial exception is integrated into a practical application, we identify whether there are “any additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception(s)” and evaluate those elements to determine whether they integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55 (emphasis added); see also Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (“MPEP”) § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th ed. Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018). Here, the additional limitations recited beyond the judicial exception itself fail to integrate the exception into a practical application. More Appeal 2018-005061 Application 14/040,269 8 particularly, the claims do not recite: (i) an improvement to the functionality of a computer or other technology or technical field (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)); (ii) a “particular machine” to apply or use the judicial exception (see MPEP § 2106.05(b)); (iii) a particular transformation of an article to a different thing or state (see MPEP § 2106.05(c)); or (iv) any other meaningful limitation (see MPEP § 2106.05(e)). See also 84 Fed. Reg. at 55. Rather, the additional elements simply add insignificant extra-solution activity (i.e., receiving and transmitting data) and a generic payment network computing device. The payment network computing device is a generic computer component recited at a high level of generality. See, e.g., Spec. ¶¶ 55–60 (describing exemplary computing devices that may be used to perform the claimed invention at a high level of generality, primarily identifying the functions performed, the use of any generic processor (e.g., CPUs, microprocessors, microcontrollers, RISCs, ASICS, logic circuits), and that the invention may be composed of any combination of software, firmware, and hardware). The receiving and transmitting data functions are generic computer functions that amount to mere insignificant extra-solution activity. Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Can., 771 F. Supp. 2d 1054, 1065 (E.D. Mo. 2011) aff’d, 687 F.3d 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (explaining that “storing, retrieving, and providing data . . . are inconsequential data gathering and insignificant post solution activity”). Accordingly, the additional limitations recite insignificant extra-solution activity and the use of generic computer components as tools to implement the abstract idea. 84 See Fed. Reg. at 55; MPEP § 2106.05(f). Appeal 2018-005061 Application 14/040,269 9 Appellants assert the claims are not directed to an abstract idea. Appeal Br. 6–9; Reply Br. 1–5. Specifically, Appellants argue the Examiner oversimplified the claims because the claims provide a specific ordered combination of rules that improves the “efficient electronic processing of a payment transaction,” which Appellants assert is the relevant technology to which the claims are directed. Appeal Br. 6–8 (citing Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36 (Fed. Cir. 2016); McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Spec. ¶ 2); Reply Br. 1–3. Appellants argue the specific recited method claims more than just a result or effect of denying a payment authorization request. Appeal Br. 8. In particular, Appellants assert the recited method claims “streamlining the fraud processing sequence to increase the speed of processing previously rejected cards . . . reducing computing resources required to detect fraudulent activity in payment transactions,” “reducing intersystem communications,” and “reducing the load on an issuer processor computer device by reducing the number of payment authorization request messages that the issuer processor is required to process and by reducing the need to maintain negative list databases over multiple computer systems maintained by multiple entities.” Appeal Br. 7–8; see Reply Br. 4. More specifically, Appellants argue that, similar to the claims in BASCOM Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016) and McRO, the claimed ordered combination of method steps improves the speed of payment transaction processing and reduces computer resources used to process payment transactions while obviating the need for an issuer processor to provide negative listings (i.e., lists of credit cards issued by the Appeal 2018-005061 Application 14/040,269 10 issuer associated with fraud) to multiple payment networks. Appeal Br. 10– 11; Reply Br. 4–5; see also Appeal Br. 11–13 (arguing the claims are similar to exemplary claims provided in the December 2016 Guidance issued by the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office that were identified as eligible subject matter because they recited a particular unconventional set of steps amounting to significantly more than the abstract idea); Reply Br. 3 (same). Appellants, however, neither claim nor describe any technological improvement that streamlines the process, reduces communication, or reduces how much processing is required. Rather, Appellants’ merely claim a change to the business process flow by moving the creation of a “negative listing” from an issuer processor to the payment network computing device. This is evident from Appellants’ own characterizations of the claimed improvements. See Appeal Br. 7 (arguing the claims improve the “electronic processing of a payment transaction”); Spec. ¶¶ 2 (explaining that prior art systems required an issuer to transmit negative listings to a payment processing system such that it would be beneficial to have a system “without requiring the issue processor to continuously update a set of negative listings”), 61 (describing the improvement over known systems as “reliev[ing] issuer processors of manually updating a listing of payment cards associated with fraud and providing the listing to a payment network on a continuous basis”). On this record, the evidence does not support Appellants’ assertion that the claims reduce the computing resources required, the intersystem communications, and the load on the issue processor by eliminating the issuer’s need to maintain a negative listing and reducing the number of payment authorization requests the issuer needs to process. Although the Appeal 2018-005061 Application 14/040,269 11 issuer processor’s load may be reduced,1 the evidence suggests the claims merely shift that load to the payment network computing device. Offloading processing by having the payment network computing device create the list is not similar to BASCOM’s claims, which provided more versatile filters than the prior art solutions. The evidence indicates the prior art payment network computing devices stored negative listings and declined certain transactions based on those listings without contacting the issuer, at least “[w]hen the issuer processor is offline or otherwise unresponsive to a payment authorization request.” Spec. ¶ 2. Therefore, at least in some instances, the prior art payment network computing devices transmitted payment denial responses without contacting the issuer processor. In Appellants’ claims, instead of (or in addition to) receiving the negative listings from the issuer, the payment network computing device creates its own negative listing. The claims in McRO—unlike the claims here—recited a “specific . . . improvement in computer animation” using “unconventional rules” that related “sub-sequences of phonemes, timings, and morph weight sets” to automatically animate lip synchronization and facial expressions for three- dimensional characters that only human animators could previously produce. McRO, 837 F.3d at 1302–03, 1307–08, 1313–15. In McRO, “the incorporation of the claimed rules” improved an existing technological process. McRO, 837 F.3d at 1314. 1 The claims do not preclude the issuer from maintaining negative listings and it is possible that the issuer may still maintain such listings for circumstances in which other payment networks may not be configured to create their own negative listings. Thus, the load on the processor may not be reduced necessarily. Appeal 2018-005061 Application 14/040,269 12 Notably, the claimed solution in McRO automated an existing animation method, but instead of simply using a computer to perform the preexisting steps to determine an appropriate appearance of a face at a particular point in time manually (and subjectively), the claims apply a set of rules to a timed transcript that go beyond the preexisting manual process of matching single phonemes from the transcript with a morph target. McRO, 837 F.3d at 1303–07; see McRO, 837 F.3d at 1314 (“The computer here is employed to perform a distinct process to automate a task previously performed by humans.”). The claims in McRO allegedly produced more realistic and accurate animations. McRO, 837 F.3d at 1306–07. The court determined the claims were “directed to a patentable, technological improvement over the existing, manual 3–D animation techniques” because they use “the limited rules in a process specifically designed to achieve an improved technological result.” McRO, 837 F.3d at 1316. In contrast, and as discussed above, Appellants’ claims recite a series of mental steps performed by a payment network computer device on two sets of received data and, after making a determination regarding the second set of data, transmitting information indicating the results of the determination. Unlike the claims in McRO, Appellants’ claimed series of steps do not recite an improvement to the functioning of a computer or other technology sufficient to provide an inventive concept because, in contrast to McRO’s claims, Appellants’ claims simply implement mental processes on generic computer components. Appellants’ have not demonstrated persuasively the claims recite an improvement to the accuracy of the negative lists or any other technology or technical field. Appeal 2018-005061 Application 14/040,269 13 Even accepting Appellants’ characterization of the claims as “streamlining the fraud processing sequence” and improving the “efficient electronic processing of a payment transaction,” Appeal Br. 6–8; Reply Br. 4, we disagree that improving the efficiency of performing a business process on a network is a technology or that streamlining the business process constitutes an improvement to the functionality of a computer, other technology, or a technical field. First, to the extent Appellants assert the fact that the business process is performed electronically provides a technological improvement, we disagree. As explained in OIP Technologies, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015), “relying on a computer to perform routine tasks more quickly or more accurately is insufficient to render a claim patent eligible.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at 224 (“use of a computer to create electronic records, track multiple transactions, and issue simultaneous instructions” is not an inventive concept). We also disagree that Appellants’ claims are similar to those determined eligible in BASCOM. In BASCOM, the court found “the patent describes how its particular arrangement of elements is a technical improvement,” and, when construed in favor of BASCOM,2 the claims may be read to improve an existing technological process. BASCOM, 827 F.3d at 1350. As discussed above, the claims do not improve an existing technological process, but rather use existing technology to automate mental steps that make up a business process to carry out a commercial interaction. Additionally, unlike the arrangement of elements (i.e., installation of a 2 In BASCOM, BASCOM appealed the district court's granting of a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). BASCOM, 827 F.3d at 1341. Appeal 2018-005061 Application 14/040,269 14 filtering tool at a specific location) in BASCOM, see 827 F.3d at 1349– 50, Appellants’ claims do not recite a non-conventional and non-routine arrangement of known elements. Accordingly, Appellants’ claims do not improve an existing technological process. See Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1335–36 (distinguishing between claims wherein the focus of the claims is on an improvement in computer capabilities and those that invoke a computer as a tool). The claims simply automate a set of mental steps using a generic “payment network computer device.” In other words, Appellants merely claim using known technology to perform its known functions of receiving, processing, and transmitting data. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 222 (using a computer to perform known processes is not enough to supply an inventive concept). For at least the foregoing reasons, the claims do not integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. Because we determine the claims are directed to an abstract idea, we analyze the claims under step two of Alice to determine whether there are additional limitations that individually, or as an ordered combination, ensure the claims amount to “significantly more” than the abstract idea. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72–73, 77–79 (2012)). As stated in the Guidance, many of the considerations to determine whether the claims amount to “significantly more” under step two of the Alice framework are already considered as part of determining whether the judicial exception has been integrated into a practical application. 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. Thus, at this point of our analysis, we determine if the claims add a specific limitation, or combination of limitations, that is not well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the Appeal 2018-005061 Application 14/040,269 15 field, or simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities at a high level of generality. 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. An inventive concept “cannot be furnished by the unpatentable law of nature (or natural phenomenon or abstract idea) itself.” Genetic Techs. Ltd. v. Merial L.L.C., 818 F.3d 1369, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see also 84 Fed. Reg. at 56; Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (explaining that, after determining a claim is directed to a judicial exception, “we then ask, ‘[w]hat else is there in the claims before us?’” (emphasis added, brackets in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 78)). Instead, an “inventive concept” is furnished by an element or combination of elements that is recited in the claim in addition to the judicial exception and sufficient to ensure the claim as a whole amounts to significantly more than the judicial exception itself. Alice, 573 U.S. at 218–19 (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–73); see BSG Tech LLC v. BuySeasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (explaining that the Supreme Court in Alice “only assessed whether the claim limitations other than the invention’s use of the ineligible concept to which it was directed were well-understood, routine and conventional,” (emphasis added)). Appellants argue the fact that the claimed method can run on a general-purpose computer or lacks specific physical components “does not ‘doom[] the claims.’” Appeal Br. 8 (quoting Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1339 (brackets in original)); see Reply Br 2. Appellants further assert the claims recite significantly more than the abstract idea because the claims recite an unconventional ordered combination, noting that there is no prior art rejection of the claims. Appeal Br. 9–10 (citing BASCOM, 827 F.3d at 1350); Reply Br. 4. Appeal 2018-005061 Application 14/040,269 16 Appellants are correct that reciting conventional computer components does not render the claims ineligible, but neither does reciting such components provide an inventive concept sufficient to transform an otherwise abstract idea into patent-eligible subject matter. See also Mortgage Grader, Inc. v. First Choice Loan Servs. Inc., 811 F.3d 1314, 1324–25 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (generic computer components such as an “interface,” “network,” and “database” fail to satisfy the inventive concept requirement). Appellants’ claims, however, fail to recite specific limitations (or a combination of limitations) that are not well-understood, routine, and conventional. Rather, the only additional elements (i.e., the payment network computing device, the receiving steps, and the transmitting step) are generic computer components recited at a high level of generality performing basic computer functions, none of which recite limitations beyond what was well-understood, routine, and conventional in the art. See Berkheimer Memo3 § III.A.1; Spec. ¶¶ 57–60. Finally, Appellants contend the claims are not directed to an abstract idea because they do not pre-empt all ways of detecting fraudulent payments. Appeal Br. 13. We disagree that the lack of complete pre- emption demonstrates patent eligibility in this case. The claims limit the 3 “Changes in Examination Procedure Pertaining to Subject Matter Eligibility, Recent Subject Matter Eligibility Decision (Berkheimer v. HP, Inc.)” at 3 (Apr. 19, 2018), available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/memo-berkheimer- 20180419.PDF (explaining that a specification that describes additional elements “in a manner that indicates that the additional elements are sufficiently well-known that the specification does not need to describe the particulars of such additional elements to satisfy 35 U.S.C. § 112(a)” can show that the elements are well understood, routine, and conventional). Appeal 2018-005061 Application 14/040,269 17 performance of the recited mental processes only by requiring that the steps are performed by a generic computing device and by the ability to receive and transmit the data analyzed by the claimed mental steps. Such limitations, for the reasons discussed above, are insufficient to add significantly more to the claims to render the abstract idea patent eligible. Moreover, although “preemption may signal patent ineligible subject matter, the absence of complete preemption does not demonstrate patent eligibility. . . . Where a patent’s claims are deemed only to disclose patent ineligible subject matter under the Mayo framework, as they are in this case, preemption concerns are fully addressed and made moot.” Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015); see also OIP Techs. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1362–63 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“And [the fact] that the claims do not preempt all price optimization or may be limited to price optimization in the e-commerce setting do[es] not make them any less abstract.”). For the above reasons, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred, and we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–21 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. DECISION We affirm the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–21 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to ineligible subject matter without significantly more. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation