SAP SE

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Feb 10, 2022

2020006107 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 10, 2022)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 16/295,865 03/07/2019 Mohsen Asadi 000005-058701US 8703 58735 7590 02/10/2022 Fountainhead Law Group P.C. Chad R. Walsh 900 LAFAYETTE STREET SUITE 301 SANTA CLARA, CA 95050 EXAMINER SHIN, ANDREW ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2612 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 02/10/2022 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): docketing@fountainheadlaw.com klhussain@fountainheadlaw.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte MOHSEN ASADI, LYNDON HIEW, CHRISTOPHER BOLOGNESE, CHRISTOPHER TAM, and SAE-WON OM _____________ Appeal 2020-006107 Application 16/295,865 Technology Center 2600 ____________ Before ST. JOHN COURTENAY III, CATHERINE SHIANG, and NORMAN H. BEAMER, Administrative Patent Judges. COURTENAY, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final rejection of claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 7-9, 11, 12, 14-16, 18, 19, and 21-26, which constitute all the claims pending in this application. Claims 3, 6, 10, 13, 17, and 20 are canceled. We have jurisdiction over the pending claims under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. 1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a). According to Appellant, the real party in interest is “SAP SE.” See Appeal Br. 2. Appeal 2020-006107 Application 16/295,865 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 Introduction Embodiments of Appellant’s claimed subject matter relate generally to using spatial filters and associated queries to obtain sets of geo-enriched data associated with spatial visualizations. See Abstract. Representative Claim 1 1. A non-transitory machine-readable medium storing a program executable by at least one processing unit of a first computing system, the program comprising sets of instructions for: sending a second computing system a spatial filter and a first query for a set of geo-enriched data associated with a spatial visualization, wherein each geo-enriched data in the set of geo-enriched data comprises location data, spatial data to which the location data is converted by the second computing system, and non-location data associated with the location data, wherein the location data of each geo-enriched data in the set of geo- enriched data describes a location, area, or region, wherein the spatial data of each geo-enriched data in the set of geo-enriched data defines a geometry of the location, area, or region described by the location data of the geo-enriched data, [L1] wherein the spatial filter specifies a geometry representing a geographical region; 2 We herein refer to the Final Office Action, mailed October 21, 2019 (“Final Act.”); the Appeal Brief, filed March 19, 2020 (“Appeal Br.”); the Examiner’s Answer, mailed June 26, 2020 (“Ans.”); and the Reply Brief (“Reply Br.”), filed August 25, 2020. We note both the Appeal Brief and the Reply Brief were filed without page numbers. We refer herein to our own annotated page numbers of Appellant’s Briefs. We request that Appellant provide numbered pages in all future correspondence with the USPTO. Appeal 2020-006107 Application 16/295,865 3 sending the second computing system the spatial filter and a second query for the set of geo-enriched data associated with a non-spatial visualization; [L2] receiving, from the second computing system, a first subset of the set of geo-enriched data, wherein the geometry defined by the spatial data associated with each geo-enriched data in the first subset of the set of geo-enriched data is within the geometry representing the geographical region of the spatial filter; receiving, from the second computing system, a second subset of the set of geo-enriched data, wherein the geometry defined by the spatial data associated with each geo-enriched data in the second subset of the set of geo-enriched data is within the geometry representing the geographical region of the spatial filter; generating the spatial visualization to include the spatial data and the location data associated with the first subset of the set of geo-enriched data; and generating the non-spatial visualization to include the non- location data associated with the second subset of the set of geo-enriched data. Appeal Br. 17. Claims App. (Bracketing and emphasis added regarding disputed limitations L1 and L2). Appeal 2020-006107 Application 16/295,865 4 Prior Art Evidence Relied Upon by the Examiner 3 Name Reference Date Karakey US 2011/0213634 A1 Sept. 1, 2011 Florance US 2013/0332877 A1 Dec. 12, 2013 Rejections Rejection Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis A 1, 2, 4, 7-9, 11, 14-16, 18, 21, 23, 25, 26 102(a)(1) Florance B 5, 12, 19, 22, 24 103 Florance, Karakey ISSUES AND ANALYSIS We have considered all of Appellant’s arguments and any evidence presented. We review appealed rejections for reversible error based upon the arguments and evidence Appellant provides for each issue identified by Appellant. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv); Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential) (cited with approval in In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (explaining that even if the Examiner had failed to make a prima facie case, “it has long been the Board’s practice to require an applicant to identify the alleged error in the examiner’s rejections.”)). “[A]ll that is required of the office to meet its prima facie 3 All reference citations are to the first-named inventor only. Appeal 2020-006107 Application 16/295,865 5 burden of production is to set forth the statutory basis of the rejection and the reference or references relied upon in a sufficiently articulate and informative manner as to meet the notice requirement of [35 U.S.C.] § 132.” Jung, 637 F.3d at 1363. To the extent Appellant has not advanced separate, substantive arguments for particular claims, or other issues, such arguments are forfeited or waived.4 See, e.g., 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (2019). Throughout this opinion, we give the claim limitations the broadest reasonable interpretation (“BRI”) consistent with the Specification. See In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997). We highlight and address specific findings and arguments for emphasis in our analysis below. 4 See In re Google Tech. Holdings LLC, 980 F.3d 858, 862 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (some internal citation omitted): It is well established that “[w]aiver is different from forfeiture.” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993).[] “Whereas forfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of a right, waiver is the ‘intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.’” Id. (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)) (additional citations omitted). The two scenarios can have different consequences for challenges raised on appeal, id. at 733-34, and for that reason, it is worth attending to which label is the right one in a particular case. (Internal citations omitted). Appeal 2020-006107 Application 16/295,865 6 Rejection A of Independent Claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 102 over Florance Based on Appellant’s arguments and our discretion under 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv), we decide the appeal of anticipation Rejection A of claims 1, 2, 4, 7-9, 11, 14-16, 18, 21, 23, 25, and 26, on the basis of representative claim 1.5 A determination that a claim is anticipated under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) involves two analytical steps. First, we must interpret the claim language, where necessary. Because the PTO is entitled to give claims their broadest reasonable interpretation, a court’s review of the Board’s claim construction is limited to determining whether it was reasonable. Morris, 127 F.3d at 1055. Secondly, the Board must compare the properly construed claim to a prior art reference and make factual findings that “each and every limitation is found either expressly or inherently in [that] single prior art reference.” In re Crish, 393 F.3d 1253, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Anticipation of a patent claim requires a finding that the claim at issue “reads on” a prior art reference. See Atlas Powder Co. v. IRECO, Inc., 190 F.3d 1342, 1346 (Fed Cir. 1999). Based upon Appellant’s arguments, we focus our analysis on the argued claim 1 limitations L1 and L2. Appellant’s arguments in the Briefs present the following issues. 5 “Notwithstanding any other provision of this paragraph, the failure of appellant to separately argue claims which appellant has grouped together shall constitute a waiver of any argument that the Board must consider the patentability of any grouped claim separately.” 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). In addition, when Appellant does not separately argue the patentability of dependent claims, the claims stand or fall with the claims from which they depend. In re King, 801 F.2d 1324, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Appeal 2020-006107 Application 16/295,865 7 Issues: Did the Examiner err by finding under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) that Florance expressly or inherently discloses the disputed limitations L1 and L2: [L1] wherein the spatial filter specifies a geometry representing a geographical region; [L2] receiving, from the second computing system, a first subset of the set of geo-enriched data, wherein the geometry defined by the spatial data associated with each geo-enriched data in the first subset of the set of geo-enriched data is within the geometry representing the geographical region of the spatial filter; Claim 1 (emphasis added). Appellant asserts that claim 1 limitations L1 and L2 are not disclosed by the cited Florance reference. See Appeal Br. 11-16; Reply Br. 2-3. We disagree with Appellant’s arguments. To the extent consistent with our analysis below, we adopt as our own: (1) the findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner in the action from which this appeal is taken (Final Act. 5-7), and (2) the reasons set forth by the Examiner in the Examiner’s Answer in response to Appellant’s Appeal Brief.6 See Ans. 3-5. For the reasons discussed below, on this record we are not persuaded of error regarding the Examiner’s finding of anticipation for independent claim 1 over Florance. 6 See Icon Health & Fitness, Inc. v. Strava, Inc., 849 F.3d 1034, 1042 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“As an initial matter, the PTAB was authorized to incorporate the Examiner’s findings.”); see also In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1564 n.13 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (upholding the PTAB’s findings, although it “did not expressly make any independent factual determinations or legal conclusions,” because it had expressly adopted the examiner’s findings). Appeal 2020-006107 Application 16/295,865 8 Disputed Limitation L1 of Claim 1 As an initial matter of claim construction for the limitation “wherein the spatial filter specifies a geometry representing a geographical region,” we turn to Appellant’s Specification for context. Under the “Summary of Claimed Subject” section of the Appeal Brief (p. 6), Appellant points to support found in paragraph 44 of the Specification. We reproduce paragraph 44 of the Specification below: Types of spatial filters may include a map filter, a location filter, or a distance filter. A map filter filters for geo-enriched data based on a defined geometry. The spatial parameters associated with a map filter may include a geometry of a polygon. FIGS. 4A-4C illustrate example map filters according to some embodiments. In particular, FIG. 4A illustrates an 15 example map filter 400. For this example, map filter 400 is defined by a circular-shaped geometric shape. As shown, the geographic locations of stores (San Francisco, Palo Alto, Sacramento, and Reno in this example) within map filter 400 are included in map visualization 200. In some embodiments, a tool (not shown) included in the map visualization 200 is used to define map filter 400. FIG. 4B illustrates another example map filter 410. In 20 this example, map filter 410 is defined by a user-define shaped. As illustrated, the geographic locations of stores (San Francisco, Palo Alto, Sacramento, Santa Barbara, Los Angeles and San Diego in this example) within map filter 410 are included in map visualization 200. In some embodiments, a tool (not shown) included in the map visualization 200 is used to define map filter 410. Finally, FIG. 4C illustrates an example map filter 420. For this example, map 25 filter 420 is defined by a rectangular-shaped geometric shape. As shown, the geographic locations of stores (Las Vegas, Phoenix, and Tucson in this example) within map filter 420 are included in map visualization 200. In some embodiments, a tool (not shown) included in the map visualization 200 is used to define map filter 420. Spec. ¶ 44 (describing Figs. 4A-4C) (emphasis added). Appeal 2020-006107 Application 16/295,865 9 We note that Appellant’s Figure 4A depicts a dotted circular region map filter 400, and Figure 4B depicts a dotted user-defined map filter 410. Figure 4C depicts map filter 420 as a dotted line rectangular geometric shape. As an initial matter of claim construction, we consider Appellant’s non-limiting, exemplary description in the Specification for the claim 1 term spatial filter: A “[s]patial filter may be a geometry of a geographical element in the map visualization. In some embodiments, the spatial visualization includes a tool for specifying a geometry in the spatial visualization. The spatial filter may be a geometry in the map visualization defined via the tool.” Spec. ¶ 4. In support of the rejection, the Examiner reads the “spatial filter” recited in claim 1 on paragraphs 33, 42, and 45 of Florance. See Final Act. 5. The Examiner reads “wherein” clause limitation L1 of claim 1 on Figure 12 and paragraphs 33, 44, and 45 of Florance. See Final Act. 6. Appellant disagrees with the Examiner’s finding of anticipation, and contends: the spatial filter recited in the present limitation specifies a geometry representing a geographical region. The space size filter in Florance merely specifies a value for an amount of square footage. See id. There is no disclosure in Florence that shows or suggests the space size filter includes a geometry of any sort much less a geometry of a geographical region. Clearly, a geometry representing a geographical region is not the same as a value for an amount of square footage. Appeal Br. 11. Appeal 2020-006107 Application 16/295,865 10 From Appellant’s responses in the Briefs, it is apparent to the panel that Appellant fundamentally misunderstands the Examiner’s mapping. Id. In the alternative, Appellant mischaracterizes the Examiner’s reading of the disputed limitations of claim 1 on the corresponding features found in Florance. See, e.g., Reply Br. 2: The Answer erroneously conflates the shapes of buildings in Florance that result from the application of a space size filter to query results as the space size filter specifying a geometry. The space size filter in Florance only specifies a value for an amount of square footage. See Florance, paras. [0036]-[0038] and figures 3, 4A, and 4B. Fully consistent with Appellant’s own Figure 4B drawing of special map filter 410, having a user-defined shape, as described in paragraph 44, and with Appellant’s own broad description of a “spatial filter” as described in paragraph 4 of the Specification, it is our understanding that the Examiner is reading the claimed “spatial filter” on the user-defined bold black line that outlines a polygonal shape that encloses a particular geographic area of properties, such as a submarket or neighborhood, as depicted in Figure 12 of Florance, as reproduced below: Appeal 2020-006107 Application 16/295,865 11 Figure 12 of Florance, reproduced below, shows a bold black line that forms a complex polygon which encloses the individual properties located in the submarket/neighborhood: Figure 12 of Florance, depicted above, shows a custom “Point In Polygon” (PIP) search of an area that is not predefined in the database, as further described in paragraph 45 of Florance. Appeal 2020-006107 Application 16/295,865 12 As noted above, the Examiner maps the claim 1 “spatial filter” to Florance, at paragraphs 33, 42,7 and 45. See Final Act. 5. The Examiner reads the specified “geometry representing a geographical region” of limitation L1 on paragraphs 33, 44, 45, and Figure 12 of Florance. See Final Act. 6. The Examiner further explains the basis for the rejection in the Answer: According to Florance, the user receives, from the server, query results of the entered neighborhood name [0045]. As discussed above, the filter for the space size would be applied to the query results [0045]. Accordingly, only the properties within the submarket boundaries and the specified space size would be displayed to the user. Furthermore, the boundaries of the neighborhood are within the shapes of the filtered properties. In other words, the boundaries of the neighborhood overlap some of the shapes of the filtered properties as illustrated in Figure 12. For example, Figure 12 illustrates the boundaries of the neighborhood as a bold line which intersects one of the rectangular shaped properties. More specifically, the bold line is drawn within or inside the rectangular shaped property. Each of these rectangular shaped properties would represent a different space size that is within the specified space size. Therefore, Florance does teach receiving geo-enriched data that is within a spatial filter. Ans. 4 (emphasis added). 7 See e.g., Florance at paragraph 42: “The corridor can be specified through the user interface in various ways. For example[,] a user can draw a single line, or box on the touch screen with one finger, or parallel lines with two fingers. Changing the width of the corridor changes the displayed results.” (emphasis added). Cf. with rectangular map filter 420 as shown in Appellant’s Figure 4C, and described in the Specification at paragraph 44 as being defined with a “tool.” Appeal 2020-006107 Application 16/295,865 13 Based upon a preponderance of the evidence in Florance, as cited by the Examiner (id.), and for essentially the same reasons articulated by the Examiner in the Final Action and Answer, as discussed above, on this record, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred regarding the finding of anticipation for the disputed “wherein” clause limitation L1 of claim 1. Given the evidence relied upon by the Examiner, we find that Florance discloses limitation L1 of claim 1: “wherein the spatial filter specifies a geometry representing a geographical region” (emphasis added). Disputed Limitation L2 of Claim 1 We reproduce limitation L2 of claim 1 below: [L2] receiving, from the second computing system, a first subset of the set of geo-enriched data, wherein the geometry defined by the spatial data associated with each geo-enriched data in the first subset of the set of geo-enriched data is within the geometry representing the geographical region of the spatial filter; Claim 1. In the Final Action (6-7), the Examiner reads the “receiving” limitation L2 on the corresponding features found in Florance, as follows: receiving, from the second computing system, a first subset of the set of geo-enriched data [Fig. 12; e.g. returned results from first query, 0034-0035, 0045], wherein the geometry defined by the spatial data associated with each geo-enriched data in the first subset of the set of geo-enriched data is within the geometry representing the geographical region of the spatial filter [e.g. neighborhoods of the resulting properties are within the space size of the filtered properties, 0033-0035, 0044-0045]. Appeal 2020-006107 Application 16/295,865 14 Regarding disputed limitation L2 of claim 1, Appellant contends: The Office Action cites to Figure 12 and paragraphs [0033]-[0035], [0044], and [0045] as disclosing the present limitation. The Office Action is interpreting the boundaries of neighborhoods described in Florance as being the spatial data recited in the present limitation. As mentioned above, the Office Action is interpreting the space size filter described in Florance as being the spatial filter recited in the present limitation. Then, the Office Action explains that the cited portions of Florance describe how neighborhoods of the resulting properties are within the space size of the filtered properties. However, the concept of a boundary of a neighborhood being within or not within a space size (e.g., square footage) does not make sense. As understood, Florance produces search results (e.g., a list of properties) by searching a real estate database using a search query. See Florance, para. [0028]. The search query may be in the form of an address, a neighborhood, or a building name. See Florance, para. [0033]. A filter may be applied to a search query or the results of the search query. See id. Appeal Br. 12-13 (emphasis added). Appellant further responds in the Reply Brief: The Answer maintains that Florance teaches the present limitation. In particular, the Answer’s alleges that the boundaries of the neighborhood shown in Figure 12 are within the shapes of the filter properties. That is simply not true. Rather, Figure 12 of Florance shows the opposite: the properties are within the boundary of the neighborhood. The boundaries of the neighborhood is much larger than any shape of the properties shown in Figure 12. Appellants find it impossible for the boundary of the neighborhood to be within a shape of a property in Figure 12. Reply Br. 2-3. Appeal 2020-006107 Application 16/295,865 15 However, we again emphasize that Appellant’s responses in the Briefs reveal that Appellant fundamentally misunderstands the Examiner’s mappings. Id. In the alternative, Appellant mischaracterizes the Examiner’s reading of the disputed limitations of claim 1 on the corresponding features found in Florance. See, e.g., Reply Br. 2-3. Therefore, for essentially the same reasons articulated by the Examiner in the Final Action and Answer, on this record, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred regarding the disputed “receiving” limitation L2 of claim 1. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s Rejection A of independent representative claim 1 over the cited Florance reference. Regarding the remaining grouped claims 2, 4, 7-9, 11, 14-16, 18, 21, 23, 25, and 26, also rejected under anticipation Rejection A, we sustain the rejection of these claims (not argued separately) for essentially the same reasons found and explained by the Examiner, consistent with our discussion above, and based upon the legal doctrines of waiver or forfeiture. See, e.g., 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv); see also Google Tech. Holdings, 980 F.3d at 862. Rejection B of Remaining Dependent Claims 5, 12, 19, 22, and 24 Appellant advances no arguments rebutting the Examiner’s legal conclusion of the obviousness for the remaining dependent claims 5, 12, 19, 22, and 24, as rejected under Rejection B over the collective teachings and suggestions of Florance and Karakey. Arguments not made are waived or forfeited. See, e.g., 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv); see also Google Tech. Holdings, 980 F.3d at 862. Appeal 2020-006107 Application 16/295,865 16 CONCLUSIONS The Examiner did not err in finding that claims 1, 2, 4, 7-9, 11, 14-16, 18, 21, 23, 25, and 26 are anticipated by Florance under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1). The Examiner did not err in concluding that claims 5, 12, 19, 22, and 24 are obvious over the cited combination of Florance and Karakey. DECISION SUMMARY In summary: Claim(s) Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/ Basis Affirmed Reversed 1, 2, 4, 7-9, 11, 14-16, 18, 21, 23, 25, 26 102(a)(1) Florance 1, 2, 4, 7-9, 11, 14-16, 18, 21, 23, 25, 26 5, 12, 19, 22, 24 103 Florance, Karakey 5, 12, 19, 22, 24 Overall Outcome 1, 2, 4, 5, 7-9, 11, 12, 14-16, 18, 19, 21-26 TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f). AFFIRMED