Sanmina Corporation

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Oct 23, 2020

2020001692 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 23, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/841,223 12/13/2017 Max Edward Klein SAN-1129T1 2884
56522 7590 10/23/2020
LOZA & LOZA, LLP/Sanmina
305 N. Second Avenue #127
Upland, CA 91786-6064
EXAMINER
BADAWI, MEDHAT
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3642
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
10/23/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
julio-pto@lozaip.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte MAX EDWARD KLEIN
Appeal 2020-001692
Application 15/841,223
Technology Center 3600
Before CHARLES N. GREENHUT, BRETT C. MARTIN, and
JILL D. HILL, Administrative Patent Judges.
GREENHUT, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–6, 8–14, and 16–22. See Final Act. 1.
We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM IN PART.

1 We use the term “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Sanmina Corp.
Appeal Br. 2.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to devices and methods for facilitating capture
of unmanned aerial vehicles. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of
the claimed subject matter:
1. An unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) capture device,
comprising:
a netting system including a net launch device and a net;
a propulsion system including a plurality of propellers
coupled to one or more motors;
a positioning system;
a camera system; and
a processing system coupled to the netting system, the
propulsion system, the positioning system, and the camera
system, the processing system comprising logic to:
operate the propulsion system to autonomously
navigate to a general location of a target UAV in response
to information obtained from the positioning system and
from the camera system;
determine a direction of travel of the target UAV
and a speed of the target UAV from images and
information obtained by the camera system;
operate the propulsion system to pursue the target
UAV in response to the determined direction of travel of
the target UAV and a speed of the target UAV; and
deploy the netting system to propel the net at the
target UAV.
REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Name Reference Date
Pavek US 9,739,881 B1 Aug. 22, 2017
Nannoni US 2012/0153074 A1 June 21, 2012
Rastgaar Aagaah US 2017/0144756 A1 May 25, 2017

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REJECTIONS
Claims 1–3, 5, 6, 8–14, and 16–22 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Rastgaar Aagaah and Pavek. Final Act.
4.
Claim 4 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable
over Rastgaar Aagaah, Pavek and Nannoni. Final Act. 13.
OPINION
Claims 1, 8 and 16 are independent and argued on the same basis.
Appeal Br. 7–12. Appellant separately argues2 claim 6 (Appeal Br. 12–13),
13 and 17 together (Appeal Br. 13), and 21 and 22 together (Appeal Br. 13–
14). Claim 1 is representative of claims 2, 3, 5, 8–12, 14, 16, 18–20 under 37
C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) and dispositive as to claim 4 argued based only on
dependency.
The Examiner correctly found Rastgaar Aagaah to disclose the basic
unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) capture device of claim 1. Final Act. 4–5.
Appellant contends “the sensors making up the intruding detecting
electronics [in Rastgaar Aagaah] are described as being utilized only for the
detection of an intruding drone, and are not described as being utilized to fly
the hunter drone or to operate the rotors of the octocopter.” Appeal Br. 8.
And, according to Appellant, “[t]he [Rastgaar Aagaah] reference is
noticeably silent about being flown responsive to any camera system.”
Appeal Br. 8.

2 Appellant is reminded that under 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) “any claim(s)
argued separately or as a subgroup shall be argued under a separate
subheading that identifies the claim(s) by number.”
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Even though Rastgaar Aagaah expressly mentions the use of its
onboard camera in connection with the operation of its net launcher
(Rastgaar Aagaah para. 17), it is somewhat difficult to imagine that Rastgaar
Aagaah’s system does not have at least some capability to “determine a
direction of travel of the target UAV and a speed of the target UAV” and
“operate the propulsion system to pursue the target UAV in response to the
determined direction of travel of the target UAV and a speed of the target
UAV.” The capacity to know and utilize the position, speed, and direction of
a target would seem to be a necessary requirement for any type of “hunter”
seeking to intercept that target, particularly a hunter that can operate
“autonomously.” Rastgaar Aagaah para. 5. Appellant points out that the
sensing and calculating aspects of pursuit can, according to Rastgaar
Aagaah, occur remotely from the UAV. Reply Br. 3. First, we see no
language in the claim precluding this and the language of the cited portion of
paragraph 5 would seem to suggest while that is preferable to minimize the
amount of hardware on the drone, presumably for weight minimization
purposes, it could be either on the drone or remotely located.
In any case, the Examiner, recognizing it is at least arguable as to
whether the subject matter of claim 1 would have been obvious in view of
Rastgaar Aagaah alone, additionally cites Pavek for its additional specificity
in demonstrating it was well known in the autonomous vehicle arts to utilize
information obtained via cameras 2605 on an autonomous vehicle 2600 to
determine the position and velocity of other “target” vehicles T in the area
and operate the vehicle’s navigation and propulsion systems 2716, 2614 in
response to such information. Final Act. 5–6 (citing, inter alia, Pavek col. 8,
ll. 13–22; Fig. 24).
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It is not clear why Appellant believes “Pavek et al. will only teach a
person of ordinary skill in the art to use the camera system of Pavek et al. to
detect a presence of an intruding drone and to aim and launch the net
launchers, since these are the limited teachings for the camera system in
Rastgaar Aagaah et al.” Reply Br. 3. It is clear that Rastgaar Aagaah must
have some mechanism to autonomously intercept the drone in order for its
projectile net system, having limited range, to be effective. Pavek’s system,
which utilizes, inter alia, a camera 2605 to create a 4D map of both where
potential targets are and where they are going, and propel 2614 an automated
vehicle 2600 in response thereto, provides just such a mechanism. “[I]n
many cases a person of ordinary skill will be able to fit the teachings of
multiple patents together like pieces of a puzzle.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex
Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 420 (2007). The fact that the so-called “targets” in Pavek
are non-stationary objects such as other vehicles which are generally to be
avoided as opposed to those with which a rendezvous is desired does not
undermine the Examiner’s position. A skilled artisan would know how to
use Pavek’s 4D model to intercept just as well as avoid a target vehicle. “[A]
person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an
automaton.” KSR v. Teleflex, 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007).
Appellant’s argument that Pavek relies exclusively on RF radar to
produce the 4D model (Appeal Br. 10) appears to be plainly inaccurate.
Although Pavek touts certain advantages of RF radar over optical sensors
(Pavek col. 8, ll. 6–12), Pavek clearly contemplates the use of camera 2605
as well. Pavek col. 28, ll. 8, 23; Fig. 24 (cited at Final Act. 5).
For the foregoing reasons we sustain the rejections of claims 1–5, 8–
12, 14, 16, and 18–20.
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Concerning claims 13 and 17 Appellant briefly asserts, “there is not
[sic] teaching of ‘cutting the tether.’” Appeal Br. 13. Appellant’s assertion is
contrary to paragraph 17 of Rastgaar Aagaah which states “the string or
cable may be detached (such as cut or otherwise released).” Ans. 5.
Concerning claims 21 and 22 Appellant briefly asserts, “[t]he cited
references fail to disclose, teach, or even suggest utilizing images and
information obtained by a camera system to ‘localize the target UAV in
azimuth, elevation, and range relative to the UAV capture device.’” Appeal
Br. 13–14. This appears to be precisely the transformation described at
Pavek col. 7, ll. 12–17 (cited at Ans. 5). Appellant does not offer any
argument or evidence to demonstrate otherwise.
Regarding claims 13, 17, 21, and 22 we recognize the Examiner, in
the Answer, departed from and/or supplemented the findings made with
respect to these claims in the Final Action from which this appeal was taken.
Appellant elected neither to pursue the options available under 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.40(a) (citing 37 C.F.R. § 1.181) or apprise us of Examiner error in the
Examiner’s new findings and reasoning under 37 C.F.R. § 41.41. Thus, we
sustain the Examiner’s rejection of these claims for purposes of the present
appeal. We nevertheless remind the Examiner that rule of 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.39(a)(2), among other things, serves an important statutory function by
helping to ensure that appellants are treated fairly and given timely and
adequate notice of all matters of fact and law asserted prior to a case being
adjudicated by the board. See, e.g., In re Stepan Co., 660 F. 3d 1341, 1345
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing Administrative Procedure Act 5 U.S.C. § 554); see
also In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1449 (Fed. Cir. 1992) Plager, J.,
Concurring (“The examiner cannot sit mum, leaving the applicant to shoot
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arrows into the dark hoping to somehow hit a secret objection harbored by
the examiner. The ‘prima facie case’ notion. . .was intended to leave no
doubt among examiners that they must state clearly and specifically any
objections (the prima facie case) to patentability, and give the applicant fair
opportunity to meet those objections with evidence and argument. To that
extent the concept serves to level the playing field and reduces the likelihood
of administrative arbitrariness.”).
Turning to claim 6, the Examiner responds to Appellant’s assertion
that neither of the cited references “identif[ies] the target UAV as a target to
be captured based on the determined size and shape” (Appeal Br. 12–13) by
stating, “Pavek, is a precision camera system that can identify the target
based on size and the shape since the system utilizes a camera, multiple
radar systems and sensors used for detection.” Ans. 5. The Examiner does
not cite to any specific portion of Pavek for this finding. Nor does the
Examiner explain precisely what “can identify the target.” Just because
Pavek’s system can be made or used to identify a target with its cameras,
presumably with some human judgment or intervention, does not mean that
Pavel’s system comprises “logic” for doing so as required by claim 6.
Our reviewing court’s predecessor has held that a “programmed
machine is structurally different from a machine without that program.” In
re Noll, 545 F.2d 141, 148 (CCPA 1976); see also In re Bernhart, 417 F.2d
1395, 1399–1400 (CCPA 1969) (“[I]f a machine is programmed in a certain
new and unobvious way, it is physically different from the machine without
that program; its memory elements are differently arranged. The fact that
these physical changes are invisible to the eye should not tempt us to
conclude that the machine has not been changed.”); In re Alappat, 33 F.3d
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1526, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Ultramercial, LLC v. Hulu, LLC, 657 F.3d
1323, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011). If the prior-art apparatus lacks the logic to
perform the function stated in the claim the prior-art apparatus cannot be
said to teach or disclose such subject matter. See Typhoon Touch Techs., Inc.
v. Dell, Inc., 659 F.3d 1376, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
For the foregoing reasons we reverse the Examiner’s rejection of
claim 6.
CONCLUSION
The rejection of claims 1–3, 5, 8–14, and 16–22 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Rastgaar Aagaah and Pavek is affirmed.
The rejection of claim 6 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Rastgaar Aagaah and Pavek is reversed.
The rejection of claim 4 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Rastgaar Aagaah, Pavek and Nannoni is affirmed.
DECISION SUMMARY
Claim(s)
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–3, 5, 6, 8–
14, 16–22
103 Rastgaar Aagaah,
Pavek
1–3, 5, 8–
14, 16–22
6
4 103 Rastgaar Aagaah,
Pavek, Nannoni
4
Overall
Outcome
1–5, 8–14,
16–22
6
TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
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AFFIRMED IN PART