Sands Hotel & Casino

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Nov 7, 1997

324 N.L.R.B. 1101 (N.L.R.B. 1997)

1101
324 NLRB No. 169
SANDS HOTEL & CASINO
1 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility
findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an admin-
istrative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear prepon-
derance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incor-
rect. Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188
F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and
find no basis for reversing the findings.
2 We agree with the judge, in the circumstances described by him
and in the absence of contrary argument from either the General
Counsel or the Charging Parties, that it is no longer necessary to
order the Respondent to furnish the information that it unlawfully re-
fused to provide.
Las Vegas Sands, Inc., d/b/a Sands Hotel and Ca-
sino and International Brotherhood of Painters
and Allied Trades Union, Local 159, AFL–CIO
and International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers, Local 357, AFL–CIO and Silver State
District Council of Carpenters, United Brother-
hood of Carpenters and Joiners of America,
Local 1780, AFL–CIO. Cases 28–CA–13583,
28–CA–13742–2, 28–CA–13594, 28–CA–13635,
and 28–CA–13742–1
November 7, 1997
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN GOULD AND MEMBERS FOX AND
HIGGINS
On July 2, 1997, Administrative Law Judge Burton
Litvack issued the attached decision. The Respondent
filed exceptions and a supporting brief. The General
Counsel filed an answering brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has considered
the decision and the record in light of the exceptions
and briefs and has decided to affirm the judge’s rul-
ings, findings,1 and conclusions and to adopt the rec-
ommended Order.2
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge and
orders that the Respondent, Las Vegas Sands, Inc.,
d/b/a Sands Hotel and Casino, Las Vegas, Nevada, its
officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the
action set forth in the Order.
Scott Feldman, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Howard E. Cole, Esq. (Lionel, Sawyer & Collins) and Paul
Roberts, Esq., of Las Vegas, Nevada, for the Respondent.
Hope Singer, Esq. (Bush & Geffner), of Burbank, California,
for Charging Parties International Brotherhood of Painters
& Allied Trades Union, Local 159, AFL–CIO and Silver
State District Council of Carpenters, United Brotherhood
of Carpenters & Joiners of America, Local 1780, AFL–
CIO.
Dalton L. Hooks, of Las Vegas, Nevada, for Charging Party
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local
357, AFL–CIO.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
BURTON LITVACK, Administrative Law Judge. The unfair
labor practice charge in Case 28–CA–13583 was filed by
International Brotherhood of Painters & Allied Trades Union,
Local 159, AFL–CIO (the Painters Union), on March 5,
1996. The unfair labor practice charge in Case 28–CA–13594
was filed by International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,
Local 357, AFL–CIO (the Electrical Workers Union), on
March 8, 1996. The unfair labor practice charge in Case 28–
CA–13635 was filed by Silver State District Council of Car-
penters, United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of
America, Local 1780, AFL–CIO (the Carpenters Union), on
April 3, 1996. Based on the unfair labor practice charges, on
April 29, 1996, the Acting Regional Director for Region 28
of the National Labor Relations Board (the Board) issued a
consolidated complaint (CC-1) alleging that Las Vegas
Sands, Inc., d/b/a Sands Hotel and Casino (Respondent) had
engaged in, and was engaging in, unfair labor practices with-
in the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the National
Labor Relations Act (the Act). On June 3, 1996, the unfair
labor practice charge in Case 28–CA–13742–1 was filed by
the Carpenters Union and the unfair labor practice charge in
Case 28–CA–13742–2 was filed by the Painters Union.
Based on the unfair labor practice charges, on July 10, 1996,
the Acting Regional Director for Region 28 of the Board
issued a consolidated complaint (CC-2) alleging that Re-
spondent had engaged in, and was engaging in, unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the
Act. The above matters were consolidated for hearing, and
a trial, before me, was held on October 31 and November
1, 1996, and February 13 and 14, 1997, in Las Vegas, Ne-
vada. At the trial, all parties were afforded the opportunity
to call witnesses, to examine and cross-examine each wit-
ness, to offer into the record any relevant evidence, to argue
their legal positions orally, and to file posthearing briefs.
Counsel for all the parties filed such posthearing briefs, and
these have been carefully considered. Accordingly, based on
the entire record here, including my observation of the testi-
monial demeanor of each of the several witnesses and the
posthearing briefs, I issue the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
At all times material here until on or about June 30, 1996,
Respondent, a State of Nevada corporation, maintained an
office and place of business in Las Vegas, Nevada, where it
was engaged in the hospitality and gaming business. During
the 12-month periods immediately preceding the issuance of
the instant consolidated complaints, in the normal course and
conduct of its above-described business affairs, Respondent
derived gross revenues in excess of $500,000 and purchased
and received goods and materials valued in excess of
$50,000, directly from sources located outside the State of
Nevada. Respondent admits that has been, at all times mate-
rial, an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning
of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:48 Apr 30, 2002 Jkt 197585 PO 00004 Frm 01101 Fmt 0610 Sfmt 0610 D:\NLRB\324.130 APPS10 PsN: APPS10
1102 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
1 Waltzman passed away subsequent to the circumstances sur-
rounding the alleged unfair labor practices and prior to the hearing.
2 During cross-examination, upon being confronted with his pre-
trial affidavit, in which he testified that Champion stated that he
would have to have Waltzman’s approval for Respondent’s position
of contract issues and in which there is no mention of Waltzman’s
attendance at this bargaining session, Hooks averred that Champion
made such a statement prior to Waltzman’s arrival for the meeting
and that the latter did, in fact, make the statement, attributed to him
by the witness.
II. LABOR ORGANIZATIONS
Respondent admits that the Painters Union, the Electrical
Workers Union, and the Carpenters Union are each labor or-
ganizations within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE ISSUES
The first consolidated complaint alleges that the Painters
Union, the Carpenters Union, and the Electrical Workers
Union each represents an appropriate unit of Respondent’s
employees; that during the fall of 1995, each labor organiza-
tion reached complete agreement on the terms and conditions
of employment of a successor collective-bargaining agree-
ment, covering the bargaining unit employees, which it rep-
resents; that each labor organization requested that Respond-
ent execute a written collective-bargaining agreement, memo-
rializing the terms of its successor collective-bargaining
agreement; and that Respondent failed and refused to execute
the collective-bargaining agreements in violation of Section
8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act. Respondent denies that it engaged
in the alleged unfair labor practices and contends that its bar-
gaining representatives’ agreement with each labor organiza-
tion was merely tentative, conditioned on the approval of its
highest management official; that each labor organization
was aware of such a condition; and that, as such approval
was not given, Respondent was under no obligation to exe-
cute memorialized versions of each of the tentative agree-
ments. The second consolidated complaint alleges that the
Painters Union and the Carpenters Union each requested in-
formation, which was necessary and relevant for purposes of
‘‘effects’’ collective bargaining and for each labor organiza-
tion’s performance of its representational duties, and that Re-
spondent engaged in acts and conduct violative of Section
8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act by failing and refusing to furnish
the information to each labor organization. Respondent de-
nies the commission of the alleged unfair labor practices, as-
serting that the General Counsel failed to meet its burden of
establishing that the requested information was relevant and
necessary for the purpose of ‘‘effects’’ bargaining.
IV. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Facts
1. Respondent’s refusals to execute the agreements
The record establishes that, until June 30, 1996, Respond-
ent, a state of Nevada corporation, operated a hotel and gam-
ing facility on what is known as the ‘‘strip’’ section of Las
Vegas Boulevard in Las Vegas, Nevada; that, since 1988,
Respondent has been wholly owned by an entity, known as
the Interface Group, which has its offices in Needham, Mas-
sachusetts; and that the controlling interest in the Interface
Group is owned by Sheldon Adelson. At all times material,
Arthur Waltzman was Respondent’s chief financial officer;1
Bill Champion acted as a consultant to Respondent’s human
resources department; and Paul Roberts has been Respond-
ent’s general counsel. The record further establishes that, in
1995, several of the collective-bargaining agreements, be-
tween Respondent and labor organizations, which represent
various of its employees, expired; that Respondent entered
into negotiations with each of these labor organizations for
successor agreements; and that among the labor organiza-
tions, whose collective-bargaining agreements with Respond-
ent expired in 1995 and with whom Respondent entered into
negotiations for successor agreements that year, were the
Painters Union, which is the bargaining representative for
Respondent’s painters, paperhangers, taper-finishers, and
combination craftsmen, the Electrical Workers Union, which
is the bargaining representative for Respondent’s electrician
foremen, journeymen electricians, and relief electricians, and
the Carpenters Union, which is the bargaining representative
for Respondent’s journeymen carpenters and carpenter fore-
men. With regard to the 1995 bargaining between these three
labor organizations and Respondent, while there is no dispute
that each negotiation resulted in an agreement on all terms
and conditions of a collective-bargaining agreement, the Gen-
eral Counsel contends that the agreements were final and Re-
spondent contends that the agreements were tentative, condi-
tioned on ratification by the members of each labor organiza-
tion and on approval by Sheldon Adelson and his attorneys.
The record reveals that, on the expiration of their most re-
cent collective-bargaining agreement, the Electrical Workers
Union, which has had an ongoing collective-bargaining rela-
tionship with Respondent for, at least, 20 years, and Re-
spondent met on just three occasions, in 1995, in order to ne-
gotiate a successor agreement. According to Dalton Hooks,
the business manager and financial secretary of the Electrical
Workers Union, during the bargaining, he was the chief
spokesperson for the labor organization and Waltzman,
Champion, and Marcie Yarnell, who was a secretary in the
human resources department and a note-taker and observer
during the bargaining, represented Respondent. He testified
that, at the initial session, on June 27, ‘‘Mr. Arthur
Waltzman told us that Bill Champion would be the lead ne-
gotiator, except that he would do all economic issues . . .
and he had full authority for negotiating, Mr. Waltzman’’2
and that, on behalf of Respondent, Waltzman agreed to and
executed an agreement, in which Respondent agreed to ex-
tend the life of the parties’ most recent agreement while the
successor agreement negotiations continued and to pay retro-
active wage increases upon completion of the negotiations.
According to Hooks, at the parties’ next negotiating session,
held on September 6, bargaining concerned future expansion
of the facility, and, while Respondent’s decision to expand
was definite, its plans were ‘‘quite sketchy.’’ Thus, ‘‘there
was discussion on whether or not the hotel was going to
build a new tower on existing property or whether it was
going to be an addition to that . . . property . . . and this
was a concern of Waltzman especially about economics
. . . . he needed . . . to make sure he had enough capitol
and he needed the unions to help in their proposals to have
the funds he needed.’’ On this same topic there was discus-
sion about the Electrical Workers Union’s bargaining rights
VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:48 Apr 30, 2002 Jkt 197585 PO 00004 Frm 01102 Fmt 0610 Sfmt 0610 D:\NLRB\324.130 APPS10 PsN: APPS10
1103SANDS HOTEL & CASINO
3 Hooks testified that, during the negotiations for the predecessor
collective-bargaining agreement, Waltzman had identified himself as
the individual, who could ‘‘put the finality’’ to the agreement’’ and
had signed it.
During cross-examination, Hooks denied being told by Roberts
that his people had assured him that the labor organization had been
informed of the need for approval by Adelson. However, he was
confronted by his pretrial affidavit in which he swore that Roberts
made such a statement during their telephone conversation.
4 As Champion stated, Waltzman appeared only at sessions during
which financial issues were discussed.
5 According to Bill Hutchinson, a business representative for the
Silver State District Council of Carpenters, shortly after the Car-
penters sent a reopened letter to Respondent in March, he met with
Champion at the latter’s office in the Sands Hotel. Hutchinson’s tes-
timony was uncontroverted that Champion expressed a desire to
commence bargaining after the labor organization completed bar-
gaining with other Las Vegas hotels so that he would be aware of
the industry positions on various subjects. He added that Respondent
also had ‘‘some special needs;’’ that ‘‘he would be negotiating the
non-economic issues . . . that the economics would be Mr.
Waltzman’s and that . . . final approval of everything would come
from Mr. Waltzman.’’
in a new building, constructed on Respondent’s current or
adjacent property.
The parties’ final bargaining session was held on Septem-
ber 11. According to Hooks, Champion presented a draft
memorandum of agreement (MOA) to the labor organization.
The proposal included a new recognition clause provision,
stating that the successor agreement would not be applicable
to another facility built on the grounds on which the present
hotel and casino stood, and a new side letter, stating that, in
the event Respondent constructed a new tower, which be-
came ‘‘an integral part of the existing operations,’’ bargain-
ing unit employees would be employed to perform bargain-
ing unit work in the tower. Hooks testified that the discus-
sion centered on the language of the afore-mentioned side
letter and the Electrical Workers Union’s retention of bar-
gaining rights. ‘‘We took a look at it, made some changes
and left it in [Champion’s] office, and shook hands with Mr.
Waltzman and Mr. Champion and we came to agreement.’’
Specifically, ‘‘Arthur Waltzman and I shook hands and he
says we have a deal, we’re looking forward to continuing re-
lationships.’’ With regard to Waltzman’s authority to reach
a final agreement, Hooks specifically denied ever having
been told during the bargaining that an agreement, at the bar-
gaining table, had to be ratified or approved by Sheldon
Adelson or anyone in Boston.
The Electrical Workers Union bargaining unit shop stew-
ard, James Springgate, also testified with regard to his labor
organization’s 1995 negotiations with Respondent. Contrary
to Dalton Hooks, as to who would be responsible for nego-
tiating on behalf of Respondent, he recalled that, at the first
bargaining session, it was Respondent’s head of maintenance,
Frank Vignola, who stated ‘‘that economics would be taken
care of by Arthur and the rest of the package would be
passed out by . . . Mr. Champion.’’ Corroborating Hooks,
Springgate recalled that, at the second bargaining session,
Waltzman discussed expansion of the hotel and mentioned
alternatives, including ‘‘adding high rise hotel facilities to the
existing casino’’ and ‘‘buying the strip adjacent property
. . . and putting up a totally separate hotel with perhaps
partners’’ and that, at the final bargaining session, after the
parties reached agreement on wages, Hooks announced
‘‘we’re in agreement on all the articles . . . and we would
accept this contract’’ and Waltzman replied that ‘‘we have
a deal’’ and reached across the table, shaking hands with
each of the Electrical Workers Union representatives. As did
Hooks, Springgate denied that any management representa-
tive said anything about Adelson or Boston having to ap-
prove the parties’ agreement.
There is no dispute that Respondent was on notice that the
bargaining unit employees, represented by the Electrical
Workers Union, would have to ratify the negotiators’ agree-
ment on the terms of the successor collective-bargaining
agreement, and, subsequent to the final bargaining session,
the employees did so. Shortly thereafter, Hooks took a me-
morialized printed version of the parties’ agreement to Re-
spondent’s human resources department and, later, spoke
with Champion and Yarnell several times during November
and December, asking why Respondent had not as yet exe-
cuted it. Ultimately, Champion informed him that the con-
tract was in Waltzman’s office but that the latter was ill and
unable to sign it. Concerned about Respondent’s failure to
execute the agreement, in January or February 1996, Hooks
telephoned Paul Roberts, Respondent’s general counsel, who
‘‘informed me that there was a problem with the length of
the agreement, and I asked him why. . . . I told him that
we came to agreement and . . . Arthur Waltzman had agreed
to it, and he says . . . [Waltzman] didn’t have authority.
And I says . . . we always were told he had the authority
by himself and I assume Bill Champion.’’3 Finally, there is
no dispute that Respondent has never executed the 1995
Electrical Workers Union MOA and that Respondent has
failed and refused to implement any of the terms and condi-
tions of employment, which are embodied in the agreement,
including the payment of retroactive wage increases.
Respondent’s respective existing collective-bargaining
agreements with the Carpenters Union and the Painters
Union also expired in 1995. Inasmuch as both contracts con-
tained ‘‘similar’’ terms and conditions of employment, Re-
spondent’s successor agreement bargaining with both labor
organizations was conducted jointly. Representing the Car-
penters Union, during the negotiations, were Bill Hutchinson,
a business representative of the Silver State District Council
of Carpenters, Aubrey Rueff, the shop steward, and the exec-
utive secretary of the labor organization; representing the
Painters Union were Jerry Kmetz, the business representative
and financial secretary of the labor organization, and its shop
steward; and representing Respondent were Champion and
Yarnell.4 The parties’ initial bargaining session was held on
September 19.5 Jerry Kmetz was unable to recall any discus-
sion about the ‘‘ground rules’’ for the bargaining during this
meeting, and, while likewise unable to recall what was said,
Aubrey Rueff vaguely thought Champion mentioned that
‘‘we were going to negotiate . . . and . . . there was no
final authority either way.’’ The parties next meeting oc-
curred on October 3 and, according to Kmetz, as with the
Electrical Workers Union negotiations, there was discussion
about hotel expansion plans and discussion on contract lan-
guage, proposed by Respondent, concerning whether Re-
spondent’s recognition of each labor organization’s status as
the bargaining representative and the collective-bargaining
agreements themselves would apply to construction on Re-
spondent’s existing property and on new property. In this re-
VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:48 Apr 30, 2002 Jkt 197585 PO 00004 Frm 01103 Fmt 0610 Sfmt 0610 D:\NLRB\324.130 APPS10 PsN: APPS10
1104 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
6 The only Carpenters Union representative present was shop stew-
ard Rueff.
7 Pursuant to Champion’s instructions, after receipt of the signed
MOA from the Painters Union, Yarnell prepared a memorandum to
Respondent’s payroll supervisor, Barbara Benassi, detailing the
changes in the painters bargaining unit employees’ terms and condi-
tions of employment. Champion denied that the document was ever
sent to Benassi.
8 In fact, Hutchinson testified, he had been specifically informed
by Champion prior to formal bargaining that ‘‘Arthur Waltzman had
approval on the agreement.’’
gard, he added, Respondent proposed a side letter to the col-
lective-bargaining agreement, which would cover contin-
gencies and representation rights. Carpenters Union Shop
Steward Rueff also recalled that there was a discussion as to
Respondent’s expansion plans at this meeting; however, Bill
Hutchinson recalled that this occurred at the parties’ next
bargaining session on October 17. According to him, what
was discussed was the possible razing of Respondent’s exist-
ing facility and the construction of a new hotel and the labor
organizations’ bargaining rights in such an event. As to this,
Respondent proposed new recognition clause language and a
side letter, modifying the language.
During direct examination, Jerry Kmetz recalled that the
final bargaining session between the Painters Union and Re-
spondent occurred on October 31; however, during cross-ex-
amination, he conceded ‘‘it’s a good possibility’’ the meeting
occurred eight days earlier—on October 23.6 According to
Kmetz, at the parties’ prior bargaining session, Waltzman
had been present, and a wage increase, vacations, and the
new contract’s term were discussed. As to the latter topic,
Waltzman said he could only agree to 4 years, and, at the
start of the final session, Champion presented an MOA to
Kmetz ‘‘with the changes . . . that we had talked about . . .
[with] the percentages split up for the four years. . . . I went
through the proposal that he handed me and I agreed with
everything that was in the proposal. . . . I was told to take
the . . . proposal and get it ratified . . . .’’ Asked to specify
how the meeting ended, Kmetz recalled that ‘‘I probably
shook hands with [Champion] . . . .’’ Subsequently, Kmetz
testified, Respondent’s painters bargaining unit employees
ratified the agreement, and he returned a signed copy of the
MOA to Yarnell in Respondent’s human resources depart-
ment office. Thereafter, after being informed several times
by Yarnell and Champion that they did not know when the
contract would be executed by Respondent,7 the latter re-
ferred the Painters Union official to Paul Roberts, who in-
formed the former that the MOA had not been executed as
Respondent wanted to change the wording of the side letter
and wanted to change the term of the agreement so that it
would expire in 1997. He added, ‘‘[Y]ou know this has to
be approved up here.’’ Kmetz responded that language to
that effect should have been included in the MOA. There is
no dispute that, at all times material, Respondent has failed
and refused to execute the 1995 Painters Union MOA and
that it has failed and refused to implement any of the terms
and conditions of employment, which are embodied in said
agreement, including the payment of retroactive wage in-
creases.
Kmetz specifically denied that Champion ever said any-
thing about what Respondent would have to do if the bar-
gaining unit employees ratified the parties’ agreement. On
the contrary, he believed that Waltzman and Champion had
authority to sign off on a new collective-bargaining agree-
ment. ‘‘The only statement was made . . . during the bar-
gaining from Mr. Champion . . . that everything will be sent
to Boston to be signed, which . . . wasn’t a problem with
me . . . . He told me these documents would be signed in
Boston, but he said nothing about them being approved or
ratified in Boston.’’ Finally, he viewed what Roberts subse-
quently told him as fundamentally differing from what
Champion had previously told him with regard to
Waltzman’s and Champion’s bargaining authority.
The last formal bargaining session between the Carpenters
Union and Respondent occurred on October 31. According to
Bill Hutchinson, Champion presented another draft MOA but
not with ‘‘everything we asked for.’’ He finally told the
union representatives that the offer was the best Respondent
could offer and, after a caucus, Hutchinson said that it was
acceptable to him and that he would take the offer to the bar-
gaining unit employees for ratification. Later that day, he did
so, but the employees rejected the proposed agreement.
Hutchinson informed Champion of the rejection of the con-
tract and requested a meeting with Waltzman. Such a meet-
ing was arranged and held at the end of November in Cham-
pion’s office. Hutchinson testified that Waltzman listened as
he explained why his members deserved a better monetary
offer and then replied, ‘‘We made a deal, now its up to you.
Go sell it to the men or . . . go on strike.’’ Thereupon, the
Carpenters Union representatives departed; Hutchinson met
with the bargaining unit employees; and the latter ratified the
agreement. Hutchinson then delivered a signed copy of the
MOA to Champion’s office, ‘‘and he said he would take it
to Arthur to get it signed.’’
With regard to what occurred on October 31 and there-
after, Aubrey Rueff testified that, on the above date, the Car-
penters Union representatives completed bargaining on lan-
guage matters with Champion and, after a short while, nego-
tiated with Waltzman on economics, including wages. ‘‘And
the proposal was three percent per year for a 4-year contract.
And we got everything straightened out.’’ However, accord-
ing to Rueff, the bargaining unit employees rejected the
agreement and, a week later, he and Hutchinson again met
with Waltzman. Hutchinson told Waltzman that the employ-
ees wanted him to give them more money as they had al-
ways helped Respondent when required. Waltzman expressed
surprise as he believed an agreement had been reached at the
prior meeting. He said ‘‘that’s all we can do’’ and explained
why. Thereupon, ‘‘as Bill and I were walking out, we shook
hands with Mr. Waltzman and says we’ve got a deal.’’
Both Hutchinson and Rueff specifically denied that, at any
time during the bargaining, any Respondent representative
said that the parties’ agreement required approval by Adelson
or in Boston. Further, Hutchinson testified that when he gave
Champion the signed MOA after ratification by the bargain-
ing unit employees, the latter said nothing about getting ap-
proval by headquarters, by Adelson, or by Boston.8 Further,
while offering no testimony that anything was said on this
point, Hutchinson averred, ‘‘I think every [MOA] is subject
to review after the contract document is prepared, the attor-
neys always review it to make sure that I’m not going to put
something in there that wasn’t agreed [to]. Review it for ac-
curacy. . . . But nothing to do with approving it.’’ Rueff,
VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:48 Apr 30, 2002 Jkt 197585 PO 00004 Frm 01104 Fmt 0610 Sfmt 0610 D:\NLRB\324.130 APPS10 PsN: APPS10
1105SANDS HOTEL & CASINO
9 As with the Painters Union, after completing negotiations with
the Carpenters Union, Champion instructed Yarnell to prepare a
memorandum on implementing the changes in the bargaining unit
employees’ terms and conditions of employment but denied that
such was ever sent to Barbara Benassi.
10 While Respondent argues that such was meant to convey that,
at the conclusion of bargaining, any agreement was tentative until
approved by Sheldon Adelson and his attorneys, such is not entirely
clear. Thus, while he negotiated, ‘‘I was discussing [progress with
regard to language] at all time’’ with Waltzman and he ‘‘was keep-
ing . . . Interface appraised of what was happening.’’ That Sheldon
Adelson was asked to approve what was being offered to labor orga-
nizations at every stage of negotiations is clear from R. Exhs. 3 and
4, which concern 1992 negotiations.
11 While stating that this review was a substantive one inasmuch
as the 1995 negotiations involved new recognition clause language,
a ‘‘sensitive’’ subject for Interface, he conceded never explaining
what the prior approval by Boston would entail—‘‘I just said it had
to be reviewed and the same as you’ve got to have it ratified by
your members.’’
however, did recall something said in this regard: ‘‘All I can
recall was that there would be a final write up and just a
check over wording.’’9 Finally, there is no dispute that, at all
times material, Respondent has failed and refused to execute
the 1995 Carpenters Union MOA and that Respondent has
failed to implement any of the terms and conditions of em-
ployment, which are embodied in the agreement, including
the payment of retroactive wage increases.
Contrary to the foregoing testimony, Respondent presented
a different version as to whether the three labor organizations
were informed of any limitation on Respondent’s representa-
tives’ authority to conclude a final agreement. Thus, Marcie
Yarnell testified that she was present during each of the 1995
bargaining sessions, between Respondent and the Electrical
Workers Union, and that, perhaps ‘‘in the middle’’ but defi-
nitely ‘‘at the end,’’ either Waltzman or Champion said,
‘‘[J]ust as you have to have the contract ratified by your
members, we need it approved by our counsel in Boston.’’
With regard to the Carpenters Union and Painters Union ne-
gotiations, she recalled that these were conducted jointly at
the outset but separately at the end; that, as to the bargaining
with the former, while not recalling how many times, either
Waltzman or Champion or both told the labor organization,
‘‘just as your members have to ratify tentative agreement,
our counsel in Boston has to’’; and that, as to the Painters
Union, ‘‘the same statement that was said in the other one
. . . that just as your members have to ratify the tentative
agreement, our counsel in Boston has to . . . go over it and
approve it also.’’ During cross-examination, Yarnell testified
that Waltzman’s or Champion’s statement, regarding the ex-
tent of their authority to bind Respondent, was made to the
Electrical Workers Union negotiators during the last bargain-
ing session ‘‘when they had reached tentative agreement and
they were shaking hands and talking about taking back to the
union for ratification.’’ Asked if such was uttered earlier in
the negotiations, Yarnell could not recall if it was stated
more than once and averred ‘‘they kind of all flow together
in my mind.’’ Also, during cross-examination, with regard to
when the comment was made to the Painters Union and the
Carpenters Union negotiators, Yarnell stated it was not said
while the bargaining was conducted jointly; that it was said
to the Painters Union at ‘‘definitely the last [session]’’; and
that Waltzman made the comment to the Carpenters Union
representatives in the context of Hutchinson saying he had to
take the parties’ agreement to the members for ratification.
Further, during cross-examination, Yarnell gave a different
version of what was said to the labor organizations ‘‘when
it came close to reaching tentative agreement and it was dis-
cussed that it needed to be ratified by the members’’—‘‘our
attorneys need to look it over and final approval needs to
come from Boston.’’ Finally, Yarnell conceded that, while,
in her bargaining notes for each negotiating session with
each labor organization, she recorded anything ‘‘I felt . . .
was important for future reference,’’ nowhere, in said notes,
is there any indication of either Waltzman or Champion ever
informing representatives of the Electrical Workers Union,
the Carpenters Union, or the Painters Union that any agree-
ments reached were subject to approval by Adelson or Re-
spondent’s attorneys.
Bill Champion testified that he became a consultant to Re-
spondent in 1994 while negotiations with the Stage Hands
Union and the Culinary Workers Union were ongoing. Prior
to negotiating with each of the labor organizations, including
the three Charging Parties, the Teamsters Union, and the Op-
erating Engineers Union, whose collective-bargaining agree-
ments with Respondent expired in 1995, he and Waltzman
‘‘decided that I would start them off and handle the language
portions. When we got . . . into the economics then he
would come in and talk economics.’’ As to their bargaining
authority, Champion stated, ‘‘My authority came from con-
tinuous review with Waltzman and his authority came from
continuous review with Interface.’’ Asked if he or Waltzman
ever told representatives of the labor organizations that they
had final authority to bargain, Champion answered, ‘‘No.
The answer is no. I could see that it was obvious that we
didn’t.’’ A moment later after being asked to explain why
such was obvious, Champion stated, ‘‘I thought it was obvi-
ous to them because I told them it was.’’ On this point, he
explained that, at the commencement of each set of negotia-
tions, he expressed the following ‘‘litany’’—‘‘I will talk with
you about language. . . . I will make a proposal to you.
After that’s over Mr. Waltzman will talk to you about money
and Mr. Waltzman has to run anything that he does by Inter-
face.’’10 Besides at the start of bargaining, Champion re-
peated the latter comment ‘‘when Waltzman struck a ten-
tative agreement with respect to wages, I reminded the
unions that as they had to get ratification from their mem-
bers, that the Sands had to get ratification from Boston. They
had to run it by the attorneys in Boston . . . is what I
said.’’11
Respondent’s general counsel, Paul Roberts, testified that,
while having no personal knowledge of what may have been
said at the bargaining table, he did speak to Waltzman during
Respondent’s negotiations with the Operating Engineers
Union with regard to communicating his bargaining author-
ity. ‘‘I reminded Mr. Waltzman that it was Mr. Adelson’s
very strong insistence that the limited authority with which
[he and Champion] had been given be communicated to the
unions. . . . He responded that he understood, sort of a cas-
ual response . . . sure, sure . . . we’re doing that.’’ Roberts
also testified to different versions of his conversations with
Dalton Hooks and Jerry Kmetz. With regard to the latter,
Roberts recalled Kmetz inquiring only as to the status of his
VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:48 Apr 30, 2002 Jkt 197585 PO 00004 Frm 01105 Fmt 0610 Sfmt 0610 D:\NLRB\324.130 APPS10 PsN: APPS10
1106 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
12 Burrus testified that Champion commented as follows at the
opening bargaining session—‘‘Mr. Champion stated that Mr.
Waltzman . . . would handle all of the monetary aspects of the col-
lective bargaining and that he would handle all of the language
issues of the contract.’’
13 Burrus’ testimony was uncontroverted that Respondent imple-
mented the terms of the successor collective-bargaining agreement,
including paying retroactive pay increases to the two bargaining
units represented by the Teamsters Union. Inasmuch as such was not
done in regard to Respondent’s electricians, painters, or carpenters,
the assumption appears warranted that what was negotiated at the
table, by Waltzman and Champion, was, in fact, a final agreement.
14 Kmetz testified that, at this time, he became aware that Re-
spondent had offered a severance package to the Culinary Workers
Union for its bargaining unit employees.
(Roberts) review of the parties’ agreement and evincing no
surprise as to the review by Adelson. Hooks, according to
Roberts, did seem ‘‘upset’’ with the latter’s substantive re-
view of the agreement and said that the parties had made a
deal at the table and that he viewed Adelson’s approval as
a mere formality. To this, Roberts responded that the nego-
tiators did not have final and binding authority and that he
understood this had been communicated to Hooks. Roberts
testified that Hooks’ assertion prompted him to speak to
Waltzman—‘‘I had a very specific conversation with Mr.
Waltzman after that . . . . he repeated again to me that [the
unions] had absolutely been told . . . that whatever was de-
cided . . . would be subject to final approval . . . [in] Bos-
ton.’’
Representatives of the Stage Hands Union, the Teamsters
Union, and the Operating Engineers Union each testified
with regard to his labor organization’s 1994–1995 contract
negotiations with Respondent and particularly with regard to
whether, at any time during the 1995 bargaining, either
Waltzman or Champion or both ever discussed his authority
to negotiate a final agreement. The only one of the above
corroborating any aspect of Respondent’s position was Brian
Reive, a business representative for the Operating Engineers
Union. Although he was not the chief spokesperson for his
labor organization, Reive participated in the 1995 successor
contract negotiations, and, he testified, Champion was the
primary spokesperson for Respondent and Waltzman ap-
peared for parts of two meetings ‘‘over the economics . . . .
just talked about the economic conditions of the propert[y]
. . . .’’ According to the witness, at ‘‘the final meeting,
where he reached a tentative agreement, Bill Champion [stat-
ed] . . . that . . . the tentative agreement we had reached
. . . was subject to the approval of the Board of Directors
and ownership of the Sands Hotel, but he felt there would
be no problem with that. . . . from my side of the table the
statement was also made, it was also subject to approval and
ratification of the membership.’’ During cross-examination,
Reive testified that, rather than Waltzman, Champion bar-
gained with the labor organization over monetary matters,
and Waltzman ‘‘came in and talked of . . . economic condi-
tions and the general ability of the hotel to make money
. . . .’’ During redirect examination, Reive recalled that
Waltzman made a similar comment to that of Champion dur-
ing his second appearance in the bargaining; he was ‘‘crying
poor and he said that anything we did at this bargaining table
would be subject to final ownership approval.’’
Testifying contrary to Reive was Dennis Kist, an attorney,
who acted as president of Stage Hands Local 7207, which
was engaged in negotiations for a successor collective-bar-
gaining agreement with Respondent in early 1995. According
to Kist, a significant problem during the bargaining was the
labor organization’s insistence on a ‘‘neutrality’’ clause, re-
quiring Respondent to be neutral in the labor organization’s
organizing efforts at any new hotel, which might be opened
by the former. Kist testified that Waltzman told him that in-
clusion of such a clause in the parties’ collective-bargaining
agreement would require approval from Boston, particularly
from Sheldon Adelson, a comment echoed by Respondent’s
attorney whenever bargaining turned to the above clause.
However, Kist added, ‘‘they never said that the whole—from
the beginning they didn’t preface it by saying that it had to
be approved by Boston . . . .’’ Likewise, contrary to Re-
spondent’s witnesses, Steve Burrus, the secretary/treasurer of
Teamsters Local 995, whose collective-bargaining agreement
with Respondent had expired in 1995 and which engaged in
successor agreement negotiations with Respondent prior to
the three charging party labor organizations, specifically de-
nied, during the negotiations, ever being told that any agree-
ment had to be ratified by Respondent’s headquarters in Bos-
ton—such was ‘‘never discussed.’’ Rather, according to
Burrus, during the parties’ initial bargaining session, Bill
Champion discussed his authority to negotiate12 and said,
‘‘[T]he whole contract would have to be approved by
Waltzman,’’ and, later in the bargaining, Waltzman con-
firmed what Champion stated, saying, ‘‘if he approved that
it would be that way.’’ During cross-examination, Burrus
was unable to recall Waltzman saying that he had to get ap-
proval of the negotiated financial package from his principal,
Sheldon Adelson. On being confronted with a contrary state-
ment in his pretrial affidavit, Burrus insisted that he contin-
ued to be unable to recall Waltzman making such a com-
ment.13
2. Respondent’s refusal to provide information
As discussed above, Respondent gave no indication to any
of the labor organizations, with which it was engaged in bar-
gaining during 1995, that it had any intent of ceasing oper-
ations. To the contrary, in connection with the new recogni-
tion clause language and the accompanying side letter, both
of which it proposed to the labor organizations, Respondent
explained that it was exploring various options for expansion
of its facility. However, in the spring of 1996, Jerry Kmetz
of the Painters Union and Bill Hutchinson of the Carpenters
Union each became aware of media reports that Respondent
was considering closing its hotel and casino and received re-
ports of rumors of such from his bargaining unit members,
employed by Respondent. Then, on or about May 15, each
received a letter from Arthur Waltzman, stating that, pursu-
ant to relevant sections of the Worker Adjustment and Re-
training Notification Act, Respondent ‘‘plans to initiate [ei-
ther a] ‘plant closing’ and/or a ‘mass lay-off.’’’ Shortly
thereafter, each received a letter from Respondent’s attorney,
Howard Cole, stating that Respondent recognized its ‘‘obli-
gation to meet and confer with [each labor organization] re-
garding the effects of the closure of the Sands’’ and that
‘‘meeting as quickly as possible will best serve the interests
of the affected employees.’’14
Both the Painters Union and the Carpenters Union were
represented by the same attorney, Hope Singer, and Kmetz
VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:48 Apr 30, 2002 Jkt 197585 PO 00004 Frm 01106 Fmt 0610 Sfmt 0610 D:\NLRB\324.130 APPS10 PsN: APPS10
1107SANDS HOTEL & CASINO
15 In the letter, Singer noted her clients’ belief that, rather than a
permanent closure, Respondent was actually undertaking a ‘‘tem-
porary closing of the Sands Hotel.’’
16 Kmetz testified that he was aware he would receive an offer of
a severance package from Cole and that, in essence, he would be
asked to trade the final 2 years of the term of the successor collec-
tive-bargaining agreement (4 years) for a severance payment to each
bargaining unit employee. Stating that he was ‘‘pretty confident’’
that Respondent desired to construct a new facility, his concern was
‘‘to not have a collective-bargaining agreement when the Sands
open[s] a new property and not have the ability to go back into that
property. That was my greatest concern. It wasn’t a fair trade off.’’
Likewise, Hutchinson was aware that he would receive such a pro-
posal.
17 With regard to the effects bargaining, Cole made a proposal to
settle the effects bargaining, offering that Respondent would execute
both the Painters Union and the Carpenters Union successor collec-
tive-bargaining agreements, pay all the retroactive wage increases
owed to both labor organizations’ respective bargaining unit employ-
ees, who were employed by Respondent, and permit the employees
in both bargaining units to participate in its severance payment pack-
age in exchange for each labor organization’s agreement to change
the term of its successor collective-bargaining agreement from 4
years to 2 years.
18 Hutchinson believed that, notwithstanding the new, agreed-on
recognition clause language, there was a chance that the Carpenters
would retain bargaining rights if Respondent, itself or in conjunction
with others, constructed a new hotel and casino on Respondent’s
property during the 4-year term of the agreement—‘‘I think that
would be open to interpretation by an arbitrator.’’
and Hutchinson each spoke to her, regarding Respondent’s
cessation of business and its offer to bargain over the effects
of the asserted closure. According to Hutchinson, he ex-
pressed concerns to Singer, especially ‘‘some skepticism that
I had . . . that [the hotel and casino] would be closed com-
pletely down. They had just done a . . . remodel of the ca-
sino. It seemed rather inappropriate. I thought they would
. . . tear down hotel buildings . . . expand . . . towards the
street.’’ He added that, in discussing the matter with Singer,
‘‘we decided that we didn’t have enough information to
make the decisions what we had to make.’’ Thereafter, on
behalf of both labor organizations, Singer arranged a meeting
with Cole and sent him a letter, dated May 24, 1966, re-
questing information, including the following documents:15
1. Any studies, surveys or reports that formed the
basis for the decision to tear down the current property,
rather than to build additional towers; 2. Any other in-
ternal records, memoranda or communications which
relate to the decision to tear down the property or to
justify that decision; 3. Any copies of minutes or
records of any pertinent meetings at which the tear
down and rebuilding of the property was discussed and
any written communications announcing the results of
those discussions . . . .
Singer, Kmetz, and Hutchinson met with Cole on June 3
in the latter’s office,16 and Cole presented a letter, dated June
2, to the others. The letter represented Respondent’s response
to Singer’s above-described information request, and, at its
outset, Cole set forth his authorization to discuss the impact
of Respondent’s ‘‘closure decision.’’ Continuing, Cole de-
scribed his client’s actions as a ‘‘significant change’’ in the
direction of its business operations and denied that such was
merely a temporary closing of the property. Then, in the let-
ter, specifically as to each numbered request for information,
Cole demanded that Singer, presumably on behalf of each
labor organization, ‘‘furnish valid and compelling reasons
justifying the need for this information for purposes of bar-
gaining over the effects of the closure decision.’’ He added
that the information sought constituted ‘‘confidential and/or
proprietary information.’’
As to what was said during the meeting regarding the two
labor organizations’ information request, according to Hutch-
inson, Cole refused to provide the information, saying he
would only do so if such was specifically relevant to bar-
gaining over ‘‘the effects of the closing.’’ Singer had no re-
sponse to Cole’s demand for ‘‘compelling’’ justification for
the information request, replying only that the labor organi-
zations remained ‘‘skeptical’’ of Respondent’s intent to close
‘‘wholly and completely.’’ There is no dispute that, at no
time after the conclusion of this meeting,17 has Respondent
ever provided the requested information to the two labor or-
ganizations.
As to the relevance and necessity for the requested infor-
mation, Hutchinson candidly conceded that, other than his
belief that Respondent was dissembling in its claim that the
cessation of its operations was permanent, he had no other
reason for demanding the information, which Singer sought
in her May 24 letter to Cole. He added that his labor organi-
zation’s concern was that the closure was merely temporary
‘‘while they demolish the hotel rooms, so they wouldn’t be
endangering their clients and reopen the casino that would be
temporary.’’ Then, ‘‘we would have bargained away our
agreement.’’ Asked if what Cole wrote and stated during the
June 3 meeting had any effect upon his labor organization’s
need for the information, Hutchinson replied, ‘‘If the hotel
was going to rise from the dust, be rebuilt, would we have
a continuing agreement? . . . . Did they really and truly in-
tend to tear the hotel building down? . . . . I didn’t know
for sure that they were really going [to]. All I had was Mr.
Cole’s word.’’18
B. Legal Analysis
Initially, I turn to consideration of the allegations that Re-
spondent engaged in conduct, violative of Section 8(a)(1) and
(5) of the Act by failing and refusing to execute the 1995
Carpenters Union MOA, the 1995 Painters Union MOA, and
the 1995 Electrical Workers MOA. The record establishes,
and there is no dispute, that, in 1995, on behalf of Respond-
ent, Bill Champion and Arthur Waltzman negotiated com-
plete successor collective-bargaining agreements with each
labor organization; therefore, the only issue is whether
Champion or Waltzman communicated to each labor organi-
zation that, prior to becoming binding upon Respondent,
their agreement was subject to approval by Respondent’s at-
torneys and corporate officers, including Sheldon Adelson, in
its Boston office. At the outset, I must determine what, in
anything, was said, on this subject, by Champion and/or
Waltzman during each negotiation, and, in this regard, reso-
lution of the credibility of the several witnesses is required.
Bluntly put, I place no reliance on the testimony of Bill
Champion that, as part of his opening ‘‘litany’’ to each labor
organization, he informed them that Waltzman was required
to have anything offered by him approved by Interface.
VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:48 Apr 30, 2002 Jkt 197585 PO 00004 Frm 01107 Fmt 0610 Sfmt 0610 D:\NLRB\324.130 APPS10 PsN: APPS10
1108 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
19 For example, at one point, when asked if anything was said by
Waltzman or him concerning their authority to reach an agreement,
Champion said, ‘‘No. The answer is no. I could see that it was obvi-
ous that we didn’t.’’ Given an opportunity to correct his answer, the
witness corrected himself. I have no confidence in the veracity of
this later response.
20 Assuming arguendo that Champion did, in fact, state what he as-
serted he said at the start of each set of negotiations, I am not at
all certain such would have been understood as meaning that any
‘‘final’’ agreement, reached at the bargaining table, required ap-
proval by Respondent’s corporate officers in Boston. Thus, what
Champion said may well have been understood as meaning that any
offers or agreements at the table required immediate approval by the
officials. This view is supported by Champion’s own comment that
Waltzman reported to him that he kept Boston fully appraised as to
the ongoing bargaining and by R. Exhs. 3 and 4, which are solicita-
tions of Adelson’s approval of bargaining positions.
I do not view Aubrey Rueff’s vague recollection, that, at the first
1995 bargaining session between the Carpenters Union, the Painters
Union, and Respondent, Champion said, ‘‘[T]here was no final au-
thority either way . . .,’’ as being corroborative of the latter’s testi-
mony. Thus, Rueff candidly conceded that he could not recall what,
in fact, was said, and his testimony is demonstrative of a witness,
who was having trouble recalling a past comment. Further, he spe-
cifically denied that Champion ever said the parties’ agreement re-
quired approval elsewhere by anyone else.
21 I note that, as Champion’s version of what he said is similar
to the recollection of Aubrey Rueff, it is not inconceivable that, at
the conclusion of the bargaining with the Carpenters Union, his
words were ‘‘They had to run it by the attorneys in Boston.’’
22 While such was at variance with his testimony and notwith-
standing his inability to recall making such a statement, inasmuch
as Steve Burrus, the secretary/treasurer of the Teamsters Union,
wrote, in his sworn pretrial affidavit, that Waltzman commented
about having to check with his principals when the parties neared
a final agreement, it is not unlikely that Waltzman also made such
a statement to the Teamsters Union during the 1995 negotiations.
23 I credit the testimony of Hutchinson that his understanding of
such a statement is that ‘‘the attorneys always review [an agreement]
to make sure that I’m not going put something in there that wasn’t
agreed [to].’’ In other words, ‘‘review it for accuracy.’’ Based on
what Waltzman reported to Champion, inasmuch as Respondent’s
corporate officers and attorneys were constantly updated on negotia-
tions and, undoubtedly, approved whatever was being offered to the
labor organizations, an examination for form would have been the
only reason Respondent’s corporate officers and attorneys would
have reviewed the agreements at issue herein.
Thus, not only did Champion’s answers to questions on this
point fail to impress me19 but also no other witnesses, in-
cluding Marcie Yarnell and Brian Reive, the only ostensibly
corroborative witnesses, substantiated him that he said any-
thing, at the start of bargaining, as to his or Waltzman’s au-
thority to bind Respondent.20
On the other hand, while I believe that he also said noth-
ing about the necessity for approval of the negotiated agree-
ment from Boston at the close of bargaining with representa-
tives of any of the three Charging Party labor organizations,
I also believe that Bill Champion did, in fact, say something
about sending their completed agreements to Boston to both
Painters Union and Carpenters Union representatives at the
conclusion of their respective negotiations. In this regard, as
Marcie Yarnell’s testimonial demeanor appeared to be that of
a mere sycophantic witness, one whose testimony was in-
tended to buttress Respondent’s position rather than to be
truthful, I place no reliance on her version of what Champion
said at the close of bargaining with the Charging Party labor
organizations. Also, in contrast to that of Dalton Hooks,
James Springgate, Jerry Kmetz, Bill Hutchinson, and Aubrey
Rueff, Bill Champion’s demeanor, while testifying, was that
of an utterly disingenuous witness; therefore, while confident
in the respective candor of Hooks, Springgate, Kmetz,
Hutchinson, and Rueff, I place only slight reliance upon the
testimony of Champion as to what, if anything, he said to
the various labor organizations at the close of 1995 bargain-
ing.21 Further, Dennis Kist, the acting president of the Stage
Hands Union, and Brian Reive, the Operating Engineers
Union business representative, each impressed me as being
a candid witness, and the testimony of each is worthy of be-
lief. While the foregoing credibility resolutions result in a
nominal inconsistency—that, at the conclusion of bargaining,
Respondent informed the representatives of the Operating
Engineers Union that their agreed-on successor agreement re-
quired approval by Respondent’s corporate officials in Bos-
ton prior to becoming binding,22 mentioned something con-
cerning attorney review to representatives of the Carpenters
Union, but said not a word on these points, to the negotiators
for other labor organizations, such, in my view, merely es-
tablishes that those, who negotiated on behalf of Respondent,
including Champion, were, in fact, inconsistent in what they
said to each labor organization, regarding restrictions on their
bargaining authority, during 1995 negotiations. Put another
way, what Respondent’s negotiators may have said, regard-
ing their bargaining authority, to one labor organization does
not establish that the same, or any, message was conveyed
to any other labor organization, with whom Respondent bar-
gained in that year. Therefore, I find that, during bargaining
in 1995, while Champion and Waltzman informed the Oper-
ating Engineer’s representatives and, perhaps, those rep-
resenting the Teamsters Union that the parties’ negotiated
agreement was tentative, subject to approval by Respondent’s
corporate officials, Respondent’s bargaining representatives
never informed negotiators for either the Electrical Workers
Union, the Painters Union, the Carpenters Union, or the
Stage Hands Union of the existence of such a condition sub-
sequent and that, at most, Bill Champion informed represent-
atives of the Carpenters Union that their completed MOA
would be sent to Boston for signing and informed representa-
tives of the Carpenters Union that their fully consummated
MOA would be ‘‘run’’ past Respondent’s attorneys in Bos-
ton or sent to them for ‘‘a check over wording.’’23
There is no dispute as to the applicable Board law. Thus,
having reached agreement on the terms of a complete collec-
tive-bargaining agreement, it is incumbent on a party to an
agreement, on the request of the other party, to execute a
memorialized version of the agreement, and a failure and re-
fusal to do so constitutes a violation of Section 8(a)(1) and
(5) of the Act. H. J. Heinz Co. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 514
(1941). Further, ‘‘a per se violation of [the Act] may occur
when a company misleads [a labor organization] into believ-
ing that an agreement has been reached . . . and only formal
execution remains.’’ NLRB v. Advanced Business Forms
Corp., 474 F.2d 457, 465 (2d Cir. 1973). In this regard, ‘‘the
law is clear that when an agent is appointed to negotiate a
collective-bargaining agreement that agent is deemed to have
apparent authority to bind his principal in the absence of
clear notice to the contrary.’’ University of Bridgeport, 229
VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:48 Apr 30, 2002 Jkt 197585 PO 00004 Frm 01108 Fmt 0610 Sfmt 0610 D:\NLRB\324.130 APPS10 PsN: APPS10
1109SANDS HOTEL & CASINO
NLRB 1074, 1074 (1977); Metco Products, Inc. v. NLRB,
884 F.2d 156, 159 (4th Cir. 1989); Hyatt Regency New Orle-
ans, 281 NLRB 279, 282 (1986); Adams Iron Works, Inc.,
221 NLRB 71 (1975); Aptos Seascape Corp., 194 NLRB
540, 544 (1971). Herein, I have concluded that, at no point
during the 1995 successor contract negotiations with the
Electrical Workers Union, the Painters Union or the Car-
penters Union, did either Arthur Waltzman or Bill Champion
inform representatives of either labor organization that the
parties’ consummated collective-bargaining agreement was
tentative and not binding on Respondent until approved by
corporate officials or attorneys in Boston. Accordingly, after
Waltzman and Dalton Hooks shook hands at the conclusion
of bargaining and the former stated they had a deal, the Elec-
trical Workers Union bargaining unit employees ratified the
completed MOA, and Hooks executed and returned a copy
to Respondent for signature, the latter was obligated to exe-
cute the document and abide by its terms. Likewise, after the
parties concluded bargaining and Champion instructed Jerry
Kmetz to take the agreement to the bargaining unit employ-
ees for ratification, the Painters Union bargaining unit em-
ployees ratified the MOA, and Kmetz brought an executed
copy of the MOA to Respondent for signature, the latter was
obligated to execute the MOA and abide by its terms. Also,
after Waltzman told Hutchinson that Respondent and the
Carpenters Union had previously reached a deal and to sell
the MOA to the bargaining unit employees, the employees
ratified the agreement, and Hutchinson delivered an executed
copy to Respondent, the latter was obligated to execute that
labor organization’s MOA and abide by its terms.
Finally, with regard to whatever Champion said to rep-
resentatives of both the Painters Union and the Carpenters
Union at the conclusion of their respective negotiations, I do
not believe that such was sufficient to place either labor or-
ganization on notice that substantive approval of their respec-
tive memorandum agreements, by its corporate officials and
attorneys in Boston, was required before these would become
binding on Respondent. Thus, ‘‘if the necessity for [an] em-
ployer’s approval of an agreement made by [its] agent is not
clearly understood, the employer’s refusal to sign the agree-
ment is unlawful.’’ Aptos Seascape, supra. In my view, it
would be nonsensical to assert that informing the Painters
Union that their completed MOA would be executed in Bos-
ton constituted clear notice that substantive approval of the
document was required before it became binding. Likewise,
inasmuch as, Bill Hutchinson understood that, after negotia-
tions for a collective-bargaining agreement, it was not un-
usual for the parties’ lawyers to review the memorialized
version of the agreement for accuracy, it would be unreason-
able to conclude that Champion’s comment, at the conclusion
of the 1995 bargaining, clearly conveyed to Hutchinson and
Aubrey Rueff that, in order for the agreed-on MOA to be-
come binding on Respondent, substantive approval of the
terms, by Respondent’s attorneys in Boston, was necessary.
Therefore, by failing and refusing to execute each of the
above memorandum agreements and by failing and refusing
to abide by the terms of each agreement, Respondent en-
gaged in conduct violative of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the
Act. H. J. Heinz Co., supra; University of Bridgeport, supra.
I turn now to analysis as to whether Respondent engaged
in conduct, violative of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act,
by failing and refusing to transmit to the Carpenters Union
and the Painters Union certain documents pertaining to Re-
spondent’s asserted permanent cessation of operations, re-
quested in a letter, dated May 24, 1996, from the labor orga-
nizations’ attorney to counsel for Respondent. In this regard,
there is no dispute that, rather than providing the requested
information, Respondent’s attorney responded by demanding
that the labor organizations furnish Respondent with ‘‘valid
and compelling reasons justifying’’ each request and that,
when counsel for the labor organizations failed to do so, Re-
spondent refused to transmit the requested information to the
labor organizations on grounds that the latter had failed to
establish the relevancy of the information to effects bargain-
ing. The parties agree on the relevant legal principals. Thus,
it has long been established Board law that, generally, an
employer is under a statutory obligation, on request, to pro-
vide a labor organization, which is the collective-bargaining
representative of the employer’s employees, with informa-
tion, which is necessary and relevant for the proper perform-
ance of the labor organization’s duties in representing the
bargaining unit employees. NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co.,
385 U.S. 432 (1967); NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149
(1956); Aerospace Corp., 314 NLRB 100, 103 (1994); How-
ard University, 290 NLRB 1006 (1988). This duty to provide
information encompasses not only material necessary and rel-
evant for the purpose of contract negotiations but also infor-
mation necessary for the administration of a collective-bar-
gaining agreement, including information required by a labor
organization to process a grievance, and for effects bargain-
ing. Acme Industrial, supra; Bacardi Corp., 296 NLRB 1220
(1989); Challenge-Cook Bros., 282 NLRB 21, 28 (1986).
The standard for relevancy is a ‘‘liberal discovery-type stand-
ard,’’ and the sought-after evidence need not be necessarily
dispositive of the issue between the parties but, rather, only
of some bearing upon it and of probable use to the labor or-
ganization in carrying out its statutory responsibilities. Aero-
space Corp., supra; Bacardi Corp., supra; Pfizer, Inc., 268
NLRB 916 (1984). Further, necessity is not a guideline itself
but, rather, is directly related to relevancy, and only the
probability that the requested information will be of use to
the labor organization need be established. Bacardi Corp.,
supra. Moreover, information, which concerns the terms and
conditions of employment of the bargaining unit employees,
is deemed ‘‘so intrinsic to the core of the employer-employee
relationship’’ that such is held to be presumptively relevant.
York International Corp., 290 NLRB 438 (1988), quoting
Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 173 NLRB 172 (1968);
Buffalo Concrete, 276 NLRB 839 (1985). However, informa-
tion, which does not concern the terms and conditions of bar-
gaining unit employees, is not presumptively relevant, and
the labor organization ‘‘must therefore demonstrate the rel-
evance of such information.’’ Maple View Manor, Inc., 320
NLRB 1149, 1151 at fn. 2 (1996); Miami Rivet of Puerto
Rico, 318 NLRB 769 (1995). ‘‘A [labor organization] has
satisfied its burden when it demonstrates a reasonable belief
supported by objective evidence for requesting the informa-
tion.’’ Shoppers Food Warehouse, 315 NLRB 358, 359
(1994); Knappton Maritime Corp., 292 NLRB 236 (1988).
Counsel for the General Counsel does not contend that the
information, which was requested by the attorney for the
Painters Union and the Carpenters Union, is presumptively
relevant. Rather, he recognizes that it is necessary for the
VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:48 Apr 30, 2002 Jkt 197585 PO 00004 Frm 01109 Fmt 0610 Sfmt 0610 D:\NLRB\324.130 APPS10 PsN: APPS10
1110 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
24 ‘‘So-called effects bargaining provides the union with an oppor-
tunity to bargain in the employees’ interest for such benefits as sev-
erance pay, payments into the pension fund, preferential hiring if the
employer continues operating at other plants, and reference letters
. . . .’’ Los Angeles Soap Co., 300 NLRB 289, 295 (1990).
25 While in Challenge-Cook Bros., supra, the Board did order the
respondent to provide the union with information relevant to effects
bargaining and while the information request was for documents,
similar to those requested herein, the Board’s order differentiated be-
tween documents, which related to the respondent’s decision to relo-
cate its operations and which the respondent was not ordered to give
to the union, and documents, which were clearly relevant for effects
bargaining.
26 The information requests were a series of questions pertaining
not to the decision to close but to the actual closure itself—had the
company, as yet, sold its goodwill, its property, its business ac-
counts, its office equipment, etc.
labor organizations to establish the relevancy of their re-
quested information and argues that they have met their bur-
den. In this regard, as I understand the respective testimony
of Jerry Kmetz and of Bill Hutchinson, both of whom I cred-
it, each was aware that Howard Cole would propose a bar-
gaining unit employee severance package, to each labor orga-
nization, contingent upon each agreeing to reduce the term
of its successor collective-bargaining agreement from 4 to 2
years, and, as, notwithstanding Respondent’s attorney’s prot-
estations to the contrary, neither Kmetz nor Hutchinson be-
lieved that Respondent’s actual intent was to permanently
close its hotel and casino facility and as each was leery of
relinquishing his labor organization’s bargaining rights for
1998 and 1999, Kmetz and Hutchinson required the re-
quested documents, concerning Respondent’s future plans, in
order to determine whether or not to engage in bargaining
over the severance offers. Given that Waltzman and Cham-
pion had recently engaged in extensive discussion of Re-
spondent’s expansion plans for its facility during the succes-
sor contract bargaining with them, there appears to have ex-
isted an objective basis for Kmetz’s and Hutchinson’s ex-
pressed skepticism.
Nevertheless, contending that his client lawfully refused to
furnish the requested information to the Painters Union and
to the Carpenters Union, counsel for Respondent argues that
the documents, which the labor organizations requested, per-
tain to Respondent’s decision to cease business operations, a
matter about which it was not entitled to bargain, and were
not concerned with, or relevant to, the effects bargaining24
itself, and Hutchinson himself admitted that, other than his
belief that Respondent was not, in fact, closing the business,
there were no other reasons underlying the document re-
quests. In this regard, the Board concluded, in BC Industries,
307 NLRB 1275, 1275 at fn. 2 (1992), that an employer did
not violate Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act by refusing to
bargain over a decision to close two plants and to relocate
one, and, clearly, as the Board held in Challenge-Cook Bros.,
supra, a labor organization is not entitled to information per-
taining to a subject about which it is not entitled to bar-
gain.25 Arguing the relevancy of the requested documents,
counsel for the General Counsel points out that the informa-
tion was required by the labor organizations in order for
them to weigh the efficacy of entering into effects bargaining
with Respondent and relies upon two Board decisions for
support. In Metro Foods, 289 NLRB 1107 (1988), which in-
volved the alleged establishment of an alter ego company, a
union requested information about the new business.26 The
respondent contended that the union, which represented cer-
tain of its employees, was demanding information pertaining
to its decision to close its business, a subject on which the
union was not entitled to bargain. The Board concluded that
the union was entitled to any information concerning
‘‘whether [the business] was in fact closing or whether the
business was continuing through a successor or alter ego.’’
Id. at 1118. Counsel also relies on Shoppers Food Ware-
house, supra, in which a union requested information, per-
taining to whether a new store was of the type covered by
the parties existing collective-bargaining agreement, from an
employer. The latter informed the union the new store was
not of the type covered by the contract. The Board concluded
that the union was entitled to the information as ‘‘the Union
was not required to accept the Respondent’s response that
[the new store] was a totally separate operation and not a
food store within the meaning of the contract’’ and was enti-
tled to conduct its own investigation to reach its own conclu-
sions. Id. at 259.
I find merit to the arguments of both counsel for the Gen-
eral Counsel and counsel for Respondent. Thus, there can be
no question that a labor organization is not entitled to bar-
gain over an employer’s decision to close a plant or that a
labor organization is not entitled to documents relating to
such a decision. However, in Metro Foods, supra, the in-
volved labor organization avoided such a result and estab-
lished the relevancy of its questions to the alleged establish-
ment of an alter ego company as, rather than inquiring as to
the decision to close the business itself, it probed the bona
fide nature of the employer’s claimed business closure deci-
sion with questions regarding its implementation. Herein,
while Hutchinson asserted that the labor organizations’ con-
cern was whether, in fact, Respondent’s business closure was
complete and permanent, examination of their attorney’s
three document requests reveals that, except for a portion of
the third, unlike the questions in Metro Foods and rather
than relating to Respondent’s implementation of its asserted
cessation of operations decision, the requested documents di-
rectly concerned the decision, a subject about which Re-
spondent was under no obligation to bargain, and Respondent
was, therefore, under no statutory obligation to provide the
documents to the labor organizations. However, I think that,
to the extent that the third document request sought minutes
or records of meetings during which the possible rebuilding
of Respondent’s facility was discussed and any written com-
munications announcing such, said request did, in fact, relate
to the permanence and entirety of the closure and not to the
closure decision itself and should have been provided to the
labor organizations in order for them to determine whether
to engage in effects bargaining. This information was clearly
necessary and relevant to the labor organizations’ decision
as, based on objective factors, including Respondent’s state-
ments at the bargaining table, Hutchinson and Kmetz could
reasonably have doubted the veracity of Waltzman’s and
Cole’s statements that Respondent was permanently and
completely closing its business, and, notwithstanding counsel
for Respondent’s posthearing brief contention to the contrary,
it is, in fact, Board law that the labor organizations were not
required to accept their assertions. Shoppers Food Ware-
VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:48 Apr 30, 2002 Jkt 197585 PO 00004 Frm 01110 Fmt 0610 Sfmt 0610 D:\NLRB\324.130 APPS10 PsN: APPS10
1111SANDS HOTEL & CASINO
27 Counsel for Respondent argues that what was requested by the
labor organization’ counsel constituted proprietary and confidential
information. An employer bears the burden of demonstrating that its
refusal to provide relevant and necessary information to a labor or-
ganization is excusable because the requested information is some-
how privileged. Aerospace Corp., supra at 103 fn. 10; McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 224 NLRB 881 (1976). Respondent offered no evi-
dence to support this defense, and, thus, it is without merit.
house, supra. Accordingly, to this limited extent, I find that
Respondent engaged in conduct, violative of Section 8(a)(1)
and (5) of the Act by not providing the requested documents
to the Painters Union and the Carpenters Union. Metro
Foods, supra.27
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The Electrical Workers Union, the Painters Union, and
the Carpenters Union are, and each is, labor organizations
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. The Painters Union is the exclusive representative for
purposes of collective bargaining of the employees in the fol-
lowing appropriate unit within the meaning of Section 9(a)
of the Act:
All painters, paperhangers, taper-finishers, and com-
bination craftsmen employed by Respondent; excluding
all other employees, office clerical employees, guards,
and supervisors as defined in the Act.
4. The Electrical Workers Union is the exclusive rep-
resentative for purposes of collective bargaining of the em-
ployees in the following appropriate unit within the meaning
of Section 9(a) of the Act:
All electrician foremen, journeymen electricians, and
relief electricians employed by Respondent; excluding
all other employees, office clerical employees, guards,
and supervisors as defined in the Act.
5. The Carpenters Union is the exclusive representative for
purposes of collective bargaining of the employees in the fol-
lowing appropriate unit within the meaning of Section 9(a)
of the Act:
All journeymen carpenters and carpenter foremen em-
ployed by Respondent; excluding all other employees,
office clerical employees, guards, and supervisors as
defined in the Act.
6. By failing and refusing to execute the memorandum of
agreement between itself and the Electrical Workers Union,
embodying the terms of their successor collective-bargaining
agreement, covering the bargaining unit employees described
in paragraph 4 above, reached on or about September 11,
1995, Respondent engaged in conduct violative of Section
8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act.
7. By failing and refusing to execute the memorandum of
agreement between itself and the Painters Union, embodying
the terms of their successor collective-bargaining agreement,
covering the bargaining unit employees described in para-
graph 3 above, reached on or about October 23, 1995, Re-
spondent engaged in conduct violative of Section 8(a)(1) and
(5) of the Act.
8. By failing and refusing to execute the memorandum of
agreement between itself and the Carpenters Union, embody-
ing the terms of the successor collective-bargaining agree-
ment, covering the bargaining unit employees described in
paragraph 5 above, reached in or about November 1995, Re-
spondent engaged in conduct violative of Section 8(a)(1) and
(5) of the Act.
9. By failing and refusing to furnish the Painters Union
and the Carpenters Union with the requested documents, re-
lating to the records and minutes of any meetings during
which the future rebuilding of Respondent’s hotel and casino
facility was discussed and to any printed announcements of
such, documents which were necessary and relevant to each
labor organizations for their considerations as to whether to
engage in effects bargaining with it, Respondent engaged in
conduct violative of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act.
10. The above violations are unfair labor practices affect-
ing commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of
the Act.
11. Unless stated above, Respondent engaged in no other
unfair labor practices.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in serious vio-
lations of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act, I shall order
it to cease and desist from engaging in the conduct, which
I have found unlawful, and to take certain affirmative action
designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
I shall recommend that Respondent be ordered to execute
the above-described memorandum of agreement between
itself the Electrical Workers Union, the memorandum of
agreement between itself and the Painters Union, and the
memorandum of agreement between itself and the Carpenters
Union. In addition, I shall recommend that, upon execution
of each memorandum of agreement, Respondent give retro-
active effect to its provisions and make whole the bargaining
unit employees, with interest, for any losses they may have
suffered by reason of Respondent’s failure to execute and ef-
fectuate all terms of the agreement, including retroactive
wage increases. Backpay shall be computed in the manner
prescribed in Ogle Protection Service, 183 NLRB 682
(1970), enfd. 444 F.2d 1173 (6th Cir. 1971), with interest to
be computed in the manner prescribed in New Horizons for
the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987). Further, I shall rec-
ommend that Respondent shall pay, to any contractually
agreed-on trust funds, the amounts of any increased contribu-
tions that Respondent failed to make on behalf of the bar-
gaining unit employees in accordance with the Board’s deci-
sion in Fox Painting Co., 263 NLRB 437 (1982), with any
additional amount to be computed in accordance with the
Board’s decision in Merryweather Optical Co., 240 NLRB
1213 (1979). I shall also recommend that Respondent reim-
burse its employees for any expenses resulting from any fail-
ure to make fund payments in the manner set forth in Kraft
Plumbing & Heating, 252 NLRB 891 fn. 2 (1980), enfd. 661
F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1981).
With regard to Respondent’s unlawful failure and refusal
to provide necessary and relevant information to the Car-
penters Union and to the Painters Union for purposes of de-
termining whether to engage in effects bargaining, I do not
VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:48 Apr 30, 2002 Jkt 197585 PO 00004 Frm 01111 Fmt 0610 Sfmt 0610 D:\NLRB\324.130 APPS10 PsN: APPS10
1112 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
28 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and rec-
ommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be
adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
29 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court
of appeals, the words in the notice reading ‘‘Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board’’ shall read ‘‘Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order
of the National Labor Relations Board.’’
believe that it would effectuate the policies of the Act to
order Respondent to furnish the requested documents to the
two labor organizations at this time. Thus, there is no dispute
that, notwithstanding the labor organizations’ reasonable be-
lief to the contrary, Respondent did, in fact, cease all busi-
ness operations on or about June 30, 1996, and that its hotel
and casino facility was torn down shortly thereafter. Accord-
ingly, the requested documents could serve no useful purpose
to either labor organization and to order Respondent to pro-
vide such would be, at most, a classic Pyrrhic victory.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on
the entire record herein, I issue the following recommended28
ORDER
The Respondent, Las Vegas Sands, Inc., d/b/a Sands Hotel
& Casino, Las Vegas, Nevada, its officers, agents, succes-
sors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Failing and refusing to execute the memorandum of
agreement, memorializing the terms of the 1995 successor
collective-bargaining agreement reached by it and the Elec-
trical Workers Union.
(b) Failing and refusing to execute the memorandum of
agreement, memorializing the terms of the 1995 successor
collective-bargaining agreement reached by it and the Paint-
ers Union.
(c) Failing and refusing to execute the memorandum of
agreement, memorializing the terms of 1995 successor col-
lective-bargaining agreement reached by it and the Car-
penters Union.
(d) Failing and refusing to furnish the Painters Union and
the Carpenters Union with documents, relating to the records
and minutes of any meetings during which the future rebuild-
ing of Respondent’s hotel and casino facility was discussed
and to any printed announcements of such.
(e) In any like or related manner interfering with, restrain-
ing, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guar-
anteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to ef-
fectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Forthwith execute the memorandum of agreement, em-
bodying the terms of the successor collective-bargaining
agreement, between it and the Electrical Workers Union,
reached on or about September 11, 1995.
(b) Forthwith execute the memorandum of agreement, em-
bodying the terms of the successor collective-bargaining
agreement, between it and the Painters Union, reached on or
about October 23, 1995.
(c) Forthwith execute the memorandum of agreement, em-
bodying the terms of the successor collective-bargaining
agreement, between it and the Carpenters Union, reached in
or about November 1995.
(d) On execution of each of the aforesaid agreements, give
retroactive effect to its provisions and make whole the bar-
gaining unit employees, with interest, for any losses they
may have suffered by means of Respondent’s failure to exe-
cute and effectuate all the terms of the agreement, including
the payment of retroactive wage increases, in the manner set
forth in the remedy section of this decision. In addition, Re-
spondent shall pay to any contractually agreed-on trust funds
the amounts of any increased contributions, which Respond-
ent failed to make, in the manner set forth in the remedy sec-
tion of this decision. Further Respondent shall reimburse any
bargaining unit employees, with interest, for any expenses re-
sulting from its failure to make any trust fund payments in
the manner set forth in the remedy section of this decision.
(e) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, make avail-
able to the Board or its agents for examination and copying,
all payroll records, social security payment records, time-
cards, personnel records and reports, and all other records
necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under terms
of this Order.
(f) Within 14 days after service by the Region, duplicate
and mail, at its own expense, copies of the attached notice,
marked ‘‘Appendix,’’29 in Spanish and English, to all em-
ployees of its Las Vegas, Nevada hotel and casino facility,
who were employed by it between August 31, 1995, and the
closure of the facility on June 30, 1996. Copies of the notice,
on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 20,
shall bear the signature of the Respondent’s authorized rep-
resentative.
(g) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with
the Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible
official, on a form provided by the Region, attesting to the
steps that the Respondent has taken to comply.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us
to post and abide by the terms of this notice.
WE WILL NOT refuse to execute the memorandum of
agreement, memorializing the terms of the 1995 successor
collective-bargaining agreement, between International Broth-
erhood of Electrical Workers, Local 357, AFL–CIO and us.
WE WILL NOT refuse to execute the memorandum of
agreement, memorializing the terms of the 1995 successor
collective-bargaining agreement, between International Broth-
erhood of Painters & Allied Trades Union, Local 159, AFL–
CIO and us.
WE WILL NOT refuse to execute the memorandum of
agreement, memorializing the terms of the 1995 successor
collective-bargaining agreement, between Silver State District
Council of Carpenters & Joiners of America, Local 1780,
AFL–CIO and us.
WE WILL NOT refuse to furnish to the Painters Union and
to the Carpenters Union documents, relating to the records
VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:48 Apr 30, 2002 Jkt 197585 PO 00004 Frm 01112 Fmt 0610 Sfmt 0610 D:\NLRB\324.130 APPS10 PsN: APPS10
1113SANDS HOTEL & CASINO
and minutes of any meetings during which the future rebuild-
ing of our hotel and casino facility was discussed and to any
printed announcements of such.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL forthwith execute the memorandum of agree-
ment, embodying the terms of the successor collective-bar-
gaining agreement between the Electrical Workers Union and
us.
WE WILL forthwith execute the memorandum of agree-
ment, embodying the terms of the successor collective-bar-
gaining agreement between the Painters Union and us.
WE WILL forthwith execute the memorandum agreement,
embodying the terms of the successor collective-bargaining
agreement, embodying the terms of the successor collective-
bargaining agreement between the Carpenters Union and us.
WE WILL give retroactive effect to the terms and condi-
tions of employment of each of the above agreements and
WE WILL make whole our employees for any losses they may
have suffered by reason of our failure to execute the above
agreements, with interest.
WE WILL reimburse any contractual trust funds for any
contributions we failed to make or for any increases in pay-
ments we failed to make, with interest.
LAS VEGAS SANDS, INC., D/B/A SANDS HOTEL
AND CASINO
VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:48 Apr 30, 2002 Jkt 197585 PO 00004 Frm 01113 Fmt 0610 Sfmt 0610 D:\NLRB\324.130 APPS10 PsN: APPS10