Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.v.Affinity Labs of Texas, LLC

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jan 28, 2016

13673391 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 28, 2016)

Trials@uspto.gov Paper 36
571-272-7822 Entered: January 28, 2016

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD and
SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC.,1

Petitioner,

v.

AFFINITY LABS OF TEXAS, LLC,
Patent Owner.
____________

Case IPR2014-011812
Patent 8,532,641 B2
____________

Before KEVIN F. TURNER, LYNNE E. PETTIGREW, and
JON B. TORNQUIST, Administrative Patent Judges.

TORNQUIST, Administrative Patent Judge.

FINAL WRITTEN DECISION
35 U.S.C. § 318 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73

1 On January 1, 2015, Samsung Telecommunications America, LLC, an
originally-named Petitioner in this case, was merged into Samsung
Electronics America, Inc. See IPR2014-01181, Paper 9.
2 On March 24, 2015, we consolidated IPR2014-01182 and IPR2014-01184
with IPR2014-01181. IPR2014-01181, Paper 15, 2.
IPR2014-01181
Patent 8,532,641 B2
2

I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background
Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd and Samsung Electronics America, Inc.
(collectively “Petitioner”) filed Petitions in IPR2014-01181 (Paper 4,
“-01181 Pet.”), IPR2014-01182 (Paper 4, “-01182 Pet.”), and IPR2014-
01184 (Paper 4, “-01184 Pet.”) requesting inter partes review of claims 1–3
and 5–14 of U.S. Patent No. 8,352,641 B2 (Ex. 1001, “the ’641 patent”).
Affinity Labs of Texas, LLC (“Patent Owner”) filed Preliminary Responses
to the Petitions.
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), we instituted inter partes review in
each of IPR2014-01181 (Paper 10, “-01181 Dec. on Inst.”), IPR2014-01182
(Paper 10, “-01182 Dec. on Inst.”), and IPR2014-01184 (Paper 10, “-01184
Dec. on Inst.”) and subsequently consolidated IPR2014-01182 and IPR2014-
01184 with IPR2014-01181. IPR2014-01181, Paper 15, 2. Patent Owner
filed a consolidated Patent Owner Response (Paper 20, “PO Resp.”) to the
Petitions and Petitioner filed a Reply (Paper 23, “Reply”).3 Patent Owner
also filed a paper identifying arguments and evidence in Petitioner’s Reply
that it contends were improper (Paper 26), to which Petitioner filed a
response (Paper 29).
In support of their respective positions, Petitioner submitted four
declarations from Dr. Schuyler Quackenbush, Exs. 1023, 1123, 1223, 1025,
and Patent Owner filed a declaration from Dr. Marilyn Wolf, Ex. 2005.
An oral hearing was held on October 28, 2015, and a transcript of the
oral hearing is included in the record. Paper 35 (“Tr.”).

3 All subsequent citations to papers or exhibits refer to those in IPR2014-
01181, unless otherwise noted.
IPR2014-01181
Patent 8,532,641 B2
3

We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(c), and this Final Written
Decision is issued pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73,
where we find claims 1–3 and 5–14 of the ’641 patent to be unpatentable.
B. The ’641 Patent
The ’641 patent is directed to a system and method for
communicating selected information to an electronic device. Ex. 1001,
1:21–23, 2:15–21. In the disclosed embodiments, a radio listener may create
a personalized playlist and “listen to this playlist in a wireless atmosphere
while enjoying CD quality sound.” Id. at 2:18–21. The audio information
transmitted to a user may include “songs, on-line radio stations, on-line
broadcasts, streaming audio, or other selectable information.” Id. at 3:67–
4:1.
Electronic devices contemplated for use in the disclosed system
include “a network radio, a modular device, an audio system, a personal
digital assistant (PDA), a cellular phone, or other electronic devices operable
to receive information wirelessly communicated” by a communications
engine. Id. at 5:36–41. Wireless communication from the communications
engine may be by various means, including cellular communications, AM or
FM signals, or “high speed, low-power microwave wireless link[s],” such as
a “Bluetooth link.” Id. at 2:33–43, 5:61–6:24.
According to the ’641 patent, “conventional” wireless systems
communicate across a channel in “an asynchronous manner.” Id. at 6:34–
39. In addition to this conventional asynchronous method, the ’641 patent
also “advantageously allows for signals to be transmitted to an electronic
device in a less than asynchronous manner.” Id. at 6:40–42.
IPR2014-01181
Patent 8,532,641 B2
4

In one embodiment, the electronic device is operable to communicate
the received audio information to a different audio system, such as an audio
radio receiver, using “a localized communications-signaling network.” Id. at
9:44–56, 10:26–35, 12:29–35. The electronic device may utilize a physical
interface having two conductive paths, the first path for communicating
information and the second path for providing power to the device. Id. at
18:40–53.
C. Illustrative Claims
1. A music enabled communication system, comprising: a
wireless telephone device, the device having (1) a display at
least partially defining a front surface of the device, (2) a housing
component at least partially defining a back surface of the device,
(3) an enclosure located between the front surface and the back
surface, (4) a wireless communication module located within the
enclosure, (5) a rechargeable power supply located within the
enclosure, (6) a physical interface having a first and a second
conductive path, the physical interface operable to communicate
data via the first conductive path and to receive a recharging
power for the rechargeable power supply via the second
conductive path, and (7) a memory system, located within the
enclosure; and

a collection of instructions stored in the memory system, the
collection of instructions operable when executed to
communicate a collection of information about media content
available from the wireless telephone device to a recipient device
such that the recipient device can use the collection of
information to generate a graphical menu comprising a selectable
menu item associated with the available media content, to utilize
the wireless communication module to stream a signal
representing at least a portion of a song to the recipient device
using a given asynchronous wireless channel of a localized
communications signaling network, to recognize receipt of an
incoming telephone call, and to alter an outputting of the signal
IPR2014-01181
Patent 8,532,641 B2
5

in connection with recognizing receipt of the incoming telephone
call.
Ex. 1001, 19:29–57.
8. A system for wirelessly communicating musical content,
comprising:
a portable electronic device having a processor operable to play
an audio file that represents a song;
a memory communicatively coupled to the processor and
configured to store a plurality of audio files; and
a wireless communication module communicatively coupled to
the processor and operable to communicate a streaming audio
signal that represents a playing of the song to a recipient device
via a localized communications signaling network in response to
a selection of a selectable menu item presented on a recipient
device display, wherein the wireless communication module is
compliant with a Bluetooth standard, further wherein the
wireless communication module is configured to communicate
at least a portion of the streaming audio signal to the recipient
device using an asynchronous channel.
Id. at 20:28–45.
11. The system of claim 8, wherein the wireless communication
module is operable to communicate the streaming audio signal at
a communication rate that provides for a CD quality listening
experience.
Id. at 20:64–67.
D. The Evidence of Record
Petitioner relies upon the following references:
Reference Patent/Publication Date Exhibit(s)
Ito US 6,990,334 B1 Jan. 24, 2006 10034

4 Exhibits with 10XX, 11XX, and 12XX prefixes were filed in IPR2014-
01181, -01182, and -01184, respectively. Exhibits with 20XX, 21XX, and
22XX prefixes were filed in IPR2014-01181, -01182, and -01184,
respectively.
IPR2014-01181
Patent 8,532,641 B2
6

Reference Patent/Publication Date Exhibit(s)
Haartsen US 6,973,067 B1 Dec. 6, 2005 1006
Rydbeck US 7,123,936 B1 Oct. 17, 2006 1008, 1112
Galensky US 6,845,398 B1 Jan. 18, 2005 1009, 1107, 1209
Abecassis US 6,192,340 B1 Feb. 20, 2001 1103
Chennakeshu US 6,542,758 B1 Apr. 1, 2003 1105
Herrod US 6,405,049 B2 June. 11,
2002
1106
Ohmura US 6,937,732 B2 Aug. 30,
2005
1203
Ahn US 2004/0214525 A1 Oct. 28, 2004 1205

Owner’s Manual, Nokia 9000i Communicator, 1995–1997 Nokia Mobile
Phones Ltd. (Ex. 1005B).
E. The Asserted Grounds of Unpatentability
The Board instituted inter partes review on the following asserted
grounds of unpatentability (-01181 Dec. on Inst. 19; -01182 Dec. on Inst.
20–21; -01184 Dec. on Inst. 15):
IPR2014-01181
Statutory Ground References Challenged Claim(s)
§ 103 Ito, Haartsen, Nokia, and
Rydbeck
8, 11, 13, and 14
§ 103 Ito, Haartsen, Nokia,
Rydbeck, and Galensky
12
IPR2014-01182
Statutory Ground References Challenged Claim(s)
§ 103 Abecassis, Chennakeshu,
and Herrod
1–3, 5, 9, 10, and 14
§ 103 Abecassis, Chennakeshu,
Herrod, and Galensky
6 and 7
IPR2014-01181
Patent 8,532,641 B2
7

Statutory Ground References Challenged Claim(s)
§ 103 Abecassis and Chennakeshu 8, 11, and 13
§ 103 Abecassis, Chennakeshu,
and Galensky
12

IPR2014-01184

II. ANALYSIS
A. Claim Construction
In an inter partes review proceeding, we give each claim term its
broadest reasonable interpretation, as understood by one of ordinary skill in
the art in light of the specification of the involved patent. 37 C.F.R.
§ 42.100(b). Absent any special definitions in the specification, under the
broadest reasonable construction standard we give claim terms their ordinary
and customary meaning, as would be understood by one of ordinary skill in
the art at the time of the invention. See In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504
F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Any special definitions for claim terms
must be set forth with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision. See
In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
1. streaming audio signal
In the Decision to Institute, we preliminarily construed the term
“streaming audio signal” to mean “an audio signal that is transferred in a
continuous stream.” -01181 Dec. on Inst. 8. This construction was based, in
part, on a dictionary definition of the term “streaming,” which is “relating to
Statutory Ground References Challenged Claim(s)
§ 103 Ohmura and Ahn 8 and 11
§ 103 Ohmura, Ahn, and Nokia 13 and 14
IPR2014-01181
Patent 8,532,641 B2
8

or being the transfer of data (as audio or video material) in a continuous
stream especially for immediate processing or playback.”5
Patent Owner contends our preliminary construction is too broad.
According to Patent Owner, a person of ordinary skill in the art6 would
understand the term “streaming” in the ’641 patent to mean a “signal/audio
signal that is played as it arrives at a recipient device, not requiring that an
entire file be transferred to and stored at a recipient device prior to initiating
playback.” PO Resp. 7; Ex. 2005 ¶¶ 114–115. Patent Owner contends this
narrower construction—requiring a “streaming audio signal” be played as it
arrives—is supported by the “clear” delineation between “download and
play files” and “streaming files” set forth in the ’641 patent. PO Resp. 7.
In support of this argument, Patent Owner points to the following
disclosures of the ’641 patent regarding the transfer of content to an
electronic device:
For example, a user may want to listen to an internet broadcast
of an Internet radio station. Therefore, high-speed
communication may be required to wirelessly communicate or
stream the selected audio information to an electronic device.
Ex. 1001, 7:3–7.

5 Streaming definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/streaming.
6 Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have a
Bachelor’s degree in Electrical Engineering or Computer Science and
approximately 1–2 years of experience in working with client/server
architectures, Internet transmission protocols, wireless transmission
protocols, Internet browser programming, and streaming media
transmission. -01181 Pet. 12. Although Dr. Wolf’s identification of a
person of ordinary skill in the art varies slightly from Petitioner’s, Patent
Owner does not assert that this difference is material to the outcome of this
case. See Ex. 2005 ¶ 34.
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Patent 8,532,641 B2
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In another embodiment, portable radio 500 may include memory
operably located within for storing downloaded information. For
example, portable radio 500 may include 32 MB of RAM
allowing electronic device 502 to receive selective information
and download the selective information to memory located
within the portable radio 500.
Id. at 13:4–9. According to Patent Owner, the first paragraph
identifies “streaming audio” that is played as it arrives and the second
paragraph identifies “download and play files” that are stored in
memory. PO Resp. 7.
Patent Owner also argues that the patentee’s statements during
prosecution reinforce the difference between “streaming” and
“download and play files”:
[S]treaming audio includes playing audio or video immediately
as it is downloaded from the Internet, rather than storing it in a
file on the receiving computer first.” A second reference defines
streaming audio as “. . . streaming sound is played as it arrives.
The alternative is a sound recording that doesn’t start playing
until the entire file has arrived.”
Id. at 8 (quoting Ex. 2101, 2). Thus, Patent Owner contends the intrinsic
evidence as a whole supports a construction that requires the immediate
playback of “streaming audio.”
Petitioner asserts the Board’s preliminary construction is consistent
with the meaning one of ordinary skill in the art would give the term
“streaming audio signal.” Reply 3. According to Petitioner, the ’641 patent
does not disclose or require that “streaming audio” be played as it arrives
and, contrary to Patent Owner’s proposed construction, the ’641 patent
discusses “downloading” “audio information such as MP3s, streaming
audio, [and] streaming Internet Broadcasts . . . .” Id. at 4 (quoting Ex. 1001,
8:31–35).
IPR2014-01181
Patent 8,532,641 B2
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With respect to Patent Owner’s statements during prosecution,
Petitioner contends the Examiner specifically rejected Patent Owner’s
proposed distinction between “streaming” and download and play files as
unsupported by the Specification of the ’641 patent:
The Applicant goes to great lengths to describe the differences
between an ‘audio file’ and ‘streaming audio’ in his remarks.
However, the examiner maintains that ‘streaming audio’ is
transferred as an ‘audio file’ and can be stored on the receiving
device as such. The invention as claimed provides no teachings
of any other definition or significant difference between
‘streaming audio’ and the transfer of an ‘audio file’.
Ex. 1218, 394; Reply 4.
We agree with Patent Owner that the term “streaming” is often used in
the context of the immediate processing and playback of audio information.
-01181 Dec. on Inst. 7. The ordinary meaning of the term, however, does
not require the immediate playback of streaming audio information, and the
portions of the ’641 patent identified by Patent Owner do not demonstrate
with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision that a narrower claim
definition should apply. For example, although the discussion in the ’641
patent of using high-speed communications for streaming an Internet radio
station supports Patent Owner’s argument that “streaming audio” may be
played immediately as it arrives, Ex. 1001, 7:3–7, the ’641 patent also
discloses “downloading” “streaming audio” and “streaming Internet
Broadcasts.” Id. at 3:67–4:1, 8:31–35, 17:1–2, 18:1–5. Thus, the
disclosures of the ’641 patent are consistent with the dictionary definition of
the term “streaming,” which contemplates the transfer of “streaming audio”
as a constant stream of data for either immediate or delayed playback.
IPR2014-01181
Patent 8,532,641 B2
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Accordingly, we construe the term “streaming audio signal” as “an
audio signal that is transferred in a continuous stream.”
2. communication rate that provides for
a CD quality listening experience
The term “communication rate that provides for a CD quality listening
experience” is recited in dependent claim 11. This term is not explicitly
defined in the Specification of the ’641 patent and we did not provide a
preliminary construction for the term in the Decision to Institute. PO Resp.
10.
Patent Owner contends this term “has a specific and well-understood
meaning” and should be construed as a “data transfer rate sufficient to obtain
1.4 megabits per second.” Id. Patent Owner reasons that the Compact Disc
Digital Audio Standard, commonly referred to as the “Red Book,”
establishes “that CD audio should consist of a 44.1 kHz sampling frequency
at a 16-bit signal quantization across 2 channels” and one of ordinary skill in
the art would look to this standard in interpreting the meaning of the term
“communication rate that provides for a CD quality listening experience.”
Id. at 10–11 (citing Ex. 2006, 4–9; Ex. 2005 ¶ 133); see also id. at 11 (citing
Ex. 2007, 40:2–17) (contending that Dr. Quackenbush admitted during his
deposition that one of ordinary skill in the art would understand that the Red
Book specifications are “related to CD audio”).
Petitioner contends the broadest reasonable construction of the term
“communication rate that provides for a CD quality listening experience” is
a “speed at which data is transmitted that provides for a listening experience
that is similar to that of a CD.” Reply 6; -01182 Pet. 11–12. In support of
this argument, Petitioner provides a dictionary definition of “CD-quality”
that defines the term as “of equal or comparable quality to sound stored on a
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Patent 8,532,641 B2
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compact disc.” Reply 9 (citing Ex. 1033 (Oxford English Dictionary)).
Petitioner also argues that a transfer rate of 1.4 megabits per second is not
required to provide for a “CD quality listening experience” as audio
compression standards such as MPEG-1 and Precision Adaptive Subband
Coding (PASC) could be used to compress data samples from a CD by “up
to an order of magnitude” and still provide “CD-Quality audio.” Id. at 7–9
(citing Ex. 1034, 2).
We find that Petitioner demonstrates persuasively that known
compression standards would allow for “CD-quality audio” at transfer rates
less than 1.4 megabits per second. Reply 7–9, 27 (citing Ex. 1032, 328; Ex.
1034, 2; Ex. 1025 ¶ 87; Ex. 1049A; Ex. 1050, 1:8–10, 3:4–11). Moreover,
the ’641 patent does not support Patent Owner’s proposed construction. For
example, in the discussion of the various communications standards
operable in the disclosed embodiments of the ’641 patent to provide CD
quality sound, it is noted that a Bluetooth link may be used. Ex. 1001, 2:18–
21, 2:39–43. Yet, both parties agree that Bluetooth cannot transfer data at a
rate of 1.4 megabits per second. Tr. 12:20–23, 80:10–14. Thus, we are not
persuaded that one of ordinary skill in the art would understand a “CD
quality listening experience” to require a data transfer rate of 1.4 megabits
per second.
Based on the dictionary definition provided by Petitioner and the
disclosures of the ’641 patent, we construe the term “communication rate
that provides for a CD quality listening experience” to mean “a data transfer
rate that provides audio of equal or comparable quality to sound stored on a
compact disc.” See Ex. 1033, 3.
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Patent 8,532,641 B2
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3. remaining claim terms
Patent Owner also proposes constructions for the terms wireless
telephone device, a signal representing at least a portion of a song, while,
and portable electronic device. PO Resp. 5–6, 8–10, 11–12. Upon review
of Petitioner’s and Patent Owner’s arguments, we determine that
construction of these additional claim terms is not required for purposes of
this decision.
B. Abecassis-Based Grounds—Obviousness of Claims 1–3 and 5–14
Petitioner asserts that claims 1–3, 5, 9, 10, and 14 of the ’641 patent
would have been obvious over Abecassis, Chennakeshu, and Herrod; claims
6 and 7 would have been obvious over Abecassis, Chennakeshu, Herrod, and
Galensky; claims 8, 11, and 13 would have been obvious over Abecassis and
Chennakeshu; and claim 12 would have been obvious over Abecassis,
Chennakeshu, and Galensky. -01182 Dec. on Inst. 20–21; Pet. 12–38.7
1. Abecassis
Abecassis is directed to “[s]ystems for, and methods of, integrating a
playing of music that is responsive to a user’s music preferences applied to
the user’s audio library with a playing of real-time information that is
responsive to the user’s information preferences.” Ex. 1103, 1:8–12. To
implement this method, Abecassis discloses a portable Multimedia Player
that is “intended to function as a stand alone cellular phone, as a part of
multiple-phone configuration, a radio, a remote control, as a digital audio
player, and/or as a radio-on-demand player.” Id. at 9:26–31. In one
embodiment, the Multimedia Player can be used in conjunction with the

7 Citations to the Petition in Section II.B are to the Petition filed in IPR2014-
01182.
IPR2014-01181
Patent 8,532,641 B2
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speaker system of a vehicle and may transfer information by “means of a
cable or by direct insertion into a built-in docking bay.” Id. at 14:12–17.
Abecassis discloses that a “virtual audio item may be retrieved at the
time of its playing, i.e, retrieved and played in a real-time manner; or
retrieved in advance of the time it is to be played, temporarily stored in any
of a Multimedia Player’[s] storage means, and erased from memory after
being utilized for a single playing or for a plurality of scheduled or projected
playings.” Id. at 14:60–65.
The Multimedia Player may be controlled by a remote control device
having various function keys useful for “program selection, music and
information preference selection, and source selection.” Id. at 9:47–55. The
remote control may communicate directly with the Multimedia Player, using
wired or wireless means, and may “directly receive from the Multimedia
Player a transmission and render it audible for the user through its built-in
speaker or by means of headphones connected to the remote control . . . .”
Id. at 10:41–45, 12:28–39.
2. Chennakeshu
Chennakeshu is directed to a mobile radio telephone for use in a
vehicle. Ex. 1105, 1:9–12. The mobile telephone of Chennakeshu may
communicate using a Bluetooth interface over an asynchronous data
channel. Id. at 4:60–5:15. In at least one embodiment, the system of
Chennakeshu is configured to allow for “hands-free operation once a call is
established.” Id. at 1:22–24.
3. Herrod
Herrod is directed to a portable data device, or terminal, for use with a
terminal docking device, or cradle. Ex. 1106, 1:5–7. The portable data
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device of Herrod “compris[es] cellular telephone means for conventional
telephone communication.” Id. at 3:32–36, 16:8–11. The portable data
device of Herrod also contains both a rechargeable battery and a physical
interface that allows for connection of the terminal with a terminal docking
device. Id. at 6:56–59, 18:66–19:14. This terminal docking device is
connected via a cable to both a power source and a network. Id. at 6:30–38,
6:56–64, 18:66–19:14; Ex. 1123 ¶¶ 45–52.
4. Galensky
Galensky is directed to “[a] wireless device, system and method for
receiving and playing multimedia files streamed from a multimedia server
over a wireless telecommunications network.” Ex. 1107, Abstract.
Galensky discloses that “to conserve bandwidth within the wireless
network,” it is preferable to transmit data “at the highest data rate possible”
to create a 5–10 second buffer and, once the desired buffer is created, to
decrease the data transmission rate to the minimum rate necessary for
adequate transmission of “streamed data.” Id. at 6:1–18.
5. Combination of Abecassis, Chennakeshu, and Herrod
Petitioner asserts that the combination of Abecassis, Chennakeshu,
and Herrod discloses, or renders obvious, every limitation of claims 1–3, 5,
9, 10, and 14 of the ’641 patent. Pet. 12–38. In particular, Petitioner asserts
that Abecassis discloses: (1) a wireless telephone device having a display,
housing, wireless communication module, and memory; (2) a collection of
instructions operable to provide information about media content available
from the wireless telephone device to a recipient device (in the form of a
remote control) such that the recipient device can use the information to
generate a selectable menu item associated with available media content;
IPR2014-01181
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and (3) streaming at least a portion of a song to the recipient device. Id. at
18–23 (citing Ex. 1103, 14:60–65 (“A virtual audio item may be retrieved at
the time of its playing, i.e., retrieved and played in a real-time
manner . . . .”)). Petitioner further asserts that Chennakeshu discloses hands-
free operation of a wireless telephone and the use of a Bluetooth
communication module to transmit information over an asynchronous
channel. Id. at 21–22, 26–28. Petitioner also asserts that Herrod discloses a
display that makes up more than half of the front surface of the device, a
rechargeable power supply, and a physical interface operable to
communicate data over a first path and receive power over a second path.
Id. at 18–19. Petitioner further asserts that USB interfaces were “well-
known prior to March 28, 2000 and provided a non-circular interface to
communicate data via a first conductive path and receive a recharging power
via a second conductive path.” Id. at 24 (citing Ex. 1123 ¶ 46; Ex. 1113A;
Ex. 1118, 13–14, 19–20).
With respect to the reason to combine the references, Petitioner
asserts it would have been obvious to incorporate Chennakeshu’s Bluetooth
communication module in the Abecassis device because “Bluetooth was
being widely adopted by many companies in the industry” and provided an
“economically feasible” method for connecting various devices. Id. at 15
(citing Ex. 1108A, 110; Ex. 1123 ¶¶ 74, 84). Petitioner further asserts that
one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that an asynchronous
channel provides “a simple, flexible, and cost-effective way to transmit
data,” Pet. 15 (citing Ex. 1123 ¶ 73), and implementing the larger display,
rechargeable power supply, and physical interface of Herrod in the wireless
telephone of Abecassis would allow for easier navigation of displayed menu
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items, “eliminate the need to replace batteries of the phone,” and permit
recharging and data communication using a single physical interface. Id. at
15–16 (citing 1123 ¶¶ 44, 52, 90, 99, 118, 119, 138) (noting that larger
screen sizes, rechargeable batteries, and physical interfaces with access to
both power and data communications were well known in the art).
a. Claim 1
Rechargeable Battery
Patent Owner asserts that Abecassis does not disclose explicitly or
inherently a rechargeable battery, as recited in claim 1. PO Resp. 54–55.
Patent Owner further asserts that one of ordinary skill in the art would not
have been motivated to incorporate the rechargeable battery of Herrod in the
Abecassis device because the two references relate to different fields of art
and there is no reported difficulty or problem that would suggest modifying
the power supply of Abecassis. Id. at 56–57.
Petitioner responds that rechargeable batteries were “common and
well-known” in the art, as confirmed by Herrod, and a person of ordinary
skill in the art would have sought to use the rechargeable battery of Herrod
in the Abecassis device “to eliminate the need to periodically replace
ordinary (i.e., non-rechargeable) batteries.” Reply 10–11 (citing Ex. 1106,
14:18–24). Petitioner further responds that Herrod and Abecassis are in the
same field of art, as both references disclose the use of cellular telephones
that support multimedia applications. Id. (citing Ex. 1123 ¶ 44; Ex. 1025
¶ 90); Pet. 16.
We agree with Petitioner that the addition of well-known rechargeable
battery technology (as disclosed in Herrod) in the device of Abecassis would
have been obvious, at a minimum, to eliminate the need to periodically
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replace the batteries in the Abecassis device. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex
Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416 (2007) (“The combination of familiar elements
according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more
than yield predictable results.”). Moreover, we are not persuaded by Patent
Owner’s argument that Abecassis and Herrod are in different fields of
endeavor, as both references relate to the communication of data using a
cellular phone.8
Physical Interface
Patent Owner asserts that Abecassis does not disclose a physical
interface having first and second conductive paths for the transfer of data
and power, respectively, as recited in claim 1. PO Resp. 58. Patent Owner
further asserts that one of ordinary skill in the art would not have sought to
implement the physical interface of Herrod in the Abecassis device because
Abecassis does not disclose a rechargeable battery. Id. at 59–60. And, to
the extent that Petitioner relies upon a USB interface for this claim
limitation, Patent Owner contends there is no evidence that “USB could
have been successfully used to provide the power needed to recharge a
battery.” Id. at 59.
Herrod discloses a cradle with an interface operable to provide both
recharging power and data communications. Ex. 1103, 6:56–64, 14:12–17,
18:66–19:4. Dr. Quackenbush persuasively testifies that one of ordinary
skill in the art would have sought to use this multipurpose interface (as well

8 Given that both Herrod and Abecassis relate to the communication of
information over a network using a cellular telephone, we are also persuaded
that Herrod would have come to the attention of one of ordinary skill in the
art considering how to improve the portability and usability of the cellular
phone of Abecassis.
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as a rechargeable battery) in the device of Abecassis to “advantageously
provide[] a convenient way to both recharge the device and send or receive
files or other data to or from the device.” Ex. 1123 ¶ 52. In addition,
Petitioner presents persuasive evidence that the USB interface was well
known in the art prior to 2000 and could be used to communicate data via a
first conductive path and provide recharging power for a cellular phone via a
second conductive path.9 Pet. 23–24 (citing Ex. 1123 ¶ 46; Ex. 1113A; Ex.
1118, 13–14, 19–20); Reply 11–12 (citing Ex. 1025 ¶¶ 95–98).
Although Patent Owner and Dr. Wolf assert that Petitioner does not
explain specifically how the physical interface of Herrod would work in the
Abecassis device, they do not provide any persuasive evidence tending to
refute Dr. Quackenbush’s testimony that Herrod’s interface could be
implemented in the Abecassis device and would work for its intended
purpose. See PO Resp. 60; Ex. 2005 ¶¶ 241–242; Ex. 1023 ¶ 52. Thus, we
are persuaded that one of ordinary skill in the art would have found it
obvious to implement either a USB interface or the physical interface of
Herrod in the Abecassis device and would have had a reasonable expectation
of success in adding these features to the device.
Collection of Instructions
Claim 1 of the ’641 patent also requires:
a collection of instructions operable when executed to
communicate a collection of information about media content
available from the wireless telephone device to a recipient device
such that the recipient device can use the collection of
information to generate a graphical menu comprising a selectable

9 We address below (discussion of claim 9) Patent Owner’s argument that a
USB interface could not recharge the battery of a cellular phone in the year
2000. See PO Resp. 60–61.
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menu item associated with the available media content.
Ex. 1101, 19:43–50.
Patent Owner asserts that there is no teaching in Abecassis of a
“graphical menu item associated with . . . media content” available from a
wireless telephone device. PO Resp. 63. According to Patent Owner,
although the graphical menu items of Abecassis allow for “subject category
selection, program selection, music and information preference selection,
and source selection,” these selectable menu items are merely preferences
and do not necessarily represent available media content. Id. at 63–64; Tr.
76:16–77:15; Ex. 2005 ¶ 254. Patent Owner also argues that graphical
menus are not generated by the recipient device. PO Resp. 63–64 (citing Ex.
2005 ¶¶ 253–254).
Abecassis discloses, however, that “function keys” on the remote
control device are used to select available content and audio preferences
using a graphical interface and Abecassis discloses that these “function
keys” are configured by a specific transmission or download from the
Multimedia Player. Ex. 1123 ¶ 56 (citing Ex. 1103, 9:50–59); Ex. 1103,
Figs. 3, 5, 6 (depicting graphical displays of menu items). Moreover, once
preferences are submitted using the remote control, the system “is designed
to automatically produce a continuous playing of audio responsive to the
pre-established music and information preferences without a need for the
user to intervene.” Reply 15–16 (citing Ex. 1103, 18:32–38); Pet. 20. Thus,
we are persuaded that Abecassis discloses both a graphical menu generated
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by the recipient device and the selection of menu items that are “associated”
with available media content.10
Streaming Using an Asynchronous Channel
Patent Owner argues that neither Abecassis nor Chennakeshu
discloses streaming at least a portion of song to the recipient device using a
given asynchronous wireless channel of a localized communications
signaling network, as recited in claim 1. PO Resp. 64–66. According to
Patent Owner, Abecassis does not disclose synchronous or asynchronous
communication and Chennakeshu discloses communicating “asynchronous
data,” not “a signal representing at least a portion of a song.” Id. at 65–66.
Petitioner responds that Abecassis discloses streaming a signal
representing a song (even under Patent Owner’s narrower construction) and
Chennakeshu discloses the asynchronous transfer of “data” which, according
to Ericsson Review 3 (incorporated by reference in Chennakeshu), may
include “video clips” and other “multimedia applications.” 11 Reply 17

10 Patent Owner also argues that the remote control device in Abecassis
cannot be the claimed “recipient device” because it was identified in the
Petition as the wireless telephone device. PO Resp. 62 (citing Pet. 22). The
Petition, however, identifies the Multimedia Player as the wireless telephone
device and cites to portions of Abecassis to show that the Multimedia Player
may transmit songs to the remote control device. See Pet. 18, 22.
11 In its Motion for Observations, Patent Owner notes that Dr. Quackenbush
admitted during his deposition that Bluetooth could transmit data over either
the synchronous or asynchronous channel. Paper 32 (citing Ex. 2038,
83:25–38, 85:2–12, 87:12–23). During his deposition, however, Dr.
Quackenbush explained that although Bluetooth could transmit data over
both the synchronous and asynchronous channels, one of ordinary skill in
the art would have understood that “the asynchronous channel is tailored for
data” and the “synchronous channel is tailored for voice.” Ex. 2038, 85:5–
12, 88:9–15.
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(citing Ex. 1105, 5:2–15; Ex. 1007A, 112; Ex. 1123 ¶ 72; Ex. 1025 ¶ 115).
Petitioner further notes that Patent Owner “does not identify any functional
difference in transmitting ‘data’ as opposed to a ‘song’ over the
asynchronous channel taught by Chennakeshu.” Id. (citing Ex. 1025 ¶ 115;
Ex. 1101, 2:15–51, 2:64–67, 3:3–9 (disclosures of the ’641 patent discussing
the wireless transmission of “data” representing a song)).
Upon review of the parties’ arguments and supporting evidence, we
are persuaded that Petitioner provides a reasoned explanation as to why one
of ordinary skill in the art would have sought to use Bluetooth in the device
of Abecassis to stream data over an asynchronous channel.12 Pet. 15
(asserting that asynchronous communication conserves bandwidth and is a
“simple, flexible, and cost effective way to transmit data”); Ex. 1123 ¶ 73.
Moreover, as noted by Petitioner, neither Patent Owner nor Dr. Wolf
identifies a functional difference between communicating asynchronous
“data” (as disclosed in Chennakeshu) and data that represent a “song.” PO
Resp. 65–66; Ex. 2005 ¶ 260.
Based on the foregoing, and upon review of the arguments and
evidence set forth by Petitioner and Patent Owner, we are persuaded that
Petitioner demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 1 of
the ’641 patent would have been obvious over Abecassis, Herrod, and
Chennakeshu.

12 During oral argument, Patent Owner conceded that the claims of the ’641
patent do not require that the device use the Bluetooth module to stream
audio data, and noted that there were a “host of” localized networks known
to one of ordinary skill in the art that “would have been able to use the
asynchronous channel to stream data.” Tr. 54:5–58:2.
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b. Claim 2
Claim 2 depends from claim 1 and further requires “wherein the
wireless communications module is compliant with a Bluetooth standard.”
Ex. 1101, 19:58–59. Petitioner asserts that Chennakeshu discloses a
wireless communications module that is compliant with the Bluetooth
standard, and Dr. Quackenbush testifies that one of ordinary skill in the art at
the time of the invention would have sought to implement Bluetooth in the
Abecassis device because Bluetooth provided a “cost-effective” way to
wirelessly communicate information between portable devices that was
gaining support from manufacturers such as Nokia, IBM, Toshiba, and Intel.
Pet. 15, 26; Ex. 1123 ¶¶ 83–84.
Patent Owner contends that one of ordinary skill in the art would not
have been motivated to add Bluetooth capability in the device of Abecassis
because there is no suggestion in Abecassis that the existing wireless
communication system did not operate properly. PO Resp. 66. Patent
Owner further argues that Petitioner does not explain how Bluetooth
capability could be added successfully to the device of Abecassis, especially
in light of the technical issues known to exist with Bluetooth at the time of
the invention. Id. at 66–67.
For the reasons set forth above, we are persuaded that one of ordinary
skill in the art would have found it obvious to add Bluetooth functionality in
the device of Abecassis. See Ex. 1105, 4:64–5:1, 5:4–8, 5:14–15, 6:31–42
(disclosing that Bluetooth allows hands-free operation of a cellular phone in
a vehicle); Ex. 1108, 3–4 (noting that Bluetooth technology “eliminates the
need for wires, cables, and connectors for and between cordless or mobile
phones, modems, headsets, PDAs, computers, printers . . . and paves the way
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for new and completely different devices and applications”); Ex. 1123
¶¶ 83–84. With respect to the technical issues noted by Patent Owner,
Petitioner presents evidence that in 1999 Bluetooth was described as “one of
the fastest growing technologies ever” with an estimated “100 million
mobile phones, computers and other types of electronic equipment”
expected to incorporate the technology by 2002. See Ex. 1025 ¶¶ 71–73
(quoting Ex. 1045, 3). Given this broad adoption of Bluetooth technology in
1999, we are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument that technical
challenges would have discouraged one of ordinary skill in the art from
adding Bluetooth functionality to the device of Abecassis.
Accordingly, we conclude that Petitioner demonstrates by a
preponderance of the evidence that claim 2 of the ’641 patent would have
been obvious over Abecassis, Chennakeshu, and Herrod. Ex. 1023 ¶¶ 81–
84.
c. Claim 3
Claim 3 depends from claim 2 and further requires an email client, a
voicemail client, and a browser operable to communicate with an Internet
server. Ex. 1101, 19:60–63. Petitioner asserts that Abecassis discloses an
email client and a voicemail client and Herrod disclose an Internet browser.
Pet. 26–27; Ex. 1123 ¶¶ 86–90. Petitioner further asserts that one of
ordinary skill in the art would have sought to implement Herrod’s internet
browser in the Abecassis device to facilitate “surfing the net,” as disclosed in
Abecassis. Pet. 27; Ex. 1123 ¶ 90. Patent Owner does not address directly
the limitations of claim 3.
Upon review of Petitioner’s arguments and Dr. Quackenbush’s
supporting testimony, we conclude that Petitioner demonstrates by a
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preponderance of the evidence that claim 3 of the ’641 patent would have
been obvious over Abecassis, Chennakeshu, and Herrod.
d. Claim 5
Claim 5 depends from claim 2 and further requires “wherein the
collection of instructions comprises a set of hands-free telephone
instructions operable when executed to allow the wireless telephone device
to operate in a hands-free mode when the wireless telephone device is
wirelessly coupled with a wireless component of an automobile.” Ex. 1101,
20:4–9.
Petitioner argues that one of ordinary skill in the art would have
implemented Chennakeshu’s hands-free mode to allow for “an easier and
safer way to operate” the phone of Abecassis in a vehicle. Pet. 16.
Petitioner further asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would
understand that the use of a hands-free mode necessarily, and thus
inherently, discloses the use of instructions that are operable when executed
to allow the wireless telephone device to operate in the hands-free mode.”
Id. at 28 (citing Ex. 1123 ¶¶ 94, 96).
Patent Owner argues that Petitioner’s inherency argument fails
because it is possible that “the entire collection of instructions could be
hardware based, as opposed to the software based configuration that the
Petitioners claim is inherent.” PO Resp. 67.
In reply, Petitioner asserts that the control programs of Abecassis
“‘are stored in mass memory devices 103 from installed or downloaded
software . . . ,’ and thus necessarily provide software-based instructions for
operating in a hands-free mode.” Reply 23 (citing Ex. 1103, 7:36–42).
Petitioner also asserts that Bluetooth necessarily requires the use of software
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layers, which comprise software instructions. Id.; Pet. 28; Ex. 1123 ¶¶ 91,
94, 96; Ex. 1025 ¶¶ 123–125.
We agree with Petitioner that Abecassis discloses that control
programs may reside in memory. Ex. 1103, 7:36–42, 9:5–9. Furthermore,
neither Patent Owner nor Dr. Wolf explains how hands-free functionality
could be implemented using Bluetooth technology without a collection of
software instructions. Thus, we are persuaded that one of ordinary skill in
the art would understand that the collection of instructions operable to
implement the hands-free functionality described in Chennakeshu would be
stored in the memory of the Abecassis device. See Ex. 1123 ¶¶ 91, 96;
Reply 22–23.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Petitioner demonstrates by a
preponderance of the evidence that claim 5 of the ’641 patent would have
been obvious over Abecassis, Chennakeshu, and Herrod.
e. Claim 9
Claim 9 depends from claim 8 and requires, inter alia, “a rechargeable
power source located within the enclosure” and “a non-circular physical
interface having a first and second conductive path, the non-circular physical
interface operable to communicate data via the first conductive path and to
receive a recharging power for the rechargeable power supply via the second
conductive path.” Ex. 1101, 20:51–57.
As noted above with respect to claim 1, Petitioner contends that both
rechargeable batteries and USB interfaces were well known in the art and it
would have been obvious to use these elements in the device of Abecassis.
Pet. 16, 19, 23–24, 47 (citing Ex. 1113A (Universal Serial Bus Specification
dated September 23, 1998)); Reply 10–13; Ex. 1123 ¶ 46.
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Patent Owner asserts that USB ports are not inherently disclosed in
Abecassis and the specifications for recharging portable devices using a
USB interface were not released until 2007, which “is a strong indication
that combining battery charging capacity with data transfer into a single
interface was not as simple as the Petitioners would lead us to believe.” PO
Resp. 60–61, 68. In support of Patent Owner’s argument, Dr. Wolf testifies
that the USB specifications “were not written with battery charging in mind”
as the technology was initially intended “only to power small peripherals
like mice and keyboards.” Ex. 2005 ¶ 241 (quoting Ex. 2034).
In reply, Petitioner notes that its argument is not that USB interfaces
were inherently disclosed in Abecassis, but that a person of ordinary skill in
the art would have sought to include the well-known USB interface in the
Abecassis device to provide both power and data communications using a
single interface. Reply 11–12; Pet. 23. Petitioner also provides evidence to
refute Patent Owner’s argument that a USB interface could not recharge the
battery of a cellular telephone. Reply 12. For example, Dr. Quackenbush
points to U.S. Patent No. 6,633,932 that issued September 14, 1999, which
discloses using a USB interface to recharge the battery of a portable
electronic device. Ex. 1025 ¶ 95 (citing 1037, 1:10–13). Dr. Quackenbush
also notes that USB 1.1 provided 500 mA of current, which a National
Institute of Standards and Technologies guide indicates is sufficient to
recharge the battery of a cellular telephone. Id. ¶ 97 (citing Ex. 1113A, 134;
1038A, 36).
Given the evidence that rechargeable batteries and non-circular USB
interfaces were well known in the art prior to March 2000, and the evidence
that non-circular USB interfaces were known to provide sufficient power to
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recharge a cellular telephone (even if the USB specifications were not
written with battery charging in mind), we are persuaded by Petitioner’s
argument that claim 9 would have been obvious over Abecassis, Herrod, and
Chennakeshu. Ex. 1123 ¶ 46; KSR, 550 U.S. at 416 (“The combination of
familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when
it does no more than yield predictable results.”).
f. Claim 14
Claim 14 depends from claim 8 and further requires “an internal
battery and means for recharging the internal battery.” Ex. 1101, 21:26–27.
Patent Owner contends that the Petition fails with respect to claim 14
because, contrary to the Board’s rules, Petitioner did not provide a claim
construction for the means-plus-function term “means for recharging the
internal battery.” PO Resp. 69. Patent Owner further contends that
Petitioner “fails to provide a reasonable reason why one of skill would
modify the power source in Abecassis with the power source in Herrod.” Id.
at 70.
Petitioner responds that the term “means for recharging the internal
battery” is not governed by § 112 ¶ 6 because “it connotes a known class of
structures, namely battery rechargers.” Reply 28 (citing Ex. 1025 ¶¶ 93,
177, 238). Petitioner further responds that, to the extent § 112 ¶ 6 applies,
the function identified in this claim term is “recharging a rechargeable power
supply” and the corresponding structure is a “battery recharger,” which are
both disclosed in Herrod. Id. at 29.
We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s identification of
corresponding structure and its argument that § 112 ¶ 6 does not apply to the
term “means for recharging the internal battery” should have been in
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Petition, and not presented for the first time in reply. PO Resp. 69; Tr.
84:12–85:14; see 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3). Moreover, Petitioner does not
provide adequate support for its broad identification of corresponding
structure in the ’641 patent. For example, we are directed to no disclosure in
the ’641 patent indicating that any “battery recharger” may recharge the
battery of the device. Thus, we do not adopt Petitioner’s proposed
constructions.
Patent Owner does not propose a construction for the term “means for
recharging the internal battery.” See PO Resp. 5–11, 69–70. The ’641
patent discloses, however, that interface 904 and mount 511 allow for
recharging the electronic device using an interface that provides both
recharging power and data communications. Ex. 1101, 13:15–32, 18:27–39,
20:52–57. As Petitioner provides persuasive evidence to explain why one of
ordinary skill in the art would have sought to add both rechargeable batteries
and a USB interface—which provides both recharging power and data
connectivity—to the device of Abecassis, under either Petitioner’s proposed
construction or the structure for recharging the internal battery set forth in
the ’641 patent, the prior art discloses the limitations of claim 14. Thus, we
are persuaded that claim 14 would have been obvious over Abecassis,
Herrod, and Chennakeshu.
g. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Petitioner has demonstrated
by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1–3, 5, 9, 10, and 14 of the
’641 patent would have been obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103 over Abecassis,
Herrod, and Chennakeshu.
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6. Combination of Abecassis and Chennakeshu
Petitioner contends that claims 8, 11, and 13 would have been obvious
over Abecassis and Chennakeshu. Pet. 32–33, 35–38.
a. Claim 8
Claim 8 requires, in relevant part, “a memory . . . configured to store a
plurality of audio files.” Ex. 1101, 20:32–33. Petitioner contends Abecassis
discloses both that the Multimedia Player includes “nonvolatile memory”
and that a user may “purchase a plurality of DVD-Audios and store them
within a Multimedia Player having the capacity to store and randomly access
an entire collection of discs.” Pet. 32 (citing Ex. 1103, 9:1–9, 14:35–45).
Patent Owner contends that claim 8 would not have been obvious over
Abecassis and Chennakeshu because the “nonvolatile memory” of Abecassis
“seems to be dedicated to storing control programs” and the DVD-Audio
discs identified by Petitioner are not true “memory,” but a form of optical
storage that is external to the device and not “communicatively coupled” to
the processor. PO Resp. 47–48 (citing Ex. 2005 ¶¶ 195, 199, 202). In
support, Dr. Wolf testifies that DVD-Audio discs are not a form of storage to
which the Multimedia Player could have written data in 2000. Ex. 2005 ¶¶
201–202.
Upon review of Abecassis, we are persuaded that the Multimedia
Player has memory configured to store a plurality of audio files.
Specifically, Abecassis discloses that the portable Multimedia Player has
memory capable of storing “significant quantities of information, e.g., 128
MB of ram,” Ex. 1103, 8:59–62, and discloses that transmitted songs may be
stored in memory. Id. at 14:60–65; Ex. 1023 ¶ 32 (noting that the
Multimedia Player of Abecassis has memory and may wirelessly download
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audio). Indeed, Dr. Wolf testifies that Abecassis discloses storing
transmitted audio files on the Multimedia Player. Ex. 2005 ¶ 258.
Patent Owner further argues that Abecassis does not disclose a
“wireless communications module compliant with the Bluetooth standard,”
“a selection of a selectable menu item presented on a recipient device
display,” or a “wireless communications module” configured to
communicate “at least a portion of a streaming audio signal to recipient
device using an asynchronous channel.” PO Resp. 49–52. For the reasons
discussed above with respect to claims 1 and 2, we are not persuaded by
these arguments. Accordingly, we find that Petitioner has demonstrated by a
preponderance of the evidence that claim 8 of the ’641 patent would have
been obvious over Abecassis and Chennakeshu.
b. Claim 11
Claim 11 depends from claim 8 and further requires “wherein the
wireless communication module is operable to communicate the streaming
audio signal at a communication rate that provides for a CD quality listening
experience.” Ex. 1101, 20:64–67.
Petitioner argues that Abecassis contemplates transmitting audio from
a CD to a recipient device, which would provide for a CD quality listening
experience. Pet. 35 (citing Ex. 1103, 2:43–53). Patent Owner contends that
Petitioner’s proposed combination would not render claim 11 obvious
because Bluetooth could not transmit data at the 1.4 megabits per second
rate required to provide “a CD quality listening experience.” PO Resp. 53;
see also Tr. 12:20–23, 80:10–14 (Petitioner and Patent Owner agreeing that
in March 2000 Bluetooth could only obtain a data transmission rate of 721
kilobits per second).
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During oral argument, Patent Owner conceded that its argument with
respect to a “communication rate that provides for a CD quality listening
experience” depends on its construction of a “CD quality listening
experience” (requiring a transmission rate of 1.4 megabits per second) and
its construction of a “streaming audio signal” (requiring a signal be played
immediately as it arrives). Tr. 80:3–14 (“JUDGE TORNQUIST: Just so I
understand, I don't want to cut you off, but is your argument here dependent
on your claim construction about being played immediately? MR.
SCHULTZ: Yes, Your Honor. If the Board does not adopt our construction,
we do not have an argument to the contrary.”). As we do not adopt either of
these proposed constructions, we are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s
argument that the device of Abecassis and Chennakeshu could not
communicate a “streaming audio signal at a communication rate that
provides for a CD quality listening experience,” as recited in claim 11.
c. Claim 13
Claim 13 depends from claim 8 and further requires the portable
electronic device have a display defining a portion of the front surface of the
device, a housing, an enclosure, and a communication module operable to
communicate a signal representing media to a recipient device while a
different wireless communication module is receiving a collection the
collection of data representing the media. Ex. 1001, 21:13–25. We agree
with Petitioner that Abecassis discloses the additional limitations of claim
13. Pet. 36–37; Ex. 1123 ¶¶ 131–137.
d. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Petitioner has demonstrated by
a preponderance of the evidence that claims 8, 11, and 13 of the ’641 patent
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would have been obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103 over Abecassis and
Chennakeshu.
7. Abecassis, Chennakeshu, Galensky, and Herrod
Petitioner contends that claims 6 and 7 of the ’641 patent would have
been obvious over Abecassis, Chennakeshu, Herrod, and Galensky. Pet. 6,
28–31. Petitioner further contends that claim 12 would have been obvious
over Abecassis, Chennakeshu, and Galensky. Pet. 6, 36.
a. Claim 6
Claim 6 depends from claim 1 and further requires “wherein the
display makes up more than half of the front surface” of the device. Ex.
1001, 20:10–11. Petitioner contends that Herrod’s figures disclose a display
that makes up more than half the front surface of the device and one of
ordinary skill in the art would have sought to implement this larger screen in
the device of Abecassis to provide a larger surface “for viewing menus,
selecting audio files, and performing other tasks on the device.” Pet. 16
(citing Ex. 1123 ¶¶ 90, 99).
Patent Owner argues Petitioner relies solely on the figures of Herrod
as disclosing the limitations of claim 6 and, because Herrod provides no
“textual disclosure” that the display takes up more than one-half of the front
surface of the device, reliance on the figures of Herrod is “contrary to well-
established law.” PO Resp. 71–72 (quoting Go Medical Indus. Pty., Ltd. v.
Inmed Corp., 471 F.3d 1264, 1271 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“Patent drawings do not
define the precise proportions of the elements and may not be relied on to
show particular sizes if the specification is completely silent on the issue.”)).
Patent Owner also contends that one of ordinary skill in the art would not
have been motivated to increase the size of Abecassis’s screen because
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screen resolution as of March 28, 2000 “was not great” and increasing the
size “would have likely resulted in a pixelated screen that would have been
of little use for selecting audio files or performing other operations on the
device.” Id. at 72 (citing Ex. 2005 ¶¶ 279–282).
Petitioner contends it is irrelevant that Herrod provides no “textual
disclosure” for a larger screen because Herrod’s figures would have
disclosed to a person of ordinary skill in the art a display that is “more than
half of the front surface” of the device. Reply 23–24 (citing Ex Parte
Matsunaga, 2012 WL 260128, at *1 (BPAI Jan. 25, 2012)). Petitioner also
argues that Herrod is presumed enabled and a person of ordinary skill in the
art would “certainly have known how to successfully implement a display
that makes up the majority of the front surface,” as evidenced by the
existence of such devices on the market prior to March 2000. Id. at 24
(citing Ex. 1048A; Ex. 1025 ¶ 131).
Although precise proportions may not be derived from a patent
drawing when the specification is silent on the issue, a patent must be
considered for all that it discloses to one of ordinary skill in the art. See In
re Aslanian, 590 F.2d 911, 914 (CCPA 1979) (noting that drawings in a
utility patent must be considered for all that they disclose to one of ordinary
skill in the art, even if the feature in “the drawing was unintended or
unexplained in the specification of the reference patent”); see also Symbol
Techs., Inc. v. Opticon, Inc., 935 F.3d 1569, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (noting
that a reference is relevant for all that it teaches). Here, Dr. Quackenbush
testifies that one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that the
display of Herrod makes up more than half the front surface of the device.
Ex. 1123 ¶¶ 98–99; 1025 ¶ 128; Ex. 1106, Fig 14 (Terminal 180). Patent
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Owner and Dr. Wolf provide no persuasive evidence or argument to refute
this testimony. Accordingly, we are persuaded that Herrod would disclose
to one of ordinary skill in the art a wireless telephone device having a
display that “makes up more than half the front surface” of the device.
With respect to the ability to use a larger screen in the device of
Abecassis, a prior art disclosure is presumed enabled. See In re Antor Media
Corp., 689 F.3d 1282, 1287–88 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (noting that prior art patents
are presumptively enabling). Patent Owner’s general questions as to
whether a larger screen would be too pixilated to permit selection of menu
items do not overcome this presumption of enablement or sufficiently refute
Dr. Quackenbush’s testimony that one of ordinary skill in the art would have
understood that the larger screen of Herrod could be used successfully in
Abecassis to view menus and select audio files. PO Resp. 72 (citing Ex.
2005 ¶¶ 279–282); Ex. 1123 ¶ 99; Ex. 1025 ¶ 131 (noting that commercially
available devices existed prior to March 28, 2000 that had a display that
made up the majority of the front surface of the device).
Claim 6 also requires that the device be operable to receive data “at a
hybrid of wireless communication rates that includes at least one faster rate
and one slower rate.” Ex. 1001, 20:12–14. We agree with Petitioner that
Galensky discloses communicating audio information using one faster and
one slower rate and that one of ordinary skill in the art would have sought to
apply this method in the device of Abecassis to conserve network bandwidth
as taught in Galensky. Pet. 17–18; Ex. 1107, 5:66–6:27.
Based on the foregoing, we are persuaded that claim 6 would have
been obvious over Abecassis, Chennakeshu, Galensky, and Herrod. Ex.
1123 ¶¶ 90, 99.
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b. Claim 7
Claim 7 depends from claim 1 and requires a “buffer memory” and
the step of receiving component parts of a media at two different
communication rates based on the amount of data located in the buffer. Ex.
1001, 20:16–27. We agree with Petitioner that Galensky discloses these
limitations and one of ordinary skill in the art would have sought to include
the buffer memory and communication rate switching of Galensky in the
device of Abecassis to conserve network bandwidth. Pet. 17–18, 30–31; Ex.
1123 ¶¶ 102, 109, 129. Thus, we are persuaded that claim 7 would have
been obvious over Abecassis, Chennakeshu, Herrod, and Galensky.
c. Claim 12
Claim 12 depends from claim 8 and further requires, inter alia, a
buffer memory and communicating media at a hybrid of wireless
communication rates. Ex. 1003, 21:1–12. Petitioner contends that claim 12
would have been obvious over the combination of Abecassis, Chennakeshu,
and Galensky. Pet. 36. We agree with Petitioner that Galensky discloses
both a buffer memory and communicating media at a hybrid of
communication rates and one of ordinary skill in the art would have sought
to implement the buffer memory and method of varying communication
rates disclosed in Galensky in the Abecassis device to conserve network
bandwidth. Pet. 17–18, 36. Thus, we are persuaded that claim 12 would
have been obvious over Abecassis, Chennakeshu, and Galensky.
8. Conclusion
Upon review of the prior art of record and Petitioner’s and Patent
Owner’s arguments and supporting testimony, we find Petitioner has
demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1–3, 5, 9, 10,
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and 14 of the ’641 patent would have been obvious over Abecassis,
Chennakeshu, and Herrod; claims 6 and 7 would have been obvious over
Abecassis, Chennakeshu, Herrod, and Galensky; claims 8, 11, and 13 would
have been obvious over Abecassis and Chennakeshu; and claim 12 would
have been obvious over Abecassis, Chennakeshu, and Galensky.
C. Ito-Based Grounds—Obviousness of Claims 8 and 11–14
Petitioner contends that claims 8, 11, 13, and 14 would have been
obvious under 35 U.S.C. §103 over Ito, Haartsen, Nokia, and Rydbeck and
claim 12 would have been obvious over Ito, Haartsen, Nokia, Rydbeck, and
Galensky. Pet. 30–36;13 -01181 Dec. on Inst. 19.
1. Ito
Ito is directed to “an acoustic receiving device for receiving music
data via wireless circuit.” Ex. 1003, 1:10–12. In the Ito system, the acoustic
receiving device is part of a cellular telephone that is operable to receive
music signals transmitted via a base station. Id. at 6:59–67.
In one disclosed embodiment, the cellular phone provides a vehicle
audio system with a list of available songs which are displayed as a
selectable menu. Id. at 14:30–34, 22:28–36, Fig. 18. Upon selection of a
particular menu item, the selected songs are delivered from a service center
to the cellular phone and then retransmitted by the cellular phone to vehicle-
loaded acoustic equipment for immediate playback. Id. at 16:54–17:28,
21:43–50, 22:1–42. In this embodiment, the cellular telephone transmits the
received music to the vehicle audio system in the “weak electro-magnetic

13 Citations to the Petition in section II.C are to the Petition filed in
IPR2014-01181.
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wave . . . of the FM broadcasting frequency band (normally 76 MHz to
90MHz).” Id. at 22:1–6.
2. Nokia
The owner’s manual for the Nokia 9000i Communicator discloses a
cellular phone having a rechargeable battery, a physical interface for
communicating data and delivering power, a rechargeable battery, and a
display that constitutes more than half of the front surface of the device. See
Ex. 1005B, 7, 13–14, 28, 51, 81, 99. Nokia further discloses an e-mail
client, an Internet web browser, and a method of voicemail access. See id. at
51, 55, 61–65; Pet. 26.
3. Haartsen
Haartsen is directed to a method and apparatus for “establishing
multimedia communications on a shared communications channel.” Ex.
1006, Abstract. In Haartsen, the communications channel is operable to
communicate data, voice, and video services using either synchronous or
asynchronous data communication. Id. at 1:17–19, 3:28–31. According to
Haartsen, an “exemplary system” for implementing the invention “may be
found in a technology known as ‘Bluetooth,’” which provides “low-cost,
robust, efficient, high capacity, ad hoc voice and data connectivity.” Id. at
4:63–67.
4. Rydbeck
Rydbeck is directed to a cellular telephone with an entertainment
module capable of “storing music or other audio signals for playback
through the telephone’s headset.” Ex. 1008, Abstract. During operation of
the Rydbeck device, “[w]hen an incoming call is received, the
microprocessor 20 automatically mutes or stops the playback of audio from
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the digital entertainment module 50 until the call is terminated.” Id. at 4:12–
15.
5. Obviousness of Claims 8, 11, 13, and 14 over
Ito, Haartsen, Nokia, and Rydbeck
Petitioner provides detailed analysis showing where each limitation of
claims 8, 11, 13, and 14 of the ’641 patent is disclosed in Ito, Haartsen,
Nokia, and Rydbeck. Pet. 30–35.
Petitioner contends one of ordinary skill in the art would have sought
to implement the Bluetooth module described in Haartsen in the Ito phone
because Bluetooth was being widely adopted in the art and provided an
economically feasible means for wirelessly communicating information
between various portable devices. Pet. 15 (citing Ex. 1023 ¶ 63; Ex. 1007A,
110). Petitioner further contends that one of ordinary skill in the art would
have sought to transmit data in an asynchronous manner because this
transmission method was known to be a “simple, flexible, and cost-effective
way to transmit data” that conserves bandwidth. Id. (citing Ex. 1023 ¶ 63).
With respect to the combination of Nokia and Ito, Petitioner contends
that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to use several
of the advantageous features disclosed in Nokia in the Ito device, including
“a rechargeable battery, a physical interface, altering an output signal when
receiving a call, email, voicemail, an Internet browser, a hands-free mode, a
display that makes up more than half of the front surface, and wirelessly
upgrading software.” Id. at 16–17; Ex. 1023 ¶¶ 44, 49, 70, 80, 83, 87, 91,
93, 100, 110, 116, 129. Petitioner further contends that it would have been
obvious to implement the processor, memory, and muting capabilities of
Rydbeck in Ito’s phone to allow for the muting or stopping of audio
playback when receiving a call. Id. at 17. Petitioner further contends that it
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would have been obvious to use Galensky’s method of using buffer memory
and variable communication rates in Ito’s phone because Galensky discloses
that this method advantageously conserves network bandwidth. Id. at 17–
18.
In support of Petitioner’s arguments, Dr. Quackenbush testifies that
one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that each of the
proposed modifications or additions to Ito’s phone would work and provide
the expected functionality. See, e.g., Ex. 1023 ¶¶ 44, 49, 70, 80, 83, 87, 91,
93, 97, 100, 110, 116, 129.
a. Claim 8
Patent Owner contends it would not have been obvious to add
Bluetooth functionality to the device of Ito because (1) adding Bluetooth
would increase the cost of Ito’s device, which was designed to be a lower
cost alternative for digital communications; (2) Ito uses an analog signal
whereas Bluetooth communicates digital information; and (3) one of
ordinary skill would not have replaced the operable communications system
of Ito with the relatively new Bluetooth technology, which had “numerous
technical problems.” PO Resp. 23–31.
We are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s arguments. First, Haartsen
provides numerous reasons to implement Bluetooth functionality in Ito’s
phone, including its ability to provide “low-cost, robust, efficient, high
capacity, ad hoc voice and data connectivity.” Pet. 15–16, 25 (quoting Ex.
1006, 4:63–5:2); Reply 33; Ex. 1007A. Second, although adding Bluetooth
functionality to Ito’s device would require some additional expense,
Haartsen indicates that Bluetooth is a low-cost system and we are directed to
no disclosure in Ito indicating that any increase in costs would render the
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phone inoperable for its intended purpose. See Orthopedic Equip. Co. v.
United States, 702 F.2d 1005, 1013 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“In other words, the
fact that two disclosed apparatus would not be combined by businessmen for
economic reasons is not the same as saying that it could not be done because
skilled persons in the art felt that there was some technological
incompatibility that prevented their combination. Only the latter fact is
telling on the issue of obviousness.”). Third, Petitioner presents evidence
that analog signals in Ito are converted to digital signals before the phone
receives the signal, Reply 33 (citing Ex. 1003, 11:34–36), and Patent Owner
provides no reasoned argument to explain why these digital signals are
incompatible with Bluetooth technology. Finally, although Patent Owner
presents evidence that Bluetooth was a burgeoning technology in 2000 with
known technical issues, Petitioner presents evidence that Bluetooth was
being rapidly adopted by companies in the field prior to March 2000 despite
any perceived technical challenges with the technology. 14 Id. at 20–21
(citing Ex. 1025 ¶¶ 71–74; Ex. 1045, 198 (“[B]ased on massive global
interest and support for the technology, analysts are predicting that by 2002
over 100 million mobile phones . . . will incorporate Bluetooth
technology.”); Ex. 1007A, 111, 117).
Patent Owner also contends that in both the second and third
embodiments of Ito the acoustic receiver is not “operable to play an audio

14 Patent Owner argues that “use of Bluetooth for streaming media via an
asynchronous link was not developed until after Patent Owner filed and
began sharing the teachings of the ’812 application.” PO Resp. 30 (noting
that a draft of the A2DP (Advanced Audio Distribution Profile) was not
released until April 2001). Patent Owner does not present evidence or any
testimony from Dr. Wolf, however, to show that Bluetooth could not be used
to stream audio over an asynchronous link prior to the publication of A2DP.
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file that represents a song,” as recited in claim 8; rather, the acoustic receiver
transmits music data to another device. PO Resp. 31–34. We are not
persuaded by this argument. Although the acoustic receiving device in the
second embodiment of Ito transmits music data for output through the
speakers of the vehicle, Patent Owner directs us to no disclosure in Ito to
suggest that the ability of the acoustic receiving device to play a song is
removed in the second embodiment of Ito, i.e., that the device is no longer
“operable” to play a song. Reply 30 (citing Ex. 1025 ¶¶ 156–157).
Moreover, Patent Owner does not explain why streaming a song for output
via the speakers of a vehicle does not represent a playing of an audio file by
the portable electronic device. Accordingly, we are persuaded that Ito
discloses a “portable device . . . operable to play an audio file that represents
a song,” as recited in claim 8.
Patent Owner further argues that in embodiment 2 of Ito neither the
radio receiver (72) nor the vehicle display unit (71) features “a selectable
menu item,” as required in claim 8. PO Resp. 33. Figure 18 of Ito is
reproduced below:

Figure 18 depicts the receiving end of the second embodiment of Ito.
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In the embodiment depicted in Figure 18, a menu identifying audio
information available from the music offering service is displayed on display
unit 71. Ex. 1003, 22:28–42. Subsequently, remote controller 74 may be
used to start the music offering service. Id. at 22:22–27, 23:1–10. Acoustic
receiver device 70 then receives music data transmitted from the PES base
station and transmits this music data to the radio receiver of vehicle loaded
acoustic equipment 72, which outputs the song via speakers 73R and 73L.
Id. at 21:43–50, 22:1–13, 23:1–52.
Patent Owner contends that in this second embodiment of Ito, radio
receiver 72 and vehicle display unit 71 do not feature a selectable menu item
because the selection is controlled by remote controller 74, which cannot
play audio. PO Resp. 33. Thus, Patent Owner argues “Ito’s second
embodiment does not disclose a recipient device that is capable of both
displaying a selectable menu item and communicating a specific selection
back.” Id.
We agree with Petitioner, however, that Patent Owner has not
explained why claim 8 requires that any particular device select the
selectable menu item or why claim 8 requires that a particular device
communicate the selection of a selectable menu item back to the portable
electronic device. Reply 32. Thus, we are persuaded that Ito discloses the
“selectable menu item” of claim 8.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Petitioner has demonstrated
by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 8 would have been obvious
over Ito, Haartsen, Nokia, and Rydbeck. Pet. 15–18, 20–21, 30–31; Ex.
1023 ¶¶ 51–56, 119.
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b. Claim 11
Claim 11 requires a “wireless communication module” that is
operable to communicate streaming audio “at a communication rate that
provides for a CD quality listening experience.” Ex. 1001, 20:64–67.
Petitioner asserts Bluetooth could be used to stream the audio content of Ito
at a rate that “provides for a CD quality listening experience.” Pet. 34
(citing Ex. 1023 ¶¶ 131–132). Patent Owner responds that a CD quality
listening experience requires a transfer rate of 1.4 megabits per second,
which neither Ito’s analog FM system nor Bluetooth could provide. PO
Resp. 38–39 (citing Ex. 2005 ¶¶ 176–178).
We are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument. First, as noted
previously, Patent Owner’s arguments with respect to claim 11 rely on
constructions for the terms “at a communication rate that provides for a CD
quality listening experience” and “streaming audio signal” that we do not
adopt. Tr. 80:3–8. Second, Petitioner provides persuasive evidence that
compression formats, such as MP3, could provide a CD quality listening
experience when communicated by Bluetooth.15 Reply 37 (citing Ex. 1025
¶¶ 169–171; Ex. 1041A; Ex. 1049A).
Accordingly, we are persuaded that claim 11 of the ’641 patent would
have been obvious over Ito, Haartsen, Nokia, and Rydbeck.
c. Claim 14
Claim 14 requires, among other things, “an internal battery and means
for recharging the internal battery.” Ex. 1001, 21:26–27. As noted above,

15 We note that the ’641 patent indicates the “disclosed embodiments”—
which include embodiments transmitting MP3s and using Bluetooth
communication—allow for a “CD quality sound.” Ex. 1001, 2:18–21, 7:45–
50, 16:24–34.
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Patent Owner asserts that Petitioner provides no construction for this mean-
plus-function term in the Petition and, even if it had, there is no persuasive
evidence that one of ordinary skill in the art would have sought to add a
rechargeable battery and a means for recharging this battery in the telephone
device of Ito. PO Resp. 39–41. Patent Owner reasons that Ito was designed
to be a low-cost alternative to existing cellular systems and, therefore, one of
ordinary skill would not have increased the cost of Ito’s system by adding a
rechargeable battery or a means for recharging this battery. Id. at 41–42.
Petitioner replies that rechargeable batteries were well known in the
art and, although costs are irrelevant to the issue of patentability,
rechargeable AA or AAA batteries could have been added to the Ito device
with no increase in costs. Reply 39–40 (citing In re Magna Elecs., Inc.,
2015 WL 2110525, at *4 (Fed. Cir. May 7, 2015)).
As noted above, at a minimum, the “means for recharging the internal
battery” in claim 14 includes an interface that provides both power and data
connectivity. Nokia discloses a rechargeable Lithium-ion battery and a
means for recharging this battery using an interface that provides both power
and data connectivity. See Ex. 1005A, 14–15; Pet 19 (Ex. 1023 ¶¶ 41–44,
45–49). In view of this disclosure, as well as the understood utility of using
a rechargeable battery and a multifunctional interface in a portable device,
we are persuaded that one of ordinary skill in the art would have sought to
add Nokia’s rechargeable battery and interface in the phone of Ito, even if
this addition would increase the cost of Ito’s phone. See Orthopedic Equip.,
702 F.2d at 1013; Ex. 1023 ¶ 42; Ex. 1025 ¶¶ 175–176; see also Ex. 2005 ¶
111 (Dr. Wolf noting that “[i]t is my opinion that a person of skill in the art
at the time of invention would have understood that the best way to maintain
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portability would be to incorporate a portable power source, such as a
rechargeable battery.”).
Accordingly, we are persuaded that claim 14 of the ’641 patent would
have been obvious over Ito, Haartsen, Nokia, and Rydbeck.
6. Obviousness of Claim 12 over
Ito, Haartsen, Nokia, Rydbeck, and Galensky
Claim 12 requires, among other things, a “buffer memory.” Ex. 1001,
21:10-12. Petitioner contends it would have been obvious to include a
buffer memory in Ito’s phone in view of Galensky. Pet. 29, 35.
Galensky discloses a method for receiving and playing multimedia
files streamed over a wireless communications network. Ex. 1009, Abstract.
Galensky also discloses that “[t]o allow the wireless network provider to
serve more subscribers and allow more users to access the system . . . it is
advantageous to conserve bandwidth within the wireless network” by
transmitting data at an initial higher rate and then lowering the transmission
rate once an acceptable buffer is created in the buffer memory. Id. at 5:66–
6:11.
Petitioner contends that one of ordinary skill in the art would have
sought to add Galensky’s buffer memory in Ito’s phone to take advantage of
Galensky’s method of conserving network resources. Pet. 17–18, 29. Patent
Owner responds that one of ordinary skill in the art would not have been
motivated to add buffer memory to Ito’s phone because neither the
transmission of data from the PHS station to the acoustic receiver or the
analog FM transmission from the acoustic receiver to the vehicle audio
system in Ito requires buffering. PO Resp. 45. In support of this argument,
Dr. Wolf testifies that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would understand
that the transmission between the PHS base station and the acoustic receiver
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device does not exhibit sufficiently variable data rates that would require a
buffer.” Ex. 2005 ¶ 189.
Dr. Wolf’s assertion that Ito’s transmission rate is not sufficiently
variable to require a buffer memory is not persuasive because it addresses
Ito’s system individually and not as combined with Galensky. Specifically,
Dr. Wolf does not explain why one of ordinary skill in the art would not
have sought to add buffer memory to Ito’s phone to facilitate the
implementation of the variable transmission rate method disclosed in
Galensky. Ex. 1025 ¶ 181.
Upon review of Petitioner’s and Patent Owner’s arguments, we credit
the testimony of Dr. Quackenbush that one of ordinary skill in the art would
have been motivated to add buffer memory to the device of Ito to obtain the
benefits of transmission rate switching disclosed in Galensky. Ex. 1023
¶¶ 98–100. Accordingly, we are persuaded that claim 12 would have been
obvious over Ito, Haartsen, Nokia, Rydbeck, and Galensky.
7. Conclusion
Upon review of the record as a whole, including Patent Owner’s
arguments and the supporting testimony of Dr. Wolf, we find that Petitioner
has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 8, 11, 13,
and 14 of the ’641 patent would have been obvious under 35 U.S.C. §103
over Ito, Haartsen, Nokia, and Rydbeck and claim 12 would have been
obvious over Ito, Haartsen, Nokia, Rydbeck, and Galensky.
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D. Obviousness over Ohmura and Ahn (Claims 8 and 11) and
Ohmura, Ahn, and Nokia (Claims 13 and 14)
Petitioner contends that claims 8 and 11 of the ’641 patent would have
been obvious over Ohmura and Ahn and claims 13 and 14 would have been
obvious over Ohmura, Ahn, and Nokia. Pet. 30–59.16
1. Priority
Ohmura was filed April 4, 2001 and issued on August 30, 2005. Pet.
27; Ex. 1203. Ahn was filed October 26, 2001 and published on October 28,
2004. Pet. 28; Ex. 1205. Patent Owner contends that Ohmura and Ahn are
not prior art with respect to the ’641 patent because the ’641 patent17 is
entitled to the benefit of the March 28, 2000 filing date of U.S. Patent
Application No. 09/537,812 (“the ’812 application”). PO Resp. 73.
To establish entitlement to the benefit of an earlier filed application, a
patentee must demonstrate that “a person of ordinary skill in the art would
recognize that the applicant possessed what is claimed in the later filed
application as of the filing date of the earlier filed application.” Noelle v.
Lederman, 355 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2004). To make this showing, a
patentee must demonstrate that “each application in the chain leading back
to the earlier application” complies with the written description requirement
of 35 U.S.C. § 112. Lockwood v. American Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565,
1571 (Fed. Cir. 1997).

16 Citations to the Petition in section II.D are to the Petition filed in
IPR2014-01184.
17 The ’641 patent issued from U.S. Patent Application No. 13/673,391 (“the
’391 application”), which has a filing date of November 9, 2012. Ex. 1201.
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a. Board Determination of Priority Issues
As a preliminary matter, Patent Owner asserts that the Board is
prohibited from determining issues of priority because such an inquiry
“necessarily implicates a challenge to the written description of the
challenged claims,” which may not be resolved in an inter partes review
proceeding. PO Resp. 73–74 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 311(b); 37 C.F.R.
§ 21.104(b)(2)). We do not agree.
In analogous reexamination proceedings—which are likewise limited
to grounds of unpatentability based on prior art patents and publications—
the Federal Circuit has determined that a priority analysis is not only
permissible but a “critical legal tool.” See In re NTP, Inc., 654 F.3d 1268,
1277 (Fed. Cir. 2011); 35 U.S.C. § 311 (limiting review in inter partes
reviews to “prior art consisting of patents or printed publications”). Patent
Owner provides no reasoned argument as to why inter partes review
proceedings should be treated differently from reexamination proceedings
on the question of whether the Board may reach issues of priority. Thus, we
are not persuaded that we are prohibited from determining whether an
involved patent is entitled to the benefit date of an earlier filed application
when resolving whether a reference is prior art.
b. Written Description Support
Petitioner contends that claims 8, 11, 13, and 14 are not entitled to a
priority date earlier than January 16, 2008, the filing date of the great-
grandparent of the ’641 patent, because there is no written description
support in earlier priority applications for the following limitation of
claim 8:
A portable electronic device having . . . a wireless
communication module communicatively coupled to the
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processor and operable to communicate a streaming audio signal
that represents a playing of the song to a recipient device via a
localized communications signaling network in response to a
selection of a selectable menu item presented on a recipient
device display . . . .
Ex. 1201, 20:34–40 (emphases added); Pet. 10.
Patent Owner contends that both the ’812 application and the ’641
patent Specification demonstrate that the inventors were in possession of a
method of communicating information to an electronic device that could be
used to generate a selectable menu item.18 PO Resp. 84–90, 97–98 (citing
Ex. 2005 ¶¶ 287, 289–291). In support of this argument, Patent Owner
directs our attention to the following passage in the ’812 application:
FIG. 4 illustrates a graphical user interface (GUI) for displaying
selectable audio information according to one aspect of the
present invention. The GUI may be operable with a computer
system, cellular device, PDA, or other electronic devices or
systems operable to display the GUI of FIG. 4. The GUI, shown
generally at 400, may be displayed using a conventional web
browser 402 such as Microsoft®. Internet Explorer, a WAP
browser, or other browsers operable to display the audio
information. Browser 402 includes browser functions, shown
collectively at 403, for navigating a network such as the Internet
or an intranet. Homepage 401 may be displayed using browser

18 Patent Owner asserts that the Examiner resolved the issue of written
description support during prosecution and notes that the Board previously
found a similar claim limitation was entitled to a priority date of March 28,
2000. PO Resp. 102–105. As noted by Petitioner, however, Patent Owner
directs our attention to no discussion or reasoned analysis by the Examiner
related to the limitations of claim 8 at issue here. Reply 41. Moreover, in a
different reexamination proceeding, the Board found that a similar claim
limitation did not have adequate written description support in the original
application. See Reexamination 95/001,281 (Decision on Rehearing
12/30/2015). Thus, we are not persuaded that the question of written
description support for claim 8 has been resolved by the Office.
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402 and may include several functions, features, information, etc.
related to audio information. Home page 401 may be developed
using several different types of programming (i.e., HTML, XML,
Java, etc.) used to developing a network location or website.
PO Resp. 98 (quoting Ex. 1218, 616:9–26). According to Patent Owner, this
disclosure “makes clear that a graphical user interface can be present on a
variety of electronic devices,” including the recipient device described in
claim 8. PO Resp. 98 (citing Ex. 2005 ¶¶ 287, 290).
Patent Owner further asserts that the ’812 application disclosure
demonstrates that the GUI discussed above allows the user to select menu
items:
Homepage 401 may also include several tabs for efficiently
navigating homepage 401. Library tab 405 may be provided to
allow a user to browse available audio information that may be
presented by title, genre, artist, decade, culture, etc. Store tab 407
may also be provided for locating items available for purchase
such as CDs, PDA devices, MP3 players, wireless
communication hardware, interfaces, software or other types of
products that may be purchased while on-line. Chat tab 408 may
also be provided allowing a user to chat with other users of home
page 401. For example, a guest musical artist may be available
to chat with visitors of home page 401 via a chat page associated
with chat tab 408. Home page 401 may also include contest tab
409 for displaying current contests, prizes, and/or winners.
PO Resp. 99 (quoting Ex. 1218, 617:13–27).
As a whole, Patent Owner contends “these disclosures support the fact
that the inventors possessed the invention of communicating information in
response to a selection of a selectable menu item presented on a graphical
menu.” PO Resp. 100.
We agree that the disclosures of the ’812 application as a whole
demonstrate that the inventors were in possession of communicating a
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selectable graphical menu to an electronic device and delivering information
to this electronic device in response to the selection of a menu item on the
electronic device. See Ex. 1001, 4:33–49, 5:42–45. The question, however,
is whether the patentee was in possession of transmitting a streaming audio
signal from a portable electronic device to a recipient device in response to
the selection of a selectable menu item displayed on the recipient device, as
set forth in claim 8. Ex. 1201, 20:29–45. Upon review of the disclosures
recited by Patent Owner and the testimony of Dr. Wolf, we agree with
Petitioner that this functionality is not expressly disclosed in the ’812
application or the ’641 patent Specification. The recited applications
indicate, instead, that the selectable menu information and streaming audio
are transmitted from a digital engine and coupled storage device to an
electronic device and not from a portable electronic device to a recipient
device in response to a selectable menu item displayed on the recipient
device. See, e.g., 1001, 4:33–63, Fig. 1.
Ipsis verbis disclosure is not necessary, however, to satisfy the written
description requirement of section 112. Fujikawa v. Wattanasin, 93 F.3d
1559, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Thus, we must also determine whether, despite
the lack of express disclosure, one of ordinary skill in the art would have
understood that Patent Owner was in possession of the invention set forth in
claim 8. Id. In conducting this analysis, we are cognizant that “a description
which renders obvious a claimed invention is not sufficient to satisfy the
written description requirement of that invention.” Regents of the University
of California v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
Dr. Wolf recites the same disclosures as Patent Owner and concludes
that one of ordinary skill in the art would understand that the ’812
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application demonstrates possession of an invention wherein a radio dial
transmitted to a recipient device could be used to cause the transmission of
selected information to the recipient device. Ex. 2005 ¶¶ 287, 290. Dr.
Wolf does not address, however, the specific configuration set forth in claim
8 of the ’641 patent. In particular, Dr. Wolf does not explain why one of
ordinary skill in the art would understand from the recited disclosures that
the patentee was possession of a method of streaming a song from a portable
electronic device to a recipient device in response to the selection of a
selectable menu item “presented on a recipient device display.”
In contrast, Dr. Quackenbush analyzes the disclosures of the ’641
patent in detail and concludes that one of ordinary skill in the art, upon
review of the priority disclosures as a whole, would not understand the
patentee to be in possession of the invention set forth in claim 8. Ex. 1025
¶¶ 189–207. Specifically, Dr. Quackenbush concludes that the disclosures
of the ’812 application and the ’641 Specification focus on the transmission
of data from a storage device and digital engine to an electronic device, and
not from a portable electronic device to a recipient device, in response to a
selection of a selectable menu item presented on a recipient device display.
Ex. 1025 ¶¶ 193–203.
Upon careful review of both Dr. Wolf’s and Dr. Quackenbush’s
testimony, we credit the testimony of Dr. Quackenbush that one of ordinary
skill in the art would not understand the patentee to be in possession of a
method of streaming a song from a portable electronic device to a recipient
device in response to the selection of a selectable menu item “presented on a
recipient device” prior to November 9, 2012. Accordingly, we find that
Ohmura and Ahn are prior art with respect to claim 8 of the ’641 patent.
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And, because claims 11, 13, and 14 each depend from claim 8, we likewise
find that Ohmura and Ahn are prior art with respect to claims 11, 13, and 14.
2. Obviousness of Claims 8, 11, 13, and 14 – Ohmura, Ahn, and Nokia
a. Ohmura
Ohmura is directed to a system for distributing musical content in a
vehicle. Ex. 1203, 1:11–13. The Ohmura system is composed of an audio
apparatus mounted in a vehicle that communicates with one or more portable
audio apparatuses containing stored music. Id. at 3:49–51, 3:64–4:1, 8:19–
27. Using a displayed selectable menu, a user may select music from any of
the available portable devices, which is then communicated wirelessly using
a short-distance data communication system, such as Bluetooth, to the audio
apparatus and played in real-time through the vehicle’s speakers. Id. at
9:39–42, 13:21–27, 20:59–67, Fig. 6.
b. Ahn
Ahn discloses the transmission of music data using Bluetooth. Ex.
1205, Abstract. In the Ahn system, music data may be streamed from a
cellular phone to the car’s audio equipment using “an asynchronous call
path.” Id. ¶¶ 26, 34, 36.
c. Analysis
Petitioner provides detailed analysis showing where the limitations of
claims 8 and 11 (Ohmura and Ahn) and claims 13 and 14 (Ohmura, Ahn,
and Nokia) are disclosed in Ohmura, Ahn, and Nokia. Pet. 49–52, 54–59.
Petitioner also provides persuasive analysis as to why one of ordinary skill
in the art would have sought to combine the various features of Ohmura and
Ahn. Id. at 30–33, 51, 52, 54, 55, 58, 59.
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Patent Owner asserts that one of ordinary skill in the art would not
have sought to combine the features of Ohmura and Ahn because Ohmura is
limited to use with a car audio apparatus and adding wireless telephone
capabilities in that limited setting would increase costs yet provide “very
limited benefit.” PO Resp. 111. Patent Owner also asserts that using Ahn’s
method of transmitting data over an asynchronous channel would not
provide any benefit in the Ohmura device because the Bluetooth standard
teaches away from using the asynchronous channel for “audio traffic.” Id.
(citing Ex. 2005 ¶ 299). Patent Owner further asserts that Dr. Quackenbush
provides no evidence to support his conclusion that one of ordinary skill in
the art would have found the combination of Ohmura and Ahn routine,
especially given Ohmura’s teaching that wirelessly downloading music
entails high costs. Id. at 112 (citing 2005 ¶ 296).
Petitioner responds that the device of Ohmura “is not constrained for
use within a car” and, in any event, claims 8, 11, 13, and 14 do not require
that the portable device be in the form of a wireless telephone. Reply 47.
Dr. Quackenbush also testifies that, contrary to Dr. Wolf’s testimony, the
Bluetooth standard does not teach away from using the asynchronous
channel to communicate music data. Ex. 1025 ¶¶ 212–213, 215.
As noted by Petitioner, claims 8, 11, 13, and 14 do not require a
wireless telephone device. Accordingly, we are not persuaded by Patent
Owner’s argument that the limited value and increased costs involved in
adding this feature are relevant to the combination of Ohmura and Ahn with
respect to claims 8, 11, 13, and 14. Even if this functionality were required,
however, Ahn discloses the benefit of using wireless telephone capability to
allow for telephone calls using a car’s audio apparatus. Ex. 1205 ¶¶ 60, 64.
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That this benefit might be limited to the time period one is inside of a car
does not teach away from or otherwise counsel against implementing this
functionality in the device of Ohmura.
With respect to Dr. Wolf’s testimony that the Bluetooth standard
teaches away from using the asynchronous channel for audio traffic, we note
that Dr. Wolf provides no citation or argument in paragraph 299 of her
declaration to support this assertion. In contrast, Dr. Quackenbush provides
evidence demonstrating that the asynchronous channel of Bluetooth is
customarily used for data, including data representing a song. Ex. 1025
¶ 215; Ex. 2038, 85:5–12, 88:9–15. Thus, we are not persuaded that the
Bluetooth standard would teach away from using an asynchronous channel
to stream audio to another device.
With respect to Patent Owner’s arguments that there is no evidence
that the combination of Ohmura and Ahn would be routine, we note that—
except for the increased costs involved with downloading audio from a
network location19— Dr. Wolf provides no evidence to refute Dr.
Quackenbush’s testimony that a person of ordinary skill would have had no
difficulty in combining the disclosed features of Ohmura and Ahn. See
Orthopedic Equip., 702 F.2d at 1013; see also 1205 ¶ 14 (disclosing the
benefits of downloading music data from a music-data-providing service).
As such, we do not find Patent Owner’s arguments persuasive.
CD quality listening experience
Patent Owner contends that there is no evidence that Ohmura or Ahn

19 We note that claim 8 does not require connection to a music distribution
service, only a connection between a portable electronic device and a
recipient device.
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could stream audio at a communication rate that provides for a CD quality
listening experience. PO Resp. 115 (citing Ex. 2005 ¶ 303). According to
Patent Owner, Ohmura only discloses saving music from a CD in
compressed form, which does not provide for a CD quality listening
experience, and one of ordinary skill in the art would not have considered
storing CD-quality audio in the portable apparatuses of Ohmura because this
“would have been prohibitively expensive in the time frame of the
invention.” Id. (citing Ex. 2005 ¶ 304).
Petitioner responds that the ’641 patent repeatedly refers to
compressed audio formats, such as MP3s, and implies that these compressed
formats allow for the enjoyment of “CD quality sound.” Reply 49 (citing
Ex. 1001, 2:18–21 (noting that the disclosed embodiments of the ’641 patent
allow for CD quality sound), 4:53–55 (“For example, the information could
be several songs or titles configured as an audio file and formatted in a
digital format such as an MP3 file, wave file, etc.”), 9:15–19). Petitioner
also asserts that Ohmura teaches reading “music pre-stored in a storage
medium such as CD” and communicating this information in uncompressed
format, which one of ordinary skill in the art would understand could have
been transmitted using Bluetooth at a rate that provides for a CD quality
listening experience. Id. at 50 (citing Ex. 1203, 25:41–44, 26:33–48, 25:1–
5, 25:47–56, Figs. 2, 16; Ex. 1025 ¶ 225).
As noted previously, Patent Owner’s arguments rely upon proposed
claim constructions we do not adopt. Moreover, even if we were to find that
“streaming audio” required the immediate playback of audio data, we are
persuaded that CD audio stored in a compressed format, such as MP3s,
could be streamed using Bluetooth at a rate that provides for a “CD quality
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listening experience.” Reply 50 (citing Ex. 1223 ¶ 126; Ex. 1025 ¶¶ 222,
227).
Accordingly, we are persuaded that claim 11 would have been
obvious over Ohmura and Ahn.
simultaneously communicate and receive data
Claim 13 depends from claim 8 and requires, inter alia:
a different wireless communication module located within the
enclosure and operable to receive a collection of data
representing a media, wherein the wireless communication
module communicatively coupled to the processor is further
operable to wirelessly communicate a signal representing the
media to the recipient device while the different wireless
communication module is receiving the collection of data
representing the media.
Ex. 1001, 21:17–25.
Patent Owner contends that Ohmura and Ahn both disclose
transmitting and communicating data, but “neither disclose the ability to
communicate and receive data simultaneously or at the same time.” PO
Resp. 116 (citing Ex. 2005 ¶¶ 306–309). Petitioner responds that the term
“while” does not require communicating or receiving data “simultaneously
or at the same time” and even if such a temporal requirement existed,
Ohmura and Ahn disclose transmitting and receiving audio at the same time.
Reply 51.
Ahn discloses that the music-data-providing server may transmit
either streaming or non-streaming music data to the mobile station via a
wireless transmitting and receiving unit. Ex. 1205 ¶ 36, Fig. 2. The system
of Ahn decompresses these signals differently according to the data type. Id.
¶ 38. For example, if the data are in the form of “streaming music data,”
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these data are transmitted to the “car kit” using Bluetooth and reproduced
before the song is completely received. Id. ¶ 37.
Given that Ahn has two communication units (a wireless transmitting
and receiving unit and a Bluetooth communication unit) and reproduction of
the streaming audio signal through the car kit is initiated before the music
data are completely received, we are persuaded by Dr. Quackenbush’s
testimony that one of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that
Ahn discloses a portable device that can receive and communicate data at
the same time using two different wireless communication modules. Ex.
1223 ¶¶ 136–138; Ex. 1025 ¶¶ 231–233; see also Ex. 1205, claims 14 and 17
(disclosing that music data may be output in real-time “while” the music
data are received from the music-data-providing server).
internal battery and means for recharging the internal battery
As noted previously, claim 14 requires “an internal battery and means
for recharging the internal battery.” Ex. 1001, 21:26–27.
Petitioner argues that Nokia discloses both a rechargeable battery and
a means for recharging this battery, in the form of an interface operable to
communicate data via a first conductive path and receive power via a second
conductive path. Pet. 35–36, 59. Petitioner further argues that one of
ordinary skill in the art would have sought to use Nokia’s battery and
interface in the Ohmura device because the utility of rechargeable batteries
and multifunction interfaces in portable devices was well understood. Pet.
32, 35, 41; Ex. 1223 ¶¶ 49–50, 52–57.
Patent Owner argues Petitioner has failed to carry its burden to
identify corresponding structure for this means-plus-function claim term
and, regardless, Petitioner provides no reasoned motivation for one of
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ordinary skill in the art to add Nokia’s rechargeable battery and interface in
the device of Ohmura and Ahn. PO Resp. 118–122. According to Patent
Owner, there are no disclosed issues with the power systems of Ohmura and
Ahn and, even if one sought to modify these power systems, one of ordinary
skill in the art could not implement Nokia’s battery and interface without
access to Nokia’s proprietary documents. Id. at 120–121. In support of
Patent Owner’s arguments, Dr. Wolf testifies that implementing the Nokia
interface and battery in Ohmura’s device “may” require a license from
Nokia and undue experimentation to modify the internal components due to
potential voltage incompatibilities. Ex. 2005 ¶ 312.
In response, Petitioner contends there is no evidence that a license
from Nokia or a change in voltage would be required to implement Nokia’s
interface and battery in the device of Ohmura and Ahn. Reply 52–53 (citing
Ex. 1025 ¶¶ 234–237). Dr. Quackenbush also reiterates his testimony that
one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood how to implement a
rechargeable battery and multifunction interface in the device of Ohmura.
Ex. 1025 ¶¶ 234–237.
As noted previously, at a minimum, the “means for recharging the
internal battery” in the ’641 patent includes an interface capable of
delivering power and communicating data. Petitioner provides persuasive
evidence that Nokia discloses both a rechargeable battery and an interface
that provides both power and data. Petitioner also provides a reasoned
rationale for adding the battery and interface of Nokia in the device of
Ohmura and Ahn. Ex. 1223 ¶¶ 57, 140. Patent Owner’s and Dr. Wolf’s
questions as to whether a license from Nokia might be required to
implement the disclosed battery and interface do not call into question the
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obviousness of the combination. See Orthopedic Equip., 702 F.2d at 1013
(evidence that businessmen might not make the combination for business
reasons does not render a combination nonobvious). Nor does Dr. Wolf’s
listing of hypothetical issues that might interfere with combining the two
references sufficiently refute the testimony of Dr. Quackenbush that one of
ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success
in combining these references.
d. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, we find that Petitioner has demonstrated by a
preponderance of the evidence that claims 8 and 11 would have been
obvious over Ohmura and Ahn and that claims 13 and 14 would have been
obvious over Ohmura, Ahn, and Nokia.
III. CONCLUSION
Having carefully reviewed the arguments and evidence presented by
Petitioner and Patent Owner, as well as the supporting testimony of Dr.
Quackenbush and Dr. Wolf, we are persuaded that Petitioner has
demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1–3 and 5–14
of the ’641 patent would have been obvious over the prior art of record.
IV. SCOPE OF REPLY EVIDENCE
Patent Owner contends that Petitioner’s Reply “improperly
supplements arguments that could and should have been presented in the
Petition.” Paper 26. According to Patent Owner, to rely on evidence or
argument in the Reply, Petitioner must demonstrate that these arguments and
evidence were either presented in the Petition or explain why they could not
have been made at that time. Id. at 1.
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A. Claim Construction Arguments
Patent Owner contends that Petitioner presents new claim
constructions arguments with respect to the means-plus-function limitation
“means for recharging the internal battery.” Id. at 2. On this point,
however, we did not adopt Petitioner’s claim construction arguments in the
Reply. Thus, Patent Owner’s argument is moot.
Patent Owner also argues that Petitioner provided new arguments and
evidence with respect to the construction of a “communication rate that
provides for a CD quality listening experience.” Paper 26, 2. On this point,
we note that Petitioner did not change its proposed construction of this term
in its Reply. See -01182 Pet. 11–12 (citing Ex. 1101, 2:18–21, 9:57–67);
Reply 6–7. Moreover, Petitioner cannot anticipate every claim construction
argument that Patent Owner may make in its response and is entitled to
provide argument and evidence in its Reply to refute arguments and
evidence in Patent Owner’s Response. 37 C.F.R. §42.23(b).
B. Priority Arguments
Patent Owner asserts that Petitioner presents new arguments and
evidence in its Reply related to priority. Paper 26, 3–4. According to Patent
Owner, Petitioner asserted three challenges to the appropriate priority date
for the ’641 patent, which did not include an argument that “a recipient
device cannot be a portable electronic device.” Paper 26, 3 (citing Reply
43). We do not agree. The Petition reasonably distinguishes between
actions taken by the portable electronic device, for example “electronic
device 300,” and a different recipient device. See -01184 Pet. 19 (“It does
not, however, disclose that a recipient device receives information from a
portable device to generate a graphical menu on the recipient device or that
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audio content is sent from the portable device to the recipient device in
response to the selection of a menu item on the recipient device.”)
(emphases added).
Patent Owner also argues that Petitioner provided arguments and
evidence in its Reply regarding prior Office proceedings that could have
been raised in the Petition. Paper 26, 3–4. We have reviewed these
arguments and the supporting evidence of Dr. Quackenbush identified by
Patent Owner and find that they reasonably respond to arguments raised by
Patent Owner in its response. As such, we are not persuaded that these
arguments or the evidence supporting these arguments are improper.
C. Additional Arguments and Evidence
Patent Owner argues that Petitioner provides many additional new
arguments as well as evidence supporting these arguments in its Reply.
Paper 26, 4. Patent Owner also objects that Petitioner often uses additional
citations to exhibits filed with the Petition to support its arguments in Reply.
Id. at 4–5.
Again, Petitioner cannot anticipate or seek to refute every possible
argument that will be made by Patent Owner in its Petition. Moreover,
Patent Owner had sufficient opportunity through cross-examination and
motions for observations on cross-examination to address the evidence
submitted by Petitioner in its Reply. See Belden v. Berk-Tek LLC, 805 F.3d
1064, 1082 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Accordingly, we are not persuaded that
Petitioner’s arguments and evidence submitted in the Reply are improper or
should otherwise be ignored.
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D. Conclusion
Upon review of Patent Owner’s identifications and the arguments and
evidence submitted in Petitioner’s Reply, we find that Petitioner’s arguments
and supporting evidence reasonably respond to arguments and evidence
present by Patent Owner in its response. Accordingly, we do not strike or
disregard this evidence.
V. ORDER
It is
ORDERED that claims 1–3 and 5–14 of U.S. Patent 8,532,641 B2 are
unpatentable;
FURTHER ORDERED that any party to the proceeding seeking
judicial review of this Final Written Decision must comply with the notice
and service requirements of 37 C.F.R. § 90.2; and
FURTHER ORDERED that both parties may file their oral argument
demonstratives as an exhibit in IPR2014-01181.

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PETITIONER:
J. Steven Baughman
ROPES & GRAY LLP
steven.baughman@ropesgray.com

Gabrielle E. Higgins
ROPES & GRAY LLP
gabrielle.higgins@ropesgray.com

PATENT OWNER:
Ryan M. Schultz
ROBINS, KAPLAN, MILLER & CIRESI LLP
rmschultz@rkmc.com

Thomas R. DeSimone
ROBINS, KAPLAN, MILLER & CIRESI LLP
trdesimone@rkmc.com