Roy L. Best, Complainant,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionJun 3, 2004
01a33918 (E.E.O.C. Jun. 3, 2004)

01a33918

06-03-2004

Roy L. Best, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


Roy L. Best v. United States Postal Service

01A33918

June 3, 2004

.

Roy L. Best,

Complainant,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A33918

Agency Nos. 4H-320-1093-96; 4H-320-1215-96; 4H-320-0080-97;

4H- 320-0160�97; 4H-320-0194-97

DECISION

Complainant timely appealed the agency's decision dated June 6, 2003,

which found no breach of a September 6, 2000 settlement agreement.

On September 6, 2000, the parties resolved complainant's complaints by

entering into a settlement agreement, which provided, in pertinent part,

that complainant would receive the following:

(1) [Complainant] will be provided light duty work within his medical

restrictions at the Defuniak Springs Post Office between the hours of

6:30 a.m.- 3:00 p.m., with 30 minutes for lunch and Saturday and Sundays

as off days;

(2) When and if [complainant] is able to return to full duty,

[Mr. W] will review the staffing at the Defuniak Springs Post Office

to determine if it is operationally feasible to change [complainant's]

schedule to 6:00 a.m.- 2:30 p.m., with 30 minutes for lunch and Saturday

and Sundays as off days. If the change is not operationally feasible,

[complainant] will remain in the Defuniak Spring Post Office with a

schedule of 6:30 am- 3:00 p.m. with 30 minutes for lunch and Saturday

and Sundays as off days;

. . .

(8) [Complainant] will remain on light duty in the Defuniak Springs

Post Office as long as his physician states there is a possibility that

he will be able to return to full duty in the future. In the event

the physician deems that [complainant's] restrictions are permanent

in nature, [complainant] understands that there is no guarantee of

permanent light duty.

By letter dated March 10, 2003, complainant alleged that the agency

breached provision (1) and (2) when the agency offered him a limited

duty job at a new station with different work hours. Complainant also

alleged that the agency breached provision (1) when on February 20,

2003, a named manager instructed him to work in the window job and he

worked in excess of his medical restrictions. Complainant claimed that

he was relieved from the window duty after he complained with the named

manager that he had injured his lower back. Complainant requested that

the agency reinstate the underlying complaints for processing.

By letter dated June 6, 2003, the agency found no breach.

EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. � 1614.504(a) provides that any settlement

agreement knowingly and voluntarily agreed to by the parties, reached at

any stage of the complaint process, shall be binding on both parties.

The Commission has held that a settlement agreement constitutes a

contract between the employee and the agency, to which ordinary rules

of contract construction apply. See Herrington v. Department of Defense,

EEOC Request No. 05960032 (December 9, 1996). The Commission has further

held that it is the intent of the parties as expressed in the contract,

not some unexpressed intention, that controls the contract's construction.

Eggleston v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05900795

(August 23, 1990). In ascertaining the intent of the parties with regard

to the terms of a settlement agreement, the Commission has generally

relied on the plain meaning rule. See Hyon v. United States Postal

Service, EEOC Request No. 05910787 (December 2, 1991). This rule states

that if the writing appears to be plain and unambiguous on its face,

its meaning must be determined from the four corners of the instrument

without resort to extrinsic evidence of any nature. See Montgomery

Elevator Co. v. Building Eng'g Servs. Co., 730 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1984).

Complainant argues that the agency breached provision (1) and (2) when

the agency forced him to accept a light duty job offer at a different

station with different work hours than was agreed to in the settlement

agreement. In its June 6, 2003 decision, the agency stated that according

to provision (8), complainant's light duty job at the Defuniak Springs

Post Office was contingent upon his medical restrictions not being

diagnosed as permanent by his physician. The agency states that on

January 17, 2003, complainant's physician indicated in an evaluation for

the Department of Labor, that complainant's medical condition reached

maximum improvement in September 2002. Because complainant's medical

condition was diagnosed as permanent, the agency asserted that it did

not have any obligation under the settlement agreement to guarantee

complainant a light duty job at the Defuniak Springs Post Office pursuant

to provision 1.

On appeal, complainant acknowledges that provision (8) does not guarantee

a permanent light duty position. However, complainant stated that

he understood that if the Department of Labor (Office of Workers

Compensation) accepted his injury, then he would be guaranteed light

duty in the same location (Defuniak Springs Post Office) with the same

work hours. Complainant also argues that he was required to accept other

job offers in violation of the settlement agreement.

A fair reading of provision (8) of the settlement agreement provided

that complainant was guaranteed to remain on light duty in the Defuniak

Springs Post Office until his physician determined that his restrictions

were permanent in nature. The record reflects that complainant was

placed into the promised light duty position at the Defuniak Springs

Post Office until at least January 2003, when his physician determined

that his restrictions were permanent in nature. Complainant claims on

appeal that he understood that if the Office of Worker's Compensation

accepted his injuries, he would be offered the same work hours and same

duty station; however, the settlement agreement specifies the duration

of complainant's placement (until his physician determined that his

restrictions were permanent). To the extent that complainant intended

that the settlement agreement guarantee that he retain indefinitely the

same work location and the same work hours, this expectation should have

been specifically included in the settlement agreement.

In his March 10, 2003 letter, complainant also alleged that he worked

in excess of his medical restriction when on February 20, 2003, he

was instructed to work in the window job. Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. �

1614.504(c), allegations that subsequent acts of discrimination violate a

settlement agreement shall be processed as a separate complaint under 29

C.F.R. � 1614.106. It is inappropriate to raise this matter on appeal.

Accordingly, the agency's decision finding no breach of the settlement

agreement was proper and is hereby AFFIRMED.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

June 3, 2004

__________________

Date