01a33918
06-03-2004
Roy L. Best v. United States Postal Service
01A33918
June 3, 2004
.
Roy L. Best,
Complainant,
v.
John E. Potter,
Postmaster General,
United States Postal Service,
Agency.
Appeal No. 01A33918
Agency Nos. 4H-320-1093-96; 4H-320-1215-96; 4H-320-0080-97;
4H- 320-0160�97; 4H-320-0194-97
DECISION
Complainant timely appealed the agency's decision dated June 6, 2003,
which found no breach of a September 6, 2000 settlement agreement.
On September 6, 2000, the parties resolved complainant's complaints by
entering into a settlement agreement, which provided, in pertinent part,
that complainant would receive the following:
(1) [Complainant] will be provided light duty work within his medical
restrictions at the Defuniak Springs Post Office between the hours of
6:30 a.m.- 3:00 p.m., with 30 minutes for lunch and Saturday and Sundays
as off days;
(2) When and if [complainant] is able to return to full duty,
[Mr. W] will review the staffing at the Defuniak Springs Post Office
to determine if it is operationally feasible to change [complainant's]
schedule to 6:00 a.m.- 2:30 p.m., with 30 minutes for lunch and Saturday
and Sundays as off days. If the change is not operationally feasible,
[complainant] will remain in the Defuniak Spring Post Office with a
schedule of 6:30 am- 3:00 p.m. with 30 minutes for lunch and Saturday
and Sundays as off days;
. . .
(8) [Complainant] will remain on light duty in the Defuniak Springs
Post Office as long as his physician states there is a possibility that
he will be able to return to full duty in the future. In the event
the physician deems that [complainant's] restrictions are permanent
in nature, [complainant] understands that there is no guarantee of
permanent light duty.
By letter dated March 10, 2003, complainant alleged that the agency
breached provision (1) and (2) when the agency offered him a limited
duty job at a new station with different work hours. Complainant also
alleged that the agency breached provision (1) when on February 20,
2003, a named manager instructed him to work in the window job and he
worked in excess of his medical restrictions. Complainant claimed that
he was relieved from the window duty after he complained with the named
manager that he had injured his lower back. Complainant requested that
the agency reinstate the underlying complaints for processing.
By letter dated June 6, 2003, the agency found no breach.
EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. � 1614.504(a) provides that any settlement
agreement knowingly and voluntarily agreed to by the parties, reached at
any stage of the complaint process, shall be binding on both parties.
The Commission has held that a settlement agreement constitutes a
contract between the employee and the agency, to which ordinary rules
of contract construction apply. See Herrington v. Department of Defense,
EEOC Request No. 05960032 (December 9, 1996). The Commission has further
held that it is the intent of the parties as expressed in the contract,
not some unexpressed intention, that controls the contract's construction.
Eggleston v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05900795
(August 23, 1990). In ascertaining the intent of the parties with regard
to the terms of a settlement agreement, the Commission has generally
relied on the plain meaning rule. See Hyon v. United States Postal
Service, EEOC Request No. 05910787 (December 2, 1991). This rule states
that if the writing appears to be plain and unambiguous on its face,
its meaning must be determined from the four corners of the instrument
without resort to extrinsic evidence of any nature. See Montgomery
Elevator Co. v. Building Eng'g Servs. Co., 730 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1984).
Complainant argues that the agency breached provision (1) and (2) when
the agency forced him to accept a light duty job offer at a different
station with different work hours than was agreed to in the settlement
agreement. In its June 6, 2003 decision, the agency stated that according
to provision (8), complainant's light duty job at the Defuniak Springs
Post Office was contingent upon his medical restrictions not being
diagnosed as permanent by his physician. The agency states that on
January 17, 2003, complainant's physician indicated in an evaluation for
the Department of Labor, that complainant's medical condition reached
maximum improvement in September 2002. Because complainant's medical
condition was diagnosed as permanent, the agency asserted that it did
not have any obligation under the settlement agreement to guarantee
complainant a light duty job at the Defuniak Springs Post Office pursuant
to provision 1.
On appeal, complainant acknowledges that provision (8) does not guarantee
a permanent light duty position. However, complainant stated that
he understood that if the Department of Labor (Office of Workers
Compensation) accepted his injury, then he would be guaranteed light
duty in the same location (Defuniak Springs Post Office) with the same
work hours. Complainant also argues that he was required to accept other
job offers in violation of the settlement agreement.
A fair reading of provision (8) of the settlement agreement provided
that complainant was guaranteed to remain on light duty in the Defuniak
Springs Post Office until his physician determined that his restrictions
were permanent in nature. The record reflects that complainant was
placed into the promised light duty position at the Defuniak Springs
Post Office until at least January 2003, when his physician determined
that his restrictions were permanent in nature. Complainant claims on
appeal that he understood that if the Office of Worker's Compensation
accepted his injuries, he would be offered the same work hours and same
duty station; however, the settlement agreement specifies the duration
of complainant's placement (until his physician determined that his
restrictions were permanent). To the extent that complainant intended
that the settlement agreement guarantee that he retain indefinitely the
same work location and the same work hours, this expectation should have
been specifically included in the settlement agreement.
In his March 10, 2003 letter, complainant also alleged that he worked
in excess of his medical restriction when on February 20, 2003, he
was instructed to work in the window job. Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. �
1614.504(c), allegations that subsequent acts of discrimination violate a
settlement agreement shall be processed as a separate complaint under 29
C.F.R. � 1614.106. It is inappropriate to raise this matter on appeal.
Accordingly, the agency's decision finding no breach of the settlement
agreement was proper and is hereby AFFIRMED.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0701)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed
with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar
days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of
receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29
C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for
29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests
and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,
Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the
request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by
mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.
See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include
proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States
District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you
receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as
the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head
or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and
official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your
case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,
and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you
file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
June 3, 2004
__________________
Date