Rosa I. Burgado, Complainant,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionApr 9, 2002
01994915 (E.E.O.C. Apr. 9, 2002)

01994915

04-09-2002

Rosa I. Burgado, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


Rosa I. Burgado v. United States Postal Service

01994915

04-09-02

.

Rosa I. Burgado,

Complainant,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01994915

Agency No. 1-I-531-0027-98

Hearing No. 260-99-8057X

DECISION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from the agency's final

decision concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint

of unlawful employment discrimination in violation of Section 501 of

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29

U.S.C. � 791 et seq. The appeal is accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. �

1614.405. Complainant alleges she was discriminated against on the

basis of disability (contact dermatitis) when, in February 1997, she

was not permitted to work around machines. For the following reasons,

the Commission AFFIRMS the agency's final decision.

The record reveals that complainant, a Mail Processor, PS-4, at the

agency's Milwaukee, Wisconsin facility, filed a formal EEO complaint with

the agency on December 4, 1997, alleging that the agency had discriminated

against her as referenced above. At the conclusion of the investigation,

complainant received a copy of the investigative report and requested

a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). The AJ issued a

decision without a hearing, finding no discrimination.

The AJ found that the record contained scant evidence of complainant's

disability. A letter dated September 9, 1996, from complainant's doctor

provided that complainant has a permanent condition called contact

dermatitis. The letter informed the agency that complainant's condition

could be controlled if her contact with industrial plastic wrapping

and boxes was reduced. Complainant was to use cotton gloves under any

other type of glove except rubber. Complainant's doctor believed that

a change of workplace to either the manual or automation unit would

control her condition. On December 20, 1996, the Department of Labor

notified complainant that her occupational disease claim was accepted

for the condition of bilateral hand eczema. Even though the Supervisor

of Distribution Operations referred to complainant's contact dermatitis

as a disability in his affidavit, complainant has provided no evidence

how her condition substantially limits a major life activity.

On October 26, 1996, complainant was awarded a bid position in the BCS-OCR

department. On October 28, 1996, a health unit statement specified her

restrictions and complainant was informed that she could wear cotton

gloves underneath surgical gloves.

On February 26, 1997, complainant was told that she could no longer

wear gloves on the machine. Complainant was given a choice of where she

wanted to work and chose the manual unit. Since that time, complainant

has worked at the light duty table in automation.

The Supervisor's Safety Handbook dated March 30, 1985, provided that

gloves must not be worn by machine operators or persons working on or

near machinery, conveyors, drills, chain drives, or similar types of

mechanical equipment. In April 1997, a personnel memorandum notified

employees that gloves must not be worn by machine operators or persons

working on or near machinery.

In June 1997, following an inspection by the Occupational Safety and

Health Administration (OSHA), the agency was given a citation for

not allowing gloves on machinery, thus causing a paper cut hazard.

Agency management contacted OSHA's national office and the office of

federal program administration, both of which supported the agency's

position that gloves pose an additional risk around moving machine parts.

OSHA granted an informal hearing and agreed that cloth or leather gloves

were not appropriate for use around machines.

Initially OSHA agreed to delete the citation if the agency allowed

employees the opportunity to wear surgical gloves. The agency argued

that the rubber belts could grab the latex material of the gloves even

if snug-fitting and cause the hand to be pulled toward the moving part.

After considering the agency's argument, the citation was withdrawn

because �even tight-fitting latex surgical gloves, posed a hazard of the

rubberized fabric adhering to the rubber machine parts pulling the mail

thereby causing the employees to sustain severe hand and finger injuries.�

Attached to the update on gloves and the OSHA complaint was an

investigation of a serious accident caused when a machine belt

caught an employee's gloved hand and pulled it into a tension roller.

An employee activated the emergency stop upon hearing the employee's cry

for help and maintenance responded to release his hand from the machine.

The employee underwent two and half hours of surgery to his left hand.

According to the hospital staff, the belt peeled the employee's skin

down and reattached itself to the employee's hand.

Assuming arguendo that complainant had a disability for purposes of the

Rehabilitation Act, the AJ concluded that she was a qualified individual

with a disability inasmuch as she was satisfactorily performing the

duties of her position while wearing gloves until February 1997.

However, the AJ then concluded that the agency showed that to permit

the wearing of gloves on the machine constituted a major undue hardship

on its operations. In support of this undue hardship analysis, the AJ

noted the Supervisor's Safety Handbook, which provided that gloves must

not be worn by machine operators or persons working on or near machinery;

OSHA's national office agreement stating that gloves posed an additional

risk around machine parts, as well as its conclusion that gloves posed

a more serious injury potential than paper cuts to an ungloved hand;

and the agency's evidence of a serious accident resulting in surgery

when a machine caught an employee's gloved hand and pulled it into a

tension roller.

After a careful review of the record, the Commission finds that the AJ

was correct when she concluded that the case was appropriate for summary

judgment and in her ultimate finding that the agency's actions were

not the result of discrimination against the complainant. However,

the Commission disagrees with the AJ's analysis of the case.

EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. �1630.15(b)(2) provides that an employer

may require that an individual not pose a direct threat to her health

and safety, or that of others. The Commission notes, however, that

the agency cannot exclude qualified individuals with disabilities from

employment based upon fear of a future risk of injury, without engaging

in the individualized assessment required by the Rehabilitation Act into

whether their disabilities pose a "direct threat" of substantial harm.<1>

A "direct threat" is defined as: "a significant risk of substantial

harm"which cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation. 29

C.F.R. �1630.2(r).

In determining whether an individual would pose a direct threat, the

factors to be considered include: (1) the duration of the risk; (2) the

nature and severity of the potential harm; (3) the likelihood that the

potential harm will occur; and (4) the imminence of the potential harm. 29

C.F.R. 1630.2(r). Therefore, in regards to complainant's claim that she

was discriminated against when she was taken off the machines, we note the

evidence in the record of an accident resulting in surgery when a machine

caught an employee's gloved hand and pulled it into a tension roller.

The agency's policy was confirmed by the Safety Captain who reiterated

management's position that gloves are not to be worn while operating

machinery. The Safety Captain stated that he often reminds employees

of the safety regulation and provided a copy of a printed reminder.

On appeal, complainant restates arguments previously made at the hearing,

namely that she has witnessed two other employees wearing gloves.<2>

However, as the AJ noted, as soon as it was brought to the Safety

Captain's attention, the two employees wearing gloves were stopped

from operating equipment. Complainant admitted that the plant safety

specialists told those employees to remove their gloves. On appeal,

complainant submits a newspaper clipping with a picture of a Mail

Processor in the Omaha, Nebraska facility wearing gloves. Besides the

fact that complainant's picture is from another facility in a different

state, this submission fails to disprove that the accommodation of

wearing gloves would not pose a direct threat to either complainant or

her fellow employees.<3> Given the findings of OSHA, as well as the

accident noted above, we agree with the agency's policy that wearing

gloves would pose a significant risk of substantial harm. In light

of the above, we find the agency acted reasonably when it determined

it could not accommodate complainant's disability by allowing her to

continue wearing gloves without posing a direct threat to herself and

to other employees. Therefore, her removal from work on the machines

does not constitute disability discrimination.

We discern no basis to disturb the AJ's ultimate finding of no

discrimination. Therefore, after a careful review of the record,

including complainant's contentions on appeal, the agency's response,

and arguments and evidence not specifically addressed in this decision,

we AFFIRM the agency's final decision.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which

to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action must be

filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right

to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

____04-09-02______________

Date

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

For timeliness purposes, the Commission will presume that this decision

was received within five (5) calendar days after it was mailed. I certify

that this decision was mailed to complainant, complainant's representative

(if applicable), and the agency on:

__________________

Date

______________________________

1 We assume, without finding, for purposes of analysis only, that

complainant is a qualified individual with a disability.

2 For the first time on appeal, complainant raised the issue of

being denied overtime. However, this was not an accepted issued for

investigation and therefore, will not be addressed.

3 Complainant never argued that she should have been accommodated in

another manner.