Ronald L. Ziegler et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Sep 11, 2019

12569384 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Sep. 11, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
12/569,384 09/29/2009 Ronald L. Ziegler CRN 361 IA2 8189
29673 7590 09/11/2019
STEVENS & SHOWALTER LLP
7019 CORPORATE WAY
DAYTON, OH 45459-4238
EXAMINER
MASUD, ROKIB
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3687
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/11/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
PTO@sspatlaw.com
ssllp@speakeasy.net
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
________________

Ex parte RONALD L. ZIEGLER, DEAN E. WINNER,
MICHAEL P. KOVACK, and TIMOTHY A. WELLMAN1
________________

Appeal 2018-002291
Application 12/569,384
Technology Center 3600
________________

Before BRADLEY W. BAUMEISTER, MICHAEL J. STRAUSS, and
ADAM J. PYONIN, Administrative Patent Judges.

BAUMEISTER, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
Final Rejection of claims 2–8 and 10–15. App. Br. 6. We have jurisdiction
under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

1 Appellants identify Crown Equipment Corporation as the real party in
interest. Appeal Brief filed May 5, 2017 (“App. Br.”) at 4.
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THE INVENTION
Appellants describe the present invention as follows:
A method of monitoring operation of a vehicle detects an
application of force to the vehicle[,] and a change of momentum
of the vehicle is calculated. If the change of momentum and the
application of force are determined to occur within a
predetermined time period of one another, an impact signal is
generated.
Abstract.
Independent claim 2 illustrates the appealed claims. It is reproduced
below with formatting modified for clarity and with emphasis added to the
language that recites elements beyond an abstract idea:
2. A method of detecting impacts on a materials handling
vehicle comprising:
[i] monitoring a signal representative of g-forces
applied to the materials handling vehicle, where the signal is
generated by an impact sensor mounted on the materials handling
vehicle;
[ii] comparing the signal representative of g-forces
applied to the materials handling vehicle to a selected g-force
limit threshold value;
[iii] obtaining a gross vehicle weight for the materials
handling vehicle;
[iv] obtaining a measure of an acceleration of the
materials handling vehicle;
[v] calculating, by a processor on the materials
handling vehicle, an impulse signal based on the gross vehicle
weight of the materials handling vehicle and the obtained
measure of the acceleration of the materials handling vehicle;
[vi] comparing by the processor, the calculated impulse
signal to a programmed impulse signal limit; and
[vii] outputting, by the processor, an impact signal when
g-forces applied to the materials handling vehicle exceed the
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selected g-force limit threshold value and the impulse signal
exceeds the impulse signal limit within a predetermined time
period.

THE REJECTIONS
Claims 2–8 and 10–15 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being
directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 2–6.2
Claims 2–4, 7, and 11–13 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Donnelly (US 6,076,028; issued June 13, 2000), Phillips
(US 5,610,372; issued Mar. 11, 1997), and Harrop (US 4,855,711; issued
Aug. 8, 1989). Final Act. 6–9.
Claims 5, 6, 8, 10, and 14 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Donnelly, Phillips, and Examiner’s Official Notice. Final
Act. 9–10.

THE PATENT-INELIGIBILITY REJECTION
Principles of Law
A. SECTION 101
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include
implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract

2 Rather than repeat the Examiner’s positions and Appellants’ arguments in
their entirety, we refer to the above-mentioned Appeal Brief, as well as the
following documents, for their respective details: the Final Action mailed
November 2, 2016 (“Final Act.”); the Examiner’s Answer mailed October
30, 2017 (“Ans.”); and the Reply Brief filed December 29, 2017 (“Reply
Br.”).
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ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208,
216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012), and
Alice. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 75–77). In
accordance with that framework, we first determine what concept the claim
is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims
before us are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use
of a third party to mitigate settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561
U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the
basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
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mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We
view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having
said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent
protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws, and this principle cannot be circumvented by attempting
to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment.”
Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace
that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known
structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (citation omitted). “A claim
that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that
the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the
[abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77).
“[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform
that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
B. USPTO SECTION 101 GUIDANCE
The United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) recently
published revised guidance on the application of 35 U.S.C. § 101. USPTO,
2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50
(Jan. 7, 2019) (“2019 Guidance”). Under the 2019 Guidance, we first look
to whether the claim recites the following:
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(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract
ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing
human activities such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental
processes); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application (see MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)).
2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 52–55.
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to
whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not
“well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of
generality, to the judicial exception.
2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 56.
Analysis3
STEP 2A, PRONG 1:
Under step 2A, prong 1, of the 2019 Guidance, we first look to
whether the claim recites “any judicial exceptions, including certain
groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of

3 Appellants argue all of the claims together as a group in relation to the
§ 101 rejection. See App. Br. 29 (wherein Appellants only argue claims 3–8
and 10–15 based upon their dependency from claim 2). Accordingly, we
select independent claim 2 as representative. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
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organizing human activities such as a fundamental economic practice, or
mental processes). 84 Fed. Reg. 52–55.
Limitations [i]–[iv] of claim 2 recite
[i] monitoring a signal representative of g-forces applied to
the materials handling vehicle, where the signal is generated by
an impact sensor mounted on the materials handling vehicle;
[ii] comparing the signal representative of g-forces applied to
the materials handling vehicle to a selected g-force limit
threshold value;
[iii] obtaining a gross vehicle weight for the materials handling
vehicle;
[iv] obtaining a measure of an acceleration of the materials
handling vehicle;
These limitations read on mental processes that can be performed in
the human mind or with the aid of pencil and paper. For example, the steps
of monitoring and obtaining data (limitations [i], [iii], and [iv]) reasonably
can be characterized as mental observations. The step of comparing a signal
to a threshold values reasonably can be characterized as a mental evaluation.
The 2019 Guidance expressly recognizes mental observations and
evaluations as patent-ineligible abstract ideas, specifically “[m]ental
processes.” 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 52. Accordingly, each of
limitations [i]–[iv] reasonably can be characterized as reciting patent-
ineligible subject matter.
Limitation [v] recites “calculating . . . an impulse signal based on the
gross vehicle weight of the materials handling vehicle and the obtained
measure of the acceleration of the materials handling vehicle.”
Limitation [v], then, in addition to a mental process of evaluation and
judgment, reasonably can be characterized as performing a mathematical
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calculation. The 2019 Guidance expressly recognizes mathematical
concepts, such as performing mathematical calculations, as patent-ineligible
abstract ideas. 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 52. Accordingly, limitation [v]
reasonably can be characterized as reciting patent-ineligible subject matter.
Limitation [vi] recites “comparing . . . the calculated impulse signal to
a programmed impulse signal limit.” Limitation [vi] reasonably can be
characterized, then, as reciting performing a mental evaluation.
Accordingly, limitation [vi] reasonably can be characterized as reciting
patent-ineligible subject matter.
For these reasons, each of limitations [i]–[vi] reasonably can be
characterized as reciting patent-ineligible subject matter.
STEP 2A, PRONG 2:
Under step 2B of the 2019 Guidance, we next analyze whether
claim 2 recites additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application. 84 Fed. Reg. 52–55.
Appellants argue that “humans are incapable of performing the
claimed invention, to detect impacts on a materials handling vehicle.” App.
Br. 23. This argument is unpersuasive.4 Claim 2 never recites an active step
of detecting impacts with an impact sensor. Claim 2 instead recites a step of
“monitoring a signal representative of g-forces applied to the materials
handling vehicle, where the signal is generated by an impact sensor
mounted on the materials handling vehicle.” Claim 2, limitation [i]
(emphasis added).

4 Separately, we note most human drivers, passengers, and eyewitnesses of
vehicles are capable of detecting impacts to said vehicles.
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That is, limitation [i] does not recite an affirmative step of generating
a signal by an impact sensor. The limitation only recites affirmatively the
step of monitoring the generated signal, and the limitation further recites the
origin of the signal that is being monitored. But the stated origin of the
signal (generation by an impact sensor) is an intangible property that does
not affect the recited monitoring step. As such, Appellants’ argument is not
commensurate in scope with the claim language.
Appellants further argue that
in focusing on the computing recitations, the Examiner
wholly ignores the recitations of monitoring a signal
representative of g-forces applied to the materials handling
vehicle, where the signal is generated by an impact sensor
mounted on the materials handling vehicle, obtaining a gross
vehicle weight for the materials handling vehicle, and obtaining
a measure of an acceleration of the materials handling vehicle.
The above-recitations describe real-world interactions with
hardware on a materials handling vehicle, and are not merely an
“idea itself” as the Examiner improperly contends.
App. Br. 22.
This argument is unpersuasive because regardless of whether these
argued limitations (limitations [i], [iii], and [iv]) “describe real-world
interactions with hardware on a materials handling vehicle” (id.), that fact
would not be dispositive of whether the limitations, as a whole, are directed
to patent-eligible subject matter.
In addition to reasonably being characterized as a mental process of
observation, each of the argued limitations alternatively can be characterized
reasonably as merely constituting the insignificant pre-solution activity of
data gathering.
An example of pre-solution activity is a step of gathering data for
use in a claimed process, e.g., a step of obtaining information
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about credit card transactions, which is recited as part of a
claimed process of analyzing and manipulating the gathered
information by a series of steps in order to detect whether the
transactions were fraudulent.
MPEP § 2106.05(g).
Moreover, claim 2’s final step (limitation [vii]) recites “outputting, by
the processor, an impact signal when g-forces applied to the materials
handling vehicle exceed the selected g-force limit threshold value and the
impulse signal exceeds the impulse signal limit within a predetermined time
period.”
Appellants argue
The claimed invention improves the technology of industrial
vehicle impact detection by reducing nuisance/false impact
alarms by outputting, by the processor, an impact signal when g-
forces applied to the materials handling vehicle exceed the
selected g-force limit threshold value and the impulse signal
exceeds the impulse signal limit within a predetermined time
period.
App. Br. 26.
This argument is unpersuasive. Appellants’ invention does not
improve the technology for detecting an impact. For example, Appellants do
not allege that they have improved an impact sensor that detects the impact.
Appellants’ invention, instead, entails a purported improvement to how
conventionally detected signals are interpreted. Id. at 13 (“[t]he claimed
invention thus provides a unique solution . . . by supplementing a threshold
analysis of the outputs of an impact sensing accelerometer with the detection
for rapid changes of momentum or mechanical energy of the materials
handling vehicle”).
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To be sure, improving the analysis of detected signals potentially
could be associated with patent-eligible subject matter. But in the present
case, claim 2 does not integrate the improved analysis or calculations into a
practical application. That is, claim 2 does not recite any meaningful step
based upon the improved analysis of the signals. Claim 2 merely outputs a
resultant signal under specified conditions.
As such, claim 2 is distinguishable from the patent-eligible claims of
Diehr. In Diehr, the claims recited steps beyond the use of a particular
mathematical equation for analyzing the operating conditions of a rubber-
molding press. In Diehr, the claims additionally recited “opening the press
automatically when a said comparison indicates [a claimed condition].”
Diehr 450 U.S. 175, n.5. The Diehr court found “[t]hat respondents’ claims
involve the transformation of an article, in this case raw, uncured synthetic
rubber, into a different stat or thing.” Id. at 184.
Appellants’ claim 2 is more analogous to the claimed method of
changing alarm limits, which was found to be patent ineligible in Parker v.
Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978). The method claim on appeal in Flook entailed
(1) determining a resent value of a process variable, (2) determining a new
alarm base using a specified equation, (3) determining an updated alarm
limit based upon a second specified equation, and (4) “adjusting said alarm
limit to said updated alarm limit value.” Id. at 597.
The Flook Court determined that “Respondent’s application simply
provides a new and presumably better method for calculating alarm limit
values. Id. at 594–95. The Court held that “the presence of specific ‘post-
solution’ activity—the adjustment of the alarm limit to the figure computed
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according to the formula—” does not make the claimed process patent
eligible. Id. at 590.
Restated, the present Appellants’ limitation [vii] does not add any
meaningful limitations to the recited abstract idea. Limitation [vii], instead,
reasonably may be characterized as merely being directed to the
insignificant post-solution activity of transmitting data. E.g., Apple, Inc. v.
Ameranth, Inc., 842 F.3d 1229, 1241–42 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that
printing or downloading generated menus constituted insignificant extra-
solution activity); see also Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590 (“The notion that post-
solution activity, no matter how conventional or obvious in itself, can
transform an unpatentable principle into a patentable process exalts form
over substance. A competent draftsman could attach some form of post-
solution activity to almost any mathematical formula”).
Appellants also argue that “claim 2 does not attempt to broadly
preempt the idea of comparing new information to stored information to
identify options[,] as the Examiner contends.” App. Br. 21–22. This
argument is unpersuasive.
We recognize that the Supreme Court has described “the concern that
drives this exclusionary principle [i.e., the exclusion of abstract ideas from
patent eligible subject matter] as one of pre-emption.” Alice, 573 U.S. at
216. However, characterizing preemption as a driving concern for patent
eligibility is not the same as characterizing preemption as the sole test for
patent eligibility. As our reviewing court has explained: “The Supreme
Court has made clear that the principle of preemption is the basis for the
judicial exceptions to patentability” and “[f]or this reason, questions on
preemption are inherent in and resolved by the § 101 analysis.” Ariosa
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Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(citing Alice, 573 U.S. at 216). Although “preemption may signal patent
ineligible subject matter, the absence of complete preemption does not
demonstrate patent eligibility.” Id.
For these reasons, Appellants do not persuade us that claim 2 is
directed to an improvement in the function of a computer or to any other
technology or technical field. MPEP ¶ 2106.05(a). Nor is claim 2 directed
to a particular machine or transformation. MPEP ¶ 2106.05(b), (c). Nor
have Appellants persuasively demonstrated that claim 2 adds any other
meaningful limitations. MPEP ¶ 2106.05(e). Accordingly, Appellants have
not persuaded us that claim 2 integrates the recited abstract ideas into a
practical application within the meaning of the 2019 Guidance. 84 Fed.
Reg. 52–55.
STEP 2B:
Under step 2B of the 2019 Guidance, we next analyze whether
claim 2 adds any specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not
“well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field. 84 Fed. Reg. 56;
MPEP § 2106.05(d).
The Examiner finds that claim 2 recites a processor, accelerometer,
and impact sensor. Ans. 5. The Examiner determines that these claimed
components were generic computer elements that existed at the time of the
invention. Id. We agree that the claimed elements beyond the abstract idea
were well-understood, routine, and conventional. See MPEP § 2106.05(d)
(discussing how well-understood, routine, and conventional activity does not
amount to significantly more than an abstract idea); Spec. ¶¶ 1, 129; see also
Alice, 573 U.S. at 226.
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Appellants do not allege that their invention constitutes an
improvement to the functioning of processors, accelerometers, or impact
sensors, themselves. See App. Br. 18 (acknowledging that “traditionally,
materials handling vehicles utilize accelerometers to detect impacts”).
According to Appellants, the invention, instead, entails performing a new
type of analysis of (or calculation for) sensed impacts using a conventional
processor:
the claimed invention solves the problem of nuisance impact
alarms in impact sensing systems of materials handling vehicles
without major changes to impact sensing hardware, by
supplementing the threshold analyses of the outputs of an impact
sensing accelerometer with the detection of simultaneous rapid
changes of momentum or mechanical energy of the materials
handling vehicle.
Id. at 19–20.
For these reasons, we determine that claim 2 does not recite additional
elements that are significantly more than the recited judicial exception.
84 Fed. Reg. 52–55; MPEP § 2106.05(d).
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 2 under
35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. We,
likewise, sustain the 101 rejection of claims 3–8 and 10–15, which
Appellants do not argue separately. App. Br. 29.

THE OBVIOUSNESS REJECTIONS
Rejections and Contentions
The Examiner finds that Donnelly discloses, inter alia, a method of
detecting impacts on a material handling vehicle, the method comprising
(1) monitoring a signal representative of g-forces applied to the materials
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handling vehicle, and (2) comparing these g-forces to a selectable g-force
threshold value. Final Act. 6–7. The Examiner finds that Donnelly also
discloses a step of obtaining a measure of an acceleration, but Donnelly does
not disclose, inter alia, obtaining a gross vehicle weight or calculating an
impulse signal. Id. at 7.
The Examiner relies on Phillips for teaching the feature of obtaining a
gross vehicle weight for the materials handling vehicle. Final Act. 7. The
Examiner relies on Harrop for teachings the steps of calculating an impulse
signal, comparing the impulse signal to a programmed impulse signal limit,
and outputting an impact signal. Id. The Examiner also determines that
motivation existed to incorporate the teachings of Phillips and Harrop into
Donnelly’s method. Id. at 8.
Appellants argue that neither Harrop nor the other references teach
detecting an “impulse,” as that term is used in the Specification and claims:
Even assuming that the Examiner can somehow combine
Donnelly, Phillips and Harrop, . . . the references, even when
combined and considered as a whole, fail to teach or suggest
calculating, by a processor on the materials handling vehicle, an
impulse signal based on the gross vehicle weight of the materials
handling vehicle and the obtained measure of the acceleration of
the materials handling vehicle.
App. Br. 33.
More specifically, Appellants argue that because “claim 2 expressly
recit[es] calculating an impulse based on the gross vehicle weight of the
materials handling vehicle and the obtained measure of the acceleration of
the materials handling vehicle,” it is reasonably clear that claim 2 uses the
term “impulse” to mean a physical impulse. App. Br. 32. Appellants further
argue that “Harrop does not teach or suggest calculating [a physical]
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impulse.” Id. According to Appellants, Harrop alternatively uses the term
“impulse” to mean an electrical impulse—an electrical signal from a sensor
element. Id. at 31.
Analysis
A physical impulse is different from an electrical impulse. The
Examiner does not dispute Appellants’ contention that an electrical impulse
is different from a physical impulse. Ans. 7. Nor does the Examiner dispute
that Harrop teaches an electrical impulse, as opposed to a physical impulse.
Id. The Examiner, instead, interprets the claim term “impulse” broadly to
also read on electrical impulses, as well as physical impulses, because claim
2 only recites “impulse”—not “physical impulse.” Id.
The question before us, then, is whether the Examiner’s broad
interpretation of “impulse” is reasonable. We determine that it is not.
It is not sufficient for an examiner merely to give a claim term the
broadest conceivable interpretation. During examination of a patent
application, pending claims are given their broadest reasonable construction
consistent with the Specification. In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d
1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004). An appellant’s disclosure may be used to
determine the proper meaning of the terms used in the claims. [I]nterpreting
what is meant by a word in a claim is not to be confused with adding an
extraneous limitation appearing in the specification, which is improper.” In
re Cruciferous Sprout Litigation, 301 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted; emphasis in original).
In the present case, Appellants’ Specification and claims use the term
“impulse” exclusively to mean a physical impulse. See, e.g. the “Brief
Summary of the Invention” section of Appellants’ Specification (explaining
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how to calculate an impulse signal by multiplying a vehicle’s gross weight
and acceleration); see also claim 2 (reciting “calculating . . . an impulse
signal based on the gross vehicle weight of the materials handling vehicle
and the obtained measure of the acceleration of the materials handling
vehicle”). The Examiner provides no evidence that Appellants alternatively
use the term “impulse” to mean an electrical impulse. Ans. 7.
For these reasons, Appellants have persuaded us of error in the
Examiner’s obviousness rejection of independent claim 2. We, therefore, do
not sustain the obviousness rejection of that claim or of claims 3, 4, 7, and
11–13, which ultimately depend from claim 2.
We, likewise, do not sustain the rejection of dependent claims 5, 6, 8,
10, and 14. The Examiner’s additional reliance on Official Notice for
rejecting these claims does not overcome the deficiency noted in relation to
claim 2. Final Act. 9–10.

CONCLUSIONS
Appellants have not shown that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims
2–8 and 10–15 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent-ineligible
subject matter.
Appellants have shown that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 2–
8 and 10–15 under 35 U.S.C. § 103.

DECISION
The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 2–9 and 10–15 is affirmed.
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No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED