Roland Patrick, Complainant,v.Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary, Department of Defense, (Defense Logistics Agency), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionAug 4, 2005
01a44341 (E.E.O.C. Aug. 4, 2005)

01a44341

08-04-2005

Roland Patrick, Complainant, v. Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary, Department of Defense, (Defense Logistics Agency), Agency.


Roland Patrick v. Department of Defense

01A44341

August 4, 2005

.

Roland Patrick,

Complainant,

v.

Donald H. Rumsfeld,

Secretary,

Department of Defense,

(Defense Logistics Agency),

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A44341

Agency No. JQ-00-77

DECISION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from a final agency decision

(FAD) concerning his complaint of unlawful employment discrimination

in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII),

as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. The appeal is accepted pursuant

to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405.

Complainant was employed as a Materials Handler, WG-6907-06, at

the agency's Defense Distribution Depot in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma

(DDOO). Complainant filed two formal complaints on July 25, 2000 and

August 22, 2000, respectively. Therein, complainant claimed that he

was discriminated against on the basis of race (African-American).

Complainant's complaints were comprised of the following claims:

(1) on June 6, 2000, his supervisor reassigned him to work in another

area without providing him training on his new duty responsibilities; and

(2) on August 10, 2000, his supervisor used profanity toward him when

he directed him to perform a work assignment.

On September 7, 2000, complainant filed a third complaint. Therein,

complainant claimed that he was discriminated against in reprisal for

prior EEO activity when:

(3) his supervisor closely monitored his whereabouts; limited his use

of the telephone; and threatened to force him to abstain from receiving

calls on his personal cellular telephone.<1>

By letter dated September 19, 2000, the agency informed complainant that

his third complaint was declared as an amendment to his previously filed

complaints and accepted claim (3) for investigation. All three claims

were identified under the captioned agency number.

The agency consolidated complainant's two complaints and amended claim,

and conducted an investigation. At the conclusion of the investigation,

complainant was informed of his right to request a hearing before an

EEOC Administrative Judge or alternatively, to receive a FAD by the

agency. Complainant initially requested a hearing before the AJ, but

later withdrew that request and requested that the agency issue a FAD.

In its March 12, 2004 FAD, the agency found that assuming complainant

established a prima facie case of race and reprisal discrimination,

management articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons which

complainant failed to show were pretextual.

As to complainant's harassment claim, the agency concluded that

complainant failed to prove that he was subjected to harassment

sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to render his work environment

hostile.

A claim of disparate treatment is examined under the three-part analysis

first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792

(1973). For complainant to prevail, she must first establish a prima

facie case of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained,

reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that

a prohibited consideration was a factor in the adverse employment

action. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco Construction

Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). The burden then shifts to

the agency to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for

its actions. See Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,

450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). Once the agency has met its burden, the

complainant bears the ultimate responsibility to persuade the fact finder

by a preponderance of the evidence that the agency acted on the basis of

a prohibited reason. See St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502

(1993).

This established order of analysis in discrimination cases, in which the

first step normally consists of determining the existence of a prima

facie case, need not be followed in all cases. Where the agency has

articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the personnel

action at issue, the factual inquiry can proceed directly to the third

step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the ultimate issue of whether

complainant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the

agency's actions were motivated by discrimination. See U.S. Postal

Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-714 (1983);

Hernandez v. Department of Transportation, EEOC Request No. 05900159

(June 28, 1990); Peterson v. Department of Health and Human Services,

EEOC Request No. 05900467 (June 8, 1990); Washington v. Department of

the Navy, EEOC Petition No. 03900056 (May 31, 1990).

Regarding claim (1), complainant's Supervisor stated that prior to May

2000, the Branch Chief needed several employees to work in another section

within the branch on a temporary basis. Specifically, the Supervisor

stated that the Branch Chief requested that he and two other supervisors

ask for volunteers to work as Motor Vehicle Operators, not to exceed

29 days. The Supervisor stated that complainant "did volunteer for

the detail." The Supervisor stated that prior to complainant's detail,

complainant was one of the three to four employees that worked under

his supervision at the South 40 facility; and that the volume of work

at the South 40 facility had declined to the point where he felt that

two employees could effectively handle the work load. The Supervisor

stated that when complainant's detail ended, he made a determination to

move complainant to Building 18 "where a workload increase appeared due

to the recent loss of two workers."

The Supervisor also stated that two separate incidents involving

complainant precipitated the Supervisor's action in assigning

complainant to Building 18, where he could be more closely supervised.

Specifically, the Supervisor stated that in March 2000, an investigator

was at South 40 facility performing an official investigation concerning

U-42 area for the command. The Supervisor stated that because a named

employee at South 40 facility was unable to answer the investigator's

questions, he referred her to complainant. The Supervisor stated that

the investigator identified herself to complainant but that complainant

refused to give her his name or help her. The Supervisor stated that in

May 2000, three employees reported to him that complainant had verbally

assaulted them "using a string of expletives." The Supervisor stated

that he provided training for complainant with a named employee,

and that complainant now "satisfactorily completes all functions of

the job." Furthermore, the Supervisor stated that while he was aware

of complainant's prior EEO activity, he did not discriminate against

complainant.

The record that the Branch Chief stated that he approved the Supervisor's

decision to have complainant reassigned to Building 18. The Branch Chief

further stated that the Supervisor felt that two employees could handle

the work load at the South 40 facility. The Branch Chief stated that he

learned through other employees and the Supervisor that complainant was

assigned to "On the Job Training" with a named employee. The Branch

Chief also stated that the Supervisor assigned another employee to

train complainant but that it was not successful because complainant

"was not cooperative." The Branch Chief stated that during the relevant

time period, he and the Supervisor met with complainant at his request,

and that complainant "became loud, obnoxious and uncooperative."

Furthermore, the Branch Chief stated that "after about 20 minutes of

[Complainant] not being able to tell me what I could do to help him,

I ended the meeting and instructed [Complainant] to go back to work."

Regarding claim (2), the Supervisor denied using profanity towards

complainant on August 10, 2000. The Supervisor further stated that two

other employees provided written statements verifying that that he did

not use profanity towards complainant.

Regarding claim (3), the Supervisor stated he does not monitor the

whereabouts or telephone usage of complainant anymore than he monitors

the activities of other employees. The Supervisor further stated

that whenever he is on the work floor, and "observe that an employee

is not there, I do inquire of the work leader where the employee is."

The Supervisor stated that each area has a sign-out book "should the work

leader not be available and the employee finds it necessary to leave the

work floor." The Supervisor stated that on several occasions, he asked

the whereabouts of three other named employees. The Supervisor stated

that he had spoken to his entire workforce in Building 18 concerning

limiting telephone usage. The Supervisor stated that he did not threaten

to force complainant from receiving calls on his personal cellular

telephone. The Supervisor stated that on one occasion, when he went

to Building 18 to check on housekeeping and do an inventory workload,

he noted that complainant was not on the work floor. The Supervisor

stated that he found complainant outside talking on his personal cellular

telephone. The Supervisor stated that complainant "did not appear to be

in an emergency type conversation but was sitting in the shade with his

foot propped up and was smiling." The Supervisor stated that he informed

complainant that there were two numbers of the work floor where employees

could be reached in case of emergency. Furthermore, the Supervisor stated

"I have not found it necessary to address the use of a cell phone with

[Complainant] subsequent to this incident."

The record reflects that the Branch Chief stated that "on various

occasions I have been driving by Building 18 and observed [Complainant]

outside Building 18, both the north end and the west side, with the

cell phone to his ear." The Branch Chief stated that the agency was

making attempts to draft a policy that would limit the use of personal

cellular telephones during work hours because it had become an issue.

Furthermore, the Branch Chief stated that while the agency has a policy

which states that telephone usage are only to be used for official

government business or in the case of emergency, management "does not

tolerate short, personal telephone calls."

As discussed above, the Commission determines that the agency articulated

legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its actions regarding claims

(1) - (3). Moreover, we determine that complainant has not demonstrated

that the agency's articulated reasons for its actions were a pretext

for discrimination.

Moreover, upon review of the record, we find that the environment created

within complainant's workplace was not sufficient to show a hostile work

environment due to his race and prior protected activity. Therefore,

we conclude that complainant failed to establish his claim of unlawful

discrimination due to harassment.

Accordingly, the agency's decision finding no discrimination on the

consolidated complaints and amended claim is AFFIRMED.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

August 4, 2005

__________________

Date

1For ease of reference, the Commission has numbered complainant's

amended claim as claim (3).