Roger Pulido, Appellant,v.F. Whitten Peters, Acting Secretary, Department of the Air Force, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionOct 8, 1998
05970099 (E.E.O.C. Oct. 8, 1998)

05970099

10-08-1998

Roger Pulido, Appellant, v. F. Whitten Peters, Acting Secretary, Department of the Air Force, Agency.


Roger Pulido v. Department of the Air Force

05970099

October 8, 1998

Roger Pulido, )

Appellant, ) Request No. 05970099

) Appeal No. 01956530

v. ) Agency No. HPOF95008

)

F. Whitten Peters, )

Acting Secretary, )

Department of the Air Force, )

Agency. )

________________________________)

DENIAL OF RECONSIDERATION

INTRODUCTION

On October 29, 1996, Roger Pulido (hereinafter referred to as appellant)

timely filed a request for reconsideration of the decision in Pulido

v. Dep't of the Air Force, EEOC Appeal No. 01956530 (October 9, 1996).

EEOC regulations provide that the Commissioners may, in their discretion,

reconsider any previous Commission decision. 29 C.F.R. �1614.407(a).

The party requesting reconsideration must submit written argument

or evidence which tends to establish one or more of the following

three criteria: new and material evidence is available that was

not readily available when the previous decision was issued, 29

C.F.R. �1614.407(c)(1); the previous decision involved an erroneous

interpretation of law or regulation, or material fact, or a misapplication

of established policy, 29 C.F.R. �1614.407(c)(2); and the decision is of

such exceptional nature as to have substantial precedential implications,

29 C.F.R. �1614.407(c)(3). For the reasons set forth herein, appellant's

request is denied.

ISSUE PRESENTED

The issue presented is whether the previous decision properly affirmed

the agency's final decision dismissing appellant's complaint for failure

to timely contact an EEO counselor.

BACKGROUND

The following is a summary of the lengthy and complicated procedural

history of the instant case.

In 1979, appellant injured his back while working as a WG-6 Warehouse

Worker for the agency. Thereafter, the agency apparently determined that

appellant was disqualified from his WG-6 position and offered him a GS-3

position that was within his medical limitations as an alternative to

disability retirement or separation. In May 1984, appellant filed an EEO

complaint alleging discrimination based on national origin (Hispanic),

color (brown), sex (male), and physical disability (back injury)

when his GS-3 Supply Clerk position was not reclassified at a higher

grade level. The parties' March 1987 settlement agreement regarding the

above complaint provided that the agency would place appellant in a WG-4,

Step 5, Warehouse Worker position with reasonable accommodation for any

documented lifting restriction.

Thereafter, petitioner alleged that the agency had breached the settlement

agreement. The decision in Pulido v. Dep't of the Air Force, EEOC Appeal

No. 01901479 (April 24, 1990) agreed that the agency had breached the

settlement agreement and ordered the agency to offer appellant the

position of WG-4, Step 5, Warehouse Worker, effective April 4, 1987,

with appropriate backpay and benefits.

In January 1991, appellant filed a petition for enforcement of the

Order in EEOC Appeal No. 01901479. In Pulido v. Dep't of the Air Force,

EEOC Petition No. 04910006 (July 19, 1991), the Commission found that

the agency had complied with the April 24, 1990 Order. Specifically,

the Commission noted appellant's contention that he should have received

a promotion to the WG-6 level retroactive to 6 months after October 27,

1987, as this was the "normal promotional pattern" for similarly situated

employees. The Commission was unpersuaded by appellant's arguments:

[T]he Commission's order...imposed no duty on the agency to place

[appellant] in any position to which he might have been potentially

promoted. Rather, the explicit language of the order only directs

the agency to offer [appellant] the WG-4 Warehouse Worker position.

The record indicates that the agency complied with this order. Moreover,

the evidence indicates that the WG-4 position in which [appellant] was

placed was not a trainee position which was automatically targeted for a

higher grade position. Rather, promotion to the WG-6 position required

basewide competition. Accordingly, while [appellant] speculates that

he would have been selected for the promotion, he has not provided

persuasive evidence to establish that the agency did not comply with

the Commission's order.

In October 1991, appellant's position was transferred to another agency,

i.e., the Department of Defense's (DOD) Defense Logistics Agency.

In November 1992, appellant filed an appeal with the Merit Systems

Protection Board (MSPB) alleging that both the agency and the DOD had

failed to restore him to the WG-6 level.<1> In its March 16, 1993 initial

decision, the MSPB dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, i.e.,

appellant had failed to allege an agency action appealable to the MSPB.

Appellant apparently requested that the MSPB review the initial decision

and, on March 1, 1994, the MSPB issued its final order denying the

request.

Appellant then filed a petition for review with the Commission.

Because there were two defendant agencies, the Commission treated

the petition as two petitions and docketed them separately. In both

decisions, the Commission found that appellant's appeals were "unmixed"

and instructed the agencies to process appellant's allegations pursuant

to 29 C.F.R. Part 1614. The decisions specifically stated that the date

on which appellant filed his appeal with the MSPB would be deemed the date

of initial contact with an EEO counselor. See Pulido v. Dep't of the Air

Force, EEOC Petition No. 03940109 (July 29, 1994) and Pulido v. Dep't of

Defense, EEOC Petition No. 03940084 (July 29, 1994). The instant case

involves only the complaint appellant filed against the Department of

the Air Force as a result of the decision in EEOC Petition No. 03940109.

Appellant subsequently filed a formal complaint with the agency alleging

race (Caucasian), color (brown/dark skinned), national origin (Hispanic),

perceived disability (musculoskeletal), and reprisal discrimination.

The EEO counselor's report indicated that appellant's initial contact

occurred on October 12, 1994 and defined the issues as:

1) On an ongoing basis from July 17, 1987, through October 1991 (when

appellant was reassigned to the Defense Logistics Agency), he was

allegedly denied priority consideration for all WG-6907-06 Warehouse

person positions filled during that time period; and,

2) On March 19, 1990 through October 1991, he was allegedly denied

WG-06 grade level pay after completing six months of training at the

WG-4 level.

In its final decision (FAD), the agency dismissed appellant's EEO

complaint for untimely contact with an EEO counselor. On appeal, the

decision in Pulido v. Dep't of the Air Force, EEOC Appeal No. 01951074

(July 13, 1995) reversed the FAD and remanded the case to the agency

for clarification of the issues in appellant's complaint. The decision

also noted that pursuant to the "NOTICE TO PARTIES" in EEOC Petition

No. 03940109, the date on which appellant filed his appeal with the

MSPB would be deemed the date of his initial EEO contact, and mistakenly

identified the date as March 1, 1994.

Pursuant to the July 13, 1995 Order in EEOC Appeal No. 01951074,

appellant's issues were clarified as follows:<2>

1) On an ongoing basis from July 17, 1987 through October 1991 (when the

complainant was reassigned to the Defense Logistics Agency) and after the

complainant's partial recovery from a compensable work injury occurring

on 17 and 21 July 1987, the complainant allegedly was not given priority

consideration for promotion to a WG-6907-06 position;

2) On an ongoing basis from 17 July 1987 through October 1991...and

after the complainant's full recovery from a compensable work injury

occurring on 2 November 1990, the complainant allegedly was not given

priority consideration for promotion to a WG-6907-06 position;

3) On an ongoing basis from the date [a WG-6 employee] retired, thereby

vacating a WG-6907-06 position, through October 1991..., the agency

allegedly refused to promote the complainant into [the] vacant position;

4) On 19 March 1990 through October 1991..., the complainant was allegedly

denied WG-06 grade level detail pay after completing six months training

at the WG-04 level due to discriminatory application of job classification

grading standards; and,

5) On an ongoing basis from the date six months after the complainant was

promoted to a WG-6907-04 through October 1991..., the agency failed to

pay the complainant for performing the duties similar to those performed

by WG-6907-06 level employees.

In its August 23, 1995 final decision, the agency again dismissed

appellant's complaint for untimely contact with an EEO counselor.

The agency found that the date of appellant's EEO contact--March 1,

1994--was considerably beyond the time allowed for timely contact.

Appellant appealed from the FAD, contending--inter alia--that the date

he filed his MSPB Appeal (and therefore the date of his EEO contact)

was November 1992, and not March 1, 1994. Upon review, the previous

decision affirmed the agency's dismissal of appellant's complaint for

untimely EEO contact.

Thereafter, appellant filed a request for reconsideration.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider any previous decision

when the party requesting reconsideration submits written argument or

evidence which tends to establish that at least one of the criteria

of 29 C.F.R. �1614.407(c) is met. For a decision to be reconsidered,

the request must contain specific information that meets the criteria

referenced above.

In his reconsideration request, appellant asserts that he filed his

appeal with the MSPB in November 1992, not March 1994. Having conducted

an exhaustive review of the record and related documents, the Commission

agrees. The decision in EEOC Appeal No. 01951074 mistakenly identified

March 1, 1994--the date on which the MSPB issued its final decision--as

the date on which appellant filed his appeal with the MSPB. In fact,

appellant filed his appeal with the MSPB in November 1992.

The Commission nonetheless finds that the previous decision properly

affirmed the agency's dismissal of the complaint for untimely EEO

contact.

The Commission finds that the events of which appellant complained

occurred on or before October 1991 and that his EEO contact in November

1992 therefore was beyond the time period for contacting an EEO counselor.

The Commission notes that appellant has never provided any reason

or explanation as to why he was unable to timely contact a counselor

regarding his allegations.<3> In addition, the record contains voluminous

evidence and argument from the agency documenting appellant's familiarity

with the EEO complaint process as well as the agency's dissemination

of information regarding the time period for EEO counselor contact,

including posters containing the time limits for same.

Appellant points to an August 16, 1995 memorandum and asserts that it

represents the agency's acceptance of his complaint for investigation,

thereby waiving all timeliness requirements. A review of the document,

however, showed that the memorandum merely advised of the receipt of

appellant's complaint--apparently following the remand of same in EEOC

Appeal No. 01951074 (July 29, 1995).

Because appellant's request fails to meet the criteria for

reconsideration, the Commission therefore denies the request.

CONCLUSION

After a review of appellant's request for reconsideration, the agency's

response, the previous decision, and the entire record, the Commission

finds that appellant's request for reconsideration fails to meet the

criteria of 29 C.F.R. �1614.407(c), and the request hereby is DENIED. The

decision in EEOC Appeal No. 01956530 hereby is AFFIRMED.

STATEMENT OF APPELLANT'S RIGHTS

RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (P0993)

This decision of the Commission is final, and there is no further right of

administrative appeal from the Commission's decision. You have the right

to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court.

It is the position of the Commission that you have the right to file

a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court WITHIN

NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision.

You should be aware, however, that courts in some jurisdictions have

interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner suggesting that

a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the

date that you receive this decision. To ensure that your civil action

is considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN THIRTY (30)

CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision or to consult

an attorney concerning the applicable time period in the jurisdiction

in which your action would be filed. If you file a civil action,

YOU MUST NAME AS THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE

OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS

OR HER FULL NAME AND OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in

the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the

national organization, and not the local office, facility or department

in which you work.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

Oct. 8, 1998

Date Frances M. Hart

Executive Officer

1Specifically, appellant argued that he was entitled to restoration

to his WG-6 Warehouseman position because his restoration to the WG-4

Warehouseman position after partial recovery was improper. Appellant

further argued that he had fully recovered from his injury and had not

been given priority consideration for placement in the WG-6 position.

2Appellant also raised new allegations of discrimination which the

agency decided were properly addressed in a new complaint, HPOF95276.

3The Commission also notes that the evidence of record strongly suggests

that appellant appears to be relitigating the same issues over and over

in different forums.