Rodolfo Bobadilla, Appellant,v.Togo D. West, Jr., Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionNov 23, 1998
01965544 (E.E.O.C. Nov. 23, 1998)

01965544

11-23-1998

Rodolfo Bobadilla, Appellant, v. Togo D. West, Jr., Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency.


Rodolfo Bobadilla v. Department of Veterans Affairs

01965544

November 23, 1998

Rodolfo Bobadilla, )

Appellant, ) Appeal No. 01965544

) Agency Nos. 92-829

v. ) 93-1628

) Hearing Nos. 340-93-3664X

Togo D. West, Jr., ) 340-93-3670X

Secretary, )

Department of Veterans Affairs, )

Agency. )

________________________________)

DECISION

On July 16, 1996, Rodolfo Bobadilla (appellant) initiated an appeal to the

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (Commission) from a final decision

of the Department of Veterans Affairs (agency) concerning his complaint of

discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,

as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq., �501 of the Rehabilitation Act of

1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �791 et seq., and the Age Discrimination

in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. �621 et seq.

The final agency decision was dated June 28, 1996. The appeal is accepted

in accordance with the provisions of EEOC Order No. 960, as amended.

The issue on appeal is whether appellant proved, by a preponderance of

the evidence, that he was discriminated against on the bases of his race

(Asian), national origin (Filipino), religion (Catholic), age (over 40),

disability (back injury), and in reprisal for prior EEO activity when:

1. he was subjected to racial slurs; 2. he was denied the opportunity to

voice his opinion at staff meetings; 3. his leave requests were denied;

4. he was criticized for arriving late at morning staff meetings; 5. he

was criticized for failing to admit a patient; 6. he was not afforded

protection from a dangerous patient; 7. he was not designated Assistant

Chief of the Spinal Cord Injury Service;<1> 8. he was denied reasonable

accommodation; and 9. he was reassigned from his position as head of

the Outpatient Clinic.

The record reveals that appellant, a physician, filed two formal

complaints raising the above-referenced allegations. Appellant asserted

that the Chief of the Spinal Cord Injury Service (Chief) referred to staff

doctors as "Chinese War Lords" during a staff meeting, and referred to

him as "Daniel Ortega" and "Bobo." Appellant stated that the latter term

meant "stupid" in Spanish. Appellant indicated that the Chief refused to

listen to the opinions of the staff physicians, frequently cut him off

during staff meetings, and criticized him for being late for meetings.

Appellant stated that he was denied official leave to attend a medical

conference, and that the Chief did not take action when advised that

a patient threatened to shoot him. Appellant stated that he was not

offered the Assistant Chief position, but that the job was given to a

physician with little experience.

The Chief acknowledged making the three comments cited, but stated that

he likened all of the staff physicians to Chinese Warlords because he felt

they were more concerned with maintaining the status quo than in improving

patient care. The testimony of those present at the meeting supports the

Chief's assertions. In addition, the Chief stated that he did not refer

to appellant as Daniel Ortega, but merely mentioned the recent fall of

Ortega in order to change the subject of the conversation at the time.

Finally, the Chief denied knowing that the term "Bobo" had derogatory

connotations, stating that he merely suggested the name to distinguish

appellant from another doctor, both of whom were referred to as "Dr. B."

Several physicians testified that they had problems getting leave

requests approved, and had to make such requests several months in

advance. In addition, the physicians indicated that the Chief criticized

anyone who was late for a staff meeting. The Chief denied criticizing

appellant for failing to admit a patient, and indicated that he contacted

security regarding another patient's threats. The Chief asserted that

after another staff physician (Asian, Filipino, Catholic, over 40;

Comparative 1) declined the Assistant Chief position, he offered the

job to a physician (Selectee) who had recently finished his residency.

The Chief stated that he wanted an Assistant Chief who was willing to

implement the changes he had proposed, and that appellant was resistant

to change.

According to the record, appellant once served as the primary doctor in

the Outpatient Clinic. In March 1991, the National Director made a site

visit to the facility, and recommended that all physicians rotate through

the wards and the Clinic. The Director also suggested that the Service

adopt a primary care approach. The Chief implemented the recommendations,

and the concept of a permanent Outpatient doctor was abolished. In May

1992, appellant injured his back moving boxes at work. Appellant was

off of work from June 1, 1992, until April 26, 1993, when he returned

with medical restrictions as to bending, standing, walking, pushing,

pulling, and lifting. Appellant's request to be permanently placed back

in the Outpatient Clinic was denied. Appellant was, however, given a

reduced patient load, and the Chief specifically advised the nursing

staff to assist appellant with the moving and positioning of patients.

Appellant asserted that the examining tables in the Clinic were higher

than the beds on the wards and that he was unable to get help moving

patients on the wards. Other physicians, however, testified that help

was always available so that they never moved patients on the wards,

and that there was no difference between the examining tables and the

beds, which could be positioned at different heights.

The agency complied with all procedural and regulatory prerequisites,

and on May 2, 1996, an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ) issued a recommended

decision finding that appellant had not been subjected to race, national

origin, religious, age, or disability discrimination. The AJ did find,

however, that appellant was discriminated against in reprisal for prior

EEO activity when he was not selected for the Assistant Chief position.

Thereafter, the agency issued a final decision dated June 28, 1996,

rejecting the AJ's finding of reprisal. The agency adopted the AJ's

determinations regarding the remaining issues. It is from this decision

that appellant now appeals.

After a careful review of the record, the Commission finds that the

AJ correctly determined that appellant was not subjected to race,

national origin, religious, age, or disability discrimination with

regard to any of the actions cited. The Commission notes that while

the AJ found that appellant failed to established a prima facie case

because he did not show that he was treated differently than similarly

situated employees, appellant needed only to present evidence which, if

unrebutted, would support an inference that the agency's actions resulted

from discrimination. See O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caters Corp.,

116 S.Ct. 1307 (1996); Enforcement Guidance on O'Connor v. Consolidated

Coin Caters Corp., EEOC Notice No. 915.002, n. 4 (September 18, 1996).

Nevertheless, an independent review of the record reveals no rationale

for overturning the AJ's ultimate finding of no discrimination, given

that appellant did not present persuasive evidence of discrimination

which would give rise to such an inference. While appellant asserted,

on appeal, that the racial slurs cited in allegation 1 created a hostile

work environment, the AJ correctly determined, after finding the Chief's

explanation for the comments credible, that the evidence failed to

support such a finding.

The Commission, however, disagrees with the AJ's determination that

appellant was subjected to reprisal discrimination when he was not

selected for the Assistant Chief position. Rather than concentrating on

the selection for the position at issue in allegation 7, the AJ instead

found that appellant was subjected to reprisal with regard to notes

kept by the Chief. While the evidence may properly have been considered

as background information, the AJ's finding of discrimination is based

entirely upon that issue. As stated, the record shows that appellant did

not support the changes proposed by the Chief. While the Chief stated

that he did not approach appellant regarding the position because he was

"conflict prone," the evidence does not show that the Chief was referring

to a prior EEO complaint in which appellant had been involved. Instead,

the record reveals that appellant and the Chief had a confrontation

several years previously when both were staff physicians, and that

appellant was involved in a confrontation with another physician in which

he grabbed her arm. Further, the record includes several complaints

from patients regarding appellant's demeanor. Finally, it is noted

that the AJ's decision relies almost entirely upon the testimony of the

former Administrative Officer, whose assertions were contradicted by

two physicians. Therefore, the Commission finds that appellant failed

to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he was subjected to

reprisal when he was not selected for the Assistant Chief positions.

Accordingly, it is the decision of the Commission to AFFIRM the agency's

final decision in this matter.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0795)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the appellant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available

when the previous decision was issued; or

2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,

regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or

3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial

precedential implications.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST

BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive this

decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive

a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any argument in

opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to reconsider

MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party

WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the request

to reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.407. All requests and arguments

must bear proof of postmark and be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark,

the request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on the date it is received

by the Commission.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances

have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration,

a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the

delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your

request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests

for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited

circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. �l6l4.604(c).

RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0993)

It is the position of the Commission that you have the right to file

a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court WITHIN

NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision.

You should be aware, however, that courts in some jurisdictions have

interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner suggesting that

a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the

date that you receive this decision. To ensure that your civil action

is considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN THIRTY (30)

CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision or to consult

an attorney concerning the applicable time period in the jurisdiction

in which your action would be filed. If you file a civil action,

YOU MUST NAME AS THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE

OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS

OR HER FULL NAME AND OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in

the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the

national organization, and not the local office, facility or department

in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a

civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative

processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

NOV 23, 1998

DATE Ronnie Blumenthal, Director

Office of Federal Operations

1Appellant's allegations have been consecutively numbered for purposes

of clarity.