Robert L. Morman, et al., Complainant,v.Dr. James G. Roche, Secretary, Department of the Air Force, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionJan 9, 2002
01996146_r (E.E.O.C. Jan. 9, 2002)

01996146_r

01-09-2002

Robert L. Morman, et al., Complainant, v. Dr. James G. Roche, Secretary, Department of the Air Force, Agency.


Robert L. Morman, et al., v. Department of the Air Force

01996146

January 9, 2002

.

Robert L. Morman, et al.,

Complainant,

v.

Dr. James G. Roche,

Secretary,

Department of the Air Force,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01996146

Agency No. ELOR-96-011

Hearing No. 380-96-8169X

DECISION

Complainant, as class agent, filed a timely appeal with this Commission

from a final agency decision dated June 30, 1999, dismissing his class

action complaint alleging unlawful employment discrimination in violation

of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �

2000e et seq., the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA),

as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 621 et seq., and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,

as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791, et seq. The Commission accepts the appeal

in accordance with 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405.

The record reflects that complainant is an employee of the agency who

actively serves as an EEO representative in numerous EEO complaints.

Complainant contacted an EEO Counselor on April 16, 1996, and subsequently

filed a formal class complaint on April 22, 1996, claiming discrimination

on the bases of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age,

disability, and in reprisal for prior protected activity (all bases

unspecified). After obtaining additional information from complainant,

the agency framed the complaint as consisting of the following matters:

The agency changed the procedure for filing EEO complaints without notice;

The agency implemented changes to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.605(a)(b)(c) without

authority, notice and consideration of impact and implementation;<1>

The agency retaliated against complainant [by denying his requests for

official time to act as an EEO representative] because of the number of

EEO complaints he represented;

The agency denied complainant time to represent EEO complaints as set

forth by law, rules and regulations;

The agency attempted to dissuade people from filing complaints;

The agency disallowed EEO complaint representation;

The agency created a conflict of interest within the EEO office by

assignment of counselors who are manipulated;

The agency denied the recognition of a collective bargaining agreement

by defining with prejudice the role of Union Representation in processing

EEO complaints; and

This interference deflects the inquiries of promotion, performance rating

and uneven punishment for like or similar infractions of policies.

The agency transferred the case to an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ)

to make a decision regarding class certification.

In a May 21, 1999 decision, the AJ construed the instant complaint

as claiming that the agency improperly disqualified complainant

from representing EEO complainants and that the agency continuously

misinterpreted the Commission's regulations on EEO representation. The AJ

also determined that the class complaint did not define a �class,� but

found that complainant claimed that the agency's improper limitation on

EEO representation affects �all federal workers alleging discrimination.�

Based on this framing of the complaint, the AJ found that the Commission's

decision in two prior companion cases rendered the instant complaint

moot, precluding the need for a determination on class certification.

Specifically, the AJ found that in Morman v. Department of the Air

Force, EEOC Appeal No. 01963870 (March 17, 1997) (hereinafter referred

to as �Morman�) and Binion v. Department of the Air Force, EEOC Appeal

No. 01964629 (March 17, 1997), (hereinafter referred to as �Binion�),<2>

the Commission held that the agency improperly disqualified complainant

as an EEO representative and remanded both cases with the instructions to

the agency to meet with complainant to determine a reasonable amount of

official time to act as an EEO representative in future cases. The AJ

then concluded that the agency should dismiss the class complaint.

In its final decision, the agency adopted the AJ's determination

dismissing the complaint under 29 C.F.R. � 1614.107(a). The agency

additionally determined that none of the criteria necessary for

certification of a class action were satisfied. The agency dismissed

the class complaint, and forwarded complainant's individual complaint

to the EEO office for further processing as appropriate.

Complainant now appeals this determination. In response, the agency

repeats the arguments as set forth in its decision, and additionally

avers that complainant has no standing to bring a complaint on behalf of

those who were purportedly denied the benefit of his EEO representation,

or otherwise disadvantaged by the agency's purportedly improper

administration of the EEO process.

Dismissal of the class complaint on the grounds provided in 29 C.F.R. �

1614.107(a).

Initially, complainant must demonstrate that the class action complaint

constitutes an actionable claim not subject to dismissal on any grounds

provided in 29 C.F.R. � 1614.107(a).

EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. � 1614.107(a)(5) provides for the dismissal of a

complaint when the issues raised therein are moot. To determine whether

the issues raised in complainant's complaint are moot, the factfinder

must ascertain whether: (1) it can be said with assurance that there

is no reasonable expectation that the alleged violation will recur; and

(2) interim relief or events have completely and irrevocably eradicated

the effects of the alleged discrimination. See County of Los Angeles

v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979); Kuo v. Department of the Navy, EEOC

Request No. 05970343 (July 10, 1998). Moreover, the Commission has long

held that where a complainant has requested compensatory damages, the

potential for said damages means that the matter cannot be dismissed as

moot until the agency has at least given the complainant the opportunity

to present evidence supporting his claim for compensatory damages and

then has either awarded the damages or has shown that the complainant was

not entitled to them. Hofmann v. Department of the Navy, EEOC Request

No. 05970962 (October 28, 1999).

Based on our de novo review of this case, we find that the AJ improperly

determined that the instant complaint must be dismissed on the grounds

that it was rendered moot by Morman and Binion. Specifically, we find

that the record contains no evidence describing the agency's compliance

with the Commission's remand instructions in Morman or Binion sufficient

to conclude that there is �no reasonable expectation that the alleged

violation will recur� or that this remedy �irrevocably eradicated the

effects of the alleged discrimination.� On the contrary, in footnote

1 of his decision, the AJ indicates that complainant filed several

subsequent complaints in which he again claimed that the agency improperly

precluded him from acting as an EEO representative. We also find that

complainant claimed compensatory damages in the instant complaint.

Under these circumstances, we conclude that the instant complaint is not

moot, and that the AJ improperly determined that it should be dismissed

on these grounds

Nonetheless, we find that the complaint, as framed by the AJ, must be

dismissed on the grounds that it states the same claim that is pending

before or has been decided by the agency or Commission. See 29 C.F.R. �

1614.107(a)(1). Specifically, we find that claims 2, 3, 4 and 6, as

set forth above, concern complainant's claim that the agency improperly

denied his request(s) for official time to act as an EEO representative,

and that the Commission previously addressed this same matter in Morman

and Binion. In this regard, we note that if the agency failed to fully

comply with the remand instructions in these cases, complainant's recourse

was to file an enforcement action with the Commission, not a class action

complaint raising this same claim. Therefore, for these reasons, we

AFFIRM the agency's dismissal of claims 2, 3, 4 and 6 pursuant to 29

C.F.R. � 1614.107(a).

EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. � 1614.107(a)(8) provides that an agency

shall dismiss an entire complaint that alleges dissatisfaction

with the processing of a previously filed complaint. See Trujillo

v. Department of the Air Force, EEOC Request No. 05950177 (June 13,

1996). The Commission's Management Directive further specifies that if

a complainant is dissatisfied with the processing of his EEO complaint,

he must bring his allegations regarding the processing of this complaint

to the appropriate agency officials. See EEO Management Directive 110,

(MD-110) p.5-25 (November 9, 1999).

Regarding claims 1, 5, 7, 8, and 9, as set forth above, we find that

complainant claims that the agency improperly administers the EEO process

to the detriment of himself as a complainant, as well as to the detriment

of those complainants he represents or even possibly to the detriment of

all federal employees. Accordingly, we find that these claims must be

dismissed because they constitute �spin off� complaints under 29 C.F.R. �

1614.107(a)(8). Moreover, to the extent that any or all of the claims set

forth above may be additionally construed as a claim that the agency's

purported improper administration of the EEO process results in federal

employees being deprived of complainant's personal representation,

or that of other EEO representatives, we find that complainant has

no standing regarding this matter. Instead, it is well settled that

claims of improper denial or limitation of EEO representation lie with

the complainant, not the EEO representative. See Ramage v. USPS, EEOC

Request No. 05A10053 (March 23, 2001). Therefore, we find that this

claim must be dismissed for failure to state a claim under 29 C.F.R. �

1614.107(a)(1). Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM

the agency's dismissal of claims 1, 5, 7, 8, and 9.

Therefore, we find that the agency properly dismissed the instant

complaint pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.107(a), and we AFFIRM that

determination.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

January 9, 2002

__________________

Date

1According to the EEO Counselor's report, complainant claims that the

Union was required to review any changes to his work schedule, and that

the agency failed to confer with the Union when it disqualified him to

act as an EEO representative based on the purported interference with

his work schedule.

2 Morman is complainant's individual complaint, and Binion was filed by

a complainant whom the agency would not allow complainant to represent.

Both complaints were filed in March 1996, one month prior to the filing

of the instant complaint.