Robert F. Smith, Complainant,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionSep 27, 2004
01A43464_r (E.E.O.C. Sep. 27, 2004)

01A43464_r

09-27-2004

Robert F. Smith, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


Robert F. Smith v. United States Postal Service

01A43464

September 27, 2004

.

Robert F. Smith,

Complainant,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A43464

Agency No. 4-I-680-0017-02

DECISION

Complainant filed a timely appeal with this Commission from an agency

decision, dated April 5, 2004, finding that it was in compliance with the

terms of a May 16, 2003 settlement agreement. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.402;

29 C.F.R. � 1614.504(b); and 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405.

The May 16, 2003 settlement agreement provided, in pertinent part, that:

(a) The Agency shall pay Complainant the sum of $361.00 within 60 days

from the date this agreement is signed by all the parties. This sum

is considered compensatory damages and will be reported to the IRS as

miscellaneous income on a form 1099. The Agency does not represent what

tax consequences, if any, apply to this payment.

(b) The Agency shall determine Complainant's daily start time and

Complainant shall adhere to that start time. The Agency agrees to

work with Complainant to assist him in his duties relative to his

position. To the extent Complainant's medical condition, or other

circumstances change in the future, Complainant is entitled to seek

additional accommodations with the Agency or pursuant to applicable

laws or regulations. The Agency does not, however, admit by signing

this Settlement Agreement that Complainant is or will be a qualified

individual with a disability within the meaning of the Rehabilitation

Act of 1973, as amended.

By letter to the agency dated March 13, 2004, complainant alleged that

the agency breached the settlement agreement. Complainant claimed

that �[t]he understanding was that �Nancy' the afternoon clerk would

be the only clerk to �spread' the mail which I had not completed on any

given day . . . .� Complainant noted that when asked if he wanted this

written into the agreement, he stated that he did so. Complainant stated,

however, that an Administrative Judge �indicated that he did not feel

this was necessary.� Complainant alleged that the �Early Morning Clerk�

was �spreading� the mail for forty-two weeks, thereby violating the

agreement and causing him to lose pay. Complainant requested $3,780.00

in lost wages, or that his complaint be reinstated.

In its April 5, 2004 decision, the agency found no breach. The agency

noted that according to the Station Manager, �The agreement does not say

that Nancy would be the only person to spread mail. In fact it doesn't

mention anything about anyone spreading the mail.�

EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. � 1614.504(a) provides that any settlement

agreement knowingly and voluntarily agreed to by the parties, reached at

any stage of the complaint process, shall be binding on both parties.

The Commission has held that a settlement agreement constitutes a

contract between the employee and the agency, to which ordinary rules

of contract construction apply. See Herrington v. Department of Defense,

EEOC Request No. 05960032 (December 9, 1996). The Commission has further

held that it is the intent of the parties as expressed in the contract,

not some unexpressed intention, that controls the contract's construction.

Eggleston v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05900795

(August 23, 1990). In ascertaining the intent of the parties with regard

to the terms of a settlement agreement, the Commission has generally

relied on the plain meaning rule. See Hyon O v. United States Postal

Service, EEOC Request No. 05910787 (December 2, 1991). This rule states

that if the writing appears to be plain and unambiguous on its face,

its meaning must be determined from the four corners of the instrument

without resort to extrinsic evidence of any nature. See Montgomery

Elevator Co. v. Building Eng'g Servs. Co., 730 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1984).

The instant settlement agreement terms shows that the issue of mail

�spreading� was not addressed. EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. � 1614.603

provides that �[a]ny settlement reached shall be in writing and signed

by both parties and shall identify the claims resolved.� The Commission

has upheld the validity of a settlement agreement entered into orally in

one type of situation - during a hearing before an EEO Administrative

Judge where the hearing transcript evidenced the agreement. See Acree

v. Department of the Navy, EEOC Request No. 05900784 (October 4,

1990). Complainant acknowledges on appeal that the requirement that

a particular afternoon clerk spread the mail was �not specifically

written into the agreement.� Complainant argues, however, that a �verbal

agreement� was violated by allowing the early morning clerk to perform

parts of his job. The Commission disagrees. We find that if complainant

wanted the morning clerk to be the only other employee to spread mail,

his intentions should have been reduced to a writing and included in

the agreement. See Jenkins-Nye v. General Services Administration, EEOC

Appeal No. 01951903 (March 4, 1987). Furthermore, complainant did not

present any evidence to support his contention that the AJ dissuaded

him from doing so.

Accordingly, the agency's decision to dismiss the complaint was proper

and is hereby AFFIRMED.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

September 27, 2004

__________________

Date