Robert C. Anderson, Complainant,v.Norman Y. Mineta, Secretary, Department of Transportation, (Federal Aviation Administration), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionOct 16, 2002
01A14048 (E.E.O.C. Oct. 16, 2002)

01A14048

10-16-2002

Robert C. Anderson, Complainant, v. Norman Y. Mineta, Secretary, Department of Transportation, (Federal Aviation Administration), Agency.


Robert C. Anderson v. Department of Transportation

01A14048

October 16, 2002

.

Robert C. Anderson,

Complainant,

v.

Norman Y. Mineta,

Secretary,

Department of Transportation,

(Federal Aviation Administration),

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A14048

Agency No. 3-00-372

DECISION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from a final agency decision

(FAD) concerning his complaint of unlawful employment discrimination in

violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA),

as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 621 et seq. The appeal is accepted pursuant to

29 C.F.R. � 1614.405. For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS

the agency's final decision.

The record reveals that during the relevant time, complainant was employed

as an Air Traffic Control Specialist, FG-2152-12, at the agency's

Air Traffic Division, Gainesville Automated Flight Service Station,

located in Gainesville, Florida. Complainant sought EEO counseling and

subsequently filed a formal complaint on January 29, 2000, alleging that

he was discriminated against on the bases of age (D.O.B. November 11,

1942) and reprisal for prior EEO activity when:

(1) he was not selected for an Operations Supervisor (permanent

assignment), Announcement No. ASO-AAT-99-A172, on January 14, 2000; and

he was not selected for an Operations Supervisor (temporary assignment),

Announcement No. ASO-AAT-00-A193, on June 28, 2000.<1>

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was informed of

his right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge or

alternatively, to receive a final decision by the agency. Complainant

requested that the agency issue a final decision. The agency issued a

FAD finding no discrimination occurred. This appeal followed.

The record reveals the following: On September 1, 1999, the agency

announced a vacant permanent position of Supervisory Air Traffic Control

Specialist, FG-2152-13 (Operations Supervisor), in Gainesville, Florida.

On March 11, 2000, the agency posted another vacancy for the temporary

promotion to Supervisory Air Traffic Control Specialist (Operations

Supervisor), FG-2152-13. Two separate rating panels, with Selecting

Official (SO) on both, were convened to rate and rank candidates for both

positions. Complainant was on the selection list for both positions.

However, complainant was not selected for either position. In regards

to the permanent operations supervisor position, the selectee (S1)

(DOB: January 4, 1954) was not rated as highly as complainant. As to

the temporary operations supervisor position, a selection was not made

and the selection list expired. Eventually, a person (S2) was selected

through a non-competitive process.

In its FAD, the agency concluded that complainant established a

prima facie case of age discrimination and reprisal. Specifically,

in regards to issue (1), complainant applied, and was qualified for

the permanent operations supervisor position. He suffered an adverse

employment action when he was not selected. The selectee was younger

than complainant. The FAD also found that the agency articulated a

legitimate non-discriminatory reason for not selecting complainant;

namely his lack of interpersonal and leadership skills as demonstrated

in two previous temporary assignments as Operations Supervisor.

According to SO, complainant was counseled regarding his shortfalls

in these areas, and offered training or mentoring, but complainant was

adamant that his skills were adequate and did not need to be developed.

In regards to issue (2), the FAD found that the complainant established

a prima facie case of reprisal. Specifically, complainant initiated EEO

counseling in January 2000, which involved the same management officials

as in the case at hand. SO was aware of his prior EEO activities and

the non-selection of complainant occurred a short time after the prior

EEO activity. The FAD, however, found that the agency articulated a

non-discriminatory reason for not selecting the complainant; that the

selectee (S2), who had not had an opportunity to occupy this position in

the past, was chosen for career development purposes whereas complainant

had received such opportunities but had neither performed well nor

subsequently demonstrated improvement in areas where his performance

had been found lacking, such as in interpersonal skills. The FAD found

that on both issues (1) and (2), complainant failed to establish that

management's reasons were pretexts for discrimination.

On appeal, complainant contends that the agency erred in finding

no discrimination and requests that the FAD be reversed. The agency

requests that we affirm its FAD.

As a preliminary matter, we note that the decision on an appeal from

a FAD issued without a hearing, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. �1614.100(b),

shall be based on a de novo review. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a). Under the

ADEA, it is "unlawful for an employer ... to fail or refuse to hire or to

discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual

with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of

employment, because of such individual's age." 29 U.S.C. �623(a)(1).

When a complainant alleges that he has been disparately treated by

the employing agency as a result of unlawful age discrimination,

"liability depends on whether the protected trait (under ADEA, age)

actually motivated the employer's decision." Reeves v. Sanderson

Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 141 (2000). Complainant's age

"must have actually played a role in the employer's decision-making

process and had a determinative influence on the outcome." Id.

Regarding complainant's claim of reprisal, the Commission has stated that

adverse actions need not qualify as "ultimate employment actions" or

materially affect the terms and conditions of employment to constitute

retaliation. Lindsey v. United States Postal Serv., EEOC Request

No. 05980410 (Nov. 4, 1999). Instead, a violation will be found if an

employer retaliates against a worker for engaging in protected activity

through threats, harassment in or out of the workplace, or any other

adverse treatment that is reasonably likely to deter protected activity

by that individual or other employees. EEOC Compliance Manual on

Retaliation, No. 915.003, at 8-14 through 8-16 (May 20, 1998).

To prevail in a disparate treatment claim such as these, complainant

must satisfy the three-part evidentiary scheme fashioned by the Supreme

Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). He

must generally establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that

he was subjected to an adverse employment action under circumstances

that would support an inference of discrimination. Furnco Construction

Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). The prima facie inquiry may be

dispensed with in this case, however, since the agency has articulated

legitimate and nondiscriminatory reasons for its conduct. See United

States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711,

713-17 (1983); Holley v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request

No. 05950842 (November 13, 1997). To ultimately prevail, complainant

must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the agency's

explanation is a pretext for discrimination. Reeves v. Sanderson

Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (2000);

St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993); Texas

Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981);

Holley v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05950842

(November 13, 1997); Pavelka v. Department of the Navy, EEOC Request

No. 05950351 (December 14, 1995). In nonselection cases, pretext may be

found where the complainant's qualifications are demonstrably superior

to the selectee's. Bauer v. Bailar, 647 F.2d 1037, 1048 (10th Cir. 1981).

The agency has broad discretion to set policies and carry out personnel

decisions, and should not be second-guessed by the reviewing authority

absent evidence of unlawful motivation. Texas Department of Community

Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259; Vanek v. Department of the

Treasury, EEOC Request No. 05940906 (January 16, 1997). Although

complainant was ranked higher in the selection process, received many

accolades from his years in service, and scored 18 points higher than S1

in the numerical ranking of candidates,<2> an employer has even greater

flexibility in filling a management position due to the nature of such

a position. Wren v. Gould, 80 F.2d 493, 502 (6th Cir. 1987). Similarly,

in regards to issue (2), complainant has failed to present evidence that

more likely than not, the agency's articulated reason for nonselection was

pretext for discrimination. Given that the positions were supervisory

in nature, and absent probative evidence of unlawful motivation,

the Commission finds that the complainant has failed to establish

that the agency's reason for nonselection or reprisal was pretext for

discrimination.

Therefore, after a careful review of the record, including complainant's

contentions on appeal, the agency's response, and arguments and evidence

not specifically addressed in this decision, we affirm the FAD.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

October 16, 2002

__________________

Date

1 On June 5, 2000, complainant amended his complaint to add issue (2).

2 Factors taken into account included experience, diversity of experience,

performance appraisals and recognitions, participation in committees,

and education and self-development.