2020005031 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 12, 2021)

Robert Bosch GmbH

Patent Trials and Appeals BoardApr 12, 2021

2020005031 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 12, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 15/754,322 02/22/2018 Frank Baehrle-Miller 2178-1817 6148 10800 7590 04/12/2021 Maginot, Moore & Beck LLP One Indiana Square, Suite 2200 Indianapolis, IN 46204 EXAMINER ABD EL LATIF, HOSSAM M ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3666 MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE 04/12/2021 PAPER Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte FRANK BAEHRLE-MILLER and DIETER BLATTERT Appeal 2020-005031 Application 15/754,322 Technology Center 3600 Before JEREMY M. PLENZLER, CARL M. DEFRANCO, and BRANDON J. WARNER, Administrative Patent Judges. PLENZLER, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–10. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We REVERSE and enter a NEW GROUND OF REJECTION in accordance with 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b). 1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Robert Bosch GmbH. Appeal Br. 3. Appeal 2020-005031 Application 15/754,322 2 CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER The claims are directed to a driver assistance method. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter: 1. A method for driver assistance in which a vehicle automatically carries out a driving maneuver, the method comprising: a) actuating a service brake of the vehicle to bring the vehicle to a standstill; b) while the vehicle is held at a standstill by the service brake, controlling a parking brake of the vehicle by (i) operating an actuator motor of the parking brake from a completely retracted state in a direction of releasing the parking brake, and (ii) stopping the actuator motor as soon as a clamping force of the parking brake has been reduced, such that the parking brake has no braking effect and a free travel to be overcome for actuation of the parking brake is minimized; c) after the controlling the parking brake, releasing the service brake of the vehicle; and d) after the releasing the service brake, automatically carrying out the driving maneuver and actuating the parking brake in response to one of a fault and a predefined event occurring to brake the vehicle to a standstill and hold the vehicle at the standstill. REFERENCES The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is: Name Reference Date Maron US 2010/0308645 A1 Dec. 9, 2010 Beever US 2012/0161508 A1 June 28, 2012 Paulson US 2015/0203081 A1 July 23, 2015 Appeal 2020-005031 Application 15/754,322 3 REJECTIONS Claims 1–6 and 10 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable by Beever and Paulson. Claims 7–9 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Beever, Paulson, and Maron. OPINION Indefiniteness–New Ground of Rejection Independent claim 1 recites “a) actuating a service brake of the vehicle to bring the vehicle to a standstill,” followed by “b) while the vehicle is held at a standstill by the service brake, controlling a parking brake of the vehicle by (i) operating an actuator motor of the parking brake from a completely retracted state in a direction of releasing the parking brake.” Independent claim 10 includes substantially identical limitations. Although not recited in the claims, based on our review of the Specification, it appears that somewhere between step “a)” and step “b),” the parking brake is implicitly engaged. See Spec. 13:34–38. It is unclear what it means to “operat[e] an actuator motor of the parking brake from a completely retracted state in a direction of releasing the parking brake,” as recited in the claims. Initially, we note that it is unclear what it means for the actuator motor, as opposed to some mechanical component of the parking brake, to be in a retracted state. Further, being in a “retracted state” implies that the parking brake is not engaged. But to move “in a direction of releasing the parking brake,” as recited in the claims, implies that the parking brake is being displaced from an engaged condition. The confusion is not clarified by the Specification, which does not define the “retracted state.” See Spec. 13:39–14:16. Appeal 2020-005031 Application 15/754,322 4 A claim is properly rejected as indefinite if, after applying the broadest reasonable interpretation in light of the Specification, the metes and bounds of a claim are not clear because the claim contains words or phrases whose meaning is unclear. In re Packard, 751 F.3d 1307, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (per curiam); see also Ex parte McAward, Appeal No. 2015-006416, 2017 WL 3669566, at *5 (PTAB Aug. 25, 2017) (precedential) (adopting the approach for assessing indefiniteness approved by the Federal Circuit in Packard). Based on our review of the record, we are left to wonder what is required to meet the claim language noted above. Accordingly, we determine that the claims are sufficiently unclear to warrant a rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) as being indefinite. Appellant has the opportunity to resolve ambiguities during prosecution. See, e.g., McAward, at *6–7. For the reasons set forth above, we reject claims 1–10 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) as being indefinite. Obviousness Although we reject the claims as indefinite, we are still able to reach a dispositive aspect of the Examiner’s obviousness rejections. Claim 1 requires “stopping the [parking brake] actuator motor as soon as a clamping force of the parking brake has been reduced, such that the parking brake has no braking effect and a free travel to be overcome for actuation of the parking brake is minimized.” Emphasis added. Appellant explains that this limitation requires moving “the parking brake into an intermediate position that is very close to the brake piston (i.e., with minimal free travel to be overcome), but not quite engaged with the brake piston (i.e., so as to have no braking effect)” so that “the parking brake can be engaged rapidly in response to the fault or the predefined event occurring.” Appeal Appeal 2020-005031 Application 15/754,322 5 Br. 8 (citing Spec. 4:11–27, 5:15–18). Appellant’s characterization of the claim is consistent with the cited portion of the Specification and supported by the plain language of the claim itself. The Examiner does not appear to disagree with Appellant’s characterization of the limitation noted above, but never directly addresses all requirements of that limitation. Rather, the Examiner finds that Beever teaches the feature noted above, with little explanation as to how Beever teaches stopping the disengagement of the parking brake as soon as the parking brake is disengaged. Final Act. 5 (citing Beever ¶ 45); Ans. 4–6 (citing Beever ¶¶ 42, 44, 45, 58). Appellant contends that Beever does not teach stopping the disengagement of the parking brake as soon as the parking brake is disengaged. Appeal Br. 11; Reply Br. 4. Appellant has the better position. We do not find the teaching asserted by the Examiner in the cited portions of Beever. Consistent with Appellant’s contentions, although Beever discusses engagement and disengagement of parking brake 30, the cited portions of Beever are silent as to precisely when the parking brake is disengaged or any particular position in which the parking brake held after disengagement. For the reasons set forth above, we do not sustain the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–10. CONCLUSION The Examiner’s rejections are reversed. We enter a new ground of rejection for claims 1–10. Appeal 2020-005031 Application 15/754,322 6 DECISION SUMMARY In summary: Claim(s) Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed New Ground 1–6, 10 103 Beever, Paulson 1–6, 10 7–9 103 Beever, Paulson, Maron 7–9 1–10 112(b) Indefiniteness 1–10 Overall Outcome 1–10 1–10 TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE Section 41.50(b) provides “[a] new ground of rejection pursuant to this paragraph shall not be considered final for judicial review.” Section 41.50(b) also provides that Appellant, WITHIN TWO MONTHS FROM THE DATE OF THE DECISION, must exercise one of the following two options with respect to the new grounds of rejection to avoid termination of the appeal as to the rejected claims: (1) Reopen prosecution. Submit an appropriate amendment of the claims so rejected or new evidence relating to the claims so rejected, or both, and have the matter reconsidered by the examiner, in which event the proceeding will be remanded to the examiner. (2) Request rehearing. Request that the proceeding be reheard under § 41.52 by the Board upon the same Record. Further guidance on responding to a new ground of rejection can be found in the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 1214.01. Appeal 2020-005031 Application 15/754,322 7 No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). REVERSED; 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b)