Robert A. Yancy, Complainant,v.R. James Nicholson, Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionMay 24, 2005
01a52469 (E.E.O.C. May. 24, 2005)

01a52469

05-24-2005

Robert A. Yancy, Complainant, v. R. James Nicholson, Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency.


Robert A. Yancy v. Department of Veterans Affairs

01A52469

May 24, 2005

.

Robert A. Yancy,

Complainant,

v.

R. James Nicholson,

Secretary,

Department of Veterans Affairs,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A52469

Agency No. 980083

DECISION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from a final agency decision

concerning his complaint of unlawful employment discrimination in

violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as

amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. The appeal is accepted pursuant to

29 C.F.R. � 1614.405. For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS

the agency's final decision.

The record reveals that complainant was formerly employed as a Realty

Specialist in the agency's Property Management Section of the Loan

Guaranty Division in San Diego, California. Complainant's probationary

period was to last one year from his appointment on July 7, 1996.

Complainant was terminated, however, for unsatisfactory performance,

effective June 20, 1997. Believing he was a victim of discrimination,

complainant sought EEO counseling and subsequently filed a formal

complaint on August 31, 1997, alleging that he was discriminated against

on the basis of sex (male) with regard to:

(1) failing to convert complainant to full-time at the end of his

probationary period; and

sexual harassment.<0>

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was informed of

his right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge or

alternatively, to receive a final decision by the agency. Complainant

initially requested a hearing, but subsequently withdrew that request

and asked that the agency issue a final decision (FAD).

In its FAD, the agency concluded as to issue (1), that complainant failed

to establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment as he failed

to identify a similarly situated individual, outside his protected

class, who was treated more favorably under similar circumstances.

The FAD nevertheless continued its analysis, and found that the agency

articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its action; namely,

S1 testified that complainant was terminated because of poor performance.

For instance, S1 stated that complainant did not submit his property

analyses in a timely manner, costing the government money. Additionally,

S1 stated that complainant was listing properties to which the agency did

not have title and was not following up on �unlawful detained actions.�

S1 asserted that she counseled complainant about these items as did

other management officials. S1 additionally stated that complainant

would raise his voice to her and get �somewhat agitated� when asked

to complete forms over leave usage. Additionally, the Chief, Loan and

Property Management (M1) testified that complainant's performance �did

not satisfy the requirements of the position� and that complainant had a

�very short temper� and was prone to �unprofessional behavior.� Further,

the Loan Guaranty Officer (L1), S1's immediate supervisor, stated that

complainant's termination resulted not from sexual harassment, but

from complainant's poor performance. L1 described the same problems

with complainant's work as S1 and M1. The Director of the San Diego

Regional Office (D1) asserted that complainant's termination was not a

product of sex discrimination, but was instead due to complainant's poor

performance, his failure to come to work, and his�disruptive� nature.

Based on the foregoing, the agency found that the agency articulated

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its action. The FAD concluded

that the record is devoid of evidence of discriminatory animus on the

part of management concerning complainant's failure to be converted to

full-time.

As to issue (2), the FAD found that there is disagreement in the record

among the witnesses as to whether the sexually harassing conduct occurred

as charged. The FAD noted that complainant's allegations do not involve

any overt conduct by S1, other than looking him �up and down� allegedly

staring at his crotch, and leering at him, all allegations that lend

themselves to subjective interpretation.

On appeal, complainant contends generally that the agency �has exaggerated

several times items which are not true.� Complainant additionally

states that �other pertinent facts have not been addressed.� The agency

requests that we affirm its FAD. As an initial matter we note that,

as this is an appeal from a FAD issued without a hearing, pursuant to

29 C.F.R. � 1614.110(b), the agency's decision is subject to de novo

review by the Commission. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a).

As to issue (1), we note that the allocation of burdens and order of

presentation of proof in a Title VII case alleging disparate treatment

discrimination is a three step procedure: complainant has the initial

burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, a prima facie case

of discrimination; the burden then shifts to the employer to articulate

some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its challenged action; and

complainant must then prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that

the legitimate reason offered by the employer was not its true reason,

but was a pretext for discrimination. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,

411 U.S. 792 (1973). Here, assuming arguendo that complainant established

a prima facie case of sex discrimination, the agency has nevertheless

articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its action, which

complainant has failed to show, by a preponderance of the evidence,

are pretextual,<0>

As to issue (2), we note that based on the standards set forth in Harris

v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993), in order to prevail on a

claim of harassment, complainant must prove that: (1) he was subjected to

harassment that was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms or

conditions of employment and create an abusive or hostile environment; and

(2) the harassment was based on his membership in a protected class. See

EEOC Notice No. 915.002 (March 8, 1994), Enforcement Guidance on Harris

v. Forklift Systems, Inc. at 3, 6; Cobb v. Department of the Treasury,

EEOC Request No. 05970077 (March 13, 1997). Assuming arguendo the

truth of complainant's version of the facts, the evidence in the record

is insufficient to support a finding that management's actions towards

complainant were sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms or

conditions of employment and create an abusive or hostile environment.

See Andrus v. Department of the Treasury, EEOC Appeal No. 01A45546

(December 13, 2004) (finding that an allegation that a manager gazed and

stared at an employee was insufficient to state a claim of harassment);

Cobb v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Appeal No. 01A35144 (July 26,

2004) (finding that allegations that a manager continuously mentioned an

employee's "beautiful smile" and stared and watched her with a look of

"desire" while she was in a bent over position, did not rise to the level

of harassment sufficient to trigger a Title VII violation). Accordingly,

after a careful review of the record, we AFFIRM the FAD.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

May 24, 2005

______________________________ __________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director Date

Office of Federal Operations

0 1Specifically, complainant contends that his supervisor (S1) harassed

him on several occasions in her office. For instance, S1 repeatedly

stared/leered at his �private area,� and engaged complainant in

non-work-related conversations, such as about her deceased husband.

Complainant asserts that he never complained to S1 or to any other

management official about S1's harassment out of fear that he might

be terminated.

0 2We note that complainant concedes that he was counseled concerning his

job performance by various managers on different occasions. See Report

of Investigation (ROI), Complainant's Affidavit, 6-11. Additionally,

complainant concedes that he once shouted at S1 and called her a liar.

Id. at 7. Complainant indicates however, that his behavior may have

been due to medication he was taking. Complainant also indicates that

S1 picked on everybody, not just himself. He further states �That's

why that section had a 50, 60 percent attrition rate.� Id., at 16.