Richard Dean. Dettinger et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Aug 8, 2019

12191428 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Aug. 8, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
12/191,428 08/14/2008 Richard Dean Dettinger ROC920050378US3 1815
46296 7590 08/08/2019
MARTIN & ASSOCIATES, LLC
P.O. BOX 548
CARTHAGE, MO 64836-0548
EXAMINER
WEINRICH, BRIAN E
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2169
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
08/08/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
derekm@ideaprotect.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
________________

Ex parte RICHARD DEAN DETTINGER, DANIEL PAUL
KOLZ, KYONG JIN SHIM, ALAN BENJAMIN SWANSON,
and MARIE RENEE WILKENING
________________

Appeal 2018-006934
Application 12/191,428
Technology Center 2100
________________

Before JEREMY J. CURCURI, JAMES B. ARPIN, and
IRVIN E. BRANCH, Administrative Patent Judges.

CURCURI, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
rejection of claims 1–7, 9–14, and 16–20. Non-Final Act. 1. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
Claims 1–7, 9–14, and 16–20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as
directed to a judicial exception without significantly more. Ans. 2–5.
Claims 14 and 16–20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to
non-statutory subject matter. Non-Final Act. 3–4; see also Ans. 5–6.
Claims 1, 2, 5–7, 9, 11–14, 16, and 18–20 are rejected under pre-AIA
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over Gross (US 2005/0131884 A1; June 16,
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2005) and Arrouye (US 2005/0289133 A1; Dec. 29, 2005). Non-Final Act.
4–18; see also Ans. 6–9.
Claims 3, 4, 10, and 17 are rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as obvious over Gross, Arrouye, and Broder (US 2004/0243557 A1; Dec. 2,
2004). Non-Final Act. 18–21.
We affirm-in-part.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants’ invention relates to “modification of a saved query based
on a change in the meaning of a query value that changes with the passage of
time.” Spec. ¶ 3. Claim 1 is illustrative and reproduced below:
1. A computer-implemented method for a user to modify a query
to a database, the method comprising the steps of:
providing a graphical user interface that allows a user to create, store
and modify queries;
displaying to the user on the graphical user interface a query that was
previously created and stored, where the query has a query value;
displaying an option to the user to time adjust the query to compensate
for a change in the query value since the query was created; and
in response to a user selection to time adjust the query, modifying the
query based on a change in a meaning of the query value over time such that
when executed the query will have the same meaning as when the query was
originally created and stored.
PRINCIPLES OF LAW
We review the appealed rejections for error based upon the issues
identified by Appellants, and in light of the arguments and evidence
produced thereon. Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010)
(precedential).

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ANALYSIS
PATENT INELIGIBILITY REJECTION OF CLAIMS 1–7, 9–14, AND 16–20
With respect to claim 1, the Examiner determines the following:
Referring to claim 1: Claim 1 is directed to the abstract
idea of time adjusting a previously stored query. This
corresponds to collecting, displaying, and manipulating data.
The courts have judged that collecting, displaying, and
manipulating data is not eligible for a patent because it is an
abstract idea (See Int. Ventures v. Cap One Financial). The claim
does not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount
to significantly more than the judicial exception, because the
additional elements, which are recited at a high level of
generality, provide conventional computer components that do
not add meaningful limits to practicing the abstract idea.
The examiner will now show how the specific limitations
fit under the abstract idea. The claim recites “providing a
graphical user interface that allows a user to create, store and
modify queries.” Since this is the entering of the query, it
corresponds to collecting data. The claim also recites “displaying
to the user on the graphical user interface a query that was
previously created and stored, where the query has a query
value.” This corresponds to displaying the collected data.
Finally, the claim recites “in response to a user selection to time
adjust the query, modifying the query based on a change in a
meaning of the query value over time such that when executed
the query will have the same meaning as when the query was
originally created and stored.” Since this is the time adjusting of
the query, this corresponds to manipulating data.
The claim does not include additional elements that are
sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial
exception. The additional element is “displaying an option to the
user to time adjust the query to compensate for a change in the
query value since the query was created.” This [is] not
significantly more than an abstract idea because it is insignificant
pre-solution activity. Looking at the limitations as an ordered
combination adds nothing that is not already present when
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looking at the elements taken individually. There is no indication
that the combination of elements improves the functioning of a
computer or improves any other technology. Their collective
functions merely provide conventional computer
implementation.
Ans. 2–3 (emphasis added).
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the U.S. Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to
include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573
U.S. 208, 216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo and Alice.
Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.,
566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, we first
determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219
(“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
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such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1854)); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876)).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We
view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having
said that, the Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent protection for
that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent
laws, . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit
the use of the formula to a particular technological environment.” Id. (citing
Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that an
application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure
or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (citation omitted). “A claim that
recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the
[claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract
idea].’” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic
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computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a
patent-eligible invention.” Id.
The USPTO recently published revised guidance on the application of
§ 101. USPTO’s 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance,
84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019). Under that guidance, we first look to whether
the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract
ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing
human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental
processes); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th ed.
2019)).
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to
whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not
“well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of
generality, to the judicial exception.
See 84 Fed. Reg. 56.
In particular, the Examiner determines that, as recited in claim 1, “‘in
response to a user selection to time adjust the query, modifying the query
based on a change in a meaning of the query value over time such that when
executed the query will have the same meaning as when the query was
originally created and stored[]’ []is the time adjusting of the query, [and]
corresponds to manipulating data.” Ans. 3.
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Contrary to the Examiner’s determinations, we determine that
“modifying the query,” as recited in claim 1, does not correspond to an
abstract idea at least because “modifying the query,” as recited in claim 1,
and in the context of the invention does not correspond to mathematical
concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity, or mental processes.
Appellants’ Specification discloses “[t]he new value for the query is
then determined by the product of the original query value times the ratio of
the current data/historical data. A new query is then formulated with this
new query value by the query adjustment mechanism 127 (Figure 1).” Spec.
¶ 44; see also id. ¶¶ 43 (“[T]he original query is executed to gather historical
data by running the query with the date set to the time of the original
query.”), 44 (“a query would be executed to determine the current data for
the above query”).
“[M]odifying the query based on a change in a meaning of the query
value over time such that when executed the query will have the same
meaning as when the query was originally created and stored,” as recited in
claim 1, in the context of the recited method, is not something that can be
performed mentally because the query only exists and has meaning within
the context of the query having been previously created and stored, and there
being stored historical and stored current data in the database. See Spec. ¶¶
43–44. Thus, modifying the query in this context is not a mental process,
such as an observation, evaluation, judgement, or opinion in one’s mind.
Moreover, modifying the query in this context is not a mathematical concept
or method of organizing human activity for the same reasons.
Thus, the Examiner does not sufficiently articulate why the claimed
concepts fall within the subject matter groupings of abstract ideas of
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mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity, or
mental processes. See 84 Fed. Reg. 56.
Accordingly, we are persuaded by Appellants’ arguments that
“[g]iven the specific limitations in the claims relating to a user selection to
time adjust the query and modifying the query based on a change in a
meaning of the query value over time, claim 1 is not abstract in any sense.”
Reply Br. 5.
In addition, Appellants’ Specification further discloses a technical
problem arising specifically in computer database systems that allow the
user to store a query for later use: “the same query run in the future may not
present the same relative information to the user as was intended when the
query was created and saved. Parts of the query that have a time sensitive
nature are not taken into consideration for future use of the query.” Spec.
¶ 7. “[M]odifying the query based on a change in a meaning of the query
value over time such that when executed the query will have the same
meaning as when the query was originally created and stored” as recited in
claim 1 provides a specific solution to the technical problem arising
specifically in such computer database systems. Accordingly, we are
persuaded by Appellants’ arguments that “the limitations allow a user to
overcome the staleness of saved queries in the prior art so that generation
and execution of queries remain useful as the values of the query change
over time.” Reply Br. 7. Because claim 1 overcomes a problem specifically
arising in the realm of computer networks, “the claimed solution is
necessarily rooted in computer technology in order to overcome a problem
specifically arising in the realm of computer networks,” and accordingly, the
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claims are not directed to an abstract idea. DDR Holdings, LLC v.
Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
Thus, we do not sustain the rejection of independent claim 1 under
35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to a judicial exception without significantly
more. Claims 2–6 depend from claim 1. We, therefore, also do not sustain
the rejection of these claims under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to a judicial
exception without significantly more.
Independent claims 7 and 14 recite similar language as claim 1. We,
therefore, also do not sustain the rejection of independent claims 7 and 14
under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to a judicial exception without
significantly more. Claims 9–13 depend from claim 7, and claims 16–20
depend from claim 14. We, therefore, also do not sustain the rejection of
these claims under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to a judicial exception
without significantly more.
NON-STATUTORY SUBJECT MATTER REJECTION OF CLAIMS 14 AND 16–20
Contentions
The Examiner concludes claims 14 and 16–20 are directed to non-
statutory subject matter because the recited (claim 14) “computer-recordable
media” includes transitory signals. See Non-Final Act. 3–4; see also Ans. 5–
6.
Appellants argue the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claim
language does not include a transitory signal. See App. Br. 4 (“computer-
recordable media excludes transmission media”); see also Reply Br. 10.
Our Review
Appellants’ Specification discloses the following:
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At this point, it is important to note that while the present
invention has been and will continue to be described in the
context of a fully functional computer system, those skilled in
the art will appreciate that the present invention is capable of
being distributed as a program product in a variety of forms, and
that the present invention applies equally regardless of the
particular type of computer-readable signal bearing media used
to actually carry out the distribution. Examples of suitable
computer-readable signal bearing media include: recordable
type media such as floppy disks and CD RW (e.g., 195 of Figure
1), and transmission type media such as digital and analog
communications links. Note that the preferred signal bearing
media is tangible.
Spec. ¶ 40 (emphasis added).
Generally, the term “computer usable storage medium” encompasses
transitory media and is, therefore, ineligible under § 101. See Ex parte
Mewherter, 107 USPQ2d 1857, 1862 (PTAB 2013) (precedential) (holding
recited machine-readable storage medium ineligible under § 101 because it
encompassed transitory media in the absence of a specific definition or
disclaimer). Furthermore, “physical but transitory forms of signal
transmission such as . . . electrical signals through a wire, and light pulses
through a fiber-optic cable” are not statutory subject matter. In re Nuijten,
500 F.3d 1346, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Here, Appellants’ Specification does
not expressly distinguish a “computer-recordable media” from transitory
media because Appellants’ Specification describes examples of computer-
recordable media. See Spec. ¶ 40. Thus, computer-recordable media include
other computer usable storage media, which encompasses transitory
recordable media where the recording is temporary.
We, therefore, sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 14 and 16–
20 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to non-statutory subject matter.
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THE OBVIOUSNESS REJECTION OF CLAIMS 1, 2, 5–7, 9, 11–14, 16, AND 18–20
OVER GROSS AND ARROUYE
Claims 1, 2, 5, 7, 9, 11, 12, 14, 16, 18, and 19
The Examiner finds Gross and Arrouye teach all of the limitations of
claim 1. Non-Final Act. 4–8. For teaching the recited “displaying an option
to the user to time adjust the query,” the Examiner relies on Arrouye’s
limiting a search to a certain period of time such as the past week (Figures
7B–7D), and, in the alternative, relies on Gross’s operational button 322
(Figure 7) to perform actions to dynamically generate search listings. Non-
Final Act. 7–8 (citing Arrouye ¶¶ 57–59), Non-Final Act. 7 (citing Gross
¶¶ 27, 28).
Appellants present the following principal argument:
Arrouye teaches to allow the user to select a time frame in
box 719A for a search. The results of the search are then shown
in the box 705. There is simply nothing in Arrouye that addresses
the essence of the claimed invention. The board rejected the
examiner’s previous rejection based on Drucker because Drucker
did not teach to “perform time adjustments on a query that was
previously created and stored” (see bottom of page 4 of the
Decision on Appeal). Similarly Arrouye does not teach or
suggest any action that is being taken on a query that was
previously created and stored. Arrouye, similar to other prior art
like Drucker merely describes creating a time sensitive query.
App. Br. 7; see also App. Br. 7 (“Appellant[s] assert[] that Arrouye and
Gross both fail to teach displaying to the user a time sensitive query that was
previously created and stored which the user is then able time adjust as
claimed.”)
In response, the Examiner explains “[i]n lines 1-8, paragraph [0059],
pages 11 and 12 [of Arrouye], the user selects the option past Week which
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causes the files from the last Week to be displayed. This corresponds to time
adjustment.” Ans. 7.
In further elaboration from Arrouye, [the Examiner explains] the
search query in lines 17-27, paragraph [0061], page 12 (i.e., the
last 11 lines of paragraph [0061]) is saved for later use[] or re-
use. Moreover, when used at [a] later time, the files are found
that match that query at the later time. This appears to the
examiner to be a time adjustment.
Ans. 7.
In the Reply Brief, Appellants respond
the building of a query as described in Arrouye does not relate to
displaying an option to adjust a query or time adjusting of a
query. The cited sections that describe drop down menus where
the user can select a time illustrate creating a query with a time
component. Arrouye does not teach or suggest in these sections
to time adjust a query that was previously created and stored.
Reply Br. 11; see also Reply Br. 12 (Arrouye and Gross both fail to teach
displaying to the user a time sensitive query that was previously created and
stored).
Gross discloses “[a]s illustrated in FIGS. 1 and 2, a user 200 submits a
query to a search engine 220 via a user interface 210 in operational block
100.” Gross ¶ 19. Thus, Gross teaches “displaying to the user on the
graphical user interface a query” as recited in claim 1.
Turning to Arrouye, Arrouye in Figures 7B-7D depicts limiting a
search to a certain period of time such as the past week. In particular,
Arrouye discloses the following:
FIG. 7C shows the window 701 on the display of a data
processing system after the user has selected a particular option
(in this case “past week”) from the sub menu 719A. If the user
accepts this selection, then the display shown in FIG. 7D results
in which the configurable pull down menu 718 is displayed
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showing that the user has selected as part of the search criteria
files that have been created or modified in the past week.
Arrouye ¶ 59. When displaying the search results in Figure 7D, Arrouye
“display[s] to the user on the graphical user interface a query that was
previously created and stored, where the query has a query value” as recited
in claim 1.
With regard to “displaying an option to the user to time adjust the
query to compensate for a change in the query value since the query was
created” as broadly recited in claim 1, contrary to Appellants’ arguments, we
agree with the Examiner that this limitation is taught by Arrouye. See
Arrouye Fig. 7D (depicting the user’s ability to time adjust the query at
pulldown menu 718A). In short, there is nothing in the broadly recited
limitations of claim 1 to preclude the Examiner’s findings. Pulldown menu
718A is used to time adjust the query to compensate for a change in the
query value since the query was created.
We do not see any error in the Examiner’s findings. We, therefore,
sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1. We also sustain the Examiner’s
rejection of claims 2, 5, 7, 9, 11, 12, 14, 16, 18, and 19, which are not
separately argued with particularity. See App. Br. 7, 8, 9.
Claim 6, 13, and 20
Claim 6 further recites “the query is stored as a query abstract with an
objected oriented framework.” The Examiner finds Gross teaches this
additional subject matter. Non-Final Act. 9 (citing Gross ¶ 20).
Appellants argue “[n]owhere does Gross teach or suggest storing a
query as a query abstract with an object oriented framework.” App. Br. 8.
In response, the Examiner explains as follows:
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The appellants assert [] that Gross does not teach an object
oriented framework or a query abstract. The user interface in
paragraph [0020], page 2 of Gross, however, can be provided in
Javascript. Javascript is a high-level computer language which is
implemented in an object oriented framework. The appellants,
however, have not defined what they mean by a query abstract.
Now, the appellants make the statement in lines 10-12, paragraph
[0028], pages 5 and 6 of their specification that object oriented
framework “abstracts out the query layer from the user and lets
the user build queries using a graphical interface.” If a query
abstract is building queries using a graphical interface, paragraph
[0020] of Gross also discusses the user interface. There is further
elaboration in Arrouye since the examiner, in the context of
claim 1, has already discussed Figures 7A-7E of Arrouye as
graphical user interface for building queries.
Ans. 8–9.
In the Reply Brief, Appellants argue as follows:
While Gross and Arrouye do teach concerning a user interface
for searching, this does not teach or suggest storing a query as a
query abstract with an object oriented framework. The Examiner
further asserts that Appellant[s] ha[ve] not defined what is meant
by a query abstract. Appellant[s] assert[] that a query abstract is
known in the prior art as described in paragraph 0028 of the
specification.
Reply Br. 13.
Appellants’ Specification discloses “[t]his framework abstracts out the
query layer from the user and lets the user build queries using a graphical
interface.” Spec. ¶ 28. Thus, we construe “the query is stored as a query
abstract with an objected oriented framework” as requiring a framework that
lets the user build queries using a graphical user interface. Given our
construction, we agree with the Examiner’s findings with respect to claim 6.
Gross discloses the “user interface can be provided via a webpage
generated using HTML, JavaScript, XML, and the like, received from a
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website associated with the search engine.” Gross ¶ 20. Arrouye Figures 7A-
7F depict a graphical user interface for building queries. Thus, we agree with
the Examiner that Gross and Arrouye teach the subject matter of claim 6
because both references describe a framework (Gross’s use of Javascript,
Arrouye’s graphical user interface) that lets the user build queries using a
graphical user interface. We also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims
13 and 20 for which Appellants present the same principal arguments. See
App. Br. 9, 10.
OBVIOUSNESS REJECTION OF CLAIMS 3, 4, 10, AND 17 OVER GROSS,
ARROUYE, AND BRODER
Contentions
Claim 3 further recites “the query value is adjusted to the product of
an original query value and a historical value returned by the query divided
by a current value returned by the query.” The Examiner finds Gross teaches
the further recited subject matter of claim 3. Non-Final Act. 19 (citing Gross
¶¶ 34, 35). The Examiner also finds Broder teaches the further recited
subject matter of claim 3. Non-Final Act. 19–20 (citing Broder ¶¶ 287, 288).
Appellants present the following principal arguments:
In the cited section of Gross, the user is allowed to dynamically
adjust pricing information in a “generated” paid listing. This says
nothing about adjusting or changing a query. Further, the values
that are used for the adjustment are not the same as claimed. For
example, the dividend is the target price, not the current price as
claimed.
App. Br. 11.
The cited section of Broder merely shows a query that has a
product and a quotient. The cited art does not teach or suggest a
query value that is adjusted to the product of an original query
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value and a historical value returned by the query divided by a
current value returned by the query. As described by the
Examiner, Bro[]der uses number of occurrences and frequencies
to adjust the values. These are clearly not the same as the claimed
original value, historical value and current value.
App. Br. 11–12.
Our Review
Gross discloses adjusting a price based on a ratio of actual click-
through rate to target click-through rate. Gross ¶¶ 34, 35. We agree with
Appellants that these disclosures do not teach the recited subject matter of
claim 3, which relates to adjusting a query value based on historical and
current values.
Broder discloses determining a document score based on the
similarity of a document to a query. Broder ¶¶ 287, 288. We agree with
Appellants that these disclosures do not teach the recited subject matter of
claim 3, which relates to adjusting a query value based on historical and
current values.
We, therefore, do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 3, or
of claim 4, which depends from claim 3. We also do not sustain the
Examiner’s rejection of claims 10 and 17, which recite substantially the
same subject matter as claim 3.
ORDER
The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1, 2, 5–7, 9, 11–14, 16, and
18–20 is affirmed.

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The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 3, 4, 10, and 17 is reversed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED-IN-PART