Richard Allen. Robbins et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Feb 25, 2020

13675440 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Feb. 25, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/675,440 11/13/2012 Richard Allen Robbins 17845.00006 9437
136794 7590 02/25/2020
HUGHES HUBBARD & REED LLP
ONE BATTERY PARK PLAZA
NEW YORK, NY 10004
EXAMINER
TOMASZEWSKI, MICHAEL
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3686
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
02/25/2020 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte RICHARD ALLEN ROBBINS, JUSTIN MARK BROCKIE,
JAMES MICHAEL KELLY, ASIF ALI,
MOJAHEDUL HOQUE ABUL HASANAT, OMAR FARUQ,
SAZZAD RAFIQUE, TAHSEEN MOHAMMAD,
UMMY HABIBA, SURAIYA PARVEEN, and
JEREMY IAN SCHULMAN ROBBINS
____________

Appeal 2018-0029341
Application 13/675,440
Technology Center3600
____________

Before JOSEPH A. FISCHETTI, BIBHU R. MOHANTY, and
BRUCE T. WIEDER, Administrative Patent Judges.

FISCHETTI, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134 of the Examiner’s
final rejection of claims 2–4, 6–11, 101, and 103–106. We have jurisdiction
under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). A hearing was held November 13, 2019.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies Therap Services, LLC as the real
party in interest. (Appeal Br. 6.)
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SUMMARY OF DECISION
We AFFIRM.

THE INVENTION
Appellant states the invention “relates to methods and system for
acquiring and processing information collected from individuals having
intellectual or cognitive disabilities, and for providing treatment, proof-of-
service, and prevention of abuse and neglect based on that information.”
(Spec. 1:14–17.)
Claim 106, reproduced below, is representative of the subject matter
on appeal.
106. A system for recording visual information in an electronic
format relating to at least two individuals, at least one of whom
is an individual under care, from a video camera, regarding one
or more goals of the individual under care, and restricting access
of a user to said information, comprising:
a computer system having a memory and a processor;
a video camera for recording information pertaining to
physical attributes of the individuals, wherein at least a portion
of said information pertains to an initial inquiry relating to one
or more goals of the individual under care;
a transmission link for sending at least a portion of said
recorded information to said computer system;
a computer program stored in said memory and adapted to
run on said processor, configured to:
store at least a portion of said transmitted information;
store at least one authorization profile associated with the
user, wherein the user is associated with one or more roles and
one or more caseloads and the caseloads include access privilege
information for the individual under care;
determine whether the user is permitted to view said
information pertaining to a caseload of the individual under care
wherein the determination is based on said authorization profile
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and the one or more caseloads and the one or more roles
associated with the user;
blur a portion of said stored information pertaining to the
one or more individuals other than the individual under care; and
transmit at least a portion of said stored information
pertaining to the individual under care, and said blurred portion
of said stored information pertaining to the one or more
individuals other than the individual under care, to said caseload
of said individual under care for viewing by said user authorized
to view said information.

THE REJECTION
The following rejection is before us for review.
Claims 2–4, 6–11, 101, and 103–106 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101.

FINDINGS OF FACT
We adopt the Examiner’s findings as set forth on pages 2–7 in the
Final Office Action2 and on pages 5–11 in the Examiner’s Answer.

ANALYSIS
35 U.S.C. § 101 REJECTION
We will affirm the rejection of claims 2–4, 6–11, 101, and 103–106
under 35 U.S.C. § 101.

The Appellant argues claim 106 as the representative claim for the
group 2–4, 6–11, 101, and 103–104, 106 (Appeal Br. 32–52), and so the

2 All references to the Final Office Action refer to the Final Office Action
mailed on March 24, 2017.
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remaining claims of this group stand or fall with claim 106. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (2016).
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include
implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573
U.S. 208, 216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with
that framework, we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.”
See id. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept
of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate
settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010)
(“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of
hedging, or protecting against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
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rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We
view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having
said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent
protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws, . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by
attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological
environment.” Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now
commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula
to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent
protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted).
“A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to
ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo,
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566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[]
fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
The PTO recently published revised guidance on the application of
§ 101. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Guidance”). Under the Guidance, we first look to
whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into
a practical application (see Manual of Patent Examining
Procedure (“MPEP”) § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th Ed., Rev.
08.2017, Jan. 2018)).
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that
exception into a practical application, do we then look to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see
MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception.
See Guidance.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has explained that
“the ‘directed to’ inquiry applies a stage-one filter to claims, considered in
light of the [S]pecification, based on whether ‘their character as a whole is
directed to excluded subject matter.’” Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp.,
822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Internet Patents Corp. v.
Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). It asks whether
the focus of the claims is on a specific improvement in relevant technology
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or on a process that itself qualifies as an “abstract idea” for which computers
are invoked merely as a tool. See Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1335–36.
In so doing, as indicated above, we apply a “directed to” two prong
test: (1) evaluate whether the claim recites a judicial exception, and (2) if the
claim recites a judicial exception, evaluate whether the claim “appl[ies],
rel[ies] on, or use[s] the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a
meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a
drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception.” Guidance at
53; see also MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h).
The Specification states:
A goal of human service agencies may be to have more
person centered documentation. Having the responses of a
person is a key component for person centered documentation.
For individuals with intellectual or cognitive disabilities who are
receiving supports from others, there is a challenge to make sure
that their goals and opinions are properly represented. In many
cases these individuals are receiving support from multiple
agencies with multiple oversights and monitoring organizations.
Even within one organization there are multiple shifts of people
with different access to information.

Spec. 1:19–25.

This method allows for the situation where different staff
members observe an individual doing the same action or
responding in a certain way and each staff member might
interpret that information and document it differently. Given that
an individual might have a lifelong condition and staff members
can be transitory and thus have limited information, there exists
a problem with the information flow available to a staff member.
Some staff members might have worked longer with an
individual and interpret non-verbal responses differently. This
means the same response by an individual may cause different
reporting interpretations. The responses would be stored so there
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is an ability to review responses as part of an audit or other look
back.
Spec. 4:11–18.
Concerning independent claim 106, the preamble says it is “for
recording visual information in an electronic format relating to at least two
individuals, at least one of whom is an individual under care, from a video
camera, regarding one or more goals of the individual under care, and
restricting access of a user to said information.”
Independent claim 106 recites in pertinent part the abstract items of:
…information pertaining to physical attributes of the
individuals, wherein at least a portion of said information
pertains to an initial inquiry relating to one or more goals of the
individual under care; . . . sending at least a portion of said
recorded information . . . ;
store at least a portion of said … information;
store at least one authorization profile associated with the
user, wherein the user is associated with one or more roles and
one or more caseloads and the caseloads include access privilege
information for the individual under care;
determine whether the user is permitted to view said
information pertaining to a caseload of the individual under care
wherein the determination is based on said authorization profile
and the one or more caseloads and the one or more roles
associated with the user;
blur a portion of said stored information pertaining to the
one or more individuals other than the individual under care; and
transmit at least a portion of said stored information
pertaining to the individual under care, and said blurred portion
of said stored information pertaining to the one or more
individuals other than the individual under care, to said caseload
of said individual under care for viewing by said user authorized
to view said information.
Accordingly, the Examiner found that claim 106 recites, “using
categories to organize, store, and transmit information, etc.; collecting and
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comparing known information; obtaining and comparing intangible data;
comparing new and stored information and using rules to identify options;
comparing data to determine a risk level; and/or organizing information
through mathematical correlations.” (Final Act. 2.)
We find similarly that claim 106 recites a mental process of redacting
confidential information based on privilege rules whereby only those parties
with authorization are permitted access to the information. This is because
claim 106 recites in pertinent part the claim limitations: store at least one
authorization profile associated with the user, wherein the user is associated
with one or more roles and one or more caseloads and the caseloads include
access privilege information for the individual under care; determine
whether the user is permitted to view said information pertaining to a
caseload of the individual under care wherein the determination is based on
said authorization profile and the one or more caseloads and the one or more
roles associated with the user; blur a portion of said stored information
pertaining to the one or more individuals other than the individual under
care; and transmit at least a portion of said stored information pertaining to
the individual under care, and said blurred portion of said stored information
pertaining to the one or more individuals other than the individual under
care. Thus, all this intrinsic evidence shows that claim 106 is directed to a
mental process. This is consistent with the Examiner’s determination.
Moreover, these are concepts performed in the human mind as mental
processes because the steps of receiving, transmitting, storing, and analyzing
data mimic human thought processes of observation, evaluation, judgment,
and opinion, perhaps with paper and pencil, where the data interpretation is
perceptible only in the human mind. See In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent
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Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 611 (Fed. Cir. 2016); FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric
Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1093–94 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Claims involving data
collection, analysis, and display are directed to an abstract idea. Elec. Power
Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding
that “collecting information, analyzing it, and displaying certain results of
the collection and analysis” are “a familiar class of claims ‘directed to’ a
patent ineligible-concept”).
Turning to the second prong of the “directed to” test, claim 106 only
generically requires “a video camera,” “a computer system having a memory
and a processor,” and “a transmission link.” These components are
described in the Specification at a high level of generality. See Spec. 5:21–
25, 6:1–17, Fig. 1. We fail to see how the generic recitations of these most
basic computer components and/or of a system so integrates the judicial
exception as to “impose[] a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such
that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the
judicial exception.” Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 53. We find no indication in
the Specification, nor does Appellant direct us to any indication, that the
operations recited in independent claim 106 invoke any assertedly inventive
programming, require any specialized computer hardware or other inventive
computer components, i.e., a particular machine, or that the claimed
invention is implemented using other than generic computer components to
perform generic computer functions. See DDR Holdings, LLC v.
Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[A]fter Alice, there
can remain no doubt: recitation of generic computer limitations does not
make an otherwise ineligible claim patent-eligible.”). Claim 106 does not
improve another technology, because neither storing an authorization profile
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nor blurring a portion of information, as recited in the claims, involves
improving a technology. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55; see also MPEP §
2106.05(a). Because no more than a generic computer is required, the claim
also does not define, or rely on, a “particular machine.” MPEP §
2106.05(b).
Thus, we find that the claims recite the judicial exception of a mental
process that is not integrated into a practical application.
That the claims do not preempt all forms of the abstraction or may be
limited to redacted information does not make them any less abstract. See
OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1362–63 (Fed. Cir.
2015) (“And that the claims do not preempt all price optimization or may be
limited to price optimization in the e-commerce setting do not make them
any less abstract.”).
Turning to the second step of the Alice analysis, because we find that
the claims are directed to abstract ideas/judicial exceptions, the claims must
include an “inventive concept” in order to be patent-eligible, i.e., there must
be an element or combination of elements sufficient to ensure that the claim
in practice amounts to significantly more than the abstract idea itself. See
Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–73).
Concerning this step the Examiner found the following:

the claims, individually, as a whole and in combination with one
another, do not include additional elements that are sufficient to
amount to significantly more than the judicial exception because
the additional elements or combination of elements in the claims,
other than the abstract idea per se, amount to no more than a
recitation of (A) a generic computer structure(s) that serves to
perform generic computer functions that serve to merely link the
abstract idea to a particular technological environment (i.e.,
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computers); and/or (B) functions that are well-understood,
routine, and conventional activities previously known to the
pertinent industry. For example, claims 2-4, 6-11, 101 and 103-
106 merely recite a computer system which is a well-known
general purpose computer that receives data, stores data,
transmits data, blurs data, etc. which are well-understood, routine
and conventional activities.
(Final Act. 3.) We agree with the Examiner. “[T]he relevant question is
whether the claims here do more than simply instruct the practitioner to
implement the abstract idea . . . on a generic computer.” Alice, 573 U.S.
at 225. They do not.
Taking the claim elements separately, the function performed by the
computer at each step of process is purely conventional. Using a computer
to record, transmit, store, determine, and apply decision criteria to data and
modify the data as a result amounts to electronic data query and retrieval—
one of the most basic functions of a computer. All of these computer
functions are well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously
known to the industry. See Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1354; see also In
re Katz Interactive Call Processing Patent Litig., 639 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) (“Absent a possible narrower construction of the terms
‘processing,’ ‘receiving,’ and ‘storing,’ . . . those functions can be achieved
by any general purpose computer without special programming”). In short,
each step does no more than require a generic computer to perform generic
computer functions. The claims do not, for example, purport to improve the
functioning of the computer itself. In addition, as we stated above, the
claims do not affect an improvement in any other technology or technical
field. The Specification spells out different generic equipment and
parameters that might be applied using this concept and the particular steps
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such conventional processing would entail based on the concept of
information access under different scenarios (see, e.g., Spec. 5:21-25, 6:1–
17, 10:22–15:8, Fig. 1). Thus, the claims at issue amount to nothing
significantly more than instructions to apply the abstract idea using some
unspecified, generic computer. Under our precedents, that is not enough to
transform an abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. See Alice, 573
U.S. at 225–26.
Considered as an ordered combination, the computer components of
Appellant’s claims add nothing that is not already present when the steps are
considered separately. The sequence of data reception-analysis (record,
transmit, store, determine, and apply decision criteria to data and modify the
data as a result) and store is equally generic and conventional or otherwise
held to be abstract. See Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715
(Fed. Cir. 2014) (sequence of receiving, selecting, offering for exchange,
display, allowing access, and receiving payment recited an abstraction),
Inventor Holdings, LLC v. Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc., 876 F.3d 1372, 1378
(Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that sequence of data retrieval, analysis,
modification, generation, display, and transmission was abstract), Two-Way
Media Ltd. v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC, 874 F.3d 1329, 1339 (Fed.
Cir. 2017) (holding sequence of processing, routing, controlling, and
monitoring was abstract). The ordering of the steps is, therefore, ordinary
and conventional.
We have reviewed all the arguments Appellant has submitted
concerning the patent eligibility of the claims before us that stand rejected
under 35 U.S.C. § 101. (Appeal Br. 18–53, Reply Br. 3–19) We find that
our analysis above substantially covers the substance of all the arguments,
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which have been made. But, for purposes of completeness, we will address
various arguments in order to make individual rebuttals of same.
Appellant argues: “the Examiner merely lists types of abstract ideas
identified in various USPTO guidance materials, and contends that claim
106 is somehow directed to an abstract idea of one of these types.” (Appeal
Br. 30.)
We disagree with Appellant because the Examiner’s “directed to
finding” explicitly sets forth the characteristics of a mental process and/or
mathematical concepts, e.g., “using categories to organize, store, and
transmit information, etc. . . . and/or organizing information through
mathematical correlations.” (Final Act. 2.)
Appellant next argues,
[t]he Examiner’s rejection fails to establish a prima facie
case that the pending claims are directed to an abstract idea. The
Examiner’s rejection also fails to establish a prima facie case
that the pending claims do not amount to significantly more than
an abstract idea itself.

. . . .
The Examiner does not set forth where in the claims these
recitations are found. In fact, the portions of the Office Action
cited above amounts to the only explanation provided by the
Examiner as to the relationship between the claims and the
alleged abstract idea. No identification of the particular abstract
idea has been provided, let alone the required explanation as to
how an abstract idea is recited by the specific features of claim
106 or why the abstract idea is considered an abstract idea in the
first place.
(Appeal Br. 29–31.)
We disagree with Appellant. The Examiner did provide sufficient
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evidentiary support for the Alice “step two–A” determination in this case.
See (Final Act. 2–3) That is, the Examiner found that:
the claims are similar to COLLECTING INFORMATION,
ANALYZING IT, AND DISPLAYING CERTAIN RESULTS
OF THE COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS; USING
CATEGORIES TO ORGANIZE, STORE AND TRANSMIT
INFORMATION; and COMPARING NEW AND STORED
INFORMATION AND USING RULES TO IDENTIFY
OPTIONS, as identified in the Electric Power Group, Cyberfone
and court decisions, because the claims define collecting
information on individuals and user profiles….
(Final Act. 2–3, Ans. 3.)
The Examiner’s characterization of claim 106 is, in our view, fully
consistent with the Specification, including the claim language as set forth
above as intrinsic evidence. That the Examiner articulates the abstract idea
at a higher level of abstraction than would Appellant is an insufficient basis
to persuasively argue that the claim language has been mischaracterized or
that the Examiner has failed to consider the claim as a whole. See Apple,
Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., 842 F.3d 1229, 1240 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“An abstract
idea can generally be described at different levels of abstraction.”)
To the extent Appellant argues that the Examiner erred in adequately
supporting this determination by not providing evidence, we are
unpersuaded. In this regard, there is no requirement that Examiners must
provide evidentiary support in every case before a conclusion can be made
that a claim is directed to an abstract idea. See, e.g., MPEP § 2106.07(a)(III)
(“The courts consider the determination of whether a claim is eligible (which
involves identifying whether an exception such as an abstract idea is being
claimed) to be a question of law. Thus, the court does not require ‘evidence’
that a claimed concept is a judicial exception, and generally decides the legal
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conclusion of eligibility without resolving any factual issues.” (Citations
omitted).)
All that is required of the USPTO to meet its prima facie burden of
production is that the Examiner set forth the statutory basis of the rejection
and the reference or references relied upon in a sufficiently articulate and
informative manner as to meet the notice requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 132.
As the statute itself instructs, the Examiner must “notify the applicant,”
“stating the reasons for such rejection,” “together with such information and
references as may be useful in judging the propriety of continuing the
prosecution of his application.” 35 U.S.C. § 132; see also In re Jung, 637
F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (declining “to impose a heightened burden
on examiners beyond the notice requirement of § 132”). Here, as we found
above, the Examiner has made these findings as required by the statute. (See
Final Act. 2–4.) Thus, we find that a prima facie case was established by the
Examiner.
On pages 31–33 of the Appeal Brief, Appellant parses various
characteristics of a mental process listed by the Examiner from case law
(Final Act. 3), but not mapped to claim recitations in the rejection. We are
unpersuaded of error because on page 2 carrying to page 3 of the Final
Office Action, the Examiner does identify the limitations of claim 106, albeit
as a group, that are tied to the mental process characteristics enumerated by
the Examiner.
Although we agree with Appellant that the claims must be read, as a
whole (Appeal Br. 34–35), we nevertheless find, on balance, that claim 106
is directed to a mental process of redacting confidential information based
on privilege rules whereby only those parties with authorization are
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permitted to view the information. As found supra, claim 106 only includes
the following generically recited device limitations: “video camera,” “a
computer system having a memory and a processor,” and “a transmission
link.” What remains in the claim after disregarding these device limitations,
are abstractions, i.e.,
… user is associated with one or more roles and one or more
caseloads and the caseloads include access privilege information
for the individual under care;
determine whether the user is permitted to view []
information pertaining to a caseload of the individual under care
wherein the determination is based on said authorization profile
and the one or more caseloads and the one or more roles
associated with the user;
blur a portion of said stored information pertaining to the
one or more individuals other than the individual under care; and
transmit at least a portion of said stored information
pertaining to the individual under care, and said blurred portion
of said stored information pertaining to the one or more
individuals other than the individual under care, to said caseload
of said individual under care for viewing by said user authorized
to view said information.
“[A] claim for a new abstract idea is still an abstract idea.” Synopsys, Inc. v.
Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1151 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing Mayo,
566 U.S. at 90).
Appellant next argues, the claims “recite[] limitations that advance the
prior art (as admitted by the Examiner) and includes ‘benefits’ that represent
an improvement in the way video healthcare information is processed that
was heretofore unknown.” (Appeal Br. 38.)
Although the claims purport to improve the way video healthcare
information is processed, our reviewing court has held that speed and
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accuracy increases stemming from the ordinary capabilities of a general
purpose computer “do[] not materially alter the patent eligibility of the
claimed subject matter.” Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance Co.
of Can. (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
Appellant states that the claimed “caseloads” is defined in U.S. Patent
8,281,370 B2 as: “Caseloads specify which individuals and which programs
the user is allowed to access information about. The actions a user is
allowed to perform on that information in an embodiment of the system is
specified by security access rules, or just rules.” (Tr. 6:9–12, see also
Appeal Br. 42–43.) Citing to the Declaration of Richard A. Robbins,
Appellant asserts that the claimed caseloads are “non-conventional.”
(Appeal Br. 43–45.)
We disagree with Appellant. First, based on the definition offered by
Appellant for the term “caseloads,” we find that this term by its definition is
in fact an abstract idea. Authorization is information which is intangible.
See Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1353 (citing Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T
Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 451 n.12 (2007)). Second, we are not persuaded by
Appellant’s reference to the Robins Declaration statement that “blurring
video healthcare data to allow users (such as healthcare providers) to view
the data associated with an individual under care, but not the video data
associated with others, was not known in the electronic healthcare industry.”
(Appeal Br. 45.) This is because “‘novelty’ of any element or steps in a
process, or even of the process itself, is of no relevance in determining
whether the subject matter of a claim falls within the § 101 categories of
possibly patentable subject matter.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188–89. Simply
because the declarant concludes “[b]lurring video healthcare data was not a
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well understood, routine, conventional activity previously known to the
electronic healthcare record industry” (Appeal Br. 45), is not sufficient
evidence as to why such is not a well understood, routine, conventional
activity. The statement is itself conclusory. Moreover, the claim does not
recite how this blurring is accomplished. It only recites the idea of blurring
by any and all means.
Citing to BASCOM Global Internet v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d
1341, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Appeal Br. 46), Appellant asserts, “the
reasoning of BASCOM supports the patent-eligibility of claim 106.” (Id.)
We fail again to see how the instant claims are similar to those in BASCOM.
There, an intermediary is inserted between two otherwise conventional
computer nodes to move the location where a process is otherwise ordinarily
executed. In BASCOM, it was the location of the filtering element, whereas
in the instant claims there is no such specific location or ordered
combination of elements.
Appellant attempts to distinguish Electric Power Group and
Cyberfone Sys., LLC v. CNN Interactive Group, Inc., 558 Fed.Appx. 988,
991 (Fed. Cir. 2014) by arguing that Appellant’s claimed filtering is
distinguishable. (Appeal Br. 49–51.) But, it is long held that filtering is an
abstract idea. BASCOM, 827 F.3d at 1348 (“filtering content is an abstract
idea because it is a longstanding, well-known method of organizing human
behavior, similar to concepts previously found to be abstract.”).
Claim 105
Appellant states, “[t]his claim contains the same allowable subject
matter as independent claim 106. Thus, it is submitted that the incorporated
arguments are equally applicable to these claims.” (Appeal Br. 53.)
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Accordingly, we affirm the rejection of independent claim 105 for the same
reasons set forth above for claim 106.
Appellant’s other arguments, including those directed to now-
superseded USPTO guidance, have been considered but are not persuasive
of error. (See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51 (“Eligibility-
related guidance issued prior to the Ninth Edition, R–08.2017, of the MPEP
(published Jan. 2018) should not be relied upon.”)).)

CONCLUSION
We conclude the Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 2–4, 6–11,
101, and 103–106 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.

DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis  Affirmed Reversed
2–4, 6–11,
101, 103–
106
101 Eligibility 2–4, 6–11,
101, 103–
106

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED