01976377_r
05-07-1999
Renee Palmer, Appellant, v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.
Renee Palmer, )
Appellant, )
)
v. ) Appeal No. 01976377
) 01984495
William J. Henderson, ) Agency No. 4-C-190-0172-97
Postmaster General, ) 4-C-190-0226-97
United States Postal Service, )
Agency. )
______________________________)
DECISION
On June 5, 1997, appellant filed a formal complaint, Agency Number
4-C-190-0172-97, alleging that she was subjected to discrimination in
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,
42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq. and �501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as
amended, 29 U.S.C. �791 et seq. on the bases of race (African-American),
sex (female), and mental disability (perceived emotional instability)
when:
On or about June 26, 1995, appellant's supervisor grabbed appellant in
a sexual manner;
On or about January 23, 1997, appellant's supervisor inappropriately
touched appellant and commented on appellant's appearance;
On or about January 23, 1997, appellant's supervisor �brushed� against
appellant;
On or about February 3, 1997, after incurring an on the job injury,
appellant's supervisor questioned whether appellant sustained an injury
or just needed more iron in her blood;
On or about February 4, 1997, appellant's supervisor required appellant
to submit a second accident report for the on-the-job injury mentioned
in allegation (4);
On or about March 10, 1997, appellant's supervisor told appellant she
was not working fast enough and, despite appellant's injury, assigned
appellant to pull mail;
On or about March 12, 1997, appellant's supervisor assigned appellant
to work in a more secluded area and began to tell appellant about her
life and problems;
On or about March 17, 1997, appellant's Supervisor said appellant was
not moving fast enough and generally complained about appellant; and
On March 22, 1997, appellant's supervisor punched appellant off the
clock and sent appellant home, and subsequently, on March 24, 1997,
appellant was verbally told by the Postmaster that she was placed on
emergency placement in an off-duty status.
In a final agency decision (FAD) dated August 13, 1997 (FAD-1), the
agency accepted allegation (8), dismissed allegations (1)-(7) pursuant
to EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. �1614.107(b), for untimely counselor
contact, and dismissed allegation (9) pursuant to EEOC Regulation 29
C.F.R. �1614.107(a) for stating the same claim pending in Agency Number
4-C-190-0156-97.
Appellant timely appealed FAD-1 on August 19, 1997. On appeal, appellant
argues, through her representative, that her complaint comprises a
continuing violation of sexual harassment and hostile work environment
allegations. Alternatively, appellant argues that she failed to file
a complaint earlier because of fear of reprisal from her supervisor.
Appellant notes that the agency failed to address two of her allegations,
i.e., that on March 12, 1997, appellant's supervisor asked appellant
to sign a late slip, but appellant refused because her supervisor had
promised to give her the opportunity to make-up her time, and that on
March 22, 1997, appellant's supervisor gave appellant sick leave slips
to sign, despite assurances from the Postmaster that appellant would
receive administrative leave for the time she spent at her doctor.
On March 27, 1998, the agency issued a second FAD on Agency Number
4-C-190-0172-97 (FAD-2), although the appeal of FAD-1 was pending.
In FAD-2, the agency dismissed allegation (8), which had been accepted in
FAD-1, pursuant to EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. �1614.107(a), for failure
to state a claim. The agency found that appellant was not aggrieved
because allegation (8) involved a remark unaccompanied by concrete harm.
Appellant's subsequent appeal of FAD-2 was postmarked April 24, 1998,
and therefore also is accepted as timely. On appeal, appellant urges
that her appeal of FAD-2 be consolidated with her earlier appeal
of FAD-1, because both FADs involve issues from the same complaint.
Appellant argues that allegation (8) is only one of a series of incidents
in a continuing violation. Appellant also contends that allegation (8)
should be viewed under the �totality of the circumstances� of her other
allegations from Agency Number 4-C-190-0172-97, and would state a claim
under such an analysis.
A review of the record for Agency Number 4-C-190-0172-97 reveals that
appellant raised the issues of being given late slips on March 12,
1997, and being given leave slips on March 22, 1997, in her June 5,
1997 formal complaint. The record also contains a notice of processing
for Agency Number 4-C-190-0156-97, dated August 8, 1997, accepting the
following allegation for investigation: appellant was discriminated
against on the bases of race (African-American), sex (female), and
mental disability (perceived) when on March 22, 1997, appellant's
supervisor punched appellant off the clock and sent appellant home;
and subsequently, on March 24, 1997, appellant was verbally told that
she was placed on emergency placement in an off-duty status.
Meanwhile, on February 24, 1998, appellant filed a separate formal
complaint, Agency Number 4-C-190-0226-97, alleging that she was subjected
to discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq. and �501 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �791 et seq. on the bases of race
(African-American), religion (unspecified), sex (female), and mental
disability (perceived emotional instability) when:
On May 12, 1997, appellant received a Notice of Removal, effective June
11, 1997, for Misconduct in violation of the Code of Ethical Conduct,
exhibiting threatening behavior, and failure to follow instructions.
Although subsequently appellant was returned to work by an arbitrator's
decision, appellant feels that her grievance did not adjudicate any
issues of discrimination or address compensatory damages;
On or about June 26, 1995, appellant's supervisor grabbed appellant in
a sexual manner. On or about January 3, 1997, appellant's supervisor
inappropriately touched appellant and commented on appellant's appearance.
On or about January 30, 1997, appellant's supervisor �brushed� against
appellant. On or about February 3, 1997, after incurring an on the job
injury, appellant's supervisor questioned whether appellant sustained
an injury or just needed more iron in her blood. On or about February
4, 1997, appellant's supervisor required appellant to submit a second
accident report for the on-the-job injury previously mentioned. On or
about March 10, 1997, appellant's supervisor told appellant she was not
working fast enough and, despite appellant's injury, assigned appellant to
pull mail. On or about March 12, 1997, appellant's supervisor assigned
appellant to work in a more secluded area and began to tell appellant
about her life and problems. On or about March 17, 1997, appellant's
Supervisor said appellant was not moving fast enough and generally
complained about appellant; and on March 22, 1997, appellant's supervisor
punched appellant off the clock and sent appellant home, and subsequently,
on March 24, 1997, appellant was verbally told by the Postmaster that
she was placed on emergency placement in an off-duty status.
On March 22, 1997, appellant's supervisor punched appellant off the
clock and sent appellant home, and subsequently, on March 24, 1997,
appellant was verbally told that she was placed on emergency placement
in an off-duty status.
On April 21, 1998, the agency issued a FAD for Agency Number
4-C-190-0226-97 (FAD-3), dismissing allegation (a) pursuant to EEOC
Regulation 29 C.F.R. �1614.107(a), for failure to state a claim, finding
that appellant was merely voicing her dissatisfaction with the outcome
of her grievance, which is not within the purview of the EEO process.
The agency also dismissed allegations (b) and (c) pursuant to the
same regulation, for stating the same claim pending in Agency Numbers
4-C-190-0172-97 and 4-C-190-0156-97.
Appellant timely appealed FAD-3 on May 20, 1998. Appellant urged
that FAD-3 also be consolidated with her appeals of FAD-1 and FAD-2.
Appellant argues that all three FAD's involve the same pattern of sexual
and hostile work environment harassment. Further, appellant notes that
she listed religion as a basis for Agency Number 4-C-190-0226-97 in error,
and that she instead meant to allege reprisal for her prior EEO activity.
Regarding allegation (a), appellant denies that she is attempting to
collaterally attack the agency's grievance decision. Appellant notes that
the grievance involved whether the agency's notice of removal was issued
with just cause, but that the grievance did not address discrimination.
The record of Agency Number 4-C-190-0226-97 includes a grievance
arbitrator's decision regarding the May 12, 1997 notice of proposed
removal. The decision sustained appellant's grievance, and ordered
compensation for the time appellant lost from work. Appellant requested
additional compensatory damages in her February 24, 1998 formal complaint.
The Commission notes appellant's request to consolidate the appeals of
Agency Numbers 4-C-190-0172-97 and 4-C-190-0226-97. EEOC Regulation 29
C.F.R. �1614.606 allows the Commission, in its discretion, to consolidate
two or more complaints of discrimination from the same complainant.
Consequently, the Commission agrees to consolidate appellant's appeals
for decision herein.
AGENCY NUMBER 4-C-190-0172-97
EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. �1614.105(a)(1) requires that complaints of
discrimination should be brought to the attention of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Counselor within forty-five (45) days of the date of the
matter alleged to be discriminatory or, in the case of a personnel
action, within forty-five (45) days of the effective date of the action.
The Commission has adopted a "reasonable suspicion" standard (as opposed
to a "supportive facts" standard) to determine when the forty-five (45)
day limitation period is triggered. See Ball v. USPS, EEOC Request
No. 05880247 (July 6, 1988). Thus, the time limitation can be triggered
before all the facts that support a charge of discrimination have become
apparent, but not until a complainant reasonably suspects discrimination.
EEOC Regulations provide that the agency or the Commission shall extend
the time limits when the individual shows that she was not notified of the
time limits and was not otherwise aware of them, that she did not know
and reasonably should not have known that the discriminatory matter or
personnel action occurred, that despite due diligence she was prevented
by circumstances beyond her control from contacting the Counselor within
the time limits, or for other reasons considered sufficient by the agency
or the Commission.
The Commission has held that the time requirements for initiating EEO
counseling could be waived as to certain allegations within a complaint
when the complainant alleged a continuing violation; that is, a series
of related discriminatory acts, one of which fell within the time period
for contacting an EEO Counselor. See McGivern v. U.S. Postal Service,
EEOC Request No. 05901150 (December 28, 1990).
A determination of whether a series of discrete acts constitutes
a continuing violation depends on the interrelatedness of the past
and present acts. Berry v. Board of Supervisors, 715 F.2d 971, 981
(5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 868 (1986). It is necessary to
determine whether the acts are interrelated by a common nexus or theme.
See Vissing v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, EEOC Request No. 05890308
(June 13, 1989); Verkennes v. Department of Defense, EEOC Request
No. 05900700 (September 21, 1990); Maldonado v. Department of the
Interior, EEOC Request No. 05900937 (October 31, 1990). Should such
a nexus exist, appellant will have established a continuing violation
and the agency would be obligated to "overlook the untimeliness of the
complaint with respect to some of the acts" challenged by appellant.
Scott v. Claytor, 469 F. Supp. 22, 26 (D.D.C. 1978).
Relevant to the determination are whether the acts were recurring or were
more in the nature of isolated employment decisions; whether an untimely
discrete act had the degree of permanence which should have triggered an
employee's awareness and duty to assert his or her rights; and whether the
same agency officials were involved. Woljan v. Environmental Protection
Agency, EEOC Request No. 05950361 (October 5, 1995).
Further, it is important, in determining whether a claim for a continuing
violation is stated, to consider whether an appellant had prior knowledge
or suspicion of discrimination and the effect of this knowledge.
Jackson v. Department of the Air Force, EEOC Request No. 05950780 (June
27, 1997); see Sabree v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners
Local No. 33, 921 F.2d 396 (1st Cir. 1990) (plaintiff who believed he
had been subjected to discrimination had an obligation to file promptly
with the EEOC or lose his claim, as distinguished from the situation
where a plaintiff is unable to appreciate that he is being discriminated
against until he has lived through a series of acts and is thereby able
to perceive an overall discriminatory pattern).
Although the agency failed to address appellant's allegations as a
continuing violation, the Commission finds enough evidence on record
with which to render a decision on the issue. The Commission finds that
allegation (1) was properly dismissed. The incident occurred in 1995,
two years before appellant's counselor contact, and is not rendered
timely by the continuing violation theory. One element necessary to
establish a continuing violation is a frequency or recurrence of events.
Allegation (1), however, occurred approximately one and a half years
before any other allegation raised by appellant. Additionally, although
appellant argued that her delay in contacting an EEO Counselor was due
to her fear of retaliation, the Commission has previously held that fear
of retaliation is an insufficient justification for extending the time
limitation for contacting an EEO Counselor. See Simeone v. Department
of the Navy, EEOC Request No. 05930973 (January 25, 1994). Accordingly,
the agency's dismissal of allegation (1) is AFFIRMED.
Allegations (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), and (8) however, involve
seven incidents of harassment by the same agency official, occurring
over a two and a half month period. Allegation (8) was timely raised,
and the other allegations are recurring acts that are interrelated by a
common nexus. Accordingly, allegations (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), and (7)
are part of a continuing violation and, therefore, are considered timely.
EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. �1614.107(a) provides, in relevant part, that
an agency shall dismiss a complaint, or portion thereof, that fails to
state a claim. An agency shall accept a complaint from any aggrieved
employee or applicant for employment who believes that he or she has been
discriminated against by that agency because of race, color, religion,
sex, national origin, age or disabling condition. 29 C.F.R. �1614.103;
�1614.106(a). The Commission's federal sector case precedent has long
defined an "aggrieved employee" as one who suffers a present harm or loss
with respect to a term, condition, or privilege of employment for which
there is a remedy. Diaz v. Department of the Air Force, EEOC Request
No. 05931049 (April 21, 1994).
In Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993), the Supreme
Court reaffirmed the holding of Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477
U.S. 57, 67 (1986), that harassment is actionable if it is sufficiently
severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the complainant's
employment. The Court explained that an "objectively hostile or abusive
work environment" is created when "a reasonable person would find
[it] hostile or abusive: and the complainant subjectively perceives it
as such. Harris, supra at 21-22. Thus, not all claims of harassment
are actionable. Where a complaint does not challenge an agency action or
inaction regarding a specific term, condition or privilege of employment,
a claim of harassment is actionable only if, allegedly, the harassment
to which the complainant has been subjected was sufficiently severe or
pervasive to alter the conditions of the complainant's employment.
A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless
it appears beyond doubt that the complainant cannot prove a set of facts
in support of the claim which would entitle the complainant to relief.
The trier of fact must consider all of the alleged harassing incidents
and remarks, and considering them together in the light most favorable to
the complainant, determine whether they are sufficient to state a claim.
Cobb v. Department of the Treasury, EEOC Request No. 05970077 (March
13, 1997).
Allegation (8) must be considered in light of all the other incidents of
alleged harassment raised in Agency Number 4-C-190-0172-97. See Cobb
v. Department of the Treasury, EEOC Request No. 05970077 (March 13,
1997). When considered with allegations (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), and
(7), the Commission finds that appellant's complaint of eight incidents
of harassment by the same agency official over a three month period
clearly is severe and pervasive enough to state a claim. Further,
the agency improperly treated matters raised in appellant's complaint
in a piecemeal manner. See Meaney v. Department of the Treasury, EEOC
Request No. 05940169 (November 3, 1994) (an agency should not ignore the
"pattern aspect" of a complainant's allegations and define the issues in
a piecemeal manner where an analogous theme unites the matter complained
of). Therefore, the agency's decision that allegation (8) fails to state
a claim is REVERSED.
EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. �1614.107(a) provides that the agency shall
dismiss a complaint or a portion of a complaint that states the same
claim that is pending before or has been decided by the agency or
Commission. The Commission finds that allegation (9) of Agency Number
4-C-190-0172-97 states the same claim pending with the agency in Agency
Number 4-C-190-0156-97. Accordingly, the agency's decision to dismiss
allegation (9) is AFFIRMED.
The Commission notes that the agency failed to address appellant's
allegations concerning being given late slips on March 12, 1997, and
being given sick leave slips on March 22, 1997. The Commission deems
the agency's action to be tantamount to a dismissal of that matter.
Appellant's submissions on appeal reveal that appellant referenced the
matter in her formal complaint. Accordingly, the agency's dismissal of
appellant's allegations concerning being given late slips on March 12,
1997, and being given sick leave slips on March 22, 1997 is REVERSED, and
these allegations also are REMANDED to the agency for further processing.
AGENCY NUMBER 4-C-190-0226-97
The Commission has held that a complainant may allege discrimination
on all applicable bases, including sex, race, national origin, color,
religion, age, disability and reprisal, and may amend his or her complaint
at any time, including at the hearing, to add or delete bases without
changing the identity of the claim. See Sanchez v. Standard Brands,
Inc., 431 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1970); Dragos v. United States Postal
Service, EEOC Request No. 05940563 (January 19, 1995). Accordingly,
appellant's complaint should be amended to delete the basis of religion,
and to add the basis of reprisal for prior EEO activity.
As mentioned above, EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. �1614.107(a) provides
that the agency shall dismiss a complaint or a portion of a complaint
that states the same claim that is pending before or has been decided
by the agency or Commission. The Commission finds that allegations (b)
and (c) from appellant's complaint clearly state the same claim pending
before the Commission in Agency Numbers 4-C-190-0172-97, and Agency
Number 4-C-190-0156-97. Accordingly, the agency's decision to dismiss
allegations (b) and (c) is AFFIRMED.
In allegation (a), appellant alleged that she was subjected to
discrimination when she received a Notice of Removal. While the agency
dismissed allegation (a) on the grounds of failure to state a claim,
clearly this was improper; appellant was aggrieved when she received
the Notice of Removal. The agency noted that appellant challenged the
Notice of Removal through the grievance process. Therefore, we find that
allegation (a) is more properly analyzed to determine whether it is moot.
EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. �1614.107(e) provides for the dismissal of a
complaint, or portions thereof, when the issues raised therein are moot.
To determine whether the issues raised in appellant's complaint are moot,
it must be ascertained (1) if it can be said with assurance that there
is no reasonable expectation that the alleged violation will recur, and
(2) if the interim relief or events have completely and irrevocably
eradicated the effects of the alleged violation. See County of Los
Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625 (1979). When such circumstances exist,
no relief is available and no need for a determination of the rights of
the parties is presented.
Appellant filed a grievance on her proposed removal, which resulted in
the rescission of the Notice of Removal and compensation of appellant
for time lost. However, appellant requested compensatory damages in
her formal complaint, in addition to the compensation she received from
the grievance. The agency failed to address this issue.
The Commission has held that an agency must address the issue of
compensatory damages when a complainant shows objective evidence
that she has incurred compensatory damages, and that the damages are
related to the alleged discrimination. Jackson v. USPS, EEOC Appeal
No. 01923399 (November 12, 1992), request to reopen denied, EEOC
Request No. 05930306 (February 1, 1993). Should appellant prevail
on this complaint, the possibility of an award of compensatory damages
exists. See Glover v. USPS, EEOC Appeal No. 01930696 (December 9, 1993).
Because appellant requested compensatory damages, the agency should have
requested that appellant provide some objective proof of the alleged
damages incurred, as well as objective evidence linking those damages
to the adverse actions at issue. See Benton v. Department of Defense,
EEOC Appeal No. 01932422 (December 10, 1993). Accordingly, allegation
(a) is not moot, and the agency's decision to dismiss allegation (a)
is REVERSED.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the agency's dismissal of allegations (1) and (9) of Agency
Number 4-C-190-0172-97, and allegations (b) and (c) of Agency Number
4-C-190-0226-97 is AFFIRMED. The agency's decision to dismiss allegations
(2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), and (8) of Agency Number 4-C-190-0172-97,
and allegation (a) of Agency Number 4-C-190-0226-97 are REVERSED, and
these allegations, including the basis of reprisal, are REMANDED for
further processing.
ORDER (E1092)
The agency is ORDERED to process the remanded allegations in accordance
with 29 C.F.R. �1614.108. The agency shall acknowledge to the appellant
that it has received the remanded allegations within thirty (30) calendar
days of the date this decision becomes final. The agency shall issue to
appellant a copy of the investigative file and also shall notify appellant
of the appropriate rights within one hundred fifty (150) calendar days
of the date this decision becomes final, unless the matter is otherwise
resolved prior to that time. If the appellant requests a final decision
without a hearing, the agency shall issue a final decision within sixty
(60) days of receipt of appellant's request.
A copy of the agency's letter of acknowledgment to appellant and a copy
of the notice that transmits the investigative file and notice of rights
must be sent to the Compliance Officer as referenced below.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0595)
Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory.
The agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30)
calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action.
The report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,
Washington, D.C. 20036. The agency's report must contain supporting
documentation, and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to
the appellant. If the agency does not comply with the Commission's
order, the appellant may petition the Commission for enforcement of
the order. 29 C.F.R. �1614.503(a). The appellant also has the right
to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's
order prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement.
See 29 C.F.R. ��1614.408, 1614.409, and 1614.503(g). Alternatively,
the appellant has the right to file a civil action on the underlying
complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled "Right to File
A Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. ��1614.408 and 1614.409. A civil action for
enforcement or a civil action on the underlying complaint is subject to
the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. �2000e-16(c) (Supp. V 1993). If the
appellant files a civil action, the administrative processing of the
complaint, including any petition for enforcement, will be terminated.
See 29 C.F.R. �1614.410.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0795)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the appellant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available
when the previous decision was issued; or
2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,
regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or
3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial
precedential implications.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST
BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive this
decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive
a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any argument in
opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to reconsider
MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party
WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the request
to reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.407. All requests and arguments
must bear proof of postmark and be submitted to the Director, Office of
Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box
19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark,
the request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on the date it is received
by the Commission.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances
have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration,
a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the
delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your
request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests
for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited
circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.604(c).
RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (T0993)
This decision affirms the agency's final decision in part, but it also
requires the agency to continue its administrative processing of a
portion of your complaint. You have the right to file a civil action
in an appropriate United States District Court on both that portion of
your complaint which the Commission has affirmed AND that portion of the
complaint which has been remanded for continued administrative processing.
It is the position of the Commission that you have the right to file
a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court WITHIN
NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision.
You should be aware, however, that courts in some jurisdictions have
interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner suggesting that
a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the
date that you receive this decision. To ensure that your civil action
is considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN THIRTY (30)
CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision or to consult
an attorney concerning the applicable time period in the jurisdiction
in which your action would be filed. In the alternative, you may file a
civil action AFTER ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY (180) CALENDAR DAYS of the date
you filed your complaint with the agency, or filed your appeal with the
Commission. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS THE DEFENDANT
IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD OR DEPARTMENT
HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND OFFICIAL TITLE.
Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court.
"Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the
local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file
a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
May 7, 1999
____________________________
DATE Ronnie Blumenthal, Director
Office of Federal Operations