Remona P.,1 Complainant,v.Louis DeJoy, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Southern Area), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

Sep 30, 2020

2019003985 (E.E.O.C. Sep. 30, 2020)

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Office of Federal Operations P.O. Box 77960 Washington, DC 20013 Remona P.,1 Complainant, v. Louis DeJoy, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Southern Area), Agency. Appeal No. 2019003985 Hearing No. 451-2015-00101X Agency No. 4G-780-0200-14 DECISION On June 8, 2019, Complainant filed an appeal with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commission), pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(a), from the Agency’s May 9, 2019 final order concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. For the following reasons, the Commission VACATES the Agency’s final order and REMANDS the entire complaint to the Agency for further processing. ISSUE PRESENTED The issue presented is whether the Administrative Judge properly issued a sua sponte decision without a hearing. 1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant’s name when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission’s website. 2019003985 2 BACKGROUND At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as a City Carrier Assistant, PS-01/BB at the Central Park Station in Austin, Texas. On October 10, 2014, Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that the Agency discriminated against her on the bases of national origin (Hispanic),2 sex (female), and age (over 40) when: 1. From January 7, 2014, and most recently on June 5, 2014, she was subjected to regular street supervision and questioned about her route and her work performance; 2. On unspecified dates since January 7, 2014, and most recently on May 14, 2014, her supervisor spoked to her in a loud demeaning manner in public and on the workroom floor; 3. On October 23, 2013, management conducted a full day inspection of her route, which was inaccurate; 4. On January 4, 2014, her supervisor stood 12 inches from her back as she attempted to deliver mail to a box unit; 5. On February 5, 2014, her supervisor blocked her from scanning a scan point on her route; 6. On March 12, 2014, her supervisor kicked her heel while following her on her route; 7. On March 21, 2014, management failed to provide her with feedback after they conducted a one-hour street observation of her route; 8. On April 28, 2014, management questioned her regarding her steps per minute; 9. On May 3, 2014, her reporting time was changed from 7:00 a.m. to 8:00 a.m.; 10. On May 5, 2014, she was instructed to change the line of travel on her route which endangered her safety; 11. On May 6, 2014, her supervisor accused her of being a few minutes over; threatened her with discipline; accused her of having dog treats; and searched her vehicle and satchel; 12. On May 7, 2014, her supervisor, in a loud tone of voice, instructed her to stop walking around and wasting time; 13. On May 14, 2014, her supervisor threatened to write her up for time wasting practices and, in a loud tone of voice, instructed her to take half of full coverage mail and return to the office by 5:30 p.m.; 14. On May 20, 2014, her supervisor stated that Complainant was instigating things and threatened to fire her; 15. On May 21, 2014, she had 28 minutes wrongly deducted during her route inspection; 16. On May 21, 2014, she was accused of deliberately slowing down; 2 Though Complainant alleged that she was subjected to discrimination on the basis of race (Hispanic), we note that he Commission considers the term, “Hispanic,” to be a description of national origin rather than race. 2019003985 3 17. On May 29, 2014, her supervisor pointed at her and stated to a route inspector that they should go out with her on the route; and 18. On May 30, 2014, she was questioned in a loud tone of voice as to whether she had taken her break. At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the report of investigation and notice of her right to request a hearing before an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant timely requested a hearing and the matter was initially assigned to the first AJ (AJ1). On June 17, 2015, AJ1 issued an “Initial Conference Summary and Order” requiring the parties to initiate discovery within seven days of the order. The order stated that the discovery period would extend for a period of 45 days. On August 10, 2015, Complainant filed a motion to compel seeking evidence pertaining to employees who were subjected to street supervision.3 She also sought records pertaining to her supervisor’s clock rings on the date of February 5, 2014. Following Complainant’s motion, the Commission reassigned the complaint to another AJ (AJ2). On April 4, 2019, AJ2 issued a Notice of Intent to issue a decision without a hearing because AJ2 determined that there were no genuine issues of material fact in dispute. The Notice afforded Complainant a period of 15 days from receipt of the notice to submit a response. Complainant timely submitted a response on April 18, 2019. In her response to AJ2’s notice, Complainant stated the following: We disagree with the request for a summary judgement [sic]. The [Agency] failed to prove during discovery that [Complainant] was treated fairly and equally to her coworkers. The only forms released by the post office in discovery were LCP-001 street observation reports. Of the 102 LCP-001 forms from January thru June of 2014 turned over, 62 were street observations done on [Complainant] alone. With no follow up disciplinary action, or reason given. While we agree the post office management has the right, outlined in the ELM 41 [Employee and Labor Relations Manual], to perform street observations. The apparent targeting of [Complainant], demonstrated by the very information provided by the [Agency], shows a pattern of discrimination. In addition to witness statements provided by carriers from the Central Park station during that time period, outlaying what they felt was visible discriminatory targeting of her. See Complaint File at 57. Over Complainant’s objections and without responding to Complainant’s earlier motion to compel, AJ2 issued a decision without a hearing on May 1, 2019. In finding no discrimination, 3 We note that the discovery period ended on Saturday, August 8, 2015 (52 days after the date of the order). As the deadline fell on a Saturday, we find Complainant’s filing on Monday, August 10, 2015, to be timely. See 29 C.F.R § 1614.604(d). 2019003985 4 AJ2 initially found that Complainant could not establish a prima case of discrimination on any basis because she failed to show that she was an “aggrieved employee” who suffered an adverse employment action. AJ2 further determined that even assuming arguendo that Complainant could establish a prima case of discrimination, the Agency had legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. Regarding claim 1, AJ2 noted that Complainant’s supervisor, as a general response to each of the incidents identified by Complainant, maintained that “all employees are subject to street supervision and questioned about work performance.” AJ2 found that Complainant was questioned about her route because she failed to maintain work standards, failed to follow instructions, and exceeded authorized time for performance of her duties. With regard to claim 3, AJ2 relied on the affidavit of Complainant’s manager (S1) to find that “a full-date route inspection was conducted due to Complainant’s inconsistent performance showing that she can complete the route more efficiently when management goes with her on her route.” As for claim 4, regarding Complainant’s allegation that her former supervisor (S2) stood 12 inches from her back, AJ2 found that S2 was not even present at work on the day of the alleged incident, but rather on a scheduled day off. For claim 5, AJ2 found that S2 did not intentionally bump into Complainant. Rather, AJ2 determined that S2 had accidentally bumped into Complainant because S2 was not “directly observing Complainant” at the time. Regarding claim 6, AJ2 found that the record indicated that a 20-minute observation from 17:11 to 17:31 was conducted; not a one-hour observation as Complainant alleged. Furthermore, AJ2 determined that despite Complainant’s contention to the contrary, management was not required to provide feedback. As for claim 7, AJ2 found that Complainant was questioned about her pace because S2 had observed her walking 120 paces per minute, which was a considerable different from the pace observed on a previous observation. For claim 8, AJ2 cited to the affidavit of the female supervisor (S3) to find that Complainant’s route was modified because Complainant worked more than eight hours each day and the change was needed to avoid incurring penalty pay. AJ2 also found that the change was in accord with Agency Handbook H-M41 and the ELM. As for claim 9, AJ2 found that Complainant’s line of travel was changed to increase efficiency. Finally, regarding the remaining claims, AJ2 noted that S3 admitted that she accused Complainant of having dog treats and inspected her government vehicle; however, AJ2 noted that S3 denied raising her voice at Complainant and that Complainant did not receive disciplinary action. AJ2 ultimately concluded that Complainant failed to proffer any evidence to contradict the Agency’s articulated reasons. The Agency subsequently issued a final order adopting AJ2’s finding that Complainant failed to prove that the Agency subjected her to discrimination as alleged. This appeal followed. 2019003985 5 CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL On appeal, Complainant contends that AJ2 erred in issuing a sua sponte decision without a hearing because there are sufficient genuine issues of material fact in dispute to warrant a hearing. Specifically, Complainant maintains that there is a dispute as to whether her managers treated her in a disparate manner with regard to street supervision, and she argues that “management does not have the right to apply policy inconsistently across the organization with inconsistent standards.” Complainant also disputes the Agency’s characterization of her performance, and she emphasizes that the record is devoid of any proof of disciplinary action taken against her. She maintains that “summary judgement [sic] was egregious and inappropriate because the evidence requested to the Post Office during [d]iscovery was not forthcoming.” Complainant requests that the Commission give her “a fair hearing to include all pertinent evidence.”4 The Agency, in response, requests that the Commission affirm its final order implementing AJ2’s finding of no discrimination. STANDARD OF REVIEW In rendering this appellate decision, we must scrutinize the AJ’s legal and factual conclusions, and the Agency’s final order adopting them, de novo. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a) (stating that a “decision on an appeal from an Agency’s final action shall be based on a de novo review . . .”); see also Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9, § VI.B. (Aug. 5, 2015) (providing that an administrative judge’s determination to issue a decision without a hearing, and the decision itself, will both be reviewed de novo). This essentially means that we should look at this case with fresh eyes. In other words, we are free to accept (if accurate) or reject (if erroneous) the AJ’s, and Agency’s, factual conclusions and legal analysis - including on the ultimate fact of whether intentional discrimination occurred, and on the legal issue of whether any federal employment discrimination statute was violated. See id. at Chapter 9, § VI.A. (explaining that the de novo standard of review “requires that the Commission examine the record without regard to the factual and legal determinations of the previous decision maker,” and that EEOC “review the documents, statements, and testimony of record, including any timely and relevant submissions of the parties, and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission’s own assessment of the record and its interpretation of the law”). ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS We must determine whether it was appropriate for AJ2 to have issued a decision without a hearing on this record. The Commission’s regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(g). 4 As we are remanding claim 1 for further consideration, we decline to address the remaining 17 claims at this time. 2019003985 6 This regulation is patterned after the summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment is appropriate where a court determines that, given the substantive legal and evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exists no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court’s function is not to weigh the evidence but rather to determine whether there are genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249. The evidence of the non-moving party must be believed at the summary judgment stage and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party’s favor. Id. at 255. An issue of fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving party. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is "material" if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case. An AJ may issue a decision without a hearing only after determining that the record has been adequately developed. See Petty v. Dep’t of Def., EEOC Appeal No. 01A24206 (July 11, 2003). Issuing a decision without holding a hearing is not appropriate for a case that can only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence. If the non-moving party “has not had the opportunity to discover information that is essential to his opposition,” then a decision without a hearing is inappropriate. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. The AJ must enable the non-moving party to engage in sufficient discovery to respond to a motion for a decision without a hearing. After receiving an opposition to a motion for a decision without a hearing, an AJ may order discovery as necessary. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(g)(2). We will initially address AJ2’s decision to procedurally dismiss claim 1. As noted above, in dismissing the claim, AJ2 found that Complainant could not establish a prima facie case of discrimination on any basis because she could not show that she is an “aggrieved employee” who suffered an adverse employment action. AJ2 emphasized that “[t]o be actionable, there must be evidence that the alleged adverse employment action materially change[d] the terms and conditions of employment and [was] more than an inconvenience or a change in job responsibility.” Because Complainant failed to do so, AJ2 concluded that Complainant could not prevail on her claim. While we acknowledge AJ2’s finding, we note that AJ2’s approach materially differs with longstanding Commission precedent. For example, in Caswell v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 01A21643 (April 4, 2002), the complainant alleged that his supervisor repeatedly, over a period time, questioned him about what time he was expected to return from his route, followed him, and monitored his work more closely than other employees. Although the agency dismissed the claim pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.107(a)(1) for failure to state a claim, the Commission reinstated the claim on appeal even though the complainant had not suffered an adverse employment action. In reversing the Agency’s dismissal, the Commission relied on Schwartz v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Request No. 05960294 (June 28, 1996), where the Commission previously found that an allegation of being watched and followed states a viable claim of harassment. See also Carter v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Request No. 05960264 (June 13, 1996) (claim that the supervisor “as a habit” assigns two people to observe complainant unload trucks states a claim); and Complainant v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal 2019003985 7 No. 0120151262 (July 2, 2015) (reinstating complainant’s claim of harassment when management allegedly subjected her to investigative interviews, official discussions, increased scrutiny with respect to her work performance, and ordered her to clock out early). Our review of the facts in this case shows that Complainant has also alleged that management watched and followed her. Specifically, she alleged that management followed her on a constant basis between January 2014 to June 2014 at a far higher frequency than similarly situated employees outside of her protected classes. Given the similarities between this case and Caswell and Schwartz, we shall follow longstanding Commission precedent and reinstate the claim, as Complainant’s allegations of repeated surveillance on a constant basis, when viewed as a trend, are sufficiently severe or pervasive to state a viable hostile work environment claim.5 See Molter v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 0120090758 (May 14, 2010) (citing Meaney v. Dep’t of the Treasury, EEOC Request No. 05940169 (Nov. 3, 1994) (an agency should not ignore the “pattern aspect” of a complainant’s claims and define the issues in a piecemeal manner where an analogous theme unites the matters). Complainant’s primary contention on appeal is that AJ2 erred in issuing a sua sponte decision without a hearing because there are sufficient genuine issues of material fact in dispute to warrant a hearing. Specifically, Complainant maintains that there is a dispute as to whether her managers treated her in a disparate manner with regard to street supervision, and she argues that “management does not have the right to apply policy inconsistently across the organization with inconsistent standards.” Complainant also disputes the Agency’s characterization of her performance, and she emphasizes that the record is devoid of any proof of disciplinary action taken against her. She maintains that “summary judgement [sic] was egregious and inappropriate because the evidence requested to the Post Office during [d]iscovery was not forthcoming.” We agree with Complainant that the record is inadequately developed. Our review of the record shows that AJ2 determined that even if Complainant could establish a prima facie case of discrimination, her claims must fail because the Agency articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions for which she could not persuasively establish pretext. Specifically, AJ2 noted that Complainant’s supervisor, as a general response to each of the incidents identified by Complainant, maintained that “all employees are subject to street supervision and questioned about work performance.” AJ2 found that Complainant was questioned about her route because she failed to maintain work standards, failed to follow instructions, and exceeded authorized time for performance of her duties. 5 In reaching this conclusion, we are mindful that in Price v. Soc. Sec. Admin., EEOC Appeal No. 0120083412 (Oct. 26, 2010), the Commission affirmed the agency’s dismissal of a claim of ongoing scrutiny because the alleged scrutiny was “uninvasive and nonconfrontational.” While we acknowledge this precedent, we find Price to be distinguishable, as that case involved an allegation of increased scrutiny of complainant’s written work product, whereas Complainant here alleges that management physically followed her into the field on a constant basis for approximately five months to conduct surveillance on her. 2019003985 8 Having reviewed the record, we acknowledge that the record is replete with evidence showing that the Agency did indeed subject many employees of varying protected classes to street supervision. However, we note that out of the 102 LCP-001 forms documenting the observations of managers during the Street Supervision Initiative, at least 62 of the forms pertain solely to Complainant. Complaint File at 118-221. We also observe that the employee (African-American male) with the second highest number of LCP-001 forms was surveilled on 14 occasions,6 far less than the 62 times that Complainant was surveilled. We find that this evidence suggests that the Agency may have implemented the Street Supervision Initiative in a disparate manner and treated employees outside of Complainant’s protected classes more favorably. On appeal, Complainant contends that the Agency did not provide all relevant documents listed in her motion to compel. Specifically, in her motion, Complainant requested the following records: 1) “lists of employees also on the SSI list at Central Park Station from January 2014 [to] June 2014”; 2) “PS-4584 and PS-4588 [forms] done during January 2014 [to] June 2014”; and 3) “100% of the LCP-001 forms done at Central Park Station between January 2014 [to] June 2014.”7 We agree with Complainant that these records are necessary to determine whether she was subjected to a hostile work environment, as they could further reveal the frequency of the surveillance on Complainant compared to other similarly situated individuals. Given the omission of relevant documents from the complaint file, we find that the record is inadequate for appellate review by the Commission. Our regulations state that if the record is inadequately developed or lacking relevant documentation, AJ2 should develop the record as necessary, to include ordering the agency to produce records. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(a) (once a hearing request is assigned to an AJ, the AJ assumes full responsibility for the adjudication of the complaint, including overseeing the development of the record); EEO MD-110, p.7-5. Because AJ2 failed to do so, we find that a remand is warranted to afford Complainant the opportunity to examine her requested documents. In support of this conclusion, we note that Complainant had filed a motion to compel discovery on August 10, 2015, with AJ1, and that motion was never ruled upon. Instead, Complainant’s hearing request was reassigned to AJ2 and no action was taken on the case for some five years. We see nothing in the record that shows that AJ2 considered Complainant’s motion to compel. On remand, AJ2 should also afford the parties the opportunity to obtain and present evidence relevant to Complainant’s alleged performance deficiencies, as such evidence could either support or refute the Agency’s articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the increased surveillance. 6 See Complaint File at 122,125-127,130,135-136,140,146-150, and 155. 7 As we are only addressing claim 1, we need not address Complainant’s request for proof that her supervisor was on vacation on February 5, 2014. 2019003985 9 CONCLUSION Therefore, after a careful review of the record, including Complainant’s arguments on appeal, the Agency's response, and arguments and evidence not specifically discussed in this decision, the Commission VACATES the Agency's final action and REMANDS the matter to the Agency in accordance with this decision and the Order below. ORDER The Agency is directed to submit a copy of the complaint file to the EEOC Hearings Unit within fifteen (15) calendar days of the date this decision becomes final. The Agency shall provide written notification to the Compliance Officer at the address set forth below that the complaint file has been transmitted to the Hearings Unit. Thereafter, the AJ shall process the complaint in accordance with 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109. In processing the complaint, the AJ shall afford Complainant the opportunity to obtain the following documents: 1) “lists of employees also on the SSI list at Central Park Station from January 2014 [to] June 2014”; 2) “PS-4584 and PS-4588 [forms] done during January 2014 [to] June 2014”; 3) “100% of the LCP-001 forms done at Central Park Station between January 2014 [to] June 2014”; 4) all relevant evidence pertaining to her alleged performance deficiencies; and 5) any other evidence that the AJ deems necessary to properly adjudicate the complaint. Following discovery, the AJ shall afford Complainant a hearing on the merits of the complaint, unless the AJ determines that it is appropriate to issue a decision without a hearing. The Agency shall then issue a final action in accordance with 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION’S DECISION (K0719) Under 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(c) and § 1614.502, compliance with the Commission’s corrective action is mandatory. Within seven (7) calendar days of the completion of each ordered corrective action, the Agency shall submit via the Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP) supporting documents in the digital format required by the Commission, referencing the compliance docket number under which compliance was being monitored. Once all compliance is complete, the Agency shall submit via FedSEP a final compliance report in the digital format required by the Commission. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g). The Agency’s final report must contain supporting documentation when previously not uploaded, and the Agency must send a copy of all submissions to the Complainant and his/her representative. If the Agency does not comply with the Commission’s order, the Complainant may petition the Commission for enforcement of the order. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.503(a). 2019003985 10 The Complainant also has the right to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission’s order prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.407, 1614.408, and 29 C.F.R. § 1614.503(g). Alternatively, the Complainant has the right to file a civil action on the underlying complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled “Right to File a Civil Action.” 29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.407 and 1614.408. A civil action for enforcement or a civil action on the underlying complaint is subject to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999). If the Complainant files a civil action, the administrative processing of the complaint, including any petition for enforcement, will be terminated. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.409. Failure by an agency to either file a compliance report or implement any of the orders set forth in this decision, without good cause shown, may result in the referral of this matter to the Office of Special Counsel pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.503(f) for enforcement by that agency. STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL RECONSIDERATION (M0617) The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that: 1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or 2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the Agency. Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision. A party shall have twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party’s timely request for reconsideration in which to submit a brief or statement in opposition. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 § VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Complainant’s request may be submitted via regular mail to P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail to 131 M Street, NE, Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. The agency’s request must be submitted in digital format via the EEOC’s Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g). The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party. Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. 2019003985 11 The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c). COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (R0610) This is a decision requiring the Agency to continue its administrative processing of your complaint. However, if you wish to file a civil action, you have the right to file such action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. In the alternative, you may file a civil action after one hundred and eighty (180) calendar days of the date you filed your complaint with the Agency, or filed your appeal with the Commission. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. Filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint. RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815) If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may request the court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter the time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant’s Right to File a Civil Action for the specific time limits). FOR THE COMMISSION: ______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden’s signature Carlton M. Hadden, Director Office of Federal Operations September 30, 2020 Date