Reller, William M. et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Dec 27, 2019

11561832 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Dec. 27, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
11/561,832 11/20/2006 William M. Reller P8130US01 8165
11764 7590 12/27/2019
Ditthavong & Steiner, P.C.
44 Canal Center Plaza
Suite 305
Alexandria, VA 22314
EXAMINER
HOAR, COLLEEN A
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3621
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/27/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
Nokia.IPR@nokia.com
docket@dcpatent.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte WILLIAM M. RELLER, SEAN PATRICK NOLAN,
MICHAEL LIBES, and JOHN CRIM
Appeal 2019-0014361
Application 11/561,832
Technology Center 3600
Before JAMES R. HUGHES, LINZY T. McCARTNEY, and
MICHAEL T. CYGAN, Administrative Patent Judges.
McCARTNEY, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant2 seeks review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the Examiner’s
final rejection of claims 1–16, 18, 20–25, and 66–68. We have jurisdiction
under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

1 This appeal is related to Appeal No. 2019-001435.
2 Appellant identifies the real party in interest as HERE Global B.V. Appeal
Brief 2, filed September 13, 2017 (“Appeal Br.”).
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BACKGROUND
This patent application concerns selecting supplemental content (for
example, advertisements) for client devices. See, e.g., Specification ¶ 21,
filed November 20, 2006 (“Spec.”). Claim 1 illustrates the claimed subject
matter:
1. A computer-implemented method for selecting
supplemental content for display at a client computer
communicating over a computer network, the method
comprising:
[a] receiving a request for a document containing content
at a server computer from a requesting client computer, wherein
the content of the requested document includes a plurality of
words;
[b] determining a relevance score for each keyword in the
content of the requested document at the server computer;
[c] valuating each keyword in the content of the requested
document based on bids received from each of two or more
supplemental content sources, the bids requested in response to
the request for the document from the client computer, the bids
requested and received automatically without contacting the
supplemental content sources, the bids not based on the relevance
score for each keyword;
[d] generating a productivity score for each of the
supplemental content sources through a content optimizer
computer process, wherein the productivity score comprises an
expected revenue total for each respective supplemental content
source, based on the valuation for each keyword in the content
of the requested document and the relevance score for each
keyword in the content of the requested document;
[e] selecting the supplemental content from the
supplemental content source having the greatest productivity
score;
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[f] serving the requested document and the selected
supplemental content from the selected supplemental content
source at the server computer;
[g] delivering the requested document from the server
computer to the client computer; and
[h] delivering the selected supplemental content via a pop-
up ad from the server computer to the client computer when the
requested document has a relevance score and a valuation above
a predetermined threshold for each keyword in the content of the
requested document.
Appeal Br. 19–20 (bracketed letters added).
REJECTIONS
Claims 35 U.S.C. § References
1–16, 18, 20–25,
66–68 101

1–16, 18, 20–25,
66–68 103(a) Anderson,
3 Ramer,4 Laifer5

DISCUSSION
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections and Appellant’s
arguments. We disagree with Appellant that the Examiner erred in rejecting
claims 1–16, 18, 20–25, and 66–68 under § 101. For this rejection, as
consistent with the discussion below, we adopt the Examiner’s reasoning,
findings, and conclusions on pages 2–8 and 17–19 of the Final Office Action
mailed April 13, 2017 (“Final Act.”) and pages 3–11 of the Examiner’s
Answer mailed October 12, 2018 (“Ans.”). But we agree with Appellant the

3 Anderson et al. (US 7,734,624 B2; June 8, 2010).
4 Ramer et al. (US 2007/0168354 A1; July 19, 2007).
5 Laifer (WO 01/82178 A2; April 20, 2001).
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Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1–16, 18, 20–25, and 66–68 under
§ 103(a). We address these rejections in turn.
Section 101 Rejection
Section 101 of the Patent Act provides that “any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof” is patent eligible. 35 U.S.C. § 101. But the
Supreme Court has long recognized an implicit exception to this section:
“Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.”
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014) (quoting Ass’n for
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 589 (2013)).
To determine whether a claim falls within one of these excluded categories,
the Court has set out a two-part framework. The framework requires us first
to consider whether the claim is “directed to one of those patent-ineligible
concepts.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217. If so, we then examine “the elements of
[the] claim both individually and ‘as an ordered combination’ to determine
whether the additional elements ‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a
patent-eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (quoting Mayo
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 78, 79 (2012)).
That is, we examine the claim for an “inventive concept,” “an element or
combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in
practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible
concept] itself.’” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (alteration in original) (quoting
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–73).
The Patent Office has revised its guidance about this framework. See
2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50
(Jan. 7, 2019) (“Revised Guidance”). Under the Revised Guidance, to decide
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whether a claim is directed to an abstract idea, we evaluate whether the
claim (1) recites subject matter that falls within one of the abstract idea
groupings listed in the Revised Guidance and (2) fails to integrate the recited
abstract idea into a practical application. See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. at 51, 54. If the claim is directed to an abstract idea, as noted above, we
then determine whether the claim has an inventive concept. The Revised
Guidance explains that when making this determination, we should consider
whether the additional claim elements add “a specific limitation or
combination of limitations that are not well-understood, routine,
conventional activity in the field” or “simply append[] well-understood,
routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified
at a high level of generality.” Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
With these principles in mind, we turn to the § 101 rejection.
Appellant argues claims 1–16, 18, 20–25, and 66–68 together for this
rejection, so as permitted by 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv), we decide the
appeal for this rejection based on claim 1.
Abstract Idea
The Revised Guidance explains that the abstract idea exception
includes “certain methods of organizing human activity” and “mental
processes.” Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52 see also USPTO, October
2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility at 4–9, https://www.uspto.gov
/sites/default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019_update.pdf (“October SME
Update”) (providing examples of claims that recite certain methods of
organizing human activity and mental processes). The Examiner determined
that claim 1 recites subject matter that falls within these categories of
abstract ideas. See, e.g., Final Act. 3 (determining that “[t]aken as a whole,
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. . . claim [1] is represented as an abstract idea relating to Certain Methods of
Organizing Human Activity” (emphasis omitted)), 4 (determining that
“[t]aken as an ordered combination, claim elements 1–5 [recited in claim 1]
represent An Idea Of Itself” (emphasis omitted)).
We agree that claim 1 recites an abstract idea. Claim 1 recites “[a]
computer-implemented method for selecting supplemental content for
display at a client computer communicating over a computer network” that
includes limitations [a]–[h] reproduced above. These limitations recite a
method that uses keywords in a document to select and deliver supplemental
content such as advertisements. See Appeal Br. 19–20; see also Spec. ¶¶ 5
(“The supplemental content can comprise material such as advertising
. . . .”), 101 (explaining that the disclosed invention can “select supplemental
content (i.e., advertising) for inclusion with requested documents”), claim 6
(“[W]herein the supplemental content from the selected supplemental
content source comprises advertising content for delivery with the Web
page.”). Selecting and delivering advertisements in the manner recited in
claim 1 is a commercial interaction that is not meaningfully different from
other commercial interactions that courts have determined are abstract ideas.
See, e.g., Bridge & Post, Inc. v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 778 F. App’x 882,
887 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“Targeted marketing is a form of ‘tailoring
information based on [provided] data,’ which we have previously held is an
abstract idea. The concept is a ‘fundamental practice’ that dates back to
newspaper advertisements.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted));
Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. Amazon.com Inc., 838 F.3d 1266, 1269 (Fed.
Cir. 2016) (“[W]e hold that the concept of delivering user-selected media
content to portable devices is an abstract idea . . . .”); Intellectual Ventures I
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LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(“There is no dispute that newspaper inserts had often been tailored based on
information known about the customer—for example, a newspaper might
advertise based on the customer’s location. Providing this minimal
tailoring—e.g., providing different newspaper inserts based upon the
location of the individual—is an abstract idea.”); Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu,
LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 714 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (determining that using an
advertisement as an exchange or currency is an abstract idea); Morsa v.
Facebook, Inc., 77 F. Supp. 3d 1007, 1014 (C.D. Cal. 2014), aff’d, 622 F.
App’x 915 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (determining that the claims at issue are drawn
to the abstract ideas of “targeting advertisements to certain consumers, and
using a bidding system to determine when and how advertisements will be
displayed,” both of which are “fundamental, long-standing, well-known
concepts” that “have ‘no particular concrete or tangible form’ and are
therefore abstract”). Claim 1 thus recites certain methods of organizing
human activity, one of the abstract idea categories listed in the Revised
Guidance. See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52 (explaining that certain
methods of organizing human activity include commercial or legal
interactions and fundamental economic principles or practices); see also
October SME Update 4–6 (explaining that certain methods of organizing
human activity include commercial interactions such as advertising).6

6 Even if limitations [a] and [f]–[h] did not form part of the abstract idea,
these limitations would not make claim 1 patent eligible because they recite
insignificant extra-solution activities such as receiving a request for a
document and serving or delivering requested documents and selected
content. Cf. CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366,
1372 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[E]ven if some physical steps are required to obtain
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Claim 1 also recites mental processes. Limitations [b]–[e] recite
determining relevance scores, valuating keywords, generating productivity
scores, and selecting supplemental content. See Appeal Br. 19. These
limitations generally recite what data these steps include or use but do not
otherwise meaningfully limit how the claimed method performs these steps.
See Appeal Br. 19. These steps are so broadly written that they encompass
steps that people can perform in their minds or using pen and paper. See
CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1373 (determining that a claim limitation “is so
broadly worded that it encompasses literally any method for” performing the
limitation, including “even logical reasoning that can be performed entirely
in the human mind”). Indeed, the written description indicates that people
can manually perform aspects of the claimed method. See, e.g., Spec. ¶ 3
(disclosing, in the Background section, that an “advertising placement
company can read each page on a site and try to select ads to appear with
that page that are related to the subject matter of the page”). Because these
steps encompass acts that people can perform in their minds or using pen
and paper, claim 1 recites mental processes. See CyberSource, 654 F.3d at
1372 (determining “that unpatentable mental processes are the subject matter
of” a claim when the claim’s “method steps can be performed in the human
mind, or by a human using a pen and paper”); October SME Update 9
(explaining that mental processes encompass acts that people can perform in

information from the database (e.g., entering a query via a keyboard,
clicking a mouse), such data-gathering steps cannot alone confer
patentability.”); Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., 842 F.3d 1229, 1242 (Fed.
Cir. 2016) (agreeing with the Board that downloading and printing menus
“are insignificant post-solution activities”).

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their minds or using pen and paper). For this additional reason, claim 1
recites an abstract idea. See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52
(explaining that the abstract idea exception includes mental processes).
Because we determine that claim 1 recites an abstract idea, we next
consider whether claim 1 integrates the abstract idea into a practical
application. See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51. In doing so, we
evaluate the claim as a whole to determine whether the claim “integrate[s]
the [abstract idea] into a practical application, using one or more of the
considerations laid out by the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit.”
Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55; see also October SME Update 12
(discussing the practical application analysis). That is, we consider any
additional elements recited in the claim along with the limitations that recite
an abstract idea to determine whether the claim integrates the abstract idea
into a practical application. See October SME Update 12.
The additional elements recited in claim 1 include “a client
computer,” “a computer network,” “a server computer,” and “a requesting
client computer.” See Appeal Br. 19–20. These elements are generic
computer components. See, e.g., Spec. ¶¶ 5 (“The network over which
communications between the server and client devices occurs can comprise
an extended network, such as the Internet.”), 31 (“[C]lient devices can
comprise a variety of processing devices that can communicate with
computer networks. These devices can include, for example, laptop
computers, desktop computers, smart phones, PDAs, and the like. The
network communications can take place over a wireless connection or over
fixed connections.”), 107 (“The computer system 1200 is constructed as a
conventional computer processor such as a typical desktop or laptop
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computer with a network communications module that enables
communication over a network, such as a Local Area Network (LAN), the
Internet, and the like.”), 108 (“If desired, the system 1200 can operate as an
advertising server. . . . If desired, the system can also operate as a Web
server, providing the requested documents as well as the selected advertising
content.”), 111 (“The operations described above can be performed on a
wide variety of computer devices having programmable processors.”).
The claimed method uses these generic computer components to
perform the recited abstract idea. See Appeal Br. 19–20. Using generic
computer components in this way does not integrate an abstract idea into a
practical application. See, e.g., Alice, 573 U.S. at 223–24 (“[W]holly generic
computer implementation is not generally the sort of ‘additional featur[e]’
that provides any ‘practical assurance that the process is more than a drafting
effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea] itself.’” (second and third
alterations in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77)); Intellectual Ventures
I, 792 F.3d at 1370 (“Steps that do nothing more than spell out what it means
to ‘apply it on a computer’ cannot confer patent-eligibility.”). Thus,
considering the additional elements along with the recited abstract idea, both
individually and as an ordered combination, we determine that claim 1 does
not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application.
Appellant’s arguments have not persuaded us otherwise. Appellant
argues that claim 1 is patent eligible because the claim “improv[es] . . .
computer-related technology by improving placement of advertising and
selection of competing advertisers for placement of advertising content in
real time using internet communications.” Appeal Br. 7; see also Reply Brief
2–3, filed December 6, 2018 (“Reply Br.”) (making similar arguments).
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We disagree. Claim 1 is directed to a commercial interaction, not an
improvement to computer-related technology. As discussed above, the claim
uses generic computer components to implement an abstract idea. Appellant
has not shown that the recited computer components operate differently than
expected, let alone operate in an improved manner. Claim 1 “thus fit[s] into
the familiar class of claims that do not ‘focus . . . on [ ] an improvement in
computers as tools, but on certain independently abstract ideas that use
computers as tools.” SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1168
(Fed. Cir. 2018) (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Elec.
Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2016)).
Inventive Concept
Finally, we consider whether claim 1 has an inventive concept, that is,
whether the claim has additional elements that “‘transform the nature of the
claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (quoting
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 78, 79). This requires us to evaluate whether the
additional claim elements add “a specific limitation or combination of
limitations that are not well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the
field” or “simply append[] well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality.”
Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
As discussed above, the additional elements recited in claim 1 include
“a client computer,” “a computer network,” “a server computer,” and “a
requesting client computer.” See Appeal Br. 19–20. Claim 1 recites that
these elements receive a request for document, determine relevance scores,
valuate keywords, generate productivity scores, select supplemental content,
and serve or deliver requested documents and selected supplemental content.
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See Appeal Br. 19–20. Claim 1 does not place meaningful restrictions on
how the claimed method performs many of these steps. Indeed, the written
description indicates that the steps encompass any “computer methods,
computer programs on program carriers . . . that, when run on a computer,
implement the method” and explains that “[t]he various embodiments of the
invention may be implemented as a sequence of computer implemented
steps or program modules organized in any of many possible
configurations.” Spec. ¶ 32.
Given the broad scope of these steps, they encompass well-
understood, routine, and conventional computer activities. For example,
receiving, serving, and delivering data are well-understood, routine, and
conventional computer activities. See, e.g., buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc.,
765 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“That a computer receives and sends
the information over a network—with no further specification—is not even
arguably inventive.”). And the written description indicates the recited
determination, valuation, and generation steps consist of basic comparisons
and mathematical calculations. See, e.g., Spec. ¶¶ 22, 25–27, 33–38, 41–43,
74–79. These steps thus encompass well-understood, routine, and
conventional computer activities. See, e.g., Intellectual Ventures I LLC v.
Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (explaining that
determining whether a content identifier matches a characteristic of other
identifiers is a generic computer function); Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun
Life Assur. Co. of Canada (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(“The computer required by some of Bancorp’s claims is employed only for
its most basic function, the performance of repetitive calculations, and as
such does not impose meaningful limits on the scope of those claims.”). As
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for the recited selection, this is also a well-understood, routine, and
conventional computer activity. See, e.g., OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com,
Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (determining that selecting a
price is a well-understood, routine, and conventional computer activity).
Whether we consider these additional elements individually or as an
ordered combination, these elements do not transform the nature of claim 1
into a patent-eligible application. These elements are largely recited at a high
level of generality, and there is no indication that these elements override the
conventional use of known features or involve an unconventional
arrangement or combination of elements. At bottom, claim 1 recites generic
computer components employed in a customary manner, which is not
enough to provide an inventive concept. Alice, 573 U.S. at 223 (“[T]he mere
recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a patent-ineligible abstract
idea into a patent-eligible invention.”).
Appellant argues that claim 1 is patent eligible because it is similar to
the claims in BASCOM Global Internet Services., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility
LLC, 827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See Appeal Br. 7–8. But other than
asserting that claim 1 “pass[es] . . . Step 2B of the test,” Appeal Br. 8,
Appellant provides no persuasive reasoning or evidence to support this
argument. In any event, claim 1 is distinguishable from the patent-eligible
claims in BASCOM. In BASCOM, the claimed invention “represent[ed] a
software-based invention[ ] that improve[d] the performance of the computer
system itself.” BASCOM, 827 F.3d at 1351 (second alteration in original)
(quotation marks omitted). Moreover, the claim contained an inventive
concept “in the non-conventional and non-generic arrangement of known,
conventional pieces.” BASCOM, 827 F.3d at 1350. Although Appellant
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asserts at various points that claim 1 both improves computer-related
technology and has an unconventional, non-generic combination of
limitations, see, e.g., Reply Br. 2, 4, Appellant does not offer persuasive
reasoning or evidence to support these assertions. Asserting that the claim 1
improves computer-related technology and has an unconventional, non-
generic combination of limitations does not make it so.
Appellant also contends “the claimed inventive steps for receiving,
determining, valuating, generating, selecting serving, and delivering are new
and no factual basis has been provided to indicate otherwise.” Reply Br. 5.
But these steps recite an abstract idea, and the abstract idea cannot provide
the necessary inventive concept no matter how new or groundbreaking the
idea is. See, e.g., Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. IBG LLC, 921 F.3d 1378, 1385
(Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The abstract idea itself cannot supply the inventive
concept, ‘no matter how groundbreaking the advance.’”); SAP Am., 898 F.3d
at 1163 (“We may assume that the techniques claimed are
‘[g]roundbreaking, innovative, or even brilliant,’ but that is not enough for
eligibility. Nor is it enough for subject-matter eligibility that claimed
techniques be novel and nonobvious in light of prior art, passing muster
under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103.” (citations omitted)); Synopsys, Inc. v.
Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1151 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“But, a
claim for a new abstract idea is still an abstract idea. The search for a § 101
inventive concept is thus distinct from demonstrating § 102 novelty.”). We
thus find this argument unpersuasive.
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Summary
For at least the reasons discussed above, claim 1 is directed to an
abstract idea and lacks an inventive concept. We therefore sustain the
Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 under § 101.
Section 103 Rejection
Claim 1 recites “generating a productivity score for each of the
supplemental content sources through a content optimizer computer process,
wherein the productivity score comprises an expected revenue total for each
respective supplemental content source, based on the valuation for each
keyword in the content of the requested document and the relevance score
for each keyword in the content of the requested document.” Appeal Br. 19.
Appellant contends that the Examiner has not shown that the combination of
Anderson, Ramer, and Laifer teaches or suggests that “the productivity score
comprises an expected revenue total for each respective supplemental
content source” as recited in this limitation. See Appeal Br. 14–15.
We agree with Appellant. Although not entirely clear, the Examiner
appears to have found that Ramer’s “future value” teaches the recited
“expected revenue total.” See Final Act. 10–11. But the cited portions of
Ramer do not disclose that this future value includes an expected revenue
total, see, e.g., Ramer ¶ 306, and the Examiner has not adequately explained
why the future value teaches or suggests an expected revenue total. The
Examiner also seems to have found that Anderson teaches this limitation,
see Final Act. 9–10, but has not adequately explained how Anderson does
so. Nor has the Examiner explained how the references would be combined
to teach or suggest this limitation. Final Act. 11–12. As a result, we do not
sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 and its dependent claims under
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§ 103(a). Because the Examiner’s rejection of independent claims 67 and 68
suffers from the same flaw, we also do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection
of these claims under § 103(a).
CONCLUSION
Claims
Rejected 35 U.S.C. § References Affirmed Reversed
1–16, 18,
20–25, 66–
68
101
1–16, 18,
20–25,
66–68

1–16, 18,
20–25, 66–
68
103(a) Anderson, Ramer, Laifer
1–16, 18,
20–25,
66–68
Overall
Outcome
1–16, 18,
20–25,
66–68

Because we affirm at least one ground of rejection for each claim on
appeal, we affirm the Examiner’s decision. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(a)(1). No
period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may
be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED