Regions Asset Companyv.Regional Acceptance Corporation

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

May 1, 2009

No. 91155302 (T.T.A.B. May. 1, 2009)

Hearing: Opinion Mailed:
February 3, 2009 May 1, 2009

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
______

Regions Asset Company,
substituted for Regions Financial Corporation1
v.
Regional Acceptance Corporation
_____

Opposition No. 91155299
to application Serial No. 76413412
filed on May 29, 2002

Opposition No. 91155302
to application Serial No. 76413402
filed on May 29, 2002
_____

William Pecau of Steptoe & Johnson LLP for opposer Regions
Financial Corporation.

Alice Carmichael Richey of Kennedy Covington Lobdell &
Hickman, LLP for applicant Regional Acceptance Corporation.
______

Before Rogers, Drost and Walsh, Administrative Trademark
Judges.

Opinion by Rogers, Administrative Trademark Judge:

Applicant Regional Acceptance Corporation has applied
to register REGIONAL, in typed characters, as well as the

1 In view of the final decision of these cases by this opinion,
the previously joined Regions Asset Company is now substituted.
See Information Resources Inc. v. X*Press Information Services, 6
USPQ2d 1034 (TTAB 1988), and TBMP § 512.01 (2d ed. Rev. 2004).

This Opinion is Not a
Precedent of the TTAB
Opposition No. 91155299 & 91155302
2
stylized display of that term shown below, as marks on the
Principal Register, both for “financial services, namely
consumer and installment loans.”

Both applications assert August 31, 2000 as the date of
first use and first use in commerce, and both applications
include a claim of applicant’s ownership of a registration
for REGIONAL ACCEPTANCE, in typed form, for the same
services as identified in the involved applications.2 The
prior registration is based on Section 2(f) of the Trademark
Act, but neither of the involved applications is.
The Pleadings
Opposer Regions Financial Corporation opposes issuance
of registrations to applicant, relying on claims of long use
of the mark REGIONS, in various forms, and a family of
REGIONS marks, for a variety of financial and banking goods
and services, including consumer and installment loans. The
notice of opposition also claims ownership of twenty-six
registrations and four applications for various marks
including the term REGIONS. Opposer specifically relies on

2 Registration No. 1992325, issued August 13, 1996, and including
a recitation of first use of the mark as of December 31, 1978,
and first use of the mark in commerce as of December 31, 1987.
The registration has been renewed.
Opposition No. 91155299 & 91155302
3
its “separate ‘REGIONS’ marks” and its “famous family of
‘REGIONS’ marks.” Contending that it would be damaged by
registration of applicant’s marks and that there is a
likelihood of confusion, mistake or deception of “consumers,
investors and others,” opposer seeks a ruling refusing
registration to applicant of both marks.3
In paragraph 3 of its answer, applicant has admitted
opposer’s corresponding allegation of ownership of
twenty-six registrations for marks including the term
REGIONS. We do not, however, view this as an admission that
such registrations are “valid and subsisting,” which is a
phrase opposer used in paragraph 4 of its notice of
opposition, but not in paragraph 3. In paragraph 4 of its
answer, applicant has admitted the opposer’s corresponding
allegations relating to a particular registration pleaded by
opposer. Thus, applicant has admitted opposer’s allegations
that it is the owner of Registration No. 1881600 for the
mark REGIONS for “banking services” and that such
registration “is valid and subsisting and is prima facie
evidence of Opposer’s exclusive right to use said mark in
commerce on the goods and services specified in said
registration.” Applicant has otherwise denied the remaining
allegations of paragraph 4 of the opposition, specifically,

3 Each notice of opposition makes specific reference to each
opposed application. Otherwise, the notices are the same.

Opposition No. 91155299 & 91155302
4
opposer’s allegation of likelihood of confusion between its
alleged family of marks and applicant’s marks. Further,
applicant has expressly or effectively denied all other
allegations in the notice of opposition.4
The two admissions made by applicant are stated to be
made “upon information and belief.” We do not take this
qualification to mean that applicant has not actually
admitted the corresponding allegations of opposer, for
applicant has separately stated in response to a number of
opposer’s allegations that “it is without sufficient
knowledge or information upon which to form a belief as to
the truth of the allegations… and therefore, denies the
same.” Accordingly, the answer distinguishes between
effective denials because of lack of information, and
admissions, albeit on information and belief.
Though filed separately, the two oppositions were
consolidated by stipulation of the parties during discovery.
The stipulated motion to consolidate was accompanied by an
unopposed motion for amendment of the notice of opposition.
Though filed under a caption that listed only Opposition No.
91155299, we view the amended notice as equally applicable
to both oppositions.

4 The answers are the same, but for their specific references to
the serial numbers of the involved applications.

Opposition No. 91155299 & 91155302
5
Through the amendments to the notice of opposition,
opposer amended paragraph three. While the amended
paragraph still claims ownership of twenty-six registrations
for marks including the term REGIONS, the list differs from
that in the original pleading. Paragraph five was amended
to expand the statements regarding the geographic extent of
opposer’s operations and the extent of its advertising.
Amended paragraph six still refers to pending applications
for marks including the term REGIONS, but refers to only
two, rather than four, such applications.5 Paragraph seven
was amended to change the description of certain services
offered by opposer. The amended notice of opposition is
largely similar to the original notice. Applicant’s answer
to the amended notice of opposition includes the same
admissions as the original answer and, similarly, expressly
or effectively denies all other allegations of the notice.
The Record
By rule, the record includes applicant’s application
files and the pleadings. Trademark Rule 2.122(b), 37 CFR
§2.122(b). Opposer did not take testimony during its
assigned testimony period, as extended. However, on the
closing day of that period, opposer filed a Notice of
Reliance, discussed below, and a stipulated extension of its

5 One mark referred to in the original paragraph six now appears
among the list of registered marks in paragraph three. The other
application appears merely to have been deleted.
Opposition No. 91155299 & 91155302
6
testimony period, which stated as the reason therefor that
the parties were in the process of drafting joint stipulated
facts. Following a number of other extensions, and within
opposer’s further extended testimony period, the parties
filed not a stipulation of facts but a stipulation (1) “that
all documents submitted via a Notice of Reliance in this
proceeding are authentic” and (2) “to the submission [in
lieu of trial testimony] of the discovery depositions and
exhibits of Ronnie Wooten,6 Michael Holley,7 and Erin Tapp8
as testimony in this proceeding.” The parties nonetheless
reserved the right to object to the submitted depositions,
exhibits and other evidence “on the grounds of competency,
relevance, and materiality.” In fact, the referenced
discovery depositions had already been filed, under cover of
opposer’s above referenced notice of reliance; and that
notice of reliance foreshadowed the later-filed stipulation,
in that opposer stated that its submission of the discovery
depositions of Michael Holley and Erin Tapp, opposer’s
witnesses, were so submitted “by agreement of Opposing
Counsel.”

6 Corporate Secretary, Senior Vice President and Chief Financial
Officer of applicant Regional Acceptance Corporation.

7 Senior Vice President and Director of Indirect Lending for
opposer Regions Financial Corporation.

8 Director of Advertising and Creative Services for opposer
Regions Financial Corporation.
Opposition No. 91155299 & 91155302
7
In addition to the three noted discovery depositions,
opposer’s notice of reliance also included (1) a certified
copy, showing status and title, of opposer’s pleaded
registration no. 1881600 for the mark REGIONS for “banking
services” (the ‘600 registration);9 (2) dictionary
definitions of “region” as meaning “an administrative area,
division, or district; an indefinite area of the world or
universe; a broad homogeneous geographical area; a sphere of
activity of interest: Field” and of “regional” as meaning
“of, relating to, or characteristic of a region; affecting a
particular region: Localized” and “something (as a branch of
an organization or an edition of a magazine) that serves a
region”; and (3) various written discovery requests and
responses thereto, including documents. We must now briefly
address this last category of evidence.
Opposer’s notice of reliance recites that “Opposer
submits all Interrogatories propounded by Opposer and
Applicant’s Answers thereto and documents supporting the
Answers submitted by Applicant in further answer to
Opposer’s Interrogatories [exhibit F],” and “all Request for
Admissions propounded by Opposer and Applicant’s Answers
thereto [exhibit G].” Though not employing exactly the same
words, in its brief opposer describes its exhibit F in

9 Issued February 28, 1995, renewed. Title is shown in Regions
Asset Company.

Opposition No. 91155299 & 91155302
8
substantially the same manner; but it describes its exhibit
G as including applicant’s responses to opposer’s
interrogatories and applicant’s responses to opposer’s
requests for admission. Applicant, in its brief, describes
opposer’s exhibit F very differently, specifically, as
including “Opposer’s Supplemental Answers to Applicant’s
First Set of Interrogatories and Opposer’s Answers to
Applicant’s Second Set of Interrogatories”; and describes
opposer’s exhibit G in substantially similar, but more
specific, terms as those used by opposer in its brief.
We are not concerned with opposer’s mere imprecision in
identifying discovery responses, for example, by saying in
its notice of reliance that applicant’s interrogatory
responses were included in exhibit F, but saying in its
brief that such interrogatory responses were included in
both exhibit F and G (in fact, such responses were only
included in exhibit G of opposer’s notice of reliance). We
must, however, address opposer’s submission of its own
responses and supplemental responses to applicant’s
interrogatories as exhibit F (both opposer’s notice of
reliance and description of this exhibit in its brief
misstate the contents of this exhibit to the notice of
reliance). A party generally cannot introduce its responses
to an adverse party’s written discovery requests by notice
of reliance, except in certain circumstances. See Trademark
Opposition No. 91155299 & 91155302
9
Rule 2.120(j)(5). The exception does not apply in this
case, and we do not view the parties’ stipulation that
documents submitted by notice of reliance are authentic and
that discovery depositions may be submitted as trial
testimony to allow for opposer’s introduction of its own
responses to applicant’s interrogatories. Nonetheless,
opposer clearly intended to introduce its own responses to
applicant’s discovery requests, as opposer refers to such
responses in its final brief on the merits. See, for
example, pages 3-5, wherein opposer repeatedly cites to its
interrogatory responses as support for statements of fact
concerning opposer’s marks and services.
Applicant did not object to the notice of reliance when
filed or in its brief and, in fact, has treated opposer’s
discovery responses as properly of record by including them
in its recitation of the record for the case, in applicant’s
brief. Accordingly, we have considered opposer’s
interrogatory responses. See Racine Industries Inc. v.
Bane-Clene Corp., 35 USPQ2d 1832, 1834 n.4 (TTAB 1985)
(Letters “not proper subject matter for a notice of
reliance… deemed to have been stipulated into the record”
when adverse party treated them as part of the record). On
the other hand, we have given opposer’s interrogatory
responses only limited weight. A party’s response to an
interrogatory is not without evidentiary value, but
Opposition No. 91155299 & 91155302
10
generally is viewed as “self-serving.” General Electric Co.
v. Graham Magnetics Inc., 197 USPQ 690, 692 n.5 (TTAB 1977)
citing Grace & Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 278 F.2d 771, 776
(9th Cir. 1960), and Beecham Inc. v. Helene Curtis
Industries, Inc., 189 USPQ 647 (TTAB 1976). The trier of
fact has discretion to decide what weight to give to an
interrogatory response. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland
v. Hudson United Bank, 653 F.2d 766, 777 (3d Cir. 1981);
Marcoin, Inc. v. Edwin K. Williams & Co., Inc., 605 F.2d
1325, 1328, 28 Fed.R.Serv.2d 157 (4th Cir. 1979); and Freed
v. Erie Lackawanna Railway Co., 445 F.2d 619, 621 (6th Cir.
1971).
Applicant also filed a notice of reliance, placing in
the record only opposer’s responses or supplemental
responses to six of applicant’s interrogatories. In
briefing the case, however, applicant was also able to rely
on any of the discovery depositions that the parties
stipulated into the record, even though they were filed
under opposer’s notice of reliance. Opposer obtained
extensions of its deadline for filing rebuttal evidence but
never filed any such evidence.
The parties briefed the case and presented oral
argument at a hearing before this panel.
Opposition No. 91155299 & 91155302
11
Standing
Having put into the record its pleaded ‘600
registration, opposer has established its standing.
Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp., 222 F.3d 943, 55 USPQ2d
1842, 1844 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Lipton Industries, Inc. v.
Ralston Purina Co., 670 F.2d 1024, 213 USPQ 185, 189 (CCPA
1982).10
Priority
Because opposer’s pleaded ‘600 registration is of
record, Section 2(d) priority is not an issue in this case
as to the REGIONS mark for “banking services.” King Candy
Co. v. Eunice King’s Kitchen, Inc., 496 F.2d 1400, 182 USPQ
108, 110 (CCPA 1974). Although opposer also pleaded
ownership of numerous other registrations, there is no
evidence of record proving the validity of and opposer’s
ownership of other pleaded registrations.11 Further, though
opposer pleaded actual priority of use of its registered
marks, vis a vis the filing date of applicant’s involved
applications, and pleaded that it has a family of marks, the

10 As already noted in our discussion of the pleadings, applicant
had admitted opposer’s allegations regarding opposer’s ownership
of and the validity of the ‘600 registration.

11 We reiterate that while we view applicant’s admission of
paragraph three of the notice of opposition as sufficient to
excuse opposer from having to prove its ownership of the
registrations listed in that paragraph, we do not view the
admission as sufficient to excuse opposer from having to prove
that the registrations are valid and subsisting.

Opposition No. 91155299 & 91155302
12
record is manifestly insufficient to establish opposer’s
prior use of any particular mark pleaded in its notice of
opposition, or that its purported family of marks was formed
and promoted prior to the filing date of applicant’s
involved applications.12
Applicant does not claim priority of use of the marks
in its involved applications. It does, however, allude to
its use of REGIONAL ACCEPTANCE, since 1978, in conjunction
with its argument regarding the asserted absence of actual
confusion, and the registration of that mark, for the same
services as identified in the involved applications. To be
absolutely clear on the point, applicant’s use and
registration of that mark cannot be tacked onto the REGIONAL
marks in the involved applications. See Van Dyne-Crotty
Inc. v. Wear-Guard Corp., 926 F.2d 1156, 17 USPQ2d 1866
(Fed. Cir. 1991) (Previously registered mark “CLOTHES THAT
WORK. FOR THE WORK YOU DO.” held not the legal equivalent of
later mark “CLOTHES THAT WORK.”), Wet Seal Inc. v. FD
Management Inc., 82 USPQ2d 1629 (TTAB 2007) (ARDENBEAUTY is
not the legal equivalent of ARDEN), and American Paging Inc.
v. American Mobilphone Inc., 13 USPQ2d 2036 (TTAB 1989),
aff’d in unpublished decision [at 17 USPQ2d 1726] (Fed. Cir.

12 Neither of the two witnesses produced by opposer for
applicant’s taking of discovery depositions discussed issues
relative to the first use of any particular pleaded marks or
opposer’s purported family of marks.

Opposition No. 91155299 & 91155302
13
1990)(AMERICAN MOBILPHONE and design is not the legal
equivalent of AMERICAN MOBILPHONE PAGING and design).
In sum, priority is not at issue in these proceedings
because of opposer’s proof of its pleaded ‘600 registration.
Even if priority were at issue, opposer would have priority
based on the filing date of that registration, which is much
earlier than both the common filing date of the involved
applications, and the common date of first use asserted in
each of the applications.13
Likelihood of Confusion
Our determination under Section 2(d) is based on an
analysis of all of the probative facts in evidence that are
relevant to the factors bearing on the issue of likelihood
of confusion. In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476
F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (CCPA 1973). See also, In re
Majestic Distilling Company, Inc., 315 F.3d 1311, 65 USPQ2d
1201, 1203 (Fed. Cir. 2003). In any likelihood of confusion
analysis, two key considerations are the similarities
between the marks and the similarities between the goods or
services. See Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper

13 The date of first use asserted in the applications is not
evidence of use as of that date, as dates of use listed in an
application must be proved by evidence. The Wooten discovery
deposition references creation of the stylized version of the
REGIONAL mark in 2000, but includes only vague references to
applicant’s use of REGIONAL alone. See, e.g., p. 81:
Q: What is your understanding of what you gain by registering
Regional as a mark that you presently do not have? A: Well, we
already had been using it, you know, from an earlier period, as
Opposition No. 91155299 & 91155302
14
Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (CCPA 1976) (“The
fundamental inquiry mandated by §2(d) goes to the cumulative
effect of differences in the essential characteristics of
the goods [or services] and differences in the marks”).
Identified Services
As the discovery depositions of record and the briefs
of the parties focus a good deal on the involved services,
we begin by considering that du Pont factor.
Opposer’s REGIONS mark is registered for “banking
services.” That is a broad term which we construe to
involve all of the various services typically provided by
banks, such as checking accounts, savings accounts, money
market accounts and IRA accounts. See Supplemental Schedule
“A,” opposer’s supplemental responses to applicant’s first
set of interrogatories.14 In addition, the record is clear
that opposer provides various lines of credit, including
personal lines and lines based on home equity, personal
installment loans, automobile loans for new and used cars,
loans for boats and other recreational vehicles,
construction loans, student loans, and credit cards. See
exhibit C4, Holley dep. In addition, opposer is involved in

we referred to ourselves as Regional for a long time. So it was
just intended to be registered simply for protection.
14 While we stated earlier that opposer’s interrogatory responses
are entitled to only limited weight, when considered as evidence
on opposer’s behalf, there can be no doubt that these types of
accounts are routinely offered by banks. Cf. Maine Savings Bank
Opposition No. 91155299 & 91155302
15
indirect lending, i.e., providing to consumers, through
dealers of boats and recreational vehicles, the funds
necessary to purchase such items under installment
contracts, and may engage in indirect lending for automobile
purchases in the future. Holley dep., pp. 10, 15, 23-27.
We consider all of these services to be encompassed by the
identification of “banking services” listed in opposer’s
‘600 registration.
The identification in each of applicant’s involved
applications is “financial services, namely consumer and
installment loans.” We are bound to construe this to
include all sorts of consumer and installment loans, whether
direct or indirect, for personal use or for purchase of, for
example, an automobile, boat or recreational vehicle. Paula
Payne Products v. Johnson Publishing Co., 473 F.2d 901, 177
USPQ 76, 77 (CCPA 1973) (“Trademark cases involving the
issue of likelihood of confusion must be decided on the
basis of the respective descriptions of goods”). See also
Octocom Systems, Inc. v. Houston Computers Services Inc.,
918 F.2d 937, 16 USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“The
authority is legion that the question of registrability of
an applicant’s mark must be decided on the basis of the
identification of goods set forth in the application

v. First Banc Group of Ohio, Inc., 220 USPQ 736, 737 (TTAB 1983)
and its reference to “services typically associated with a bank.”

Opposition No. 91155299 & 91155302
16
regardless of what the record may reveal as to the
particular nature of an applicant’s goods, the particular
channels of trade or the class of purchasers to which the
sales of goods are directed”).
Applicant relies on the fact that its actual services
are limited to indirect lending, to consumers with subprime
credit, for the purchase of automobiles, and on the fact
that opposer does not provide such a service under its
REGIONS mark. The argument is unavailing, however, because
we must focus on the identifications. Applicant cannot
artificially limit either its own identification or that of
opposer. See In re Bercut-Vandervoort & Co., 229 USPQ 763,
764 (TTAB 1986). In addition, “Opposer's rights are not to
be tied into its current business practices, which may
change at any time. Its rights are as broad as its
registration.” See San Fernando Electric Mfg. Co. v. JFD
Electronics Components Corp., 565 F.2d 683, 196 USPQ 1, 2
(CCPA 1977). Applicant also argues that it is not even
licensed to engage in direct consumer lending. Brief, p. 7,
citing Wooten dep. This is not, however, a fact of which
consumers would be aware. Cf. United States National Bank
of Oregon v. Midwest Savings and Loan Association, 194 USPQ
232 (TTAB 1977) (“whether there are any banking regulations
precluding affiliation of a commercial bank with a savings
and loan association and vice versa is a matter that the
Opposition No. 91155299 & 91155302
17
average consumer would be unfamiliar with and, more often
than not, it would be a matter he would not concern himself
with”). Accordingly, we must consider the services in these
cases to be overlapping, as opposer’s “banking services”
encompass applicant’s “consumer and installment loans.”
Even if we were able to consider the involved services
to be limited to, for applicant, indirect loans to subprime
purchasers of automobiles, and, for opposer, to various
loans except for indirect loans to subprime borrowers of any
type, we would still find the services related. The Holley
deposition includes discussion of opposer’s lending for
automobile purchases (pp. 35-36), indirect lending for boats
and recreational vehicles (pp. 10, 18, 24-27), and even of
its receipt of applications for financing from subprime
borrowers, albeit applications that might eventually be
serviced by a related company (pp. 39-40). Under these
circumstances, there could easily be opportunities for
ultimate borrowers to utilize the actual services of both
opposer and applicant. Moreover, because a consumer might
purchase both a boat or recreational vehicle, on the one
hand, and a car, on the other, all the while utilizing
indirect lending from applicant and opposer, the indirect
nature of the relationships would contribute to the
likelihood of confusion arising if the marks used to
identify such indirect loans were similar.
Opposition No. 91155299 & 91155302
18
Channels of Trade; Classes of Consumers
Neither opposer’s nor applicant’s identification
includes any restriction as to channels of trade or classes
of consumers. Accordingly, we must consider the channels of
trade and classes of customers for the services to include
all that would be customary for such services. See, e.g.,
CBS Inc. v. Morrow, 708 F.2d 1579, 218 USPQ 198, 199 (Fed.
Cir. 1983); Squirtco v. Tomy Corp., 697 F.2d 1038, 216 USPQ
937, 940 (Fed. Cir. 1983); and Paula Payne, supra, 177 USPQ
at 77.
We therefore must assume that both opposer and
applicant can advertise their services through general
advertising, direct mail, on the internet, and in any other
way that may bring to the attention of a prospective
borrower various loans available from each. We also must
assume that the involved classes of customers include all
general consumers who may be in the market for any of the
various types of loans that are encompassed by the involved
identifications. Applicant’s focus on automobile dealers,
rather than ultimate borrowers, as its class of customers,
and on its marketing to such dealers, is therefore
irrelevant to our required analysis.
Sophistication of Consumers
Applicant would prefer our focus on the involved
consumers to be limited to automobile dealers as applicant’s
Opposition No. 91155299 & 91155302
19
customers and boat and recreational vehicle dealers as
opposer’s customers, because these are the customers the
parties deal with for their respective indirect lending
operations. If we could so limit our focus, we would likely
agree that the classes of prospective customers would be
somewhat more discriminating than members of the general
public. However, as noted, because of the involved
identifications we must construe the classes of consumers
for the various types of loans encompassed by such
identifications to include members of the general public,
with varying degrees of sophistication. Moreover, consumers
borrowing funds for the purchase of a boat, recreational
vehicle, automobile, or for some other purchase may be more
concerned and discriminating about the purchase itself,
rather than the financing particulars. This would be
particularly so when the loans involved are indirect loans
and the individual purchaser may not even be aware of
prospective financing options until after an agreement has
been reached to make a purchase, albeit subject to approval
for financing.
Applicant, in its brief (pp. 14-16), discusses certain
cases that found consumers of banking services and credit
cards to be somewhat discerning. Opposer, in its reply
brief (pp. 4-5) relies on a contrary decision of the Board
and distinguishes one of the cases on which applicant
Opposition No. 91155299 & 91155302
20
relies. We do not believe that the comparison made by
consumers trying to decide which credit card to apply for is
directly analogous to the comparisons being made by
prospective borrowers. There may be affinity and reward
programs that influence the selection of a credit card, but
which have little or no role in the selection of a loan,
where a consumer may be focused only on the amount being
financed, interest rate, the repayment period and the size
of the required installment payment. Further, as opposer
notes in its reply brief, the Freedom Card case on which
applicant relies noted that “where the buyer class is mixed,
the standard of care to be exercised by the reasonably
prudent purchaser will be equal to that of the least
sophisticated consumer in the class.” Freedom Card Inc. v.
JPMorgan Chase & Co., 432 F.2d 463, 77 USPQ2d 1515, 1526 (3d
Cir. 2005) (internal citation omitted).
We find that while some borrowers may pay much
attention to the source of a loan being used for the
purchase of boat, recreational vehicle, automobile, or for
some other reason, there will certainly be borrowers who
will pay less attention and may not note the difference
between a REGIONS loan and a REGIONAL loan.
Comparing the Marks
To determine whether the marks are similar, we must
consider the appearance, sound, connotation and commercial
Opposition No. 91155299 & 91155302
21
impression of each mark. Palm Bay Imports Inc. v. Veuve
Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 73
USPQ2d 1689, 1692 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
While one of applicant’s REGIONAL marks is set out in
stylized form, the stylization is slight, and the REGIONS
mark of opposer’s ‘600 registration is registered in typed
form. We must, therefore, consider that it could be
displayed in actual use in any reasonable form of lettering,
including the font used by applicant for its stylized mark.
See Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp., 222 F.3d 943, 55 USPQ2d
1842, 1847-48 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Squirtco v. Tomy Corp.,
supra, 216 USPQ at 939. When REGIONS and REGIONAL are set
forth in the same or similar forms of display, they will
have very similar appearances. Moreover, the first parts of
marks are often most likely to be impressed on the minds of
consumers and remembered, and therefore many consumers will
focus on the common use of the root REGION, and pay less
attention to the ending S and AL, respectively. See Presto
Prods., Inc. v. Nice-Pak Prods., Inc., 9 USPQ2d 1895 (TTAB
1988).
As for the sounds of the marks, their pronunciation
will not be identical, but will be similar because of the
common root term.
Applicant argues that the marks have different
connotations, but we disagree and find the distinction
Opposition No. 91155299 & 91155302
22
between “region,” singular or plural, and “regional” to be
slight indeed. Especially given the context, both marks
carry the connotation of lending from businesses focused on
an area or region, as opposed to a smaller area, such as a
town, city or county, or a larger area, such as the nation
as a whole.
In sum, we find the overall commercial impressions of
the marks very similar and the slight differences at the end
of each mark will not be sufficient to avoid confusion. See
In re BASF Aktiengesellschaft, 189 USPQ 424 (TTAB 1975)
(Likelihood of confusion found between registered mark LUTEX
for various non-resinous chemicals used in the textile
industry and applicant’s LUTEXAL for resinous chemicals used
for various but different purposes also in the textile
industry). See also, United States Olympic Committee v.
Olymp-Herrenwaschefabriken Bezner GmbH & Co., 224 USPQ 497
(TTAB 1984) (likelihood of confusion found between OLYMP for
shirts, blouses and collars and OLYMPIC for various items of
sports apparel, including warmup uniforms and track shoes),
and In re Pellerin Milnor Corporation, 221 USPQ 558 (TTAB
1983) (likelihood of confusion between MILTRON for
“microprocessor for controlling and programming the
operation of a commercial laundry washing and drying machine
and sold as part thereof” and MILLTRONICS (stylized) for
Opposition No. 91155299 & 91155302
23
“electronic control devices for automatically regulating or
controlling the operation of machinery”).
Actual Confusion; Applicant’s Good Faith Adoption
Applicant places great reliance on the absence of any
evidence of actual confusion. Suffice it to say that while
evidence of actual confusion may be some of the best
evidence of likelihood of confusion, the converse is not
true, as evidence of actual confusion is difficult to
obtain. Compare Exxon Corp. v. Texas Motor Exchange, Inc.,
628 F.2d 500, 208 USPQ 384, 389 (5th Cir. 1980) (“The best
evidence of likelihood of confusion is provided by evidence
of actual confusion”) with Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation's
Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 218 USPQ 390, 396 (Fed.
Cir. 1983) (absence of significant evidence of actual
confusion does not mean that there is no likelihood of
confusion). See also, Gillette Canada Inc. v. Ranir Corp.,
23 USPQ2d 1768, 1774 (TTAB 1992).
In addition, because the parties have less overlap in
the market in terms of their actual use, there likely have
been fewer opportunities for actual confusion to occur. In
short, the absence of evidence of actual confusion does not
aid applicant or allow us to conclude that there is no
likelihood of confusion.
Similarly, while evidence of bad faith adoption of a
mark suggests a likelihood of confusion, the mere fact that
Opposition No. 91155299 & 91155302
24
a mark has been adopted in good faith does not mean that
confusion is not likely. See J & J Snack Foods Corp. v.
McDonald’s Corp., 932 F.2d 1460, 18 USPQ2d 1889, 1891 (Fed.
Cir. 1991), and Greyhound Corp. v. Both Worlds Inc., 6
USPQ2d 1635, 1640 (TTAB 1988).
Strength of Opposer’s Mark; Resolving Doubt
Opposer argues that its REGIONS mark is particularly
strong and famous, especially because of its consistent and
deliberate promotion. Brief, pp. 9-10. However, almost all
of the support for this argument is derived from opposer’s
responses to applicant’s discovery requests. As we have
already noted, we consider opposer’s responses somewhat
self-serving and we accord them only limited weight. On the
other hand, opposer’s witness has testified that she was not
aware of other uses of either REGIONS or REGIONAL by
financial institutions. Tapp dep., p. 53. Accordingly,
while we do not find the record to support opposer’s claim
that its mark is famous, it is entitled to the presumption
of distinctiveness that accompanies registration; and on the
record presented, we consider the mark to have some strength
and recognition in the marketplace. Finally, we resolve
doubt in favor of opposer as the prior registrant.
Balancing the du Pont Factors; Conclusion
We find the involved marks very similar and the
involved services to be overlapping. Likewise, the channels
Opposition No. 91155299 & 91155302
25
of trade and classes of consumers for the overlapping
services are presumed to be the same. Consumers of the
involved services likely include a mix of individuals with
varying degrees of sophistication. On balance, we find
there to be a likelihood of confusion and resolve any doubts
on the point in favor of opposer as the prior registrant.

Decision: The opposition is sustained as to each of
the involved applications and registration to applicant is
refused.