Regina M. Stocco

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

Mar 16, 2004

No. 76404246 (T.T.A.B. Mar. 16, 2004)

Mailed:
March 16, 2004
Paper No. 9
Bottorff
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
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In re Regina M. Stocco
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Serial No. 76404246
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Douglas J. McEvoy of Gifford, Krass, Groh, Sprinkle,
Anderson & Citkowski, P.C. for Regina M. Stocco.
Leslie L. Richards, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law
Office 106 (Mary I. Sparrow, Managing Attorney).
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Before Hanak, Chapman and Bottorff, Administrative
Trademark Judges.
Opinion by Bottorff, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Applicant seeks registration on the Principal Register
of the mark DINING TO MEET YOU (in typed form) for services
recited in the application as “social introduction agency
services.”1
1 Serial No. 76404246, filed May 6, 2002. The application is
based on intent-to-use under 15 U.S.C. §1051(b).
THIS DISPOSITION IS NOT
CITABLE AS PRECEDENT
OF THE TTAB
Ser. No. 76404246
2
The Trademark Examining Attorney has refused
registration of applicant’s mark on the ground that
applicant’s mark, as applied to the recited services, so
resembles the mark DINE TO MEET YOU, previously-registered
on the Principal Register (in typed form) for “dating
services where dinners are arranged for groups of people at
restaurants,”2 as to be likely to cause confusion, to cause
mistake, or to deceive. Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15
U.S.C. §1052(d).
When the refusal was made final, applicant filed this
appeal. Applicant and the Trademark Examining Attorney
have filed main appeal briefs, but applicant filed no reply
brief, nor did applicant request an oral hearing. We
affirm the refusal to register.
Our likelihood of confusion determination under
Section 2(d) is based on an analysis of all of the
probative facts in evidence that are relevant to the
likelihood of confusion factors set forth in In re E. I. du
Pont de Nemours and Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (CCPA
1973). In considering the evidence of record on these
factors, we keep in mind that “[t]he fundamental inquiry
mandated by §2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of
differences in the essential characteristics of the goods
2 Registration No. 2,124,044, issued December 23, 1997.
Ser. No. 76404246
3
and differences in the marks.” Federated Foods, Inc. v.
Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (CCPA
1976).
In this case, we find that applicant’s mark is highly
similar to the cited registered mark in terms of
appearance, sound, connotation and overall commercial
impression. Indeed, applicant’s mark is identical to the
cited registered mark but for applicant’s replacement of
the word DINE with the word DINING. This slight difference
does not distinguish the marks. The marks create exactly
the same commercial impression as applied to the relevant
services, i.e., a pun combining the colloquial phrase
“dying (or dyin’) to meet you” and the concept of dinner
and dining.
We also find that applicant’s services are closely
related and indeed legally identical to the services
recited in the cited registration. The record shows that
the Better Business Bureau, in its public listing of types
or categories of businesses, uses “Dating & Social
Introduction Services” as the name of one such type or
category of business. This fact is evidence of the close
commercial relationship between “dating services” like
registrant’s and “social introduction agency” services like
applicant’s.
Ser. No. 76404246
4
Indeed, we find that the prior registrant’s “dating
services” are but a type or species of applicant’s “social
introduction agency services,” and that applicant’s and
registrant’s services therefore are legally identical.
Applicant argues that her recitation of services is broad
enough to encompass services other than the specific type
of dating services covered by the prior registration. This
contention, although true, is legally irrelevant. The
dispositive fact here is that applicant’s recitation of
services encompasses the services recited in the cited
registration, and that the services therefore are legally
identical. That is, applicant’s registration rights in her
mark, if that mark were to be registered for the services
recited in her application, would include the right to use
the mark in connection with services identical to those
recited in the cited registration.
There are no restrictions or limitations as to trade
channels or classes of purchasers in either applicant’s
application or in the cited registration. We therefore
presume that both applicant’s and registrant’s services are
marketed in all normal trade channels and to all normal
classes of purchasers for such services. See In re Elbaum,
211 USPQ 639 (TTAB 1981). Given the legal identity of the
respective services, we find that the trade channels and
Ser. No. 76404246
5
classes of purchasers for them likewise are legally
identical and overlapping.
In summary, we find that applicant’s mark is highly
similar and indeed essentially identical to the cited
registered mark in terms of overall commercial impression,
and that applicant’s services encompass and are legally
identical to the services recited in the cited
registration. We conclude that a likelihood of confusion
exists, and that registration of applicant’s mark is barred
by Trademark Act Section 2(d).
Decision: The refusal to register is affirmed.