Regal Beloit America, Inc.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jun 25, 2020

2019003833 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 25, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/335,335 07/18/2014 Roger Carlos Becerra 14-FW-017-UPA1 2958
50233 7590 06/25/2020
PATRICK W. RASCHE (23571)
ARMSTRONG TEASDALE LLP
7700 Forsyth Boulevard
Suite 1800
St. Louis, MO 63105
EXAMINER
DHAKAL, BICKEY
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2846
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
06/25/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
uspatents@armstrongteasdale.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte ROGER CARLOS BECERRA, BRIAN LEE BEIFUS,
LUDOVIC ANDRE CHRETIEN, YAO DA,
and GLEN CHESTER YOUNG
____________

Appeal 2019-003833
Application 14/335,335
Technology Center 2800
____________

Before JAMES C. HOUSEL, MERRELL C. CASHION, JR., and
JANE E. INGLESE, Administrative Patent Judges.

CASHION, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 16–20, 22, and 25–29. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We REVERSE.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Regal
Beloit America. Appeal Br. 1.
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Application 14/335,335

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The invention relates generally to motor controllers and methods for
adjusting an operation of a motor using a first activation signal that is a
direct current signal and a second activation signal that is an alternating
current signal, or vice versa. Spec. ¶¶ 1, 38. Claim 16 illustrates the subject
matter on appeal and is reproduced below:
16. A motor controller coupled to a motor, said motor
controller comprising a processor, a memory coupled to said
processor, and a plurality of inputs coupled to said processor,
said motor controller configured to:
receive, through at least one of said plurality of inputs, a
first activation signal having a first type, wherein the first type
is one of a direct current (DC) signal and an alternating current
(AC) signal;
operate the motor in a first mode of operation in response
to receiving the first activation signal;
receive, through at least one of said plurality of inputs, a
second activation signal in combination with receiving the first
activation signal, the second activation signal having a second
type, wherein the second type is the other of the one of the DC
signal and the AC signal associated with the first activation
signal; and
in response to receiving both the first activation signal of
the first type and the second activation signal of the second
type, reconfigure said processor such that said motor controller
selectively increases or decreases a value of a parameter
associated with the first mode of operation.

Independent claim 25 relates generally to a method of adjusting a
value of a parameter associated with operation of a motor using the
controller of claim 16.

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Application 14/335,335

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Appellant requests review of the Examiner’s rejection of claims 16–
20, 22, and 25–29 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Densmore
(US 5,290,205, issued March 1, 1994) and Mingliang (Duan Mingliang,
Meng Yanjing, Xu Deyu and Huang Jianbing, “Speed closed-loop control
system based on general-purpose inverter,” ICEMS ’2001. Proceedings of
the Fifth International Conference on Electrical Machines and Systems
(IEEE Cat. No.01EX501), Shenyang, China, 2001, pp. 564–566 vol.1, doi:
10.1109/ICEMS.2001.970738). Appeal Br. 32; Final Act. 3.

OPINION
After review of the respective positions that Appellant presents in the
Appeal and Reply Briefs and the Examiner presents in the Final Office
Action and the Answer, we REVERSE the Examiner’s prior art rejection of
claims 16–20, 22, and 25–29 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 for the reasons
Appellant presents. We add the following.
Independent claim 163 recites a motor controller configured to receive
a first activation signal having a first type, wherein the first type is one of a
direct current (DC) signal and an alternating current (AC) signal and a
second activation signal in combination with receiving the first activation
signal, the second activation signal having a second type, wherein the second

2 We refer to the Appeal Brief filed August 30, 2018 as “Appeal Brief” or
“Appeal Br.” for the purposes of this opinion.
3 Both independent claims 16 and 25 recite the use of first and second
activation signals to adjust a value of a parameter associated with operation
of a motor. For the purposes of this opinion, we limit our discussion to
independent claim 16 with the understanding that the discussion applies
equally to the subject matter of claim 25.
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4
type is the other of the one of the DC signal and the AC signal associated
with the first activation signal.
We refer to the Examiner’s Final Office Action for a complete
statement of the rejection of claim 16. Final Act. 3–7. 4
Briefly, the Examiner finds Densmore teaches a motor controller to
control the speed of a motor by receiving first and second activation signals.
Final Act. 3–4. The Examiner finds that Densmore’s first activation signal
is a square wave pulse signal and that the second activation signal is a direct
current (DC) signal. Final Act. 3–4; Densmore Figure 7B, col. 7, ll. 47–62,
col. 8, ll. 18–36. The Examiner reasons that Densmore’s pulse signal is an
alternating current (AC) signal because, under a broadest reasonable
interpretation,
[a]ny pulsating signal is interpreted as the AC signal since the
claim fails to define the AC signal. As a result, Examiner
maintains the rejection (Fig. 7B clearly discloses 5V SPEED
ENABLE is a pulsating AC signal which goes up and down
with a certain magnitude. Also, it is well known that every
periodic signal comprises of collections sine or cosine wave
based on Fourier transform. In other words, SPEED ENABLE
signal in Fig. 7B is the collection of different sine or cosine
waves at different frequencies which are [AC] signal as well).
Accordingly, Densmore clearly discloses receiving a first
activation signal having a first type that is either a DC signal or
an AC signal, and receiving a second activation signal having a
second type that is the other of the one of the DC signal and the
AC signal associated with the first activation signal as stated
above in the rejection.

4 A discussion of Mingliang is unnecessary for disposition of this appeal.
The Examiner relies on Mingliang to address inventive features not related
to the use of the first and second activation signals. See Final Act. 5–7.
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Final Act. 16–17; see also Ans. 3–8.

Appellant argues that the term AC signal is a term of art that is well
known. According to Appellant, an AC signal is a
signal [that] continually reverses direction, or polarity, and
alternates between being output from a positive and a negative
terminal of a power supply. On a voltage versus time graph [],
this continual reversing of direction is shown by the voltage
signal crossing the time axis. The signal increases from 0V in
the positive direction, reaches a peak voltage, and then
decreases back towards 0V. When the signal crosses the 0V line
and increases in the negative direction, it has changed polarity.
This continual change in direction or polarity is a fundamental
element of the definition of an AC signal, as known in the art.

Appeal Br. 5. Appellant further argues that Densmore’s pulse signal is “a
DC voltage signal because it alternates between values of 0V and 5V, and is
always in the positive direction, never crossing the time axis to change
directions or polarities.” Id. at 5–6.
We agree with Appellant that there is reversible error in the
Examiner’s determination of obviousness. “[D]uring examination
proceedings, claims are given their broadest reasonable interpretation
consistent with the specification.” In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d
1249, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (quoting In re Hyatt, 211 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed.
Cir. 2000)). See also In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (explaining that the scope of the claims in patent
applications is not determined solely on the basis of the claim language, but
upon giving claims their broadest reasonable construction in light of the
specification as it would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art);
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“[T]he
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specification ‘is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis.
Usually, it is dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a
disputed term.’” (citation omitted)). In general,
the PTO applies to the verbiage of the proposed claims the
broadest reasonable meaning of the words in their ordinary
usage as they would be understood by one of ordinary skill in
the art, taking into account whatever enlightenment by way of
definitions or otherwise that may be afforded by the written
description contained in the [Appellant’s] [S]pecification.

In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
Thus, the terms in the appealed claims must be given their broadest
reasonable interpretation including the ordinary meaning unless another
meaning is intended by Appellant as established in the written description of
their Specification. See, e.g., In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319, 321–22 (Fed. Cir.
1989).
When the Specification does not contain an express definition, a
reasonable, supported interpretation of the appealed claims that differs from
that urged by applicants can be used to determine the patentability of the
claims. Morris, 127 F.3d at 1055–56 (“Absent an express definition in their
specification, the fact that appellants can point to definitions or usages that
conform to their interpretation does not make the PTO’s definition
unreasonable when the PTO can point to other sources that support its
interpretation.”). Indeed, “[i]t is the applicants’ burden to precisely define
the invention, not the PTO’s. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 2 [statute omitted].”
Morris, 127 F.3d at 1055–56.
Here, we agree with Appellant that the Examiner’s interpretation that
any pulsating signal, such as Densmore’s pulse signal, can be construed as
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an AC signal is unreasonable. As Appellant argues, the term AC signal is a
term of art. In fact, Appellant’s description of an AC signal comports with
established definitions for this term. See Electronics Club - AC, DC and
Electrical Signals (https://electronicsclub.info/acdc.htm (last accessed June
16, 2020)); see also Encyclopaedia Britannica (https://www.britannica.com/
science/alternating-current (last accessed June 16, 2020)). Thus, the
Examiner’s response that no special definition of “the AC signal” is
disclosed in the Specification does not refute adequately Appellant’s
argument that AC signal is a term of art or address Appellant’s request for a
construction of the term “AC signal” that does not conflict with what is well-
known and well-understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art. Ans. 4;
Reply Br. 1. While the Examiner may point to a definition from other
sources that supports a proposed alternate interpretation of a term, the
Examiner, in this case, fails identify a source for the proposed alternate
definition that any pulse signal, such as Densmore’s pulse signal, can be
construed as an AC signal. See Morris, 127 F.3d at 1055–56.
The Examiner’s reasoning that it is well known that every periodic
signal comprises collections of sine or cosine waves based on a Fourier
transform also lacks persuasive merit. Final Act. 16–17. Claim 16, directed
to a motor controller, is an apparatus claim configured to receive an AC
signal. Even if a pulse signal is produced from an AC signal, once it
becomes a pulse signal, this pulse signal is no longer an AC signal as
understood by one of ordinary skill in the art.
Although it is well established that claims directed to an apparatus
must be distinguished from the prior art in terms of structure rather than
function, see, e.g., In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473, 1477–78 (Fed. Cir. 1997),
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in order to satisfy the functional limitations in an apparatus claim, however,
the prior art apparatus must be capable of performing the claimed function.
Id. at 1478. As such, to be capable of performing the functional limitations
in claim 16, the control unit must possess the necessary structure, hardware
or software, for example, the programming, to function as claimed. The
Examiner does not find that Densmore’s motor controller is programmed or
otherwise structured to function as claimed. That is, the Examiner does not
find that Densmore’s motor controller is capable of receiving an AC signal,
as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art.
While it is possible to install software and/or hardware that would
allow Densmore’s control unit to perform the functions of the control unit as
required in claim 16, the “configured to” language requires that the prior art
structure be capable of performing the function without further
programming. Typhoon Touch Techs., Inc. v. Dell, Inc., 659 F.3d 1376,
1380 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (discussing Microprocessor Enhancement Corp. v.
Texas Instruments, Inc., 520 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). When the
functional language is associated with programming or some other structure
required to perform the function, that programming or structure must be
present in order to meet the claim limitation. Id. The Examiner’s attempt to
interpret Densmore’s pulse signal as an AC signal is insufficient to establish
that Densmore’s motor controller is capable of receiving an AC signal
because, as Appellant argues, a pulse signal is not an AC signal.
Accordingly, we REVERSE the Examiner's prior art rejections of
claims 16–20, 22, and 25–29 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 for the reasons the
Appellant presents and we give above.
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CONCLUSION
In summary:

Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
16–20, 22,
25–29
103 Densmore,
Mingliang
16–20, 22,
25–29

REVERSED