[Redacted], Shayna P., 1 Complainant,v.Christine Wormuth, Secretary, Department of the Army, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

Apr 11, 2022

Appeal No. 2022000771 (E.E.O.C. Apr. 11, 2022)

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Office of Federal Operations P.O. Box 77960 Washington, DC 20013 Shayna P.,1 Complainant, v. Christine Wormuth, Secretary, Department of the Army, Agency. Appeal No. 2022000771 Agency No. ARHQOSA19JUL02577 DECISION On November 23, 2021, Complainant filed an appeal with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commission), pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(a), from the Agency’s November 26, 2021, final decision (FAD) concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 791 et seq., and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the Agency’s final decision. BACKGROUND During the relevant time, Complainant worked as an Equal Employment Opportunity Specialist at the Agency’s Fort Knox Installation in Fort Knox, Kentucky. Complainant is diagnosed with sarcoidosis/Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease (COPD). Complainant Brief, Exhibit 2; Record of Investigation (ROI) at 185. Complainant was originally hired as an Army Civilian Training, Education and Development System (ACTEDS) intern in 2017. ROI at 184, 189. 1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant’s name when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission’s website. 2022000771 2 Director EEO/OCR explained that this is a two-year program. After successful completion of the internship program, the Command looks for positions to place the ACTEDS interns. The interns are placed based upon the needs of the Command. ROI at 219. Complainant asserted that, from her inception into the program, her goal was to return to Washington, D.C., because of her medical condition and that she wanted to work in human resources or EEO. ROI at 189. Complainant acknowledged that she was told that the Agency may not be able to place her in D.C., but that they would try to get her as close to D.C. as possible. ROI at 189, 194. Complainant recounted that in February or March 2019, EEO Director (female, over 40, with a disability) contacted her and asked if Fort Detrick would be an acceptable placement, and Complainant said that was “great.” ROI at 189. On June 15, 2019, Complainant visited Fort Detrick. ROI at 189. Program Manager recounted that she did not think that it would be a good idea for Complainant to visit Fort Detrick because, in her interactions with Complainant, Complainant could become argumentative. ROI at 247. Complainant told human resources that EEO Officer approved a house hunting trip for Complainant which, in actuality, EEO Officer had not approved. ROI at 242. During her visit, Complainant purportedly told EEO Officer that EEO Officer’s division was broken and Complainant told EEO Officer how she planned to fix it. Despite this, upon being told by Complainant that she was 100 percent disabled, with breathing and allergy difficulties, EEO officer ordered Complainant an air purifier in anticipation of her arrival at Fort Detrick. ROI at 210. EEO Officer stated that, after Complainant’s visit, she concluded that Complainant’s behavior caused conflict among the staff at Fort Detrick. ROI at 212. Specifically, EEO Officer said that she received a report from an employee that Complainant called EEO Officer the “Tasmanian devil” during her visit. ROI at 212. EEO Officer said that she was receiving comments from the staff at Fort Detrick such as, “if [Complainant is] coming to EEO it’s going to be an issue.” ROI at 212. EEO Officer believed Complainant’s behavior would cause more conflict if she worked at Fort Detrick, because Complainant had managed to create conflict before she’d even arrived to begin her position. ROI at 212. EEO Officer reported that she told Program Manager she did not think Complainant would be a good fit for the office. Director EEO/OCR made the final decision and said that he would let Complainant know. ROI at 212. In July 2019, Complainant was notified that she was not assigned to Fort Detrick but, instead, was assigned to Presidio at Monterey in California (POM). ROI at 190. Complainant stated that she objected to the assignment due to her medical condition, the high cost of rent, and her terminally ill mother who had stage IV kidney disease. ROI at 190. Director EEO/OCR asserted that, in the conversation notifying Complainant of the change in assignment, Complainant threatened to quit the ACTEDS program. Director EEO/OCR said that he encouraged Complainant to reconsider that decision, because if she quit, she would have to repay the money to the government that had been invested in her training. Director EEO/OCR stated that he encouraged her to take the position at POM and he would look for opportunities for her on the East Coast. ROI at 221. 2022000771 3 On July 11, 2019, Complainant accepted the position at POM. ROI at 272. Complainant alleged that Program Manager told her that she would be removed from the program if she did not accept the position in POM. ROI at 195-96. Complainant opined that three coworkers (CW) were treated more favorably than she. Complainant alleged that CW1 (female, early twenties, with a disability), was treated more favorably than Complainant, because she was supposedly offered several choices, but she denied assignments and was assigned to Leavenworth, Kansas. ROI at 190. CW2 (female, approximately 50s, with a disability), was noted by Complainant to have been assigned to her hometown. ROI at 190. CW3 (male, early 50s, with a disability), was presumed by Complainant to have been treated more favorably than she because Complainant believed that CW3 had been given two assignments and, when he refused, Complainant said that the Agency found him an assignment at Fort Benning. ROI at 190. The evidence of record contradicts Complainant’s assumptions about all her named comparators. Neither CW1, CW2, nor CW3 was placed at their first-choice location. ROI at 222, 261. Complainant alleged that the Agency did not engage in the interactive process required by the Rehabilitation Act. ROI at 192. Complainant asserted that she contacted her supervisors and chain of command and requested that she receive a reasonable accommodation (RA) to not be assigned to California. ROI at 192. Complainant provided the EEO investigator an undated and unfinished email, without time, date, or address stamp, which stated, “The thing is, I have COPD a chronic illness. It’s [sic] Very Respectfully, [Complainant]” ROI at 204. There is no evidence that it was sent to or received by anyone at the Agency. On July 11, 2019, EEO Director emailed Director EEO/OCR relaying that Complainant stated that her medical condition would not allow her to except the POM assignment, but that Complainant refused to resign from the Intern Program. ROI at 224. Agency policy outlined that the decision-maker for a requested RA is someone in the employee’s chain of command, usually the employee’s immediate supervisor. ROI at 230. Director EEO/OCR and Program Manager denied that Complainant requested an RA, or provided any relevant medical documentation, prior to her accepting the position at POM. ROI 169, 179, 248. Rather, Program Manager stated that Complainant asserted that she was unable to move to POM because her mom was sick, and she was her mother’s sole caregiver. ROI at 169. Program Manager reached out to the EEO officer at POM to let the EEO officer know that Complainant’s mother was sick, and that Complainant would likely be taking time off. ROI at 169, 245. Program Manager said that she later discovered that Complainant’s mother was not located on the East coast, where Complainant was requesting placement, but was in the Midwest. ROI at 169. In a July 18, 2019, email, Program Manager relayed information from Deputy and Command Disability Program Manager, that Complainant was to gather all of her documentation from her doctor, and her requested documentation, and submit the packet once she arrived at POM. ROI at 205. Complainant acknowledged that she submitted her RA and equipment requests when she arrived at POM and her POM supervisor approved the requests. ROI at 197. 2022000771 4 On September 5, 2019, Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that the Agency: 1. Discriminated against her on the bases of disability (physical) when on July 3, 2019, she was informed her agreed upon assignment to Fort Detrick, Maryland was canceled and she would be reassigned to Monterey, California. She was told if she did not take reassignment that she would be removed from her federal position; she had to respond no later than July 11, 2019, or her removal would be implemented;2 and 2. Discriminated against her based upon disability (physical) when on July 18, 2019, Program Manager, Program Manager, IMCOM, San Antonio, told her she could not submit her RA request until she received her new assignment. Thus, the Agency did not accept her RA request or medical documents prior to her reassignment to California. At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the report of investigation and notice of her right to request a hearing before an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant initially requested a hearing before an AJ, and an AJ was assigned to the complaint. The case was assigned Hearing Number 570-2020-01111X. Complainant subsequently withdrew her hearing request and on July 26, 2021, the assigned AJ dismissed the Hearing Request and directed the issuance of a FAD. In accordance with Complainant’s request, the Agency issued a FAD pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110(b). The decision concluded that Complainant failed to prove that the Agency subjected her to discrimination as alleged. The instant appeal followed. CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL Complainant’s representative asserts that the Commission should issue a default judgment against the Agency, as the Agency issued its FAD on November 26, 2021, as opposed to September 24, 2021. In the alternative, the representative argues that the Agency should pay attorney’s fees and costs. 2 Complainant originally claimed that claim 1 was discrimination due to sex (female) and age (60) discrimination, in addition to discrimination based upon disability. Complainant’s brief, however, clearly specifies she is not challenging the FAD as to their findings of sex and age. To that end, we note that the Commission has the discretion to review only those issues specifically raised in an appeal. See Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9, § IV.A.3 (Aug. 5, 2015). As Complainant did not contest the Agency’s decision concerning sex or age discrimination, we need not address these claims in the instant decision. 2022000771 5 With regard to the substance of the appeal, Complainant contends that the Agency failed to accommodate her medical conditions and that the Agency’s officials were untruthful in their affidavits that they were unaware of Complainant’s request for an accommodation. Complainant’s counsel asserts that the “unfair and improper conduct by management officials” justifies default judgment. The Agency counters that Complainant did not request an RA prior to moving to California and that Complainant has not met her burden to show that the Agency failed to act on Complainant’s request. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS Standard of Review As this is an appeal from a decision issued without a hearing, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110(b), the Agency's decision is subject to de novo review by the Commission. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a). See Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614, at Chapter 9, § VI.A. (Aug. 5, 2015) (explaining that the de novo standard of review “requires that the Commission examine the record without regard to the factual and legal determinations of the previous decision maker,” and that EEOC “review the documents, statements, and testimony of record, including any timely and relevant submissions of the parties, and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission’s own assessment of the record and its interpretation of the law”). Sanctions On appeal, Complainant requests that the Commission issue a sanction against the Agency regarding the processing of the supplemental investigation. Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.108(c)(3), when an Agency is untimely with requested documents, records, or witnesses, the Commission may draw and adverse inference, exclude the evidence, or take other action as appropriate, the regulations are clear that these actions are permissible and not required. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.108(c)(3). In the current case, the Agency was notified on July 26, 2021, that the AJ granted Complainant’s motion to withdraw her hearing request. To be considered timely, in this case, the Agency should have issued the FAD no later than September 24, 2021. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110. The Agency did not issue the FAD until November 26, 2021, approximately two months later. However, Complainant did not present any evidence of prejudicial effect as a consequence of this delay. As such, the Commission declines to issue sanctions against the Agency at this time. Complainant’s counsel further seeks sanctions against the Agency in the form of summary judgment “for failing to develop an impartial factual record based on the patently false testimony from its two primary witnesses.” 2022000771 6 In this case, Complainant’s counsel has not produced any evidence that these statements are “patently false”. Complainant’s counsel voluntarily withdrew Complainant’s hearing request, where an AJ could have made a determination as to credibility. As Complainant’s counsel has not provided the Commission with evidence of dishonesty on the part of Agency officials, and expressly denied the Commission the opportunity for an AJ to make such a determination, the Commission declines to issue sanctions against the Agency.3 Disparate Treatment-Claim 1 A claim of disparate treatment is examined under the three-part analysis first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). For a complainant to prevail, she must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained, reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that a prohibited consideration was a factor in the adverse employment action. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). The burden then shifts to the Agency to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions. See Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). Once the Agency has met its burden, the complainant bears the ultimate responsibility to persuade the fact finder by a preponderance of the evidence that the agency acted on the basis of a prohibited reason. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993). The Commission will assume, without so finding, that Complainant established a prima facie case of discrimination concerning her change of assignment from Fort Detrick to POM. We now turn to the Agency to provide a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its decision. We find that it has done so here. The Agency asserts that EEO Officer withdrew the offer at Fort Detrick due to Complainant’s own conduct. After numerous instances of Complainant’s conduct, witnessed by EEO Officer and her staff, such as explaining to EEO Officer that her department was broken, referring to EEO Officer as either a devil or “Tasmanian devil,” and telling HR that EEO Officer approved a house hunting trip that EEO Officer did not approve, EEO Officer did not think that Complainant would be a good fit for the department. After hearing comments from employees such as, “if [Complainant is] coming to EEO it’s going to be an issue,” EEO Officer assessed that Complainant’s brief presence caused conflict among the staff at Fort Detrick, and EEO Officer believed it would only worsen if Complainant worked at Fort Detrick on a permanent basis. EEO Officer’s opinion of Complainant’s behavior was consistent with Program Manager’s, who did not think Complainant’s visit to Fort Detrick was well-advised, as Program Manager found Complainant to have a propensity to be combative. 3 The Commission notes that Complainant’s counsel made a charge of falsehood against an Agency official without evidence thereof. This is a serious allegation, as the statements in the affidavits were provided under oath. The Commission cautions counsel regarding such statements and accusations, as the American Bar Association has found, “In representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person…” may arise to unethical conduct. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 4.4. 2022000771 7 While Complainant alleges that the decision to withdraw her offer of placement at Fort Detrick was made based upon discriminatory animus, there is no evidence of such a motivation in the record. To the contrary, upon hearing Complainant assert that she was 100 percent disabled, had issues with breathing, and had various allergies, EEO Officer ordered an air purifier in anticipation of Complainant’s arrival. The withdrawal of the employment offer came only after the Fort Detrick staff complained to EEO Officer about Complainant’s visit. With regard to Complainant’s placement at POM, the Agency asserts that POM was the only location that was available for Complainant after Fort Detrick fell through. Though Complainant stated that she did not want to go to POM, she knew, from the onset of the program, that while her preferences would be considered, she would ultimately be placed based upon the needs of the Agency. The Agency proffers that, once the offer from Fort Detrick was withdrawn, there were no other available positions. Though Complainant, as an argument for pretext, states that CW1, CW2, and CW3 were given preferential treatment relative to her, the evidence does not support this assertion. None of the proffered comparators received their first-choice placement. With regard to Complainant’s claim that “[s]he was told if she did not take reassignment that she would be removed from her federal position; she had to respond no later than July 11, 2019, or her removal would be implemented,” the Complainant was aware that, at the end of the internship program, she would be placed in a position consistent with the needs of the Agency. Complainant successfully completed the program and had a placement. To refuse the position she was offered would have, objectively speaking, placed Complainant in breach of that contract. The Agency informing her of that fact, and reminding her of her contractual obligations which she freely entered, is not discriminatory. Whether she agreed with the Agency’s reasons, or even whether the Commission finds the decision to be best, is not relevant to the issue at hand. The Commission cannot second-guess an Agency’s decisions involving personnel unless there is evidence of a discriminatory motivation on the part of the officials responsible for making those decisions. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 259. Ultimately, a Complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the agency’s articulated reason for its action was not its true reason, but a sham or pretext for unlawful discrimination. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253; see Reeves, 530 U.S. at 143; Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511; McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804. A complainant’s generalized testimony alleging a subjective belief that a particular action was motivated by discrimination is insufficient to show pretext. See Perry v. Dep’t of Hous. and Urban Dev., EEOC Appeal No. 01A54957 (Jan. 4, 2006). The question is not whether the agency made the best, or even a sound, business decision; it is whether the real reason is discrimination. Mere assertions or conjecture that an agency's explanation is a pretext for intentional discrimination is insufficient because subjective belief, however genuine, does not constitute evidence of pretext. The focus of pretext inquiry is whether an agency's actions were motivated by discriminatory animus. Further, at all times the ultimate burden of persuasion remains with Complainant to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the Agency was motivated by prohibited discrimination.” Alameda B. v. Dep’t of the Treasury, EEOC Appeal No. 0120181968, 2019 WL 4945106, at 6 (Sept. 24, 2019). Complainant has afforded no such persuasive evidence here. 2022000771 8 Reasonable Accommodation-Claim 2 An agency must make reasonable accommodation for the known physical and mental limitations of a qualified individual with a disability unless it can show that accommodation would cause an undue hardship. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(o), 1630.2(p). A qualified individual with a disability is an “individual with a disability” who satisfies the requisite skill, experience, education and other job-related requirements of the employment position such individual holds or desires and, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of such position. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m). The complainant has the initial responsibility of showing that a suggested accommodation is “reasonable” (i.e., that is generally plausible in the job being performed by the individual). See U.S. Airways. Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002), EEOC Enforcement Guidance No. 915.002. While this is not a high burden for the complainant, it is an initial plausibility threshold that the complainant must meet. Once the complainant shows that the requested accommodation is plausible, the burden then shifts to the agency to show whether the accommodation, even if plausible, would nonetheless impose an undue hardship (i.e., a significant difficulty or expense) on the operations of the agency. See Harge v. Dep't of Veteran's Affs., EEOC Appeal No. 0120111521 (Dec. 4, 2014). After receiving a request for reasonable accommodation, the employer should engage in an informal process with the disabled individual to clarify what the individual needs and identify the appropriate reasonable accommodation. See EEOC Enforcement Guidance No. 915.002, see also, Abeijon v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., EEOC Appeal No. 0120080156 (Aug. 8, 2012). Protected individuals are entitled to reasonable accommodation, but they are not necessarily entitled to their accommodation of choice. Castaneda v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 01931005 (Feb. 17, 1994). Improper termination of the interactive process constitutes an improper denial of a reasonable accommodation. See Harvey G. v. Dep't of the Interior, EEOC Appeal Nos. 0120132052 & 0120150844 (Feb. 4, 2016). The Commission finds that Complainant, herself, was the reason that she was not afforded an RA prior to her acceptance of the POM position. Prior to July 11, 2019, the day that Complainant accepted the assignment at POM, Complainant had made not a single request for an RA. Complainant’s first and only RA request occurred in September 2019, over two years after she began her internship at the Agency. ROI p. 61. It was not until after Complainant’s own conduct caused her preferred location placement to be withdrawn that Complainant asserted a need for a reasonable accommodation. In short, Complainant did not provide evidence sufficient to convince the decision maker that she requested an RA prior to accepting the position at POM. Moreover, the Commission finds that Complainant has failed to establish that her requested RA is reasonable. The only available position at the time was in POM. Complainant provided no documentation or evidence that her medical condition would preclude her from working at POM. 2022000771 9 She asserts that her medical providers are in the D.C. metro area, her location of choice, but she has presented no evidence that there were no providers for her COPD in the POM area. As to her arguments that the air quality is not conducive to her respiratory health in the area, she has not provided any evidence that this area is substantially worse for her respiratory health than other areas, or that she is unable to work at POM with other accommodations. Complainant conceded that POM management accepted her application for an RA and she was provided with everything she requested. Furthermore, the evidence indicates that Complainant was, in fact, able to perform her job at POM. As Complainant has not provided any evidence, aside from her own opinions, that she could not work in California, and her reasons for not wishing to relocate to POM ranged from rent to medical providers to caring for her mother, the Commission concludes that the request to not relocate to California was not, in fact, an RA, but a personal preference. An Agency does not violate EEOC regulations merely by not providing Complainant the accommodation of her choosing. Castaneda, EEOC Appeal No. 01931005. To the extent that Complainant argues that requiring that she wait until arriving in California constitutes an unnecessary delay in the RA process, the Commission cannot agree. EEOC Guidance No. 915.002 at Q. 10, Yessenia H. v. Dep't of Veterans Affs., EEOC Appeal No. 0720070027 (Oct. 13, 2015). The Agency was notified of a need for an RA on the day she had accepted the position at POM. As policy dictated that the primary decision maker is an employee’s supervisor, in this case an individual at POM, asking that Complainant provide all necessary documentation to her POM supervisor at her gaining unit of employment is not deemed to be an unnecessary delay in the RA process. To the extent that Complainant argues, in an exhibit for her brief, that she was required to relocate to Washington, D.C., two years after her move to POM, due to a severe exacerbation of her respiratory illness, she provides no evidence in support of that assertion. In light of the above, Complainant has not proven that the Agency denied her an RA or that the Agency delayed an RA in bad faith, and the Commission finds that the Agency is not in violation of Rehabilitation Act. CONCLUSION Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal, including those not specifically addressed herein, we AFFIRM the Agency’s decision. STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL RECONSIDERATION (M0920) The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider this appellate decision if Complainant or the Agency submits a written request that contains arguments or evidence that tend to establish that: 1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or 2022000771 10 2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the agency. Requests for reconsideration must be filed with EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision. If the party requesting reconsideration elects to file a statement or brief in support of the request, that statement or brief must be filed together with the request for reconsideration. A party shall have twenty (20) calendar days from receipt of another party’s request for reconsideration within which to submit a brief or statement in opposition. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 § VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015). Complainant should submit his or her request for reconsideration, and any statement or brief in support of his or her request, via the EEOC Public Portal, which can be found at https://publicportal.eeoc.gov/Portal/Login.aspx Alternatively, Complainant can submit his or her request and arguments to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, via regular mail addressed to P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail addressed to 131 M Street, NE, Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a legible postmark, a complainant’s request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if OFO receives it by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. An agency’s request for reconsideration must be submitted in digital format via the EEOC’s Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g). Either party’s request and/or statement or brief in opposition must also include proof of service on the other party, unless Complainant files his or her request via the EEOC Public Portal, in which case no proof of service is required. Failure to file within the 30-day time period will result in dismissal of the party’s request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted together with the request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c). COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610) You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint. 2022000771 11 RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815) If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may request the court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter the time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant’s Right to File a Civil Action for the specific time limits). FOR THE COMMISSION: ______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden’s signature Carlton M. Hadden, Director Office of Federal Operations April 11, 2022 Date