01A05117
06-25-2002
Raythell Smith, Complainant, v. Ann M. Veneman, Secretary, Department of Agriculture, Agency.
Raythell Smith v. Department of Agriculture
01A05117
06-25-02
.
Raythell Smith,
Complainant,
v.
Ann M. Veneman,
Secretary,
Department of Agriculture,
Agency.
Appeal No. 01A05117
Agency No. 98-0698
Hearing No. 130-99-8102X
DECISION
Complainant timely initiated an appeal from the agency's final order
concerning his equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint of unlawful
employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.
The appeal is accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405. For the
following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the agency's final order.
The record reveals that complainant, an Agricultural Credit Officer
Trainee, GS-475-11,was performing work duties at the Amite County Farm
Service Agency facility, in Jackson, Mississippi, while preparing for
the Agricultural Credit Officer Comprehensive (ACOT) Final Examination.
Complainant had one year to study for the examination. At the time of his
employment with the agency at the Amite County office, complainant signed
a mobility statement wherein he was put on notice of the possibility that
he might have to move at any given time of employment. Subsequently,
complainant was detailed from Amite County to Marion County because of a
staffing imbalance in the these two offices. Specifically, the agency
asserted that because one of the trainees in the Amite County office
(a Black female) (Trainee-2) did not have loan approval authority, the
Agricultural Credit Officer (Officer)(Caucasian) would be overburdened
performing his own duties and training two trainees as well. It was felt
by the agency that complainant would receive better training in another
office that already had a loan approving authority and less trainees.
The record also reveals that when complainant was detailed to the Marion
County office, there appeared to be an ongoing problem with the accuracy
of the travel vouchers which complainant was required to submit for
reimbursement. Consequently, complainant's travel vouchers had to be
returned to complainant for corrections thereby delaying complainant's
reimbursement. The record also reveals that complainant was removed from
a compressed work schedule he had been mistakenly approved for because
he was a trainee. Trainees were not allowed to be on an alternate
work schedule. Moreover, the agency asserted and the record showed
that on March 6, 1998, the compressed work schedule was canceled for
all employees.
Complainant filed a formal EEO complaint on May 27, 1998, alleging that
the agency had discriminated against him on the bases of race (Black)
and reprisal for prior EEO activity when:
(1) on February 2, 1998, complainant was reassigned from the Amite
County office to the Marion County office;
(2) in February 1998, the District Director scrutinized his travel
vouchers, accused him of filing a false claim,<1> and did not process
complainant's travel vouchers in a timely manner; and
(3) in March 1998, complainant was removed from a compressed work
schedule.
At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant received a copy
of the investigative report and requested a hearing before an EEOC
Administrative Judge (AJ). The AJ issued a decision without a hearing,
finding no discrimination.
The AJ concluded that complainant failed to establish a prima facie
case on any of the bases alleged. Specifically, the AJ found that
complainant failed to demonstrate that similarly situated employees not
in complainant's protected classes were treated differently under similar
circumstances. Moreover with regard to reprisal, the AJ found that
approximately eight months elapsed between the date of complainant's
last EEO activity to the time of the events which gave rise to the
instant claims. Furthermore, the AJ was not persuaded that complainant
was subjected to an adverse employment action under the facts developed in
this complaint. The agency's final order implemented the AJ's decision.
The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a
hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material
fact. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after the
summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment
is appropriate where a court determines that, given the substantive
legal and evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exists
no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment,
a court's function is not to weigh the evidence but rather to determine
whether there are genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249. The evidence
of the non-moving party must be believed at the summary judgment stage
and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party's
favor. Id. at 255. An issue of fact is "genuine" if the evidence is
such that a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving
party. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital
Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is "material"
if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case. If a case can
only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence, summary judgment is
not appropriate. In the context of an administrative proceeding, an AJ
may properly consider summary judgment only upon a determination that
the record has been adequately developed for summary disposition.
Here, the AJ correctly determined that there was no genuine issue of
material fact in dispute regarding whether complainant was subjected
to discrimination or retaliation. In so finding, we note that even
assuming complainant established a prima facie case of discrimination
on the alleged bases, he failed to show pretext as to the agency's
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. We note that
complainant raises the same arguments to show pretext on appeal that
he previously raised before the AJ. Namely, with regard to claim (1)
complainant claimed that the affidavit of Trainee-2 stated that after
complainant was detailed to the Marion County office, she never received
training by the Officer or anyone else at the Amite County office.
We find that this does not discredit the agency's non-discriminatory
reason for detailing complainant. Record evidence, specifically, the
testimony of the Officer, establishes that complainant, as opposed
to any other trainee, was detailed because complainant voiced his
concern about the Officer being out of the office for significant
periods of time and not providing him training. Therefore, management
decided to detail complainant to an office without any trainees which
addresses complainant's question as to why he was detailed as opposed to
another trainee. There is persuasive evidence that complainant's detail
effectuated the purpose of facilitating complainant's preparation for
the examination. Contrary to complainant's argument with regard to claim
(2), the AJ found and the record supports that the evidence of record
failed to show that the District Director approved the travel vouchers
of similarly-situated people outside of complainant's protected group
that had deficiencies. The AJ also noted that neither complainant's
travel vouchers, the statement that complainant filed a false claim,
or the delay in processing his travel vouchers constituted an adverse
employment action in this case. With regard to claim (3), the record
shows complainant, a trainee, was not allowed to be on an alternate work
schedule. And subsequently, compressed work schedules were canceled for
all employees.
In addition, we find complainant's contention that the AJ failed to
address complainant's claim that he was improperly trained for the ACOT
examination and that this training was interrupted when he was detailed
to be without merit. First, we find that complainant is reframing the same
issue raised in claim (1) as it is, in essence, the same claim. Moreover,
the record contradicts complainant's argument that he was improperly
trained for the examination when the reason he was transferred to a
different County office was in response to his original concern that he
would not receive the proper attention, i.e., training, and was therefore
detailed to an office with less trainees with the specific purpose of
providing complainant with proper training for the examination. Moreover,
credible evidence in the record, specifically the affidavit of the Manager
in Marion County, shows that complainant never came to him with questions
or asked for guidance in studying for the examination. The Manager stated
that when he offered his assistance and asked complainant if he needed
any help, complainant would always tell him everything was okay. The
Manager stated he never heard anything from complainant until he failed
the examination at which point complainant contacted the agency's state
office and claimed that he had not been trained for the examination.
Accordingly, the Commission finds that the grant of summary judgment
was appropriate, as no genuine dispute of material fact exists.<2> We
find that the AJ's decision properly summarized the relevant facts and
referenced the appropriate regulations, policies, and laws. Further,
construing the evidence to be most favorable to complainant, we note
that complainant failed to present evidence that any of the agency's
actions were motivated by discriminatory animus toward complainant's
protected classes. We therefore AFFIRM the agency's final decision.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0701)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed
with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar
days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of
receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29
C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for
29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests
and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,
Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the
request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by
mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.
See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include
proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States
District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you
receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as
the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head
or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and
official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your
case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,
and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you
file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which
to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action must be
filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right
to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
____06-25-02______________
Date
1 Complainant is essentially arguing that the District Director's
assertion that complainant's travel vouchers were inaccurate upon
submission for reimbursement was essentially an accusation of filing a
false claim.
2Complainant also raises arguments related to his subsequent removal,
which is not raised in the complaint at issue herein.