07A30118
04-21-2004
R. Bruce Williams, Complainant, v. Anthony J. Principi, Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency.
R. Bruce Williams v. Department of Veterans Affairs
07A30118
April 21, 2004
.
R. Bruce Williams,
Complainant,
v.
Anthony J. Principi,
Secretary,
Department of Veterans Affairs,
Agency.
Appeal No. 07A30118
Agency No. 99-0228
Hearing No. 160-99-8875X
DECISION
Following its July 17, 2003 final order, the agency filed a timely
appeal which the Commission accepts pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405.
On appeal, the agency requests that the Commission affirm its rejection of
an EEOC Administrative Judge's (AJ) finding that the agency discriminated
against complainant on the basis of disability (rheumatoid arthritis).
The agency also requests that the Commission affirm its rejection of,
among other things, the AJ's order to offer complainant an equivalent
position to the one he was denied. For the following reasons, the
Commission REVERSES the agency's final order.
Background
Complainant, a physician seeking to apply for the position of Part-Time
Internist at the agency's Primary Care Outpatient Clinic in Hyannis,
Massachusetts, was given a telephone interview with the selecting official
(SO: no known disability) on September 2, 1998. When he was not selected
for the position, complainant filed a formal EEO complaint with the agency
on November 19, 1998, alleging that the agency had discriminated against
him on the bases of disability and reprisal for prior EEO activity.
At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was provided a copy
of the investigative report and requested a hearing before an AJ.
Following a hearing, the AJ found that complainant established a prima
facie case of disability discrimination but not of reprisal. The AJ
further found that the agency articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reasons for its actions but concluded that it was more likely than not
that the reasons provided by the agency were a pretext for discrimination.
In reaching this conclusion, the AJ found that SO's testimony was not
credible. The AJ noted that SO's statements about the requirements of
the position changed depending on which candidates he was talking about,
his explanations concerning his reasoning during the selection process
were contradictory, and he was unable to provide any justification for
his contention that complainant's work style would be too expensive and
too slow. Finally, the AJ found, SO ended up selecting a candidate
who had less experience than complainant, and who did not even meet
certain requirements for the position previously articulated by SO.
The AJ ordered relief to include offering complainant a position at
the same grade, pay, and benefits scale he would have enjoyed had he
been selected for the position, backpay and interest, attorney's fees
in the amount of $34,237.00, and non-pecuniary compensatory damages in
the amount of $15,000.00.
The agency's final order rejected the AJ's decision. On appeal, the
agency argues that the AJ erred by finding complainant established a prima
facie of discrimination. The agency reveals that it recently discovered
that complainant is not a United States citizen. As such, the agency
argues, he is not eligible for the Part Time Intern position for which he
applied, pursuant to 38 USC � 7402(c). Because being qualified for the
position applied for is an essential element of a prima facie case of
nonselection, the agency argues, complainant did not establish a prima
facie case and therefore cannot establish discrimination. Furthermore,
the agency argues, the AJ's order to make complainant an offer for the
position is unlawful, given his citizenship, and the award of any and
all relief is similarly unlawful. The agency does not argue that the AJ
erred based on any of the facts that were before the AJ at the time of the
hearing, nor does the agency contest the AJ's conclusions of law based on
such facts. Regarding the award of non-pecuniary compensatory damages,
the agency argues that the amount awarded is excessive considering the
harm suffered by complainant, and the fact that he did not present medical
evidence of harm. Regarding backpay, the agency argues that the date
from which to calculate backpay should be no earlier than eight weeks
after the date the discrimination allegedly occurred.
Complainant on appeal argues that the agency's argument that
complainant's status as a non-citizen precludes him from holding
the position is incorrect. Complainant argues that the statute in
question allows for non-citizens to be offered physician positions under
certain circumstances and that despite his citizenship, complainant
had previously been employed as a physician by the agency from January
1991 to January 1994. Regarding the backpay award, complainant argues
that backpay should not be calculated based on the Part-Time Internist
position that complainant sought. Instead, complainant maintains,
packpay should be calculated on the basis of a full-time position,
because the agency ultimately converted the position to a full-time
position when it selected the selectee (S: no disability), and hence
would also have done so had it selected complainant. Regarding the
non-pecuniary damages award, complainant argues that the amount awarded
was insufficient to compensate him for his injuries.
Finally, regarding attorney's fees, complainant argues that he is entitled
to the full amount claimed because only a minimal amount of work involved
establishing a prima facie case of reprisal, while the majority of
the work involved disproving the agency's articulated reason for its
action, work which applied equally to the reprisal claim as it did to
the disability claim. In addition, complainant argues that the AJ's
decision to award attorney's fees based on the hourly rate in effect at
the time of the attorney's representation, instead of the higher rate
in effect at the time of the AJ's decision, was in error.
Analysis and Findings
Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a), all post-hearing factual findings by
an AJ will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence in the record.
Substantial evidence is defined as �such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.� Universal
Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951)
(citation omitted). A finding regarding whether or not discriminatory
intent existed is a factual finding. See Pullman-Standard Co. v. Swint,
456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982). An AJ's conclusions of law are subject to a
de novo standard of review, whether or not a hearing was held.
After a careful review of the record, we discern no basis to disturb
the AJ's finding of discrimination. The findings of fact are supported
by substantial evidence, and the AJ correctly applied the appropriate
regulations, policies, and laws. We note that, aside from the argument
that complainant was not qualified for the position based on his status
as a non-citizen, the agency does not otherwise dispute the AJ's findings
of fact or conclusions of law. Regarding complainant's citizenship,
we find that this argument does not, as the agency asserts, go to
whether complainant established a prima facie case of discrimination.
Rather, we find that the evidence of complainant's citizenship is
after-acquired evidence which does not bar the agency's liability for
having engaged in unlawfully discriminatory conduct. See McKennon
v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 513 U.S. 352 (1995) (holding that
an employer who discriminates when discharging an employee is liable
even if the employer subsequently discovers evidence of wrongdoing that
would have led to the employee's termination on legitimate grounds); see
also EEOC Enforcement Guidance on After-acquired evidence and McKennon
v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co. (McKennon Guidance) (December 14,
1995)(interpreting McKennon and noting that even where the agency proves
that it would have taken the same or more harsh adverse action had it
known of the employee misconduct, complainant will still be entitled to
relief, but that relief may be subject to some limitations).
Here, after failing to select complainant for the position of Part-Time
Internist, and, indeed, after the AJ determined that this failure was
motivated by complainant's disability, the agency acquired evidence which
established that complainant was not a United States citizen. The agency
asserts that complainant was therefore not minimally qualified for the
position and that his complaint should be dismissed. The Supreme Court
has held, however, that after-acquired evidence such as this does not
defeat an employer's liability for violating anti-discrimination laws.
See McKennon, supra. The Court found that in such cases the violation
that actually prompted the adverse action could not be ignored. Id.
Instead, the Court concluded that after-acquired evidence bears upon
the remedy afforded to the complainant. Id. Accordingly, we find that
the AJ's determination that complainant was subjected to disability
discrimination when he was not selected for the Part-Time Internist
position is supported by substantial evidence. We next turn to the
issue of the relief due complainant.
Equitable Relief
The agency argues on appeal that the AJ erred in ordering entitlement
to backpay and that complainant be offered the position. The agency
contends that, because he is a non-citizen, complainant is not legally
entitled to the position or to backpay. We note that the Court in
McKennon stated that where an employer seeks to rely upon after-acquired
evidence to limit the amount of damages, it must first establish that
the action it took would have been justified on those grounds alone had
the employer known of the evidence at the time of the adverse action.
See McKennon, supra; see also McKennon Guidance, fn. 3 (in a case alleging
discriminatory refusal to hire, the pertinent inquiry is whether the
employer would have lawfully rejected the applicant had it been aware
of the after-discovered evidence at the time of hire). Applying those
principles to the case at hand, we note initially that complainant does
not deny the agency's contention that he is not a United States citizen.
Instead, complainant argues, there is no blanket preclusion against
hiring non-citizens as physicians, that 38 USC � 7402 provides that the
agency can hire non-citizen physicians "under certain circumstances,"
and that complainant had previously been employed as a physician by the
agency from January 1991 to January 1994.
We note that, under 38 USC �7407(a), exceptions to the citizenship
requirement can be made where the Under Secretary for Health determines
that it is not possible to recruit qualified United States citizens for
the position. Given that two of the physicians who were offered the
position turned it down and the agency was unable to fill the position
for a full year, as well as the fact that complainant had worked for
the agency once before, we find that the agency has not established
that the Under Secretary for Health would not have made an exception
to the citizenship requirement in complainant's case. Therefore, the
agency has not established that its action in not selecting complainant
would have been justified based on legitimate reasons and thus may not
rely on the after-acquired evidence to limit the amount of damages.
See McKennon Guidance. Accordingly, we find no basis to disturb the
AJ's finding that complainant is entitled to be placed in the position,
as well as being entitled to backpay.
The AJ ordered the agency to calculate backpay from September 8, 1998.
The agency argues, based on an affidavit provided by the agency Human
Resources Chief (HRC: disability status unknown), that even assuming
complainant had been selected, the earliest he would have been able to
commence employment would have been eight weeks from September 8, 1998
due to various pre-employment processing requirements. See Agency's
Rebuttal to Complainant's Damages Brief before the AJ, (Rebuttal)
Exhibit 1. A review of the record provides no justification for the
AJ's conclusion that employment would have begun on September 8 since by
that time complainant, having submitted his resume and having enjoyed
a highly promising telephone interview with SO, was still waiting
to receive the application package. In fact it was on that date that
complainant contacted SO and was informed that he would not be selected.
We note that while in most cases of after-acquired evidence such as this,
backpay is generally calculated from the date of the unlawful adverse
action, "unusual equitable circumstances that affect the legitimate
interests of either party may alter the calculation in particular cases."
McKennon Guidance. Given the circumstances of this case, we find that
complainant's entitlement to backpay begins the first full pay-period
after November 3, 1998, which is the earliest date complainant could
have been hired, according to HRC. See Rebuttal, Exhibit 1.
On appeal, complainant argues that he is entitled to backpay at the
full-time rate, and placement in a full-time position, notwithstanding
the fact that the position in question was a part-time position.
Complainant points out that the position in question was changed
to a full-time position and that S was hired on a full-time basis.
Complainant argues that he would have gladly accepted a full-time position
had it been available at the time of the offer, and that absent the
agency's discrimination, he would have benefitted from the eventual
change to a full-time position once he began working for the agency.
SO testified that the workload at the clinic justified the change to
a full-time position, and that S was hired on a full-time basis, see
Hearing Transcript (HT), pp. 225-6. These statements were confirmed
by the agency's Chief of Managed Care, see Report of Investigation
(ROI) Affidavit B-3, p. 14, as well as by HRC. See HT, pp. 135-6.
Given the above, we find that the preponderance of the evidence shows
that the position complainant would have held, absent the agency's
discrimination, would eventually have been converted to a full-time
position. We note, however, that S was not selected for the full-time
position until September 1, 1999. See Rebuttal, Exhibit 2. We therefore
find that complainant is only entitled to backpay at the full-time rate
from September 1, 1999. Prior to that date, complainant is entitled to
backpay at the part-time rate.<1> Regarding being placed in a position,
we find that, for the reasons provided above, complainant is entitled
to the full-time position or a substantially equivalent position.
Non-Pecuniary Compensatory Damages
The AJ awarded complainant non-pecuniary compensatory damages in the
amount of $15,000.00. The AJ indicated that this award took into
account the fact that complainant and his wife attributed some of his
emotional harm to an earlier, unrelated claim. The agency maintains
that complainant's ineligibility for the Part-Time Internist position
precludes an award of compensatory damages, but presents no new argument
on appeal. Regarding complainant's eligibility for such damages, we note
that the agency's argument is without merit. See McKennon Guidance.
In considering the appropriate award in this case, we find that the
evidence supports the AJ's award of $15,000.00 to compensate complainant
for his pain and suffering. See Hull v. Department of Veterans Affairs,
EEOC Appeal No. 01951441 (September 18, 1998); Bever v. Department of
Agriculture, EEOC Appeal No. 01953949 (October 31, 1996). This amount
takes into account the severity and the likely duration of the harm done
to complainant by the agency's action. The Commission further notes
that this amount meets the goals of not being motivated by passion
or prejudice, not being "monstrously excessive" standing alone, and
being consistent with the amounts awarded in similar cases. See See
Ward-Jenkins v. Department of the Interior, EEOC Appeal No. 01961483
(March 4, 1999) (citing Cygnar v. City of Chicago, 865 F. 2d 827, 848
(7th Cir. 1989)); US EEOC v. AIC Security Investigations, Ltd., 823
F.Supp. 573, 574 (N.D. Ill 1993). We therefore discern no basis to
disturb the AJ's decision in this regard.
Attorney's Fees
Complainant requested $56,025.00 in attorney's fees, based on 186.75
hours at an hourly fee of $300.00. The AJ reduced this amount and awarded
$34,237.00 in attorney's fees. The AJ found that the hourly rate was
reasonable, but noted that documentation supporting the fee petition
indicated that at the time of his representation, complainant's attorney's
billing rate was $275.00 per hour. The AJ therefore calculated the total
fees based on this lower rate. The AJ also applied an across-the-board
reduction of 25 percent on the grounds that complainant did not prevail on
the reprisal claim. On appeal, complainant argues that he is entitled to
the full amount claimed because only a minimal amount of work involved
establishing a prima facie case of reprisal, while the majority of
the work involved disproving the agency's articulated reason for its
action, work which applied equally to the reprisal claim as it did to
the disability claim. Complainant further argues that fees should be
awarded based on the rate in effect at the time of the AJ's decision,
not those in effect at the time services were provided.
Regarding the across-the-board reduction, we find that since the claims
involved the same management official, the same nonselection, and the same
articulated reason for the nonselection, an across-the-board reduction is
not warranted. As to the hourly rate, we find that, absent any evidence
of undue delay on the part of the agency, complainant is entitled to a
fee award calculated at the $275.00 hourly rate in effect at the time
attorney's fees were rendered, not the higher rate in effect at the time
of the AJ's decision.
In its July 15, 2003 Memorandum to the File, the agency maintains that
it was first notified of complainant's attorney's representation on
October 16, 1998 and argues that, of the 3.25 hours of work performed
prior to that date, 1.25 hours should be deducted from the total for
work performed prior to notice of representation, pursuant to Stauner
v. Department of Agriculture, EEOC Appeal No. 01890678 (April 13, 1989).
A review of the record, however, reveals that the agency was notified of
complainant's attorney's representation on October 15, 1998. The letter
of representation is time-stamped as being received by the agency on that
date, and more pertinently, complainant and his attorney held a telephone
conference with the agency's EEO counselor on that date. Given the fact
that we are affirming the AJ's finding of discrimination, complainant's
attorney is entitled to fees incurred during the pre-complaint process.
29 C.F.R 1614 �501(e)(1)(iv). However, under Stauner, complainant is only
entitled to reimbursement for 2 hours prior to notice of representation.
Therefore, of the 2.5 hours of work performed prior to October 15, 1998,
we find it appropriate to reduce the attorney's fee award by 0.5 hours,
or $137.50. Accordingly, we find complainant is entitled to $51,218.75
in attorney's fees.
Therefore, after a careful review of the record, including arguments and
evidence not specifically discussed in this decision, the Commission
reverses the agency's final order. The agency is directed to take
corrective action in accordance with this decision and the Order below.
ORDER (D0403)
The agency is ordered to take the following remedial action:
Within sixty (60) days of this decision becoming final, the agency
shall determine the appropriate amount of backpay due complainant,
plus interest and benefits. The amount due shall be subject to 5 C.F.R
� 550.805. Backpay shall be calculated at the part-time rate from the
first day of the full pay-period after November 3, 1998 to August 31,
1999, and at the full-time rate from September 1, 1999. Complainant
shall cooperate with the agency by providing any information necessary
to calculate backpay.
Within sixty (60) days of this decision becoming final, the agency
shall offer to complainant placement in the position of Internist at the
Hyannis, Massachusetts VA Clinic, or a substantially equivalent position.
Complainant shall have fifteen (15) days from receipt of the offer to
decide whether to accept or decline the offer. Failure to accept the
offer within the 15-day period shall be considered a declination of
the offer, unless complainant can show that circumstances beyond his
control prevented a response within the time limit. If the offer is
accepted, appointment shall be retroactive to the first day of the full
pay period after November 3, 1998, the date complainant would have been
hired absent the discrimination. The appointment will take into account
the fact that complainant would have been in a Part-Time position from
November 1998 until August 31, 1999.
Within forty five (45) days of this decision becoming final the
agency shall pay complainant the amount of $15,000.00 in non-pecuniary
compensatory damages.
Within forty five (45) days of this decision becoming final, the agency
shall pay complainant attorney's fees in the amount of $51,218.75.
The agency shall train the Selecting Official regarding his
responsibilities under the Rehabilitation Act. The Agency shall further
consider taking disciplinary action against the Selecting Official.
The agency shall report its decision. If the agency decides to take
disciplinary action, it shall identify the action taken. If the agency
decides not to take disciplinary action, it shall set forth the reason(s)
for its decision not to impose discipline.
If there is a dispute regarding the exact amount of backpay and/or
benefits, the agency shall issue a check to the complainant for the
undisputed amount within sixty (60) calendar days of the date the
agency determines the amount it believes to be due. The complainant
may petition for enforcement or clarification of the amount in dispute.
The petition for clarification or enforcement must be filed with the
Compliance Officer, at the address referenced in the statement entitled
"Implementation of the Commission's Decision."
The agency is further directed to submit a report of compliance, as
provided in the statement entitled "Implementation of the Commission's
Decision." The report shall include supporting documentation of the
agency's calculation of backpay and other benefits due complainant,
including evidence that the corrective action has been implemented.
POSTING ORDER (G0900)
The agency is ordered to post at its Primary Care Outpatient Clinic
in Hyannis, Massachusetts, facility copies of the attached notice.
Copies of the notice, after being signed by the agency's duly authorized
representative, shall be posted by the agency within thirty (30) calendar
days of the date this decision becomes final, and shall remain posted
for sixty (60) consecutive days, in conspicuous places, including all
places where notices to employees are customarily posted. The agency
shall take reasonable steps to ensure that said notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material. The original signed notice
is to be submitted to the Compliance Officer at the address cited in
the paragraph entitled "Implementation of the Commission's Decision,"
within ten (10) calendar days of the expiration of the posting period.
ATTORNEY'S FEES (H0900)
If complainant has been represented by an attorney (as defined by
29 C.F.R. � 1614.501(e)(1)(iii)), he/she is entitled to an award of
reasonable attorney's fees incurred in the processing of the complaint.
29 C.F.R. � 1614.501(e). The award of attorney's fees shall be paid
by the agency. The attorney shall submit a verified statement of fees
to the agency -- not to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
Office of Federal Operations -- within thirty (30) calendar days of this
decision becoming final. The agency shall then process the claim for
attorney's fees in accordance with 29 C.F.R. � 1614.501.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0501)
Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory.
The agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30)
calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The
report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,
Washington, D.C. 20036. The agency's report must contain supporting
documentation, and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to
the complainant. If the agency does not comply with the Commission's
order, the complainant may petition the Commission for enforcement
of the order. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(a). The complainant also has the
right to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's
order prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement.
See 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407, 1614.408, and 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(g).
Alternatively, the complainant has the right to file a civil action on
the underlying complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled
"Right to File A Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407 and 1614.408.
A civil action for enforcement or a civil action on the underlying
complaint is subject to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c)
(1994 & Supp. IV 1999). If the complainant files a civil action, the
administrative processing of the complaint, including any petition for
enforcement, will be terminated. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.409.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0701)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed
with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar
days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of
receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29
C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for
29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests
and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,
Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the
request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by
mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.
See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include
proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court
appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you
to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other security.
See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �
2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the
request is within the
sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not
extend your time in which to file a civil action. Both the request and
the civil action must be filed within the time limits as stated in the
paragraph above ("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
April 21, 2004
__________________
Date
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
An Agency of the United States Government
This Notice is posted pursuant to an Order by the United States Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission dated which found that a
violation of Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,
29 U.S.C. � 791 (Rehabilitation Act) has occurred at this facility.
Federal law requires that there be no discrimination against any employee
or applicant for employment because of the person's RACE, COLOR, RELIGION,
SEX, NATIONAL ORIGIN, AGE, or DISABILITY with respect to hiring, firing,
promotion, compensation, or other terms, conditions or privileges of
employment. The Primary Care Outpatient Clinic, Hyannis, Massachusetts
confirms its commitment to comply with these statutory provisions.
The Primary Care Outpatient Clinic, Hyannis, Massachusetts supports
and will comply with such Federal law and will not take action against
individuals because they have exercised their rights under law.
The Primary Care Outpatient Clinic in Hyannis, Massachusetts has been
found to have discriminated against an applicant based on disability
when he was not selected for a position with the agency. The Primary
Care Outpatient Clinic in Hyannis, Massachusetts has been ordered to
provide backpay, reinstatement in the position, compensatory damages,
and attorney's fees to the affected employee and provide training
regarding discrimination under Title VII and the Rehabilitation Act to
the appropriate manager. The Primary Care Outpatient Clinic in Hyannis,
Massachusetts will ensure that officials responsible for personnel
decisions and terms and conditions of employment will abide by the
requirements of all Federal equal employment opportunity laws.
The Primary Care Outpatient Clinic in Hyannis, Massachusetts will not
in any manner restrain, interfere, coerce, or retaliate against any
individual who exercises his or her right to oppose practices made
unlawful by, or who participates in proceedings pursuant to, Federal
equal employment opportunity law.
_______________________________
Date Posted: ____________________
Posting Expires: ________________
29 C.F.R. Part 16141We note that the actual amount of back pay due is
subject to 5 C.F.R � 550.805.