QUALCOMM Incorporated

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Apr 23, 2020

15202207 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Apr. 23, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/202,207 07/05/2016 Shrinivas KUDEKAR 160855US 9216
15055 7590 04/23/2020
Patterson + Sheridan, L.L.P.
Qualcomm
24 Greenway Plaza, Suite 1600
Houston, TX 77046
EXAMINER
NGUYEN, THIEN DANG
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2111
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
04/23/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
PAIR_eOfficeAction@pattersonsheridan.com
ocpat_uspto@qualcomm.com
qualcomm@pattersonsheridan.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte SHRINIVAS KUDEKAR, SE YONG PARK,
ALEXANDROS MANOLAKOS, KRISHNA KIRAN MUKKAVILLI,
VINCENT LONCKE, JOSEPH BINAMIRA SORIAGA, JING JIANG, and
THOMAS JOSEPH RICHARDSON
Appeal 2019-002222
Application 15/202,207
Technology Center 2100
Before JOHN P. PINKERTON, NABEEL U. KHAN, and JOYCE CRAIG,
Administrative Patent Judges.
CRAIG, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1, 3–7, 9–18, 21, 25–27, 29–38, and
41–44. See Final Act. 1. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). An
oral hearing was held on April 14, 2020. We affirm.

1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as QUALCOMM
Incorporated. Appeal Br. 3.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to puncturing of structured low density parity
check (LDPC) codes. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the
claimed subject matter:
1. A method for wirelessly transmitting data in a accordance
with a radio technology, comprising:
encoding a set of information bits based on a low density
parity check (LDPC) code to produce a code word, the LDPC
code defined by a matrix having a first number of variable nodes
and a second number of check nodes;
puncturing the code word to produce a punctured code
word, wherein the puncturing is performed according to a first
puncturing pattern designed to puncture bits corresponding to at
least one variable node at a start of the code word having a
highest degree of connectivity to the check nodes and to puncture
a number of bits at an end of the code word; and
transmitting the punctured code word in accordance with
the radio technology across a wireless channel.
REJECTION
Claims 1, 3–7, 9–18, 21, 25–27, 29–38, and 41–44 stand rejected
under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because the claimed invention is directed to patent-
ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 9–11.
ANALYSIS
Appellant argues that the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 under
35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to patent-ineligible subject matter is in error. To
the extent Appellant has not advanced separate, substantive arguments for
particular claims, or other issues, such arguments are waived. 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv). Appellant argues claims 1, 3–7, 9–18, 21, 25–27, 29–38,
and 41–44 as a group. Appeal Br. 10, 20. Given our discretion under
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37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv), we decide the § 101 rejection of claims 1, 3–7,
9–18, 21, 25–27, 29–38, and 41–44 based on representative claim 1.
Principles of Law
“Whether a claim is drawn to patent-eligible subject matter is an issue
of law that we review de novo.” SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 601
F.3d 1319, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the U.S. Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to
include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573
U.S. 208, 216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Court’s two-part framework, described in Mayo and Alice.
Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework,
we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573
U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
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mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making waterproof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not
become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula.”
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We view respondents’ claims as
nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an
attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having said that, the Court also
indicated that a claim “seeking patent protection for that formula in the
abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, and this
principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the
formula to a particular technological environment.” Id. (citing Benson and
Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that an application of a
law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may
well be deserving of patent protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted).
“A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to
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ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo,
566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[]
fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
In January 2019, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
published revised guidance on the application of § 101. 2019 Revised Patent
Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019)
(“2019 Revised Guidance”).2 “All USPTO personnel are, as a matter of
internal agency management, expected to follow the guidance.” Id. at 51; see
also October 2019 Update at 1.
Under the 2019 Revised Guidance and the October 2019 Update, we
first look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract
ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing
human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental
processes) (“Step 2A, Prong One”); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th ed.
Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018)) (“Step 2A, Prong Two”).3

2 In response to received public comments, the Office issued further
guidance on October 17, 2019, clarifying the 2019 Revised Guidance.
USPTO, October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (the “October
2019 Update”) (available at
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019_update.p
df).
3 This evaluation is performed by (a) identifying whether there are any
additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception, and
(b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to
determine whether the claim as a whole integrates the exception into a
practical application. See 2019 Revised Guidance - Section III(A)(2), 84
Fed. Reg. 54–55.
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2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55.
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look, under
Step 2B, to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not
“well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of
generality, to the judicial exception.
2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–56.
Step 1
Claim 1, as a method claim, falls within the process category of
§ 101. See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 53–54 (citing MPEP
§§ 2106.03, 2106.06).
Step 2A(i): Does the Claim Recite a Judicial Exception?
In the rejection, the Examiner determined that claim 1 is directed to an
abstract idea, namely encoding data. See Final Act. 9. The Examiner
identified the “encoding” and “puncturing” steps as part of the recited
abstract idea. Id.
Figures 4 and 4a of Appellant’s Specification show graphical and
matrix representations of an exemplary LDPC code. For example, Figure 4
shows bipartite graph 400 representing exemplary LDPC code. Bipartite
graph 400 includes a set of 5 variable nodes 410 (represented by circles)
connected to 4 check nodes 420 (represented by squares). Edges in graph
400 connect variable nodes 410 to check nodes 420 (represented by the lines
connecting variable nodes 410 to check nodes 420). Spec. ¶ 72. The degree
of a node refers to the number of edges connected to that node. Id. ¶ 75.
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Puncturing is the act of removing bits from a code word to yield a
shorter code word. Spec. ¶ 84. Specifically, for a matrix representation of an
LDPC code, including bits to be punctured, where the variable node to be
punctured has a degree of one, puncturing the variable node removes the
associated bit from the code and effectively removes its single neighboring
check node from the graph. As a result, the number of check nodes in the
graph is reduced by one. Id.
Consistent with Appellant’s description of the claims, we find that the
“encoding” and “puncturing” limitations, as recited in claim 1, describe
concepts that can be performed in the human mind or practicably with pen
and paper, and that fall into the mental process category of abstract ideas.
See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. The 2019 Revised
Guidance explains that “mental processes” include acts that people can
perform in their minds or using pen and paper, even if the claim recites that
a generic computer component performs the acts. See id. at 52 n.14 (“If a
claim, under its broadest reasonable interpretation, covers performance in
the mind but for the recitation of generic computer components, then it is
still in the mental processes category unless the claim cannot practically be
performed in the mind.”); see also Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec
Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[W]ith the exception of
generic computer-implemented steps, there is nothing in the claims
themselves that foreclose them from being performed by a human, mentally
or with pen and paper.”), quoted in 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at
52 n.14.
Appellant argues that the Examiner erred by characterizing the claims
“as merely directed to encoding/decoding leading to analysis untethered
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from the claim language.” Appeal Br. 12. Appellant further argues that “the
cited case law is insufficient because Recognicorp4 is based upon a different
set of facts and claims not like those pending here.” Id. (footnote added).
We are not persuaded that the Examiner erred. Here, claim 1 recites
no structural elements, let alone particular structures, articles, or devices that
implement the recited encoding and puncturing method. The limitation
calling for encoding a set of information bits bases on a LDPC code can be
performed entirely mentally, even by merely thinking about this encoding.
Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(noting that analyzing information by steps people go through in their minds,
or by mathematical algorithms, without more, are essentially mental
processes within the abstract idea category); Digitech Image Tech., LLC v.
Elecs. for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“Without
additional limitations, a process that employs mathematical algorithms to
manipulate existing information to generate additional information is not
patent eligible.”); Benson, 409 U.S. at 63 (holding ineligible claims
involving a mathematical algorithm and directed to converting binary-
coded-decimal (BCD) numerals into pure binary numerals for use with a
computer); accord CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d
1366, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“That purely mental processes can be
unpatentable, even when performed by a computer, was precisely the
holding of the Supreme Court in [Benson].”).
We reach this conclusion noting that it is well settled that not only is
standard encoding and decoding an abstract concept long utilized to transmit

4 RecogniCorp, LLC v. Nintendo Co., 855 F.3d 1322, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
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information, encoding and decoding can also be performed entirely
mentally. See RecogniCorp, 855 F.3d at 1326 (“Morse code, ordering food
at a fast food restaurant via a numbering system, and Paul Revere’s ‘one if
by land, two if by sea’ signaling system all exemplify encoding at one end
and decoding at the other end.”); see also Return Mail, Inc. v. U.S. Postal
Serv., 868 F.3d 1350, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting encoding and decoding
information are processes that can—and have been—performed in the
human mind).
For similar reasons, the “puncturing” step recites an abstract mental
process. As recited in claim 1, puncturing is performed according to a first
puncturing pattern designed to puncture bits corresponding to at least one
variable node at a start of the code word having a highest degree of
connectivity to the check nodes and to puncture a number of bits at an end of
the code word. Appeal Br. 21 (claim 1). Like encoding, puncturing can be
performed with the human mind or with pen and paper.
Appellant’s argument that the Examiner improperly interpreted the
claimed “puncturing” as “encoding” “in an attempt to fit these features of
Appellant’s claim to generic concepts which have been held by courts to be
abstract” (Reply Br. 5) is unavailing under the current § 101 guidance, as it
is no longer necessary to compare a claim to claims in prior cases in order to
determine whether the claim recites an abstract idea. The 2019 Revised
Guidance extracts and synthesizes key concepts identified by the courts as
abstract ideas. 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. The question in
this step of the analysis, then, is whether claim 1 recites a judicial exception,
including certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts,
certain methods of organizing human activity such as a fundamental
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economic practice, or mental processes). Id. In the Reply Brief, filed after
the effective date of the 2019 Revised Guidance, Appellant presented no
arguments directed to whether claim 1 recites mathematical concepts, certain
methods of organizing human activity, or mental processes. Accordingly,
Appellant has waived those arguments.
Therefore, given the mental steps associated with the encoding and
puncturing limitations noted above, these limitations fall squarely within the
mental processes category of the agency’s guidelines and, therefore, recite
an abstract idea. See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52.
Because we agree with the Examiner that the claim recites an abstract
idea, we proceed to Prong Two of Step 2A to determine if the idea is
integrated into a practical application, in which case the claim as a whole
would not be “directed to” merely an abstract idea.
Step 2A(ii): Judicial Exception Integrated into a Practical Application?
Because we determine that claim 1 recites a patent-ineligible concept,
we next determine whether the recited judicial exception is integrated into a
practical application of that exception by: (a) identifying whether there are
any additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception(s);
and (b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination
to determine whether they integrate the exception into a practical
application.
We use the term “additional elements” for claim features, limitations,
or steps that the claim recites beyond the identified judicial exception. See
2019 Revised Guidance at 55 n.24. In claim 1, the additional elements
include the limitation “transmitting the punctured code word in accordance
with the radio technology across a wireless channel.” We agree, however,
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with the Examiner that the additional “transmitting” element amounts to
insignificant, extra-solution activity and, therefore, does not integrate the
judicial exception into a practical application. Final Act. 10; MPEP §
2106.05(g).
Appellant argues that claim 1 is directed to improvements in computer
functionality and of wireless communication technology. Appeal Br. 13. In
particular, Appellant argues that claim 1 is directed to improvements in
processors, such as wireless transmitters and receivers in wireless
communication systems. Id. Appellant further argues that, because the
claimed puncturing allows transmission at higher code rates and, without
sacrificing code performance, the communications between the transmitter
and receiver are more efficient, which results in power savings. Id. at 14.
Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive at least because they are not
commensurate with the scope of claim 1, which does not recite modifying or
otherwise improving processors or wireless transmitters or receivers.
Moreover, the Federal Circuit has found that “merely adding computer
functionality to increase the speed or efficiency of the process does not
confer patent eligibility on an otherwise abstract idea.” Intellectual Ventures
I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1369–70 (Fed. Cir. 2015);
see also Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Erie Indemnity Co., 711 F. App’x
1012, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (unpublished) (“Though the claims purport to
accelerate the process of finding errant files and to reduce error, we have
held that speed and accuracy increases stemming from the ordinary
capabilities of a general-purpose computer ‘do[] not materially alter the
patent eligibility of the claimed subject matter.”’).
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Appellant’s claim 1 is also unlike the technology-based integrations
cited by Appellant. See Appeal Br. 13, 16. Appellant argues that, like the
claims in Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016),
the claims of the present application are directed to features that
achieve benefits over conventional systems (e.g., conventional
encoding systems, decoding systems, and puncturing systems)
and improve those systems by logical structures and processes
that provide an improvement in the performance, for example,
of the encoder, decoder, apparatus, and wireless communication
device.
Appeal Br. 16.
We disagree. In Enfish, the patent-eligible claim was directed to a
self-referential table to improve computer databases. Enfish, 822 F.3d at
1330. The disclosed technique enabled faster searching and more effective
storage of data than previous methods. Id. at 1333. The court found the
claims directed to “a specific improvement to the way computers operate,
embodied in the self-referential table” (id. at 1336), and explained that the
claims are “not simply directed to any form of storing tabular data, but
instead are specifically directed to a self-referential table for a computer
database” that functions differently than conventional databases. Id. at 1337.
Appellant further argues that the claimed puncturing step “is a new
technique for efficiently transmitting LDPC code words at higher rates
without sacrificing code performance.” Appeal Br. 19.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument. The puncturing step
recited in claim 1 is part of the abstract idea, and is not an additional
element. Moreover, the puncturing step merely reduces the size of the code
word. Spec. ¶ 84. Thus, at best, the puncturing step manipulates data, rather
than improving an encoder, decoder, apparatus, or wireless communication
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device. Moreover, the novelty of any element or steps in a process, or even
of the process itself, is of no relevance in determining whether the subject
matter of a claim falls within the § 101 categories of possibly patentable
subject matter. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188–89. Our reviewing court further
guides that “[e]ligibility and novelty are separate inquiries.” Two-Way
Media Ltd. v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC, 874 F.3d 1329, 1340 (Fed.
Cir. 2017); see also Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d
1253, 1263 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that “[e]ven assuming” that a particular
claimed feature was novel does not “avoid the problem of abstractness”).
Considering claim 1 as a whole, then, Appellant’s invention lacks a
technical solution to a technical problem like the claims in Enfish. Here, the
additional limitation(s) do not integrate the judicial exception into a practical
application. More particularly, the claims do not recite (i) an improvement to
the functionality of a computer or other technology or technical field (see
MPEP § 2106.05(a)); (ii) a “particular machine” to apply or use the judicial
exception (see MPEP § 2106.05(b)); (iii) a particular transformation of an
article to a different thing or state (see MPEP § 2106.05(c)); or (iv) any other
meaningful limitation (see MPEP § 2106.05(e)). See 2019 Revised
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55. Rather, claim 1 recites an abstract idea as
identified in Step 2A(i), supra, and none of the limitations integrates the
judicial exception into a practical application.
Therefore, because the abstract idea is not integrated into a practical
application, we conclude that the claim is directed to the judicial exception.
Step 2B — “Inventive Concept” or “Significantly More”
If the claims are directed to a patent-ineligible concept, as we
conclude above, we proceed to the “inventive concept” step. For Step 2B we
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must “look with more specificity at what the claim elements add, in order to
determine ‘whether they identify an “inventive concept” in the application of
the ineligible subject matter’ to which the claim is directed.” Affinity Labs,
838 F.3d at 1258 (quoting Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1353). We look to
see whether there are any “additional features” in the claims that constitute
an “inventive concept,” thereby rendering the claims eligible for patenting
even if they are directed to an abstract idea. Alice, 573 U.S. at 221. Those
“additional features” must be more than “well-understood, routine,
conventional activity.” Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79.
The Examiner determined that it is conventional and well-known in
the art to transmit data over a wireless channel. Final Act. 10. Indeed, courts
have recognized that receiving or transmitting data over a network, in a
manner similar to that recited in the claims, is well-known, routine, and
conventional. OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363
(Fed. Cir. 2015) (sending messages over a network); buySAFE, Inc. v.
Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (computer receives and
sends information over a network).
Appellant relies on the recited “puncturing” step in claim 1 to provide
an inventive concept. Appeal Br. 18–19.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument because the
“puncturing” step, as recited in claim 1, is part of the abstract idea and is not
an “additional feature” of the claim. Moreover, Appellant does not direct our
attention to anything in the Specification that indicates the puncturing step,
even in combination with computer components, performs anything other
than well-understood, routine, and conventional functions, such as
manipulating and transmitting data. See buySAFE, 765 F.3d at 1355 (“That a
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computer receives and sends the information over a network—with no
further specification—is not even arguably inventive”); In re TLI Commc’ns
LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 614 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (server that receives
data, extracts classification information from the received data, and stores
the digital images insufficient to add an inventive concept); Alice, 573 U.S.
at 225–26 (receiving, storing, sending information over networks
insufficient to add an inventive concept).
We conclude claim 1 does not have an inventive concept because the
claim, in essence, merely recites the identified abstract idea and a well-
understood, routine and conventional “transmitting” step.
Because the claims are directed to a judicial exception, without
significantly more, we sustain the Examiner’s § 101 rejection of independent
claim 1 and grouped claims 3–7, 9–18, 21, 25–27, 29–38, and 41–44, not
argued separately with particularity.
DECISION
We affirm the decision of the Examiner rejecting claims 1, 3–7, 9–18,
21, 25–27, 29–38, and 41–44.
DECISION SUMMARY
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 3–7, 9–
18, 21, 25–
27, 29–38,
41–44
101 Eligibility 1, 3–7, 9–
18, 21, 25–
27, 29–38,
41–44

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TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED